TheKutKu
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This thread will hopefully be dedicated to early european earth observation satellite projects civilian or not, up to, or around, Spot-1 (1986) which revolutionised civilian space-based earth observation. Feel free to contribute.
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SAMRO was the first french large-scale attempt at making a military observation satellite, while previous attempts existed (one of which I wrote about in another thread), none compared to it. It was cancelled in 1982 but was nevertheless important for laying the basis of the multi-national HELIOS satellite.
A couple sources give a good overview of the program
First, "Observation de la Terre optique et radar - La France et l'Europe pionnières 1960-2010"; IFHE, 2016
P 116: The Defence sector, from the SAMRO Project to the Helios decision, Yves Blin, Jean-Jacques Dechezelles
The year 1977 saw the coming together of the DGA and the CNES with the aim of concretizing an agreement between the Direction Technique des Engins (DTEn, now part of the DGA, the french military procurement agency) and the CNES around the use of a common multi-mission platform capable of satisfy, at the national level, a civilian SPOT mission and distinctly a mission in the service of Defense. In this agreement, CNES was responsible for the SPOT program and DTEn made a financial contribution to the development of the platform while a joint committee called the "SPOT Committee" was created. The Defense mission would be served by its own means, the dedicated SAMRO satellites (SAtellite Militaire de Reconnaissance Optique; Military Optical Reconnaissance Satellite), official name from November 1977.
SNIAS SAMRO concept drawing.
1979 SAMRO Synoptic chart, made by SNIAS-Cannes and Thomson Espace
The chapter then discusses HELIOS.
Another source is
The SAMRO Program 1977-1982: First space military reconnaissance program
By Jean Jacques Dechezelles in Strategiques, 2021/2 (#126-7) p 86 which is linked
And third, a SAMRO Brochure, thanks to Franck_Laidin on twitter.
Translation:
The SAMRO system is made of
-a satellite based on the platform of the SPOT probationary earth observation satellite (a CNES program), and a payload comprising a camera and an adapter box, all designed to meet military requirements. Compared with SPOT, the imaging mode is different, the observation resolution is much greater, and the protections provided correspond to those required for a military system.
-a ground-based transmitter-receiver center, an operational center, an in-orbit control center and an image processing center.
The main problems to be solved lie in the camera assembly and the on-board recording system, which stores images until the satellite passes within sight of the ground station.
The DTEN responsible for the overall system is currently carrying out design and definition work, with the assistance of CNES for the satellite and the camera system, focusing primarily on the above-mentioned problems. Once this work has been completed, the actual development work can begin.
---
SAMRO was the first french large-scale attempt at making a military observation satellite, while previous attempts existed (one of which I wrote about in another thread), none compared to it. It was cancelled in 1982 but was nevertheless important for laying the basis of the multi-national HELIOS satellite.
A couple sources give a good overview of the program
First, "Observation de la Terre optique et radar - La France et l'Europe pionnières 1960-2010"; IFHE, 2016
P 116: The Defence sector, from the SAMRO Project to the Helios decision, Yves Blin, Jean-Jacques Dechezelles
The year 1977 saw the coming together of the DGA and the CNES with the aim of concretizing an agreement between the Direction Technique des Engins (DTEn, now part of the DGA, the french military procurement agency) and the CNES around the use of a common multi-mission platform capable of satisfy, at the national level, a civilian SPOT mission and distinctly a mission in the service of Defense. In this agreement, CNES was responsible for the SPOT program and DTEn made a financial contribution to the development of the platform while a joint committee called the "SPOT Committee" was created. The Defense mission would be served by its own means, the dedicated SAMRO satellites (SAtellite Militaire de Reconnaissance Optique; Military Optical Reconnaissance Satellite), official name from November 1977.
The Space group of general armaments engineer Jean Corbeau at the DTEn/STEn needs to strengthen itself. From January 1, the principal armaments engineer Claude Rocheof ETCA was assigned to the DTEn for this purpose and, in April, he was officially named director of the SAMRO program. It is therefore now a question for this group of going beyond the stage of previous prospective studies and of gradually putting in place the technical and programmatic architecture which should lead to a decision to commit to a program satisfying the expressed needs, normally materialized by a program sheet. issued at the level of the General Staff. The SAMRO activity will rely on several sectors whose program team will coordinate the efforts and reconcile the contributions:
-various establishments or military research organizations (LRBA, ETCA, CELAR, ONERA, SCTI, STTA and DRET) which provide their skills while the Air Force intervenes with its means in terms of aerial reconnaissance and picture interpretation ;
-from the industry which is solicited by numerous consultations both at the system level and at the level of the critical elements which will contribute to the definition and development of the specific payload of the SAMRO satellite.
The SPOT Committee is set up and its first meeting is held on February 22. The first edition of the SAMRO General Technical Specification was released the next day, and, shortly after, the third draft of the "program sheet" resulted, a reference document for any armament program (ref. n°495/EMA/ FN).
The major point, which will be debated throughout the year, lies in the level of image resolution targeted by SAMRO in comparison to that which the civil SPOT system has promised to satisfy since the end of 1977, namely a 10 m panchromatic channel. and three 20 m spectral channels. This debate requires two levels: the highest level of Defense to know whether SPOT can meet its needs or not, and the technical level to know what SAMRO can reasonably do best. The industry, at the level of potential prime contractors, the companies SNIAS (Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, which will soon become Aérospatiale) and Matra, is aware of the differences between the two mission projects. Indeed, these industrials are, on the one hand, involved in various capacities in the SPOT program where they were pre-selected by the CNES based on their recognized specific skills, and, on the other hand, have a very significant presence with Defense, in particular the SNIAS with the DGA and the FN (Nuclear Forces) throughout the ballistic program.
The performance of SAMRO's Image Collection (EPV, Ensemble de Prises de Vues ) instrument forms the heart of the technical debate with the associated image quality. The two industrial companies SNIAS and Matra are competing with each other to obtain the highest performances, each having skills which have just been enhanced by the joint success of the launch and implementation of the first meteorological imaging satellite, METEOSAT
Jean-Jacques Dechezelles (SNIAS), who had just left the system subdivision of the Division of Ballistic and Space Systems (DSBS) in Les Mureaux to join the Cannes establishment, remembers, as responsible for EPV proposals, the important developments of the project during this year 1978.
■Taking into account the choice of the SPOT platform and the requests from the DTEn Space Group, we were led to produce two EPV projects with their associated performances during the year. The first project was called CASIMIR, internal to SNIAS; it satisfied the need to be able to orient the EPV shots on either side of the local vertical and included two spectral channels, a visible channel based on CCD and an infrared channel. This project was presented to Jean Corbeau who called me to his office the next day to tell me that the project was certainly of quality but still too close to what SPOT was aiming for. Equipped with this observation, and some additional confidences on the personal affinities of his superior Antonin Collet-Billon in terms of optical production, I decided on my return to Cannes a strong creative relaunch. The excellence of my colleagues, the opticians Guy Cerutti-Maori and Pierre Pulitini being called upon in first position, is put to the test to obtain the best possible in all points: resolution, image quality in the width of the field of view, volume available under cover, and docking on the SPOT platform for which we were responsible for the mechanical architecture. Jean Espiard, technical director of REOSC, provides his assistance and it is also one of his collaborators, Mr. Mercier, who develops the best optical formula after detailed analysis of several relevant configurations. Let us remember that at that time sophisticated means of calculating optical systems were not widely available and that, fortunately, REOSC could access from time to time the powerful computer on the Orsay campus. Based on the optical formula thus found, the available CCD performances and the mechanical, thermal and electronic architecture work. accomplished in Cannes itself, I let our big boss at SNIAS DSBS,
Pierre Usunier, know that we were ready for a second presentation. This took place in the fall; we had prepared a quality presentation for which I was asked to be the interpreter during the session, a sort of soloist. I had received a lot of advice on the habits of the DTEn director, in particular on his art of asking “disconcerting” questions.
It's like a major oral exam at the X [Ecole Polytechnique], I was warned. We found ourselves in Puteaux, on the said day in the morning, in the presence of five DTEn/STEn people, in hierarchical order: Antonin Collet-Billon (DTEn director), Georges Desgranges (head of STEn), Jean Corbeau, Daniel Pichoud his deputy and Claude Roche who became director of the SAMRO program. For our part, the representation was also important, chaired by Pierre Usunier who was accompanied by Amédée Mollard¹², director of ballistic tests at DSBS and specially responsible for following the SAMRO affair. The meeting was held in a DTEn room in Puteaux, a room with a dark atmosphere for those who can keep the memory of this disappeared place. So I lead the presentation and comes the first question from Antonin Collet-Billon: “What is diffraction?” Guy Cerutti-Maori immediately answers "It's the percussive response of the optical instrument to the incident light wave", cutting short the scientific interrogation. I then moved on to the field of mirror polishing.
Jean Espiard demonstrated the polishing capabilities and the iterative control associated with polishing, because the focusing mirror, the main difficulty and therefore quality concern of the DTEn director, was an aspherical profile mirror requiring very high quality compliance with the theoretical shape and the most perfect possible surface condition. The DTEn director listened without questioning the expert details of Jean Espiard. The only difficulty of the morning came when Daniel Pichoud asked the question “Have you taken into account the elastic limit of precision? ". Daniel Pichoud had worked expertly on gyroscopic power stations for which we know that the drums must not suffer the slightest deformation (the elastic limit of precision at the value of 10^-6 means, for example, that the sum of all the efforts of mechanical, structural, vibrational, thermal type, etc. on an object one meter long should not cause it to vary by more than one micron). We had not expressly evaluated this constraint. Applying this mechanical and thermoelastic dimensioning constraint, which was justified, caused the instrument to gain nearly 100 kg, as subsequent studies showed.
11 Pierre Usunier, assigned to LRBA then to DEFA as head of the Industrialization department: joined SEREB in 1959 as Chief Engineer then technical director. From 1970 to 1986, emblematic director of the Ballistic and Space Systems Division (DSBS) of SNI Aérospatiale.
12 Amédée Mollard, colonel, he specializes in machine testing and shooting ranges; he led, alongside Robert Michaud and then after him, the test teams at SEREB then Aérospatiale DSBS for the development and provision of ballistic weapons for the Deterrence Force.
Matra was no less in demand than SNIAS for this important EPV project, so on December 1, 1978, SAMRO's program management issued a call for tenders to the two industrialists vying to build this unprecedented instrument. Needless to say, the requirements in terms of resolution and photometric sensitivity were far ahead of those of SPOT. Accustomed to competitive tenders, the two manufacturers provided highly documented confidential responses, some of which had to be expressed at Defence Secret level at the request of DTEn.
. Another critical piece of equipment, the Spatialized Magnetic Recorder (EMS), had already been the subject of a consultation with SAGEM and ENERTEC (part of the Schlumberger group); no such space-based equipment existed in Europe, and its capacity and reliability specifications were far superior to those of the American recorder from Odetics selected for the SPOT mission.
The DTEn/STEn program team had meanwhile been "beefed up", and its director Claude Roche recalls that it included Nicolas de Chézelles (LRBA), Jean-Jacques Dordain (ONERA), Michel Dages (SCTI), François Naville (STTA) and M. Busson (CELAR). Colonel Launay, whose operational experience of on-board systems was very useful, was also present.
-various establishments or military research organizations (LRBA, ETCA, CELAR, ONERA, SCTI, STTA and DRET) which provide their skills while the Air Force intervenes with its means in terms of aerial reconnaissance and picture interpretation ;
-from the industry which is solicited by numerous consultations both at the system level and at the level of the critical elements which will contribute to the definition and development of the specific payload of the SAMRO satellite.
The SPOT Committee is set up and its first meeting is held on February 22. The first edition of the SAMRO General Technical Specification was released the next day, and, shortly after, the third draft of the "program sheet" resulted, a reference document for any armament program (ref. n°495/EMA/ FN).
The major point, which will be debated throughout the year, lies in the level of image resolution targeted by SAMRO in comparison to that which the civil SPOT system has promised to satisfy since the end of 1977, namely a 10 m panchromatic channel. and three 20 m spectral channels. This debate requires two levels: the highest level of Defense to know whether SPOT can meet its needs or not, and the technical level to know what SAMRO can reasonably do best. The industry, at the level of potential prime contractors, the companies SNIAS (Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, which will soon become Aérospatiale) and Matra, is aware of the differences between the two mission projects. Indeed, these industrials are, on the one hand, involved in various capacities in the SPOT program where they were pre-selected by the CNES based on their recognized specific skills, and, on the other hand, have a very significant presence with Defense, in particular the SNIAS with the DGA and the FN (Nuclear Forces) throughout the ballistic program.
The performance of SAMRO's Image Collection (EPV, Ensemble de Prises de Vues ) instrument forms the heart of the technical debate with the associated image quality. The two industrial companies SNIAS and Matra are competing with each other to obtain the highest performances, each having skills which have just been enhanced by the joint success of the launch and implementation of the first meteorological imaging satellite, METEOSAT
Jean-Jacques Dechezelles (SNIAS), who had just left the system subdivision of the Division of Ballistic and Space Systems (DSBS) in Les Mureaux to join the Cannes establishment, remembers, as responsible for EPV proposals, the important developments of the project during this year 1978.
■Taking into account the choice of the SPOT platform and the requests from the DTEn Space Group, we were led to produce two EPV projects with their associated performances during the year. The first project was called CASIMIR, internal to SNIAS; it satisfied the need to be able to orient the EPV shots on either side of the local vertical and included two spectral channels, a visible channel based on CCD and an infrared channel. This project was presented to Jean Corbeau who called me to his office the next day to tell me that the project was certainly of quality but still too close to what SPOT was aiming for. Equipped with this observation, and some additional confidences on the personal affinities of his superior Antonin Collet-Billon in terms of optical production, I decided on my return to Cannes a strong creative relaunch. The excellence of my colleagues, the opticians Guy Cerutti-Maori and Pierre Pulitini being called upon in first position, is put to the test to obtain the best possible in all points: resolution, image quality in the width of the field of view, volume available under cover, and docking on the SPOT platform for which we were responsible for the mechanical architecture. Jean Espiard, technical director of REOSC, provides his assistance and it is also one of his collaborators, Mr. Mercier, who develops the best optical formula after detailed analysis of several relevant configurations. Let us remember that at that time sophisticated means of calculating optical systems were not widely available and that, fortunately, REOSC could access from time to time the powerful computer on the Orsay campus. Based on the optical formula thus found, the available CCD performances and the mechanical, thermal and electronic architecture work. accomplished in Cannes itself, I let our big boss at SNIAS DSBS,
Pierre Usunier, know that we were ready for a second presentation. This took place in the fall; we had prepared a quality presentation for which I was asked to be the interpreter during the session, a sort of soloist. I had received a lot of advice on the habits of the DTEn director, in particular on his art of asking “disconcerting” questions.
It's like a major oral exam at the X [Ecole Polytechnique], I was warned. We found ourselves in Puteaux, on the said day in the morning, in the presence of five DTEn/STEn people, in hierarchical order: Antonin Collet-Billon (DTEn director), Georges Desgranges (head of STEn), Jean Corbeau, Daniel Pichoud his deputy and Claude Roche who became director of the SAMRO program. For our part, the representation was also important, chaired by Pierre Usunier who was accompanied by Amédée Mollard¹², director of ballistic tests at DSBS and specially responsible for following the SAMRO affair. The meeting was held in a DTEn room in Puteaux, a room with a dark atmosphere for those who can keep the memory of this disappeared place. So I lead the presentation and comes the first question from Antonin Collet-Billon: “What is diffraction?” Guy Cerutti-Maori immediately answers "It's the percussive response of the optical instrument to the incident light wave", cutting short the scientific interrogation. I then moved on to the field of mirror polishing.
Jean Espiard demonstrated the polishing capabilities and the iterative control associated with polishing, because the focusing mirror, the main difficulty and therefore quality concern of the DTEn director, was an aspherical profile mirror requiring very high quality compliance with the theoretical shape and the most perfect possible surface condition. The DTEn director listened without questioning the expert details of Jean Espiard. The only difficulty of the morning came when Daniel Pichoud asked the question “Have you taken into account the elastic limit of precision? ". Daniel Pichoud had worked expertly on gyroscopic power stations for which we know that the drums must not suffer the slightest deformation (the elastic limit of precision at the value of 10^-6 means, for example, that the sum of all the efforts of mechanical, structural, vibrational, thermal type, etc. on an object one meter long should not cause it to vary by more than one micron). We had not expressly evaluated this constraint. Applying this mechanical and thermoelastic dimensioning constraint, which was justified, caused the instrument to gain nearly 100 kg, as subsequent studies showed.
11 Pierre Usunier, assigned to LRBA then to DEFA as head of the Industrialization department: joined SEREB in 1959 as Chief Engineer then technical director. From 1970 to 1986, emblematic director of the Ballistic and Space Systems Division (DSBS) of SNI Aérospatiale.
12 Amédée Mollard, colonel, he specializes in machine testing and shooting ranges; he led, alongside Robert Michaud and then after him, the test teams at SEREB then Aérospatiale DSBS for the development and provision of ballistic weapons for the Deterrence Force.
Matra was no less in demand than SNIAS for this important EPV project, so on December 1, 1978, SAMRO's program management issued a call for tenders to the two industrialists vying to build this unprecedented instrument. Needless to say, the requirements in terms of resolution and photometric sensitivity were far ahead of those of SPOT. Accustomed to competitive tenders, the two manufacturers provided highly documented confidential responses, some of which had to be expressed at Defence Secret level at the request of DTEn.
. Another critical piece of equipment, the Spatialized Magnetic Recorder (EMS), had already been the subject of a consultation with SAGEM and ENERTEC (part of the Schlumberger group); no such space-based equipment existed in Europe, and its capacity and reliability specifications were far superior to those of the American recorder from Odetics selected for the SPOT mission.
The DTEn/STEn program team had meanwhile been "beefed up", and its director Claude Roche recalls that it included Nicolas de Chézelles (LRBA), Jean-Jacques Dordain (ONERA), Michel Dages (SCTI), François Naville (STTA) and M. Busson (CELAR). Colonel Launay, whose operational experience of on-board systems was very useful, was also present.
SNIAS and Matra's responses to the EPV consultation arrive as specified, at the beginning of February, but the competition doesn't stop there. Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Marguain is appointed by the Armed Forces General Staff as “distinguished officer” SAMRO, the first on this program. The Minister of Defense requests a comparison between SPOT and SAMRO, and announces in May that SAMRO will be included in the 5th military programming law.
In July, SNIAS and Matra were again asked to supplement the EPV proposals with an additional imaging mode that would improve acuity by a factor of two. By this time, it was clear that the addition of a specific infrared channel was no longer an essential requirement, which would help in the requested optimization. In September, the program management announced the results of the bid evaluation and proposed to the DTEn director the choice of SNIAS's EPV proposal.
The analysis of the industrial distribution of the entire program is decanted and proposed to the DTEn. With regard to the SPOT program, it appeared difficult for Matra not to become responsible and integrator of the SAMRO satellite, while SNIAS, unofficially selected at EPV level, was keen to take on the role of industrial system architect for the DTEn, as well as the important responsibility of developing the mission center. . Thomson-CSF would inevitably be present, both at space level, for the image telemetry chain, and at ground level, for the various transmission and reception stations. ENERTEC had previously been selected to develop the magnetic recorder, and its contract was awarded. Let us add that a consultation on the image manipulation computer console, called MIMI for Interactive Image Manipulation Machine, had been launched via the Directorate of Research and Technical Studies (DRET); This consultation had no significant follow-up as this field was subsequently the subject of impressive developments in terms of image processing techniques as well as in terms of associated software and visualization machines.
SNIAS and Matra are asked to carry out an analytical evaluation of program costs; these comparative assessments will be taken into account by DGA/DTEn at the end of the year. In the last quarter of the year, ministerial negotiations begin, involving the Minister of Defense (13) and the Minister of Industry (14) , with the ministerial departments involved, in order to compare and coordinate points of view. A meeting between the DGA, DIELI (15) , CNES and DTEn was held on December 3, with the agenda including the creation of a SAMRO and CNES/DTEn Committee, the possibility of adapting SPOT's HRV instrument to meet Defense needs, and the request to draw up a CNES/DTEn agreement on the SAMRO program.
13 Under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Yvon Bourges was Minister of Defense from May 1974 to October 1980 in the successive governments of Jacques Chirac then Raymond Barre: Joël Le Theule succeeded him but died shortly after: Robert Galley then took the post until May 1981, the date of the presidential elections.
14 André Giraud was Minister of Industry for the entirety of the Raymond Barre III government from April 1978 to May 1981; his ministry is under the supervision of CNES.
15 DIELI: Directorate of Electronic Industries and IT within the Ministry of Industry.
In July, SNIAS and Matra were again asked to supplement the EPV proposals with an additional imaging mode that would improve acuity by a factor of two. By this time, it was clear that the addition of a specific infrared channel was no longer an essential requirement, which would help in the requested optimization. In September, the program management announced the results of the bid evaluation and proposed to the DTEn director the choice of SNIAS's EPV proposal.
The analysis of the industrial distribution of the entire program is decanted and proposed to the DTEn. With regard to the SPOT program, it appeared difficult for Matra not to become responsible and integrator of the SAMRO satellite, while SNIAS, unofficially selected at EPV level, was keen to take on the role of industrial system architect for the DTEn, as well as the important responsibility of developing the mission center. . Thomson-CSF would inevitably be present, both at space level, for the image telemetry chain, and at ground level, for the various transmission and reception stations. ENERTEC had previously been selected to develop the magnetic recorder, and its contract was awarded. Let us add that a consultation on the image manipulation computer console, called MIMI for Interactive Image Manipulation Machine, had been launched via the Directorate of Research and Technical Studies (DRET); This consultation had no significant follow-up as this field was subsequently the subject of impressive developments in terms of image processing techniques as well as in terms of associated software and visualization machines.
SNIAS and Matra are asked to carry out an analytical evaluation of program costs; these comparative assessments will be taken into account by DGA/DTEn at the end of the year. In the last quarter of the year, ministerial negotiations begin, involving the Minister of Defense (13) and the Minister of Industry (14) , with the ministerial departments involved, in order to compare and coordinate points of view. A meeting between the DGA, DIELI (15) , CNES and DTEn was held on December 3, with the agenda including the creation of a SAMRO and CNES/DTEn Committee, the possibility of adapting SPOT's HRV instrument to meet Defense needs, and the request to draw up a CNES/DTEn agreement on the SAMRO program.
13 Under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Yvon Bourges was Minister of Defense from May 1974 to October 1980 in the successive governments of Jacques Chirac then Raymond Barre: Joël Le Theule succeeded him but died shortly after: Robert Galley then took the post until May 1981, the date of the presidential elections.
14 André Giraud was Minister of Industry for the entirety of the Raymond Barre III government from April 1978 to May 1981; his ministry is under the supervision of CNES.
15 DIELI: Directorate of Electronic Industries and IT within the Ministry of Industry.
SNIAS SAMRO concept drawing.
1979 SAMRO Synoptic chart, made by SNIAS-Cannes and Thomson Espace
Jean Corbeau was appointed deputy head of the Technical Equipment Service (STEn) and Daniel Pichoud succeeded him as head of the Satellite Space group, a position he held until 1990. The SAMRO program management was gradually expanded: the armaments engineer Edwige Bonnevie joined it at the end of 1980 and the armaments engineer Joël Chenet at the beginning of 1982.
Following the first ministerial negotiations, the Presidency of the Republic approached the Minister of Defense with a request that the development of the SPOT satellite precede that of the military satellite, and that the amount of work to be included in the 1983-1988 program be assessed. Contacts between DTEn and CNES increased with meetings of the SAMRO Joint Committee, so that CNES learned the true specifications of the SAMRO EPV, and the limits of possible improvements to the SPOT HRV instrument were recognized. hortly after SAMRO's presentation to the Prime Minister's and the French President's cabinets (Admiral Lacoste and Admiral Aimeury), the SPOT and SAMRO projects are coordinated at a select committee meeting at the Elysée Palace, defining the roles of DTEn, as SAMRO project manager, and CNES, as technical manager for the space segment. The CNES/DTEn agreement is signed on July 9. Louis Dulherm (16), who was involved in the SPOT program, will now be responsible at CNES for the activities to be carried out under the SAMRO space component.
The Minister of Defense approves the preparatory development of the EPV instrument, which leads CNES in turn to evaluate the proposals resulting from the EPV call for tenders conducted by DTEn. The EPV SNIAS team was invited to the CNES Toulouse Space Center for a hearing, and CNES soon confirmed the DTEn's choice in favor of the EPV SNIAS proposal The official announcement of this joint decision came on August 1, 1980. By knock-on effect, an appropriate industrial policy for the program was defined, then proposed to the DGA and finally to the Minister.
In October 1980, Matra, SNIAS and Thomson-CSF were notified of the program's industrial organization, whose main responsibilities were in line with the general scheme anticipated earlier. At the beginning of 1981, SNIAS, as industrial system architect, received from the DTEn the cost objectives for the different phases of the program, from design through to satellite commissioning, with the task of consolidating all the financial evaluations, which would be passed on to the various levels of industrial responsibility
In June 1981, a review of the results of the design phase (Phase A) was carried out, with presentations from industry and CNES. Shortly afterwards, an additional study was requested for a simplified version of the SAMRO system, with the removal of a eavesdropping payload. The number of SAMRO satellite flight models was also discussed.
During the course of the year, the organization of the system with a view to its operation was the subject of consultations within defense organizations, in the form of working groups focusing on image processing, operational organization and the location of the main transmission-reception center in mainland France.
On November 10, 1981, the design phase was completed, and DTEn was in a position to issue the technical requirements specifications (STB) for the detailed definition phase (Phase B). The satellite launch target was set for the end of 1987
Historically, it is interesting to note that the important political changes that occurred after the elections of May and June 1981 (17) do not seem to have immediately affected the course of the program in its progress, at least in what is reported by the precious chronology preserved by Claurté Roche. It shows that there was no important warning sign from the Ministry of Defense before the Defense Council of June 2, 1982.
16: Louis Dulherm: Joined CNES in 1969 as manager in the D2B programs then SPOT, SPOT-SAMRO and SPOT-Hélios
17: The second round of the presidential elections happened on May 10 1981 and brought Mitterand to the presidency, he then dissolved the parliament and the parliamentary elections on June 21 1981 gave a large majority to the socialist left
Following the first ministerial negotiations, the Presidency of the Republic approached the Minister of Defense with a request that the development of the SPOT satellite precede that of the military satellite, and that the amount of work to be included in the 1983-1988 program be assessed. Contacts between DTEn and CNES increased with meetings of the SAMRO Joint Committee, so that CNES learned the true specifications of the SAMRO EPV, and the limits of possible improvements to the SPOT HRV instrument were recognized. hortly after SAMRO's presentation to the Prime Minister's and the French President's cabinets (Admiral Lacoste and Admiral Aimeury), the SPOT and SAMRO projects are coordinated at a select committee meeting at the Elysée Palace, defining the roles of DTEn, as SAMRO project manager, and CNES, as technical manager for the space segment. The CNES/DTEn agreement is signed on July 9. Louis Dulherm (16), who was involved in the SPOT program, will now be responsible at CNES for the activities to be carried out under the SAMRO space component.
The Minister of Defense approves the preparatory development of the EPV instrument, which leads CNES in turn to evaluate the proposals resulting from the EPV call for tenders conducted by DTEn. The EPV SNIAS team was invited to the CNES Toulouse Space Center for a hearing, and CNES soon confirmed the DTEn's choice in favor of the EPV SNIAS proposal The official announcement of this joint decision came on August 1, 1980. By knock-on effect, an appropriate industrial policy for the program was defined, then proposed to the DGA and finally to the Minister.
In October 1980, Matra, SNIAS and Thomson-CSF were notified of the program's industrial organization, whose main responsibilities were in line with the general scheme anticipated earlier. At the beginning of 1981, SNIAS, as industrial system architect, received from the DTEn the cost objectives for the different phases of the program, from design through to satellite commissioning, with the task of consolidating all the financial evaluations, which would be passed on to the various levels of industrial responsibility
In June 1981, a review of the results of the design phase (Phase A) was carried out, with presentations from industry and CNES. Shortly afterwards, an additional study was requested for a simplified version of the SAMRO system, with the removal of a eavesdropping payload. The number of SAMRO satellite flight models was also discussed.
During the course of the year, the organization of the system with a view to its operation was the subject of consultations within defense organizations, in the form of working groups focusing on image processing, operational organization and the location of the main transmission-reception center in mainland France.
On November 10, 1981, the design phase was completed, and DTEn was in a position to issue the technical requirements specifications (STB) for the detailed definition phase (Phase B). The satellite launch target was set for the end of 1987
Historically, it is interesting to note that the important political changes that occurred after the elections of May and June 1981 (17) do not seem to have immediately affected the course of the program in its progress, at least in what is reported by the precious chronology preserved by Claurté Roche. It shows that there was no important warning sign from the Ministry of Defense before the Defense Council of June 2, 1982.
16: Louis Dulherm: Joined CNES in 1969 as manager in the D2B programs then SPOT, SPOT-SAMRO and SPOT-Hélios
17: The second round of the presidential elections happened on May 10 1981 and brought Mitterand to the presidency, he then dissolved the parliament and the parliamentary elections on June 21 1981 gave a large majority to the socialist left
The year 1982, with its budgetary concerns, changed the course of events. At the beginning of the year, the program was successively presented to the Delegate General for Armaments by the DTEn, then to the Chief of the Armed Forces Staff (CEMA) by the FN Staff. The program is then presented to the Minister of Defense (18) by the DGA and the DTEn. The program group continues its work, shortlisting the manufacturers who will be consulted during the definition phase for the various equipment in the image chain beyond the EPV.
On June 2, 1982, François Mitterrand chaired the Defense Council, which discussed budgetary issues and the impact of cuts on the defense budget. During the following month of July, SAMRO's fate would change.
The Minister of Defense's office tells the EΜΑ, the DTEn and the CNES that we need to move towards a simplified SAMRO probationary program with a single satellite, then the EMA envisages a two-phase program, with a probationary phase followed by an operational phase with European cooperation, a proposal that will be blocked at the CEMA level. CNES, for its part, proposes to the Minister of Research and Industry (19) a probationary SAMRO by developing the technical and political interest that this represents.At the end of July, the DGA and DTEn were in a quandary, and finally confirmed the suspension of the program to CNES and industry; nevertheless, the preparatory development contracts with SNIAS, for the EPV, and ENERTEC, for the magnetic recorder, were maintained.
In the turmoil surrounding the suspension of a SAMRO program aimed at operational readiness, we find traces of the opposition that had been undermining the project; thus, the SGDN (20) sent a note expressing its satisfaction with the suspension of SAMRO, explaining that SPOT would meet requirements at a lower cost. Then, in September, the Minister of Defense wrote to the President of the Republic, asking that SPOT be continued and that, when the time came, the study of a specifically military satellite be restarted.
On June 2, 1982, François Mitterrand chaired the Defense Council, which discussed budgetary issues and the impact of cuts on the defense budget. During the following month of July, SAMRO's fate would change.
The Minister of Defense's office tells the EΜΑ, the DTEn and the CNES that we need to move towards a simplified SAMRO probationary program with a single satellite, then the EMA envisages a two-phase program, with a probationary phase followed by an operational phase with European cooperation, a proposal that will be blocked at the CEMA level. CNES, for its part, proposes to the Minister of Research and Industry (19) a probationary SAMRO by developing the technical and political interest that this represents.At the end of July, the DGA and DTEn were in a quandary, and finally confirmed the suspension of the program to CNES and industry; nevertheless, the preparatory development contracts with SNIAS, for the EPV, and ENERTEC, for the magnetic recorder, were maintained.
In the turmoil surrounding the suspension of a SAMRO program aimed at operational readiness, we find traces of the opposition that had been undermining the project; thus, the SGDN (20) sent a note expressing its satisfaction with the suspension of SAMRO, explaining that SPOT would meet requirements at a lower cost. Then, in September, the Minister of Defense wrote to the President of the Republic, asking that SPOT be continued and that, when the time came, the study of a specifically military satellite be restarted.
On October 8, 1982, Defense Minister Charles Hernu wrote officially about the SAMRO program: << Due to budgetary constraints and national defense priorities, we have decided to postpone the program. (...) The 1984-1988 military plan(21) currently being drawn up will enable us, once it has been adopted, to better define the medium- and long-term prospects for satellite optical reconnaissance and the conditions for resuming the SAMRO program.”
Over and above the budgetary rigor being put in place at the time, this decision to suspend the program merely served to highlight the doubts surrounding the appropriateness of launching such a program. The SAMRO system's sole objective was to meet the reconnaissance needs of the deterrent force (22)"; its high cost worried the rest of the armed forces about the number of tanks, ships and aircraft that would be sacrificed on the altar of this program (23); finally, its performance was not sufficiently different from that of the civilian SPOT observation program (24). This decision also reflected the doubts of certain government departments. How far could we reasonably go technologically? This question was anything but trivial in 1982, as France had not yet launched an Earth observation satellite. The first satellite was still under development as part of the SPOT program.
Budgetary resources are now limited, but the most critical preparatory developments are being maintained and, even at a low level, system studies will continue to be carried out as part of the technical watch within DTEn and industry, as well as at CNES, pending a resumption of the program. The development of the SPOT satellite is also a way of contributing to the preparation of the military program, insofar as it will produce the first generation of multi-mission observation platforms. Various technologies hitherto unavailable in Europe will be qualified, and a number of major technical difficulties will be overcome, such as the residual level of vibration, known as micro-vibration, generated by the platform in orbital mode, a factor which could have adversely affected the acuity of the images taken and the corresponding image quality.
The preparatory developments of the EPV and the recorder gave rise, as expected, to difficulties, and it has to be acknowledged, with hindsight, that the obstacles to be overcome were numerous and undoubtedly even more serious than had been anticipated.
18 Charles Hernu in the Mauroy government
19 Jean Pierre Chevenement, in the Mauroy government, first Minister of Research and Technology, became Minister of Research and Industry after the dissapearence of the Ministry of Industry
20 SGDN: Secrétariat Général de la Défense National, a high-level department attached to the Prime Minister in the Fifth Republic. From May 1977 to June 1983, it was headed by General (Air) Roger Rhenter. SGDN has since become SGDSN, Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale.
21 Plan Pluriannuel Spatial Militaire (PPSM); the first PPSM was signed by Minister Charles Hernu in May 1984.
22 Interview with Colonel Didier Leleu de la Simone.
23 Interviews with Colonel Leleu de la Simone and Lieutenant-Colonel Chantal Capelli.
Over and above the budgetary rigor being put in place at the time, this decision to suspend the program merely served to highlight the doubts surrounding the appropriateness of launching such a program. The SAMRO system's sole objective was to meet the reconnaissance needs of the deterrent force (22)"; its high cost worried the rest of the armed forces about the number of tanks, ships and aircraft that would be sacrificed on the altar of this program (23); finally, its performance was not sufficiently different from that of the civilian SPOT observation program (24). This decision also reflected the doubts of certain government departments. How far could we reasonably go technologically? This question was anything but trivial in 1982, as France had not yet launched an Earth observation satellite. The first satellite was still under development as part of the SPOT program.
Budgetary resources are now limited, but the most critical preparatory developments are being maintained and, even at a low level, system studies will continue to be carried out as part of the technical watch within DTEn and industry, as well as at CNES, pending a resumption of the program. The development of the SPOT satellite is also a way of contributing to the preparation of the military program, insofar as it will produce the first generation of multi-mission observation platforms. Various technologies hitherto unavailable in Europe will be qualified, and a number of major technical difficulties will be overcome, such as the residual level of vibration, known as micro-vibration, generated by the platform in orbital mode, a factor which could have adversely affected the acuity of the images taken and the corresponding image quality.
The preparatory developments of the EPV and the recorder gave rise, as expected, to difficulties, and it has to be acknowledged, with hindsight, that the obstacles to be overcome were numerous and undoubtedly even more serious than had been anticipated.
18 Charles Hernu in the Mauroy government
19 Jean Pierre Chevenement, in the Mauroy government, first Minister of Research and Technology, became Minister of Research and Industry after the dissapearence of the Ministry of Industry
20 SGDN: Secrétariat Général de la Défense National, a high-level department attached to the Prime Minister in the Fifth Republic. From May 1977 to June 1983, it was headed by General (Air) Roger Rhenter. SGDN has since become SGDSN, Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale.
21 Plan Pluriannuel Spatial Militaire (PPSM); the first PPSM was signed by Minister Charles Hernu in May 1984.
22 Interview with Colonel Didier Leleu de la Simone.
23 Interviews with Colonel Leleu de la Simone and Lieutenant-Colonel Chantal Capelli.
Work on the EPV had two aspects: a technical aspect and an industrial aspect of no less importance. The main objective of the preparatory development of the instrument was to establish, through studies, realizations and tests, the performance obtained in terms of image quality. A scale model of the collecting optics with its mount, a detector box and various sophisticated mechanisms were all material elements to be produced and tested. It is always difficult in such a preparatory development to manage the compromise between completing the planned equipment within a given timeframe and obtaining intermediate results that will qualify the project for the future. At the SNIAS plant in Cannes, under the supervision of the DTEn and the CNES, the search for technological mastery of the difficult points was the imperative, as it was clearly essential to the credibility of the French industrial capacity in the event of a resumption of the program. Industrial difficulties quickly became apparent on several levels.
In the optics sector, it was first necessary to save the REOSC company from filing for bankruptcy and give it, first with the SEP then with the Société Française d'Instruments de Mesures (SFIM), a lasting industrial foothold and quality management. This was achieved with Dominique de Pontevès as Chairman and Jean Espiard as Managing Director.
Achievements for the Armed forces gave additional stability of activity to this company whose technical expertise in polishing large mirrors was unrivaled in Europe. The presence of a first-rate quality engineer from SNIAS/Cannes proved necessary to ensure that workshop processes, particularly for mechanical operations involving the lightening of mirrors, approached the desired level of quality. The breakage of a poorly-fixed mirror during a centrifuge test quickly sounded the alarm, a fact that left an indelible impression on the DGA's top decision-makers.
In terms of CCD detectors, Thomson in Saint Egrève (near Grenoble) knew26 how to produce some prototype strips but, in order to be able to meet the specifications required for the SAMRO application (and for SPOT-2 and the following ones as well), it was necessary to commit to a large-scale industrial production line, so as to be able to sort out the best strips from a photometric point of view. Thomson's quote (20 MF) was beyond the financial possibilities available to the DTEn and we had to wait for a major contract from the DGT (27), for the production of fax machines, before this industrial breakthrough could materialize. Sodern's teams therefore had to wait to define the detection box, and then encountered some difficulties in managing the various interfaces. However, as they were also awarded the contract to produce the SPOT detection units, their ability to succeed was never in doubt.
By the end of 1985, it had been objectively established that the EPV optical formula could achieve the required performance, and perhaps even better, that the <<all-carbon >>> frame would satisfy the required stability with certain reservations, and that the active thermal control would be able to manage the whole assembly, down to the degree, in terms of temperature gradient. Another conclusion had long since been drawn from a test model: the mechanism for raising and then orienting the EPV was still highly complex and, given the inertias involved, unquestionably not a very recommendable solution. In fact, the manoeuvring capacity of the SPOT platform, designed for the SPOT-1 mission and fitted with a flexible solar generator, was far from sufficient to manage kinematic disturbances of the order of those created by a rapid tilting of the EPV on its mount.
The EMS magnetic recorder and its first developments
The technical difficulties to be overcome were numerous, even before tackling the spatialization aspect itself, which requires the entire magnetic tape transport and playback assembly to be integrated inside a pressurized housing that is perfectly sealed for the duration of its life in orbit. A number of major functional concerns were addressed in the initial developments: firstly, the selection of the magnetic tape itself, whose quality - both mechanical and magnetic - had to withstand the test of the targeted service life without disturbing the homogeneity of all the tracks; secondly, the ability to process a high data rate, to be divided into a large number of tracks in a parallel organization; and thirdly, the design of the multi-track recording and playback heads. Given the discretion required by a mission such as SAMRO, the total storage capacity of the recorder had to be considerable, as data retransmission was only planned during the satellite's overflight of French territory, i.e. an average of three usable passes per 24 hours, for a total of around 30 minutes of radio visibility.
As with the EPV instrument, the mass budget of the EMS recorder was to grow as the first developments progressed. By the end of the pre-development phase, which lasted several years, the selection of high-quality magnetic tape had been completed, and a first version of the tape transport and reading unit had been produced. However, ENERTEC's teams had not sufficiently addressed the problems of spatialization, a difficulty which led CNES to step in to help ENERTEC on site with a quality engineer specialized in space mechanisms.
24 Interview by Louis Dulherm
25 For a given resolution, the modulation transfer function (MTF) is a main parameter of image quality
26 M. Blamoutier ran the corresponding Thomson service
27 DGT: Direction Generale des Telecoms, would later become France Telecom
28 General weapon engineer Jean Sandeau, DTeN director from 1983 to 1986
In the optics sector, it was first necessary to save the REOSC company from filing for bankruptcy and give it, first with the SEP then with the Société Française d'Instruments de Mesures (SFIM), a lasting industrial foothold and quality management. This was achieved with Dominique de Pontevès as Chairman and Jean Espiard as Managing Director.
Achievements for the Armed forces gave additional stability of activity to this company whose technical expertise in polishing large mirrors was unrivaled in Europe. The presence of a first-rate quality engineer from SNIAS/Cannes proved necessary to ensure that workshop processes, particularly for mechanical operations involving the lightening of mirrors, approached the desired level of quality. The breakage of a poorly-fixed mirror during a centrifuge test quickly sounded the alarm, a fact that left an indelible impression on the DGA's top decision-makers.
In terms of CCD detectors, Thomson in Saint Egrève (near Grenoble) knew26 how to produce some prototype strips but, in order to be able to meet the specifications required for the SAMRO application (and for SPOT-2 and the following ones as well), it was necessary to commit to a large-scale industrial production line, so as to be able to sort out the best strips from a photometric point of view. Thomson's quote (20 MF) was beyond the financial possibilities available to the DTEn and we had to wait for a major contract from the DGT (27), for the production of fax machines, before this industrial breakthrough could materialize. Sodern's teams therefore had to wait to define the detection box, and then encountered some difficulties in managing the various interfaces. However, as they were also awarded the contract to produce the SPOT detection units, their ability to succeed was never in doubt.
By the end of 1985, it had been objectively established that the EPV optical formula could achieve the required performance, and perhaps even better, that the <<all-carbon >>> frame would satisfy the required stability with certain reservations, and that the active thermal control would be able to manage the whole assembly, down to the degree, in terms of temperature gradient. Another conclusion had long since been drawn from a test model: the mechanism for raising and then orienting the EPV was still highly complex and, given the inertias involved, unquestionably not a very recommendable solution. In fact, the manoeuvring capacity of the SPOT platform, designed for the SPOT-1 mission and fitted with a flexible solar generator, was far from sufficient to manage kinematic disturbances of the order of those created by a rapid tilting of the EPV on its mount.
The EMS magnetic recorder and its first developments
The technical difficulties to be overcome were numerous, even before tackling the spatialization aspect itself, which requires the entire magnetic tape transport and playback assembly to be integrated inside a pressurized housing that is perfectly sealed for the duration of its life in orbit. A number of major functional concerns were addressed in the initial developments: firstly, the selection of the magnetic tape itself, whose quality - both mechanical and magnetic - had to withstand the test of the targeted service life without disturbing the homogeneity of all the tracks; secondly, the ability to process a high data rate, to be divided into a large number of tracks in a parallel organization; and thirdly, the design of the multi-track recording and playback heads. Given the discretion required by a mission such as SAMRO, the total storage capacity of the recorder had to be considerable, as data retransmission was only planned during the satellite's overflight of French territory, i.e. an average of three usable passes per 24 hours, for a total of around 30 minutes of radio visibility.
As with the EPV instrument, the mass budget of the EMS recorder was to grow as the first developments progressed. By the end of the pre-development phase, which lasted several years, the selection of high-quality magnetic tape had been completed, and a first version of the tape transport and reading unit had been produced. However, ENERTEC's teams had not sufficiently addressed the problems of spatialization, a difficulty which led CNES to step in to help ENERTEC on site with a quality engineer specialized in space mechanisms.
24 Interview by Louis Dulherm
25 For a given resolution, the modulation transfer function (MTF) is a main parameter of image quality
26 M. Blamoutier ran the corresponding Thomson service
27 DGT: Direction Generale des Telecoms, would later become France Telecom
28 General weapon engineer Jean Sandeau, DTeN director from 1983 to 1986
The suspension of the program, decided in 1982, obviously had the immediate result of reducing industrial mobilization at satellite system and ground segment level. Nevertheless, SNIAS maintained a small team in Les Mureaux to prepare for a resumption of the program and to keep in touch with DTEn, in particular to document new industrial proposals and continue the analysis of image quality aspects, including data compression, in conjunction with ongoing aircraft reconnaissance campaigns and simulations of transposition to space observation. For its part, Matra Espace, a major partner of CNES in the development of SPOT-1, was taking stock of the various tasks involved in prime contracting (29) for this type of satellite.
CNES took its role as space segment manager seriously and, in conjunction with the SPOT program management, appointed a team to work on the SAMRO program, headed by Louis Dulherm. Monitoring EPV and EMS preparatory developments was an ongoing task, but CNES also took advantage of its system role on SPOT to gain a better understanding of what might need to be added in order to move on to a more demanding SAMRO-type mission. In addition, by developing the SPOT system with the associated downstream image processing and exploitation chain, CNES was well placed to anticipate many of the architecture and functionality development issues required for a new high-resolution mission tailored to defense requirements.
CNES took its role as space segment manager seriously and, in conjunction with the SPOT program management, appointed a team to work on the SAMRO program, headed by Louis Dulherm. Monitoring EPV and EMS preparatory developments was an ongoing task, but CNES also took advantage of its system role on SPOT to gain a better understanding of what might need to be added in order to move on to a more demanding SAMRO-type mission. In addition, by developing the SPOT system with the associated downstream image processing and exploitation chain, CNES was well placed to anticipate many of the architecture and functionality development issues required for a new high-resolution mission tailored to defense requirements.
Edwige Bonnevie, system engineer in the Space Group of the DTEn recalls:
"In the spring of 1982, everyone imagined that the SAMRO program would be started following the preparatory work and given the green light. But in the summer, the program was formally suspended. The French Minister of Defense, Charles Hernu, then asked us to prepare a military PPSM covering all areas of military use of space. The order was placed in September 1982: the plan was published in 1983 and signed by the Minister in May 1984; there were other plans later, but to my knowledge, this was the only one of its kind to be implemented. Of course, studies on abservation satellites are continuing along three lines:
-the system and photo-interpretation axis:
-the two specific exploratory developments EPV and EMS of the Defense mission, which is different from the SPOT mission:
-and then mission analyses, as the heliosynchronous orbits envisaged are not the same as those of SPOT, so studies with ONERA оu working with Anne-Marie Mainguyet Jean-Jacques Dordain.
We are also carrying out a whole range of in-house simulations. As technologies start to improve, we try to simulate what would be useful for photo-interpreters carrying out a given mission; this is how we came to work very closely with the photo-interpreters' teams of the armed forces, air force, army, etc. The satellite images available from Landsat had been used for a long time, but we were not able to use them:
The Landsat satellite images available had a resolution that didn't allow us to carry out useful simulations for our project. We need to put before the eyes of photo-interpreters images that can resemble what they will have in the envisaged space-based recognition system? But what characteristics? How to make images? We'll use images taken by air.
Based on this basic data, we'll run simulations representing different ranges of satellite image performance. "
The people who produce the images for us are the FAS (30) with the Mirage IVs in Bordeaux, and the FATAC (31) in Colmar.
I go there once a year to explain our purpose to them, which once earned me a flight in a Mirage III."
CELAR (32) was one of the points of expertise used within the French Defense Ministry, and in the 1982-1985 period, it pursued activities aimed at refining the expression of needs in terms of image quality (resolution, FTM (33) , admissible compression rate, correction algorithms) initiated under the SAMRO program, with an evolution towards intelligence broader than that dedicated to the needs of the Nuclear Forces. Photo-interpreters from CIPAA (34) (Armée de l'Air) took part in this work, later joined by those from CIRIP (Armée de Terre) and the FAS and FATAC.
Several images from the same site, with different image quality parameters, were presented to the photo-interpreters for analysis. They ranked the images against each other using an analysis grid supplied by the CELAR team headed by Mr. Michel Busson (35). The images used for these experiments were developed by SEP from aerial images taken from IGN's B17 aircraft or from a Mirage IV.
Lieutenant-Colonel Chantal Capelli (36) testifies.
“These aircraft flew over targets chosen to correspond to those of STANAG 3769 (NATO's photo-interpretation standard), which gives the criteria for each category of target (building, armored vehicle, ship, aircraft, etc.) for detection, reconnaissance, identification or technical analysis”.
These images were then resampled at different scales of ground resolution and image quality. This work, which continued well beyond the end of 1985, helped to consolidate the specifications for the image chain of the future military satellite observation system in terms of operational requirements. In parallel with CELAR's activities, CEPIA (37) was set up in 1982 at ETCA's Arcueil facility in the Paris region. Its role is to carry out experiments focused on the end of the image chain, i.e. image processing and the associated technical resources. These experiments should also enable us to better estimate the personnel requirements for operating the future military satellite reconnaissance system. François Louange", consultant to CEPIA at the time, explains the content of this pioneering work in computer-aided image processing.
"We were conducting experiments to help us answer questions such as: How long will it take to operate such and such a thing? Can we expect to see this or that in relief? We were trying to come up with tools and means of submitting images and associated questions to the eyes of photo-interpreters, so that they could give answers, and so that we could collate them, put them together to make statistics and provide a written report on the question (...). This work was carried out within the framework of a working group called the GEI (Groupe d'Expérimentation d' Images), which was officially chaired by the DTEn, notably for a long time by Edwige Bonnevie, and whose day-to-day work and animation was carried out at the CEPIA. When the SAMRO project came to an end, CEPIA set about acquiring large-scale image processing systems. After a bit of trial and error, and some piecemeal programming to answer questions, we decided to stop making programs all over the place. We had lots of little programs all over the place, one for geometric correction, another for polygon editing, and so on.
For this to go ahead (and this is the only insight I can boast), it was absolutely essential that the end-users themselves take possession of a tool. I could see, from the outside, that it was unbearable for these officers to have two or three engineers fussing over a keyboard, dealing with ancestral machines that crashed every five minutes before the VICOM (38) machine was available, and, in general, constantly asking someone else to do something; they couldn't really concentrate on their work. We thought that the priority would probably be to provide a tool that was easy to use, because you can't go into the wrong profession, intelligence work being in itself very complicated; nor was it a question of making the people who do it take six months of university courses. So the aim was to create a simple tool capable of bringing together all the tools we'd been able to invent up to now, with a binder that was as convenient as possible, and with menus in French that were as clear as possible. This gave rise to the idea of the OCAPI project (Outil Conversationnel d'Aide à la Photo Interprétation) which, as a cartographic tool for photo interpreters, became the guiding principle for the following years.
29 Matra Espace became the prime contractor for SPOT hardware starting from SPOT 2
30 FAS: Strategic Air Forces
31 FATAC TACtical Air Forces
32 CELAR: Armement Electronic Center in Bruz (Ille et Vilaine)
33 FTM: MTF, modulation transfer function
34 The CIPAA in St-Cyr School became the CEIAA in 1986 before being integrated in the Inter-armies Imagery Training and Interpretation center (CFIII) in 1993
35 Interview of lieutenant-colonel Graviere of CIPAA
36 Interview of lieutenant-colonel Capeli of CIPAA
37 CEPIA: Picture Interpreter Interpretation Center of the Army
38 We discovered that there was an American who had developed a machine, the VICOM machine. This American, William K. Pratt, was the author of the cult book on image processing (Digital Image Processing - 1978 - Wiley & Son). This machine was expensive but Defense justified the acquisition.
"In the spring of 1982, everyone imagined that the SAMRO program would be started following the preparatory work and given the green light. But in the summer, the program was formally suspended. The French Minister of Defense, Charles Hernu, then asked us to prepare a military PPSM covering all areas of military use of space. The order was placed in September 1982: the plan was published in 1983 and signed by the Minister in May 1984; there were other plans later, but to my knowledge, this was the only one of its kind to be implemented. Of course, studies on abservation satellites are continuing along three lines:
-the system and photo-interpretation axis:
-the two specific exploratory developments EPV and EMS of the Defense mission, which is different from the SPOT mission:
-and then mission analyses, as the heliosynchronous orbits envisaged are not the same as those of SPOT, so studies with ONERA оu working with Anne-Marie Mainguyet Jean-Jacques Dordain.
We are also carrying out a whole range of in-house simulations. As technologies start to improve, we try to simulate what would be useful for photo-interpreters carrying out a given mission; this is how we came to work very closely with the photo-interpreters' teams of the armed forces, air force, army, etc. The satellite images available from Landsat had been used for a long time, but we were not able to use them:
The Landsat satellite images available had a resolution that didn't allow us to carry out useful simulations for our project. We need to put before the eyes of photo-interpreters images that can resemble what they will have in the envisaged space-based recognition system? But what characteristics? How to make images? We'll use images taken by air.
Based on this basic data, we'll run simulations representing different ranges of satellite image performance. "
The people who produce the images for us are the FAS (30) with the Mirage IVs in Bordeaux, and the FATAC (31) in Colmar.
I go there once a year to explain our purpose to them, which once earned me a flight in a Mirage III."
CELAR (32) was one of the points of expertise used within the French Defense Ministry, and in the 1982-1985 period, it pursued activities aimed at refining the expression of needs in terms of image quality (resolution, FTM (33) , admissible compression rate, correction algorithms) initiated under the SAMRO program, with an evolution towards intelligence broader than that dedicated to the needs of the Nuclear Forces. Photo-interpreters from CIPAA (34) (Armée de l'Air) took part in this work, later joined by those from CIRIP (Armée de Terre) and the FAS and FATAC.
Several images from the same site, with different image quality parameters, were presented to the photo-interpreters for analysis. They ranked the images against each other using an analysis grid supplied by the CELAR team headed by Mr. Michel Busson (35). The images used for these experiments were developed by SEP from aerial images taken from IGN's B17 aircraft or from a Mirage IV.
Lieutenant-Colonel Chantal Capelli (36) testifies.
“These aircraft flew over targets chosen to correspond to those of STANAG 3769 (NATO's photo-interpretation standard), which gives the criteria for each category of target (building, armored vehicle, ship, aircraft, etc.) for detection, reconnaissance, identification or technical analysis”.
These images were then resampled at different scales of ground resolution and image quality. This work, which continued well beyond the end of 1985, helped to consolidate the specifications for the image chain of the future military satellite observation system in terms of operational requirements. In parallel with CELAR's activities, CEPIA (37) was set up in 1982 at ETCA's Arcueil facility in the Paris region. Its role is to carry out experiments focused on the end of the image chain, i.e. image processing and the associated technical resources. These experiments should also enable us to better estimate the personnel requirements for operating the future military satellite reconnaissance system. François Louange", consultant to CEPIA at the time, explains the content of this pioneering work in computer-aided image processing.
"We were conducting experiments to help us answer questions such as: How long will it take to operate such and such a thing? Can we expect to see this or that in relief? We were trying to come up with tools and means of submitting images and associated questions to the eyes of photo-interpreters, so that they could give answers, and so that we could collate them, put them together to make statistics and provide a written report on the question (...). This work was carried out within the framework of a working group called the GEI (Groupe d'Expérimentation d' Images), which was officially chaired by the DTEn, notably for a long time by Edwige Bonnevie, and whose day-to-day work and animation was carried out at the CEPIA. When the SAMRO project came to an end, CEPIA set about acquiring large-scale image processing systems. After a bit of trial and error, and some piecemeal programming to answer questions, we decided to stop making programs all over the place. We had lots of little programs all over the place, one for geometric correction, another for polygon editing, and so on.
For this to go ahead (and this is the only insight I can boast), it was absolutely essential that the end-users themselves take possession of a tool. I could see, from the outside, that it was unbearable for these officers to have two or three engineers fussing over a keyboard, dealing with ancestral machines that crashed every five minutes before the VICOM (38) machine was available, and, in general, constantly asking someone else to do something; they couldn't really concentrate on their work. We thought that the priority would probably be to provide a tool that was easy to use, because you can't go into the wrong profession, intelligence work being in itself very complicated; nor was it a question of making the people who do it take six months of university courses. So the aim was to create a simple tool capable of bringing together all the tools we'd been able to invent up to now, with a binder that was as convenient as possible, and with menus in French that were as clear as possible. This gave rise to the idea of the OCAPI project (Outil Conversationnel d'Aide à la Photo Interprétation) which, as a cartographic tool for photo interpreters, became the guiding principle for the following years.
29 Matra Espace became the prime contractor for SPOT hardware starting from SPOT 2
30 FAS: Strategic Air Forces
31 FATAC TACtical Air Forces
32 CELAR: Armement Electronic Center in Bruz (Ille et Vilaine)
33 FTM: MTF, modulation transfer function
34 The CIPAA in St-Cyr School became the CEIAA in 1986 before being integrated in the Inter-armies Imagery Training and Interpretation center (CFIII) in 1993
35 Interview of lieutenant-colonel Graviere of CIPAA
36 Interview of lieutenant-colonel Capeli of CIPAA
37 CEPIA: Picture Interpreter Interpretation Center of the Army
38 We discovered that there was an American who had developed a machine, the VICOM machine. This American, William K. Pratt, was the author of the cult book on image processing (Digital Image Processing - 1978 - Wiley & Son). This machine was expensive but Defense justified the acquisition.
In March 1983, President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) raised awareness of the political and strategic stakes of space. A first multi-year military space plan was drawn up by the Groupe de Coordination Spatiale Militaire (GCSM), which I had the honor of chairing and which brought together engineers and staff officers. This enabled the Minister of Defense to approve, in May 1984, a plan describing all the programs that could be envisaged over the next fifteen years, including the European cooperative ventures we see taking shape today (1996). This plan was closely coordinated with the civil space plan within the CNES-DGA consultation group. The first Télécom I satellite was launched in August 1984 by the first Ariane 3, and declared operational in January 1985.... March 1985 saw the creation of the Ministry of Defense's Groupe d'Etudes Spatiales (GES), chaired by the Major General of the Armed Forces Staff, with the DGA's Director of Engines as Vice-Chairman. This group, supported by the GCSM, was then in charge of the PPSM, which placed space affairs at a level of responsibility comparable to that of military nuclear affairs.
The decision was then taken to launch a military space observation program named Helios, after the ancient Greek god of the Sun. The program included two major improvements over the SAMRO project, enabling higher resolution images to be taken, and a significant reduction in the time needed to access information.
The decision was then taken to launch a military space observation program named Helios, after the ancient Greek god of the Sun. The program included two major improvements over the SAMRO project, enabling higher resolution images to be taken, and a significant reduction in the time needed to access information.
The chapter then discusses HELIOS.
Another source is
The SAMRO Program 1977-1982: First space military reconnaissance program
By Jean Jacques Dechezelles in Strategiques, 2021/2 (#126-7) p 86 which is linked
The SAMRO program was designed to meet the need for strategic intelligence for our deterrent forces. Indeed, the development of deterrent weapons meant that we needed to know, count and locate potential targets more accurately. The range of ballistic vectors, counted in thousands of kilometers, considerably multiplied the number of potential targets. French staffs lacked data on targets at these great distances. As Admiral Louzeau (1) testifies in an account containing the following extract
"My first contribution on the subject of space-based reconnaissance came when I was a member of the Forces Nucléaires FN staff. We had put together a small team from the Air Force and Navy, including Colonel Marguain (Air). We were working on the target files. More specifically, we were looking at the remote targets that could be assigned with the necessary precision to the ballistic vectors we had at our disposal in nuclear forces of various types. Our analysis of the available information, maps and plans led us to the conclusion that the geographical locations were all inaccurate, and that even the plans of major urban infrastructures collected on site had been deliberately distorted. The need for better established imagery, given the sheer number of targets, was pressing, but this was debated with politicians, who routinely said we didn't need the details."
The air force staff was reluctant to support this program. Nevertheless, the DGA, which took the initiative in drawing up the program, did not hesitate to call on Air Force specialists, experts in the field of photo-interpretation, by crediting them to look into the possibilities of exploiting space imagery.
"My first contribution on the subject of space-based reconnaissance came when I was a member of the Forces Nucléaires FN staff. We had put together a small team from the Air Force and Navy, including Colonel Marguain (Air). We were working on the target files. More specifically, we were looking at the remote targets that could be assigned with the necessary precision to the ballistic vectors we had at our disposal in nuclear forces of various types. Our analysis of the available information, maps and plans led us to the conclusion that the geographical locations were all inaccurate, and that even the plans of major urban infrastructures collected on site had been deliberately distorted. The need for better established imagery, given the sheer number of targets, was pressing, but this was debated with politicians, who routinely said we didn't need the details."
The air force staff was reluctant to support this program. Nevertheless, the DGA, which took the initiative in drawing up the program, did not hesitate to call on Air Force specialists, experts in the field of photo-interpretation, by crediting them to look into the possibilities of exploiting space imagery.
The prospect of observation from space, studied in the early 1960s at LRBA with the VSOP project, involved the atmospheric re-entry of containers of photographic film. The laboratory prototype stage was reached, but the project was too ambitious for the technology available. Another obstacle was the lack of a French or European satellite launcher with sufficient payload capacity. Successive versions of the Europa launcher, developed by the European intergovernmental organization CECLES-ELDO, were all failures, and the last unsuccessful attempt, from the Guiana Space Center on November 4, 1971, was followed by the decision to stop the program for good. This situation, compounded by the need to call on NASA for the launch of the Franco-German Symphonie telecommunications satellites (1974-1975), led to the positive reaction, initiated by France, which enabled European partners to agree on the European Ariane program, in July 1973, with a first launch in December 1979.
With the prospect of the Ariane launcher, the DTEn launched the study of a space reconnaissance system with the support of military establishments (LRBA, ETCA, CELAR), the contribution of experts from the French Air Force and the involvement of industry (SNIAS, MATRA, Thomson-CSF, Sodern, SEP). Jean Corbeau (3), who had supervised the VSOP preparatory studies at LRBA, directed these studies as director of the Space Group created within DTEn. As early as 1976, CNES engineers were invited to attend industry presentations at pre-project meetings held in Puteaux. An essential technological leap forward facilitated high-resolution observation and confirmed the choice of optical means for target recognition from space. The emergence in the early 1970s of CCD (Charge Coupled Device) technology enabled detection in the visible and very near infrared range, outperforming all previous processes. Not only did it deliver excellent sensitivity, but it also simplified the shooting process, eliminating the need for mechanical scanning of the field of view.
In 1977, DGA and CNES came together under a DTEn/CNES agreement to develop a multi-mission satellite platform capable of fulfilling both a civilian SPOT mission and a separate defense mission. The DGA is making a financial contribution to the development of the platform, and a joint committee known as the “SPOT Committee” has been set up. The optical reconnaissance mission for defense will be served by dedicated SAMRO satellites (Satellite Militaire de Reconnaissance Optique, the official name from November 1977). IPA Claude Roche, assigned to the DTEn, is named SAMRO program director. His task was to set up the technical and programmatic architecture that would lead to a decision to commit to a program that would satisfy the needs expressed, materialized by a program sheet issued at headquarters level. The program team will coordinate the efforts of several sectors and reconcile their contributions:
-Of the various military research establishments or organizations, LRBA, ETCA, CELAR, ONERA, SCTI, STTA and DRET ;
-Of Air Force experts to judge the quality of space images for target recognition purposes;
-Of the industry, which is involved in numerous consultations on both the system level and the critical elements contributing to the definition and development of the SAMRO satellite's specific reconnaissance payload.
A general technical specification for SAMRO is drawn up, from which a draft program sheet is derived (ref. n°495/EMA/FN). A lengthy comparison of spatial and photometric resolution requirements between civil observation (SPOT) and military reconnaissance was to form the political-technical touchstone for the SAMRO program. The debate, right up to the highest levels of defence, is based on two questions: whether or not the SPOT civil mission can satisfy the strategic military needs identified, and whether SAMRO can do much better than SPOT. These questions involve both ends of the image chain. On the one hand, the feasibility of the EPV SAMRO imaging instrument is at the heart of the technical debate on the military satellite side; on the other, for a given instrumental performance, what information can be obtained at photo-interpretation level? A comparison of the respective capabilities of SPOT and SAMRO will have to be carried out within the armed forces.
In 1977, DGA and CNES came together under a DTEn/CNES agreement to develop a multi-mission satellite platform capable of fulfilling both a civilian SPOT mission and a separate defense mission. The DGA is making a financial contribution to the development of the platform, and a joint committee known as the “SPOT Committee” has been set up. The optical reconnaissance mission for defense will be served by dedicated SAMRO satellites (Satellite Militaire de Reconnaissance Optique, the official name from November 1977). IPA Claude Roche, assigned to the DTEn, is named SAMRO program director. His task was to set up the technical and programmatic architecture that would lead to a decision to commit to a program that would satisfy the needs expressed, materialized by a program sheet issued at headquarters level. The program team will coordinate the efforts of several sectors and reconcile their contributions:
-Of the various military research establishments or organizations, LRBA, ETCA, CELAR, ONERA, SCTI, STTA and DRET ;
-Of Air Force experts to judge the quality of space images for target recognition purposes;
-Of the industry, which is involved in numerous consultations on both the system level and the critical elements contributing to the definition and development of the SAMRO satellite's specific reconnaissance payload.
A general technical specification for SAMRO is drawn up, from which a draft program sheet is derived (ref. n°495/EMA/FN). A lengthy comparison of spatial and photometric resolution requirements between civil observation (SPOT) and military reconnaissance was to form the political-technical touchstone for the SAMRO program. The debate, right up to the highest levels of defence, is based on two questions: whether or not the SPOT civil mission can satisfy the strategic military needs identified, and whether SAMRO can do much better than SPOT. These questions involve both ends of the image chain. On the one hand, the feasibility of the EPV SAMRO imaging instrument is at the heart of the technical debate on the military satellite side; on the other, for a given instrumental performance, what information can be obtained at photo-interpretation level? A comparison of the respective capabilities of SPOT and SAMRO will have to be carried out within the armed forces.
Initial contact was established between the DTEn project (via the LRBA's Chezelles IPA) and CIPAA, represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Cocot. Working methods were very different, hampered by the very modest resolution of the space images available (NASA's Landsat mission with a resolution of 80 m). The method requested by DTEn for correlating maps and spatial images did not correspond to the interpreter's usual work, i.e. detecting detail, recognizing its nature and identifying it. The interview concluded with a request for CIPAA's participation in the study undertaken by DTEn and LRBA. This request was initially turned down, before General Forget (Deputy Chief of Operations) agreed to CIPAA's participation and the association with CIPAT. The DGA covered the costs incurred for this participation. Lieutenant-Colonel Cocot then set up a CIPAA studies section staffed by officers and non-commissioned officers.
The space imagery was digitally discretized, which was a major difference from the photographic images on film that were operationally delivered to CIPAA. For its part, CELAR, in Mr. Busson's department, had expertise in image digitization and in the efficiency of the compression algorithms needed to reduce data rates. A sharing of skills and a synergy of results ensued, to the benefit of the SAMRO project and the analysis of the satisfaction of the need expressed for target intelligence. CIPAA was tasked with establishing the best spectral observing template(s) within the detection band of the CCD detector. To this end, missions were carried out by the 33rd Reconnaissance Wing using OMERA 33 airborne cameras. For its part, CELAR needed high quality, wide-field aerial photographs to generate digitized images representative of the ground sampling step of the EPV instrument. Captain Gravière, head of the CIPAA Studies Division, selected suitable films from the air force photo library. While waiting for new ways of displaying digitized images on screen, CIPAA was imaginative, as can be seen in the photograph of the device designed by Captain Gravière, comprising television cameras focusing on aerial photo negatives.
At CELAR, where digital simulations were carried out, the computer used magnetic tapes containing digitized image data. Evaluation, in the presence of CIPAA experts, was always carried out using the same analysis grid drawn from Stanag's recognition and identification standards. Simulation parameters included
different sampling steps;
▪ variations in the MTF (modulation transfer function) associated with the sensitivity and contrast of the imaging instrument;
▪ degraded modes of the CCD detector;
▪ various compression modes;
▪ the effects of the transmission chain in modulation and then demodulation.
In this way, the various thresholds at which interpretation would give a conclusive result could be identified, the result obviously being better when the step is smaller and the FTM suitable.
The space imagery was digitally discretized, which was a major difference from the photographic images on film that were operationally delivered to CIPAA. For its part, CELAR, in Mr. Busson's department, had expertise in image digitization and in the efficiency of the compression algorithms needed to reduce data rates. A sharing of skills and a synergy of results ensued, to the benefit of the SAMRO project and the analysis of the satisfaction of the need expressed for target intelligence. CIPAA was tasked with establishing the best spectral observing template(s) within the detection band of the CCD detector. To this end, missions were carried out by the 33rd Reconnaissance Wing using OMERA 33 airborne cameras. For its part, CELAR needed high quality, wide-field aerial photographs to generate digitized images representative of the ground sampling step of the EPV instrument. Captain Gravière, head of the CIPAA Studies Division, selected suitable films from the air force photo library. While waiting for new ways of displaying digitized images on screen, CIPAA was imaginative, as can be seen in the photograph of the device designed by Captain Gravière, comprising television cameras focusing on aerial photo negatives.
At CELAR, where digital simulations were carried out, the computer used magnetic tapes containing digitized image data. Evaluation, in the presence of CIPAA experts, was always carried out using the same analysis grid drawn from Stanag's recognition and identification standards. Simulation parameters included
different sampling steps;
▪ variations in the MTF (modulation transfer function) associated with the sensitivity and contrast of the imaging instrument;
▪ degraded modes of the CCD detector;
▪ various compression modes;
▪ the effects of the transmission chain in modulation and then demodulation.
In this way, the various thresholds at which interpretation would give a conclusive result could be identified, the result obviously being better when the step is smaller and the FTM suitable.
The DTEn/STEn program team has been strengthened. In addition to its director, Claude Roche, it includes Nicolas de Chézelles (LRBA), Jean-Jacques Dordain (ONERA), Michel Dages (SCTI), François Naville (STTA) and M. Busson (CELAR). Lieutenant-Colonel (Air) Jean Marguain is designated by the EMA as SAMRO officer. The CIPAA (French Air Force) begins to provide documented advice. In May, the French Minister of Defense requests a performance comparison between an upgraded SPOT and SAMRO, and announces that SAMRO will be included in the 5th military programming law. The SAMRO system definition includes a space segment, satellites and their ground control system, a Mission Center and a user ground segment. The space segment and the user ground segment are linked by the end-to-end image chain. In July, SNIAS and MATRA were again asked to supplement the EPV proposals with an additional imaging mode offering a factor-of-two improvement in sharpness. In September, program management proposed SNIAS's EPV proposal to the DTEn director. The analysis of the industrial distribution over the whole program is analyzed and evaluated within the DTEn. Because of the SPOT program, with MATRA's responsibility as satellite integrator, SNIAS applies for the role of industrial system architect with the DTEn, as well as major responsibility for development of the Mission Center.
Thomson-CSF will be present both in space for the image telemetry chain and on the ground for the various transmission and reception stations. SEP will contribute equipment for the user segment. SNIAS and MATRA have been asked to provide an analytical costing of the program's industrial costs; comparative evaluations will be taken into account by DGA/DTEn.
Thomson-CSF will be present both in space for the image telemetry chain and on the ground for the various transmission and reception stations. SEP will contribute equipment for the user segment. SNIAS and MATRA have been asked to provide an analytical costing of the program's industrial costs; comparative evaluations will be taken into account by DGA/DTEn.
ICA Daniel Pichoud succeeds Jean Corbeau as head of Groupe Espace, a position he holds until 1990. The SAMRO program management team expanded again, with IA Edwige Bonnevie joining at the end of 1980 and IA Joël Chenet at the beginning of 1982. The French President approached the Minister of Defense with a request that SPOT precede the military satellite, and that the amount of work to be included in the 1983-1988 program be evaluated. The relationship between the SPOT and SAMRO projects was clarified at an Élysée cabinet meeting, confirming DGA/DTEn as the SAMRO prime contractor, and establishing CNES as the delegated technical manager for the space segment. On November 10, 1981, the design phase was completed, and DTEn was in a position to issue the technical requirements specifications (STB) for the detailed definition phase (Phase B). The satellite launch target was set for the end of 1987.
On June 2, 1982, François Mitterrand presided over a Defense Council meeting at which the reduced budgetary implications were discussed. The fate of the SAMRO program was about to change. At the end of July, DGA and DTEn confirmed the suspension of the program to CNES and Industry. The preparatory development contracts with SNIAS for the EPV and with ENERTEC for the magnetic recorder are nevertheless maintained. CCD detector production was launched in France by Thomson at St Egrève, with the help of a DGT (Telecommunications) contract. On October 8, 1982, the Minister of Defense, Charles Hernu, wrote officially about the SAMRO program: “Due to budgetary constraints and national defense priorities, we have decided to postpone the program. (...) The 1984-1988(4) military plan currently being drawn up will, once adopted, provide a clearer picture of the medium- and long-term prospects for satellite optical reconnaissance and the conditions for resuming the SAMRO program".
The work of bringing together skills in satellite image processing and intelligence extraction has begun within the armed forces. Edwige Bonnevie, who was part of DTEn's Space Group as SAMRO System Engineer, closely monitored this synergy. Launched for the SAMRO evaluation, then consolidated by the launch of the PPSM plan, space image simulations will progress by involving a number of players. During the 1982-1985 period, CELAR (5) continued to refine the expression of image quality requirements (resolution, FTM (6), admissible compression rate, correction algorithms) initiated under the SAMRO program, with a move towards broader intelligence than that dedicated to the needs of the Nuclear Forces. This work continues to involve CIPAA (7) personnel, later joined by those of CIRIP (Army), and calls for new FAS airborne missions on Mirage IV and FATAC aircraft. In parallel with CELAR's activities, CEPIA (8) was set up in 1982 on the premises of ETCA Arcueil in the Paris region. Its role is to carry out experiments focused on the end of the image chain, i.e. the actual use of images and the associated computerized technical resources.
And third, a SAMRO Brochure, thanks to Franck_Laidin on twitter.
Translation:
The SAMRO system is made of
-a satellite based on the platform of the SPOT probationary earth observation satellite (a CNES program), and a payload comprising a camera and an adapter box, all designed to meet military requirements. Compared with SPOT, the imaging mode is different, the observation resolution is much greater, and the protections provided correspond to those required for a military system.
-a ground-based transmitter-receiver center, an operational center, an in-orbit control center and an image processing center.
The main problems to be solved lie in the camera assembly and the on-board recording system, which stores images until the satellite passes within sight of the ground station.
The DTEN responsible for the overall system is currently carrying out design and definition work, with the assistance of CNES for the satellite and the camera system, focusing primarily on the above-mentioned problems. Once this work has been completed, the actual development work can begin.
