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http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a209811.pdf
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a239308.pdf
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a239308.pdf
[SIZE=15px said:AUSA 89: focus on firepower; some major up-and-coming programmes in the pipeline.[/SIZE]]The hottest political potato at AUSA, by far, was the US Army's planned Follow-On To Lance (FOTL).
This new nuclear missile is intended to be deployed in Europe in the early 1990s under NATO's highly controversial Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SRNF) modernization programme. It is to have a range of some 450 km, more than four times that of the present Lance it is due to replace, and approaching the lower range limit on missiles banned under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
The Follow-on To Lance is to be carried in pairs, in two launch containers mounted on conventional Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launch vehicles. As is the case with the conventional long-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS - see below), now in low-rate initial production at LTV, the containers are to be camouflaged so as to be indistinguishable from the six-pack containers for the more than 30 kilometre-range MLRS rockets already being deployed in NATO. This camouflage is designed to make the nuclear Follow-On to Lance systems difficult to recognize by anti-nuclear demonstrators and saboteurs in peacetime, as well as by Soviet conventional assets (both airborne and Spetsnaz special forces) in time of war. The Army specifications do, however, call for the FOTL to be identifiable by Soviet <<technical means of verification>> (i.e. satellites). They will, in any case, be available for inspection by visiting Soviet verification teams in peacetime, in compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty rules.
As this article went to press, the US Army was scheduled to issue Requests For Proposals (RFPs) on FOTL to industry. It plans to issue one or more development contracts in May/June, just as political campaigning for the December 1990 West German federal elections gets into full swing. If the US Army sticks to this appallingly ill-judged timing, it will guarantee an electoral firestorm over FOTL in West Germany, where the Lance replacements would have to be deployed. This will be two years earlier than NATO had agreed to re-discuss the thorny issue of its future SRNF requirements, and eventual negotiations on their reduction. Unless it changes its schedule, the US Army therefore risks having the FOTL programme killed off by anti-nuclear pressure from German politicians and public opinion, before it has even got into development.
Recognizing the political sensitivity of the Follow-on To Lance programme, at least two of the major US companies expected to bid for it had no FOTL exhibit, and refused to discuss it. Speculation that LTV would propose an extended-range version of ATACMS, and that Martin Marietta would bid a boosted variant of Assault Breaker (or a Pershing 3), could thus not be confirmed.
Boeing, on the other hand, had no such reservations. It showed a model and handed out a data sheet on its proposed FOTL design. This is based on the new SRAM T nuclear weapon Boeing is already developing for the tactical air-to-surface role from the existing SRAM II (Short-Range Attack Missile). In the ground-launched FOTL role, SRAM T would require virtually no modifications other than being fitted with two off-the-shelf, 6" diameter strap-on booster rockets.
Compared to the obsolescent Lance, Boeing claims that its FOTL design would provide not only a dramatic range increase, but also improved ground and in-flight survivability, greater accuracy, and reduced collateral damage. "Replacing the dedicated Lance force structure with multi-capable (MLRS/ATACMS/FOTL) battalions", Boeing says, "will yield a better than 5-to-1 reduction in required manpower-to-ready missiles."
According to Boeing the 2 600lb missile would, however, require a launch container 20 cm longer than the standard MLRS six-pack. For satellite verification, the launcher would simply be elevated and the end-covers removed, revealing the missiles in their containers. The missiles could also be electronically "tagged".