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For what it's worth I think 1957 is the most likely of the two options because it's in the aftermath of the Suez War.My interpretation of it is that it taught the French in general and De Gaulle in particular that the Americans would only support France when it suited them so that France had to make itself as independent as possible with as much freedom of action as possible. Hence the development of an independent SNF, leaving NATO in 1966, maximising French influence in the would be EU and developing as much military equipment as possible "in house".My interpretation is that the British in general and MacMillan also learned that Americans would only support the UK when it suited them but decided that instead of being as independent as possible they should do the opposite and co-operate with the Americans as much as possible so that the "tail would wag the dog". E.g. assigning the British SNF to NATO allowed the British to have some say over where the Americans aimed their nuclear weapons.So the British have to come to the conclusion that the "Special Relationship" means doing exactly what the USA tells the UK to do and they'd be better off trying to develop an "Entente Cordiale Marque Deux" with the French. This was partly because they thought it would be a partnership of equals. By population ratio between the USA and UK is currently about 5:1 while the French and British populations are about equal. However, a certain retired general with a big nose might have other ideas.It's also when the French start spending serious sums of money on their own SNF which means that the UK can save serious sums of money by sharing R&D costs with the French.
For what it's worth I think 1957 is the most likely of the two options because it's in the aftermath of the Suez War.
My interpretation of it is that it taught the French in general and De Gaulle in particular that the Americans would only support France when it suited them so that France had to make itself as independent as possible with as much freedom of action as possible. Hence the development of an independent SNF, leaving NATO in 1966, maximising French influence in the would be EU and developing as much military equipment as possible "in house".
My interpretation is that the British in general and MacMillan also learned that Americans would only support the UK when it suited them but decided that instead of being as independent as possible they should do the opposite and co-operate with the Americans as much as possible so that the "tail would wag the dog". E.g. assigning the British SNF to NATO allowed the British to have some say over where the Americans aimed their nuclear weapons.
So the British have to come to the conclusion that the "Special Relationship" means doing exactly what the USA tells the UK to do and they'd be better off trying to develop an "Entente Cordiale Marque Deux" with the French. This was partly because they thought it would be a partnership of equals. By population ratio between the USA and UK is currently about 5:1 while the French and British populations are about equal. However, a certain retired general with a big nose might have other ideas.
It's also when the French start spending serious sums of money on their own SNF which means that the UK can save serious sums of money by sharing R&D costs with the French.
