So Hooker, on arrival at Bristol, was plunged headlong into a crisis. He soon realised he had a crisis of organisation as well as a hardware problem. He tried to be a good co-operator with no job title with Owner but the team below him was problematic ... the Mansell brothers were both shy and retiring; Swinchatt did not believe in turbines and felt the future was Centaurus, his view being supported by Norman Rowbotham, the engineM/D. There was no collaboration between Design and Development with Design often acting unilaterally.
By mid-1950 the Proteus was at crisis level... Hooker and Owner were summoned to Rowbotham's office; also present was an old friend of Hooker's -Reginald Verdon Smith director and grandson of the founder. Owner was moved sideways and Hooker put in charge.
Hooker soon kicked piston engines out to production area and came up with a stronger more focussed management team.
Time was against them and it was agreed the first Princess (Brabazon had been cancelled) would fly with underpowered Proteus 2; meanwhile Bristol would go ahead with the Proteus 3 to deliver the right power at the right weight. So the third redesign began which we will cover in another post.
In order to have an engine available for the first Princess it was agreed to install ten of the Proteus 2s which would be cleared for flight at 2,500hp. The Twin-Proteus had been tested for 1600 hrs in a specially built hangar and the gearbox seemed to be one more part that gave heartache.
The first and only Princess to fly achieved a total of 100 hrs flying time.
In Saunders-Roe's opinion Development problems were of many kinds but the most challenging are included in the list attached.
Hooker's view was that both the big aircraft were doomed and the Britannia was the best bet. As they considered the redesign they thought of straightening out the flow but the Princess was still on the books so they stuck with the existing flow path.
