Effectiveness of WWII German surface raiders

[Grey Havoc]

This is a spin-off from the 'Best Battleships of WWII' thread. The first few entries in this topic are edited posts from there.

Little wonder that it was considered effective to put an R-class battleship with the tastier convoys: what happened to Bismarck would have been on the mind of the captains of all the other German capital ships - all it takes is for that old battlewagon to put a few shells in the right place and you're not going home, even if you sink her.

It certainly was, in fact the entire mission raised fundamental questions about the use of long range commerce raiders in the mechanical/radio age. Bismarck proved that even minor battle damage could critically damage a capital unit, damage that could prove fatal when that far from a friendly port. Prinz Eugen then demonstrated what Prince of Wales already had, that mechanical issues can occur without being inflicted by enemy fire, her engine issues mid Atlantic sent her home without sinking a single merchant ship. Then there is the stress that this puts on a commanding officer, those officers who actually undertook genuinely successful commerce raiding missions, Captain von Müller in Emden for example, were not just good commanders, not even great, but amongst the most outstanding of their generation.

 

[Grey Havoc]

A couple of points.

It certainly was, in fact the entire mission raised fundamental questions about the use of long range commerce raiders in the mechanical/radio age.

I'm not so sure about that.

Bismarck proved that even minor battle damage could critically damage a capital unit, damage that could prove fatal when that far from a friendly port.

The reason that Bismarck was so badly affected by what would otherwise would have been normal battle damage was the design flaw in the stern I mentioned earlier. Most capital units of that era, Allied or Axis, weren't quite that vulnerable. (Those that shared that flaw [all German vessels!] eventually got a partial fix through post-Bismarck retrofits, albeit only after Prinz Eugen proved that flaw anew the hard way!) And, if it hadn't been for enigma (helped by some poor EMCON on the part of Admiral Lütjens, who perhaps should have ignored certain standing orders), Bismarck would have had a very good chance of reaching France and relative safety, even with the damage she had substained, based on the disposition of the British forces hunting her.

Prinz Eugen then demonstrated what Prince of Wales already had, that mechanical issues can occur without being inflicted by enemy fire, her engine issues mid Atlantic sent her home without sinking a single merchant ship.

Prinz Eugen had been added to the operation as a subsitute at the last moment, despite her engines being not fully broken in yet, with predictable results.

Then there is the stress that this puts on a commanding officer, those officers who actually undertook genuinely successful commerce raiding missions, Emden for example, were not just good commanders, not even great, but amongst the most outstanding of their generation.

Very true.

 

[Grey Havoc]

IMO that German's never launched a major long range surface raid again, only short range dash and slash attacks against the Arctic convoys underscores the point.

The reason that Bismarck was so badly affected by what would otherwise would have been normal battle damage was the design flaw in the stern I mentioned earlier. Most capital units of that era, Allied or Axis, weren't quite that vulnerable. (Those that shared that flaw [all German vessels!] eventually got a partial fix through post-Bismarck retrofits, albeit only after Prinz Eugen proved that flaw anew the hard way!) And, if it hadn't been for enigma (helped by some poor EMCON on the part of Admiral Lütjens, who perhaps should have ignored certain standing orders), Bismarck would have had a very good chance of reaching France and relative safety, even with the damage she had substained, based on the disposition of the British forces hunting her.

Prinz Eugen had been added to the operation as a subsitute at the last moment, despite her engines being not fully broken in yet, with predictable results.

The individuality of the issues does not explain away the generality, all hips have potential vulnerable points and in Bismarck, if it had not been the rudder it could have been something else, a lucky destroyer or submarine torpedo hit (as happened to Prinz Eugen Scharnhorst and Gneisnau at various points in the war), a lucky shell from Hood or PoW taking out the main fire control apparatus as Rodney achieved in the final sinking or Renown achieved against Gneisnau etc. And mechanical problems can crop up at any point. Then there is the reliance on support ships for such heavy formations, 7 out of the 9 dispatched for the Bismarck mission were rounded up and sunk in just two weeks, something else that would have made the forces life very difficult.

 

[Grey Havoc]

IMO that German's never launched a major long range surface raid again, only short range dash and slash attacks against the Arctic convoys underscores the point.

I would think that was more of a function of limited resources in terms of surface ships (both combatatants and support vessels), especially after the Eastern Front opened up, rather than a flaw in the general concept of surface raiders. Remember, WWII began as something of a surprise to the Germans, with their surface fleet still in the early stages of it's planned buildup. They quite literally never had enough, especially after the Norwegian campaign. The fact that they, for the most part, didn't really get the priority they needed didn't help matters. And after 1943, Hitler and the Kreigsmarine thought they could achieve the same goals with U-Boats as their sole primary weapon. That proved to be optimistic.

And even without sortieing in force, the remaining surface capital ships did play valuable roles up until Hitler effectively discarded them and the rest of the surface fleet. Remember that Tirpitz alone was able to tie down a ridiculous amount of British combat power (and intel resources) just by existing as a 'Fleet in Being' while staying in port for much of the war! Not to mention Operation Cerberus, which, although more of a 'fighting withdrawal' rather than a engagement, still showed what was possible, even on what was literally the enemy's front doorstep.

The individuality of the issues does not explain away the generality, all hips have potential vulnerable points and in Bismarck, if it had not been the rudder it could have been something else, a lucky destroyer or submarine torpedo hit (as happened to Prinz Eugen Scharnhorst and Gneisnau at various points in the war), a lucky shell from Hood or PoW taking out the main fire control apparatus as Rodney achieved in the final sinking or Renown achieved against Gneisnau etc.

Vulnerability to gremlins and plain old bad luck applies to the other side too.

Then there is the reliance on support ships for such heavy formations, 7 out of the 9 dispatched for the Bismarck mission were rounded up and sunk in just two weeks, something else that would have made the forces life very difficult.

A mixture of bad luck and arguably faulty planning. By the way, was it just the one 'milch cow' U-Boat that was lost during this time, or two, do you know?

 

[Grey Havoc]

I would think that was more of a function of limited resources in terms of surface ships (both combatatants and support vessels), especially after the Eastern Front opened up, rather than a flaw in the general concept of surface raiders. Remember, WWII began as something of a surprise to the Germans, with their surface fleet still in the early stages of it's planned buildup. They quite literally never had enough, especially after the Norwegian campaign. The fact that they, for the most part, didn't really get the priority they needed didn't help matters. And after 1943, Hitler and the Kreigsmarine thought they could achieve the same goals with U-Boats as their sole primary weapon. That proved to be optimistic.

And even without sortieing in force, the remaining surface capital ships did play valuable roles up until Hitler effectively discarded them and the rest of the surface fleet. Remember that Tirpitz alone was able to tie down a ridiculous amount of British combat power (and intel resources) just by existing as a 'Fleet in Being' while staying in port for much of the war! Not to mention Operation Cerberus, which, although more of a 'fighting withdrawal' rather than a engagement, still showed what was possible, even on what was literally the enemy's front doorstep.

The Germans still had plenty of resources, Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Tirpitz, Scheer and Lutzow were all still afloat and not doing very much, the German's could have launched a sortie into the Atlantic relatively easily with what they had available- the problem was that they risked being found and destroyed as the Bismarck mission aptly demonstrated. In 1914 all Emden had to do was stay out of sight of enemy surface warships, by 1941 the North Atlantic is being prowled by long range patrol aircraft, carrier based aircraft and a multitude of other ships. Not to mention a much more highly evolved intelligence network- both code breaking and HUMINT. The harsh reality was that it was incredibly difficult for long range German raiders to operate in the North Atlantic and so they ceased trying. It is telling that the most successful conventional German surface raider of the war was the Scheer and she found most of her prey in the much sparser (in terms of RN/RAF presence) waters of the mid/south Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

The German navy had always expected to fight from a position of numerical inferiority and in the same way the KM had not come close to completing its construction programme neither had the RN, the tentative programme got nowhere near completion. No Lion's were ever completed and a number of the ships planned for reconstruction never got it not to mention the other vessels considered for construction.

The problem with the Fleet in being concept is the cost benefit ratio, it cost the German's as well as the British who expended considerable resources maintaining and protecting their heavy surface units, and the overall effect of this fleet in being was limited- after all the allied were still able to run convoys to Murmansk straight past the German fleet with only periodic interference (occasional disasters such as PQ17 not withstanding). Cerberus can not be seen as a standalone act- rather it was part of a wider problem for the German surface raiders, wherever they docked in Europe they were a magnet for Allied aircraft- both Gneisnau and Scharnhorst took bomb damage in France, and whenever they tried to move they frequently got torpedoed. Cerberus was really just one successful attempt at finding somewhere safer for the German heavy units as the RN/RAF had managed to close down their potential areas of operation.

Vulnerability to gremlins and plain old bad luck applies to the other side too.

Yes, but the overside is numerically superior and much closer to friendly ports, an RN ship with broken engines mid-atlantic was in a much less perilous situation than a German one.

A mixture of bad luck and arguably faulty planning.

That does not change the fact that the at-sea infrastructure required to support such a mission was highly vulnerable.

 

[Grey Havoc]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-ZYsQx_sr8

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1Uyu5jasw4

 

[shin_getter]

German heavy surface navies was always a meme with RN still around. German being a land power, would have wars won or lost on land. A battleship costs like 1000 fighter aircraft or 1000 medium tanks or 1000 pieces of heavy artillery. All could have accounted for months of campaigning, and occasionally potentially decisive. (doubling of luftwaffe fighter strength in battle of Britain?)

Ship-Gun warfare is a closer fit to Lanchester's 2nd law than all known forms of warfare: a weaker navy can be potentially wiped without sinking anything (if both sides have well protected vitals and progressive decay of capability happens), as battle of Tsushima shows. This is makes it a horrible investment for the weaker side in comparison to land forces that can be effective in the defense against far stronger opponent.

The geology and distant blockade means German surface units actually have a big disadvantage when trying to do anything.

This in comparison than sea denial strategy by submarines where some 5x as much was spent countering than what it costed and the battle was only won with multiple new technological advantages from rapid radio direction finding, code breaking, microwave radar and so on, and this is not due to lack of development potential for submarines either, just lack of resources to development to maturity in time.

----
Reviewing my impression of the conflict, I really do wonder if capital ships were the most overhyped vehicle in history. They get all the attention when destroyers fought all the battles. It would be interesting to do a simulation for a large navy where the larger light cruiser (assume no strike capable carriers, it obviously change things) is the largest ship, with 10 years advantage in torpedo tech due to lack of investment in capital ship engineering. I suspect it'd do fairly well (advantage in ASW, slight disadvantage in surface meeting engagements) except in escort of critical (invasion fleets) fleets.

 

[muttly]

I have never understood why you use a battleship to hunt convoys.
I think a cruiser might be a better fit.

 

[Grey Havoc]

German Surface Raiders

The number of armed United States merchant ships lost to armed raiders is not definitely known. Several ships went out independently and were never heard from again. They may have been torpedoed, have suffered marine casualties, or have gone down before the guns of some fast surface raider. Six...

www.history.navy.mil

 

[publiusr]

Perhaps the best known from WWI

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1988/july/cruise-kronprinz-wilhelm

 

[Dilandu]

have never understood why you use a battleship to hunt convoys.
I think a cruiser might be a better fit.

Because Gemans were extremely reluctant to face Royal Navy with anything but absolute superiority.