Does 'Flexible Response' NEED 'massive Retaliation' first?

[Rule of cool]

The 'Massive Retaliation' era ~1957-1967 appears to have skewed Defence Projects and Procurement compared to what occurred previously and what occurred in the 'Flexible Response' era where conventional forces were given much greater priority compared to nuclear forces. This made me think that if the move to 'Massive Retaliation' was pushed back a couple of years and 'Flexible Response' was bought forward a couple of years then there would be less need for 1,000 Minuteman missiles, 41 USN SSBNs, 116 B58 Hustlers etc and more need for cool toys that aren't going to end the world.

But!

Is 'Flexible Response' only possible because of the 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs, 41 USN plus RN and MN SSBNs and tens of thousands of nuclear warheads? To go directly from 'WW2 with a few (small) nukes' to 'Flexible Response' without the huge nuclear arsenal built up in the 'Massive Retaliation' era asking for trouble, therefore dreaming up alternative planes, tanks and ships in this era can't be unlimited?

 

[okakac]

Thahn Hoa/Dragon's Jaw. Hundreds of sorties; still standing. Move it to Central Europe, multiply by ten or fifty. As you have to interdict the logistic movements of Warsaw Pact or the Second Echelon itself. Simply can not be done with iron bombs.

Then you get guided weapons. LGBs for the bridges, AAMs to engage interceptors so that your attack force can keep the LGBs to attack the bridges.

War at jet speed was quite a waste of money before working guided weapons. Massive Retaliation accepts that without even telling the Airforce staff officers. Flexible Response allows you to conduct Colonial Warfare without risking foreign advisors. Nothing flexible before Texas Instruments...

 

[Archibald]

41 For Freedom: 16 tubes each, total 656 Polaris launch tubes. Later with three warheads, total 1968 nukes.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

41 For Freedom: 16 tubes each, total 656 Polaris launch tubes. Later with three warheads, total 1968 nukes.

Later still, 31 of the boats get UGM-73 Poseidon, let's assume an average of 10 warheads per missile (the full 14 would not be usually carried, as that reduced missile range to 1800 nautical miles and warhead crossrange to zero), that's 4960 W68s, on top of the 480 W58s from the 10 remaining boats with Poseidon, for a total of 5440 nuclear warheads.

 

[zen]

Is 'Flexible Response' only possible because of the 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs, 41 USN plus RN and MN SSBNs and tens of thousands of nuclear warheads? To go directly from 'WW2 with a few (small) nukes' to 'Flexible Response' without the huge nuclear arsenal built up in the 'Massive Retaliation' era asking for trouble, therefore dreaming up alternative planes, tanks and ships in this era can't be unlimited?

Good question.

Under the 'cover' of massive arsenals of nuclear weapons, the inescapable logic drives the realisation you cannot engage 'limited use', and the concept of 'managed exchange' is unworkable.
For either to work, each side has to have high trust in the other. Virtually the opposite of why you'd use even one nuclear weapon.

Now you're staring down the barrel of Armageddon.
One flies, they all fly.
And not only you be a target.
Everyone is a target.
But you be a target for everyone with nukes.....

And now what do you do, when something happens and you actually have to act but not trigger civilisation ending WWIII?

Time for precision.

 

[Desertfox]

Massive retaliation was also partially driven by the "Bomber gap" and the "Missile gap", so I would say yes you can go to "Flexible Response" without having to go thru "Massive retaliation".

 

[Avimimus]

By the way - an interesting bit of analysis - computer the numbers with the sides reversed... what did it look like from a Soviet perspective?

Throughout most of the Cold War, the bomber gap, and later the missile gap, was enormous - it as just skewed in favour of the U.S.

I think that recognising this (and understanding what the situation looked like from 'the other side') is absolutely essential if we want to understand what was actually happening/playing out in terms of perceptions, policy, and consequences.

 

[Rule of cool]

IIUC one supporting pillar of massive retaliation was the inability for NATO to stop a Soviet/WP conventional offensive with conventional weapons in the era. This started to change with the introduction of the Helicopter with ATGMs in the 2nd half of the 60s, initial projections is they could score a 45:1 kill ratio against tanks.

Another pillar supporting massive retaliation was the Soviets embracing ballistic missiles in the big way. Up until the late 50s NATO air superiority made it likely they would come out on top in WW3, but air superiority meant nothing to ~600 SS-4 and ~100 SS-5. The only way to deal with these missiles was deterrence by retaliation, and I suppose a massive attack can only be deterred by massive retaliation.

I don't know how to change either of these factors.

 

[okakac]

Tank Armies on the Western Side. Might come out more expensive than nuclear weapons.

Russian nuclear weapons, especially their rockets are a frantic response to Western advantages in megatonnage and delivery means. They weren't exactly treehuggers but reportedly quite frightened most of the time. Massive Retaliation strategy arguably was more successful for the Soviets.

 

[paralay]

I am sure that the next war, after the Russian-Ukrainian one, will be with the widespread use of tactical nuclear weapons. Massive strikes with conventional weapons for two years are available only to the Great Powers and do not lead to a quick victory.

 

[uk 75]

The defining moments that changed Western strategy were the 1961 Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuba crisis.
The Kennedy brothers were shocked to find that they had no nuclear options other than all out strikes against the Soviet Union and China.
Chancellor Adenauer was dismayed to face losing all of West Germany in order to defend West Berlin.
Both the US and W Germany recognised that conventional forces in Europe had to be strengthened both to defend W Germany as forward as possible and delay the use of nuclear weapons.
It took some time for NATO to adapt its forces. France was so upset by the change that it withdrew its forces from NATO command and developed its nuclear forces as a clear warning not to venture into France.
The nuclear forces that were the hallmark of massive release were all American. The few weapons available to Bomber Command were a small percentage of what the US forces had plus the US weapons operated by NATO allies.
The emergence of W Germany as a military and economic power greater than France or the UK makes flexible response both necessary (Germans did not want to be dead not red) and achievable (The Bundeswehr is the most effective force in NATO after the US).

 

[Michel Van]

To put in context the SIOP plans were in way 'Flexible Response' special the later one in 1980s

The early 1960 SIOP plans were only Flexible in number of Nuclear waves fired on Soviets in way they react.
SAC consider for target Moscow in first wave, a total drop of 100 MT by ICBM, MRBM, Bombers and SLBM.
(also to drop at least 3 nukes upon every Target of SIOP list.)
If Soviets strike back the next wave of Nukes until US run out of Nukes or no one survive in USSR...

in 1970s and 1980s SIOP were more Flexible in number of nuke used in conventional World War 3 to total nuclear war.
Here SAC distinguish unter Counterstrike and Countervalue
Counterstrike is option to destroy the Enemy military asset like ICBM silos in first strike senario
Countervalue is launch during Enemy attack and destroy him totally, by target his cities and industry zones.

 

[Rule of cool]

The defining moments that changed Western strategy were the 1961 Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuba crisis.
The Kennedy brothers were shocked to find that they had no nuclear options other than all out strikes against the Soviet Union and China.
Chancellor Adenauer was dismayed to face losing all of West Germany in order to defend West Berlin.
Both the US and W Germany recognised that conventional forces in Europe had to be strengthened both to defend W Germany as forward as possible and delay the use of nuclear weapons.
It took some time for NATO to adapt its forces. France was so upset by the change that it withdrew its forces from NATO command and developed its nuclear forces as a clear warning not to venture into France.
The nuclear forces that were the hallmark of massive release were all American. The few weapons available to Bomber Command were a small percentage of what the US forces had plus the US weapons operated by NATO allies.
The emergence of W Germany as a military and economic power greater than France or the UK makes flexible response both necessary (Germans did not want to be dead not red) and achievable (The Bundeswehr is the most effective force in NATO after the US).

I read somewhere that by the 60s there was an agreement within NATO that nuclear strikes west of the IGB were to be less than 200kt, which is why the British WE.177C is 190kt.

The numbers are hazy now but when I studied the Cuban Missile Crisis at Uni IIRC the Soviets could only land a max of ~340 nukes on CONUS, mostly from bombers but a handful of ICBMs and SLBMs and apparently only ~10% of this was expected to survive US strikes and defences. However even ~34 nukes landing on CONUS was enough to deter JFK from launching the massive retaliation strike. Of course, at the same time Western Europe would have eaten at least 1000 'Euro-strategic' nukes, ie not battlefield nukes. There had to be a better way of dealing with nukes than all or nothing.

 

[Rule of cool]

To put in context the SIOP plans were in way 'Flexible Response' special the later one in 1980s

The early 1960 SIOP plans were only Flexible in number of Nuclear waves fired on Soviets in way they react.
SAC consider for target Moscow in first wave, a total drop of 100 MT by ICBM, MRBM, Bombers and SLBM.
(also to drop at least 3 nukes upon every Target of SIOP list.)
If Soviets strike back the next wave of Nukes until US run out of Nukes or no one survive in USSR...

in 1970s and 1980s SIOP were more Flexible in number of nuke used in conventional World War 3 to total nuclear war.
Here SAC distinguish unter Counterstrike and Countervalue
Counterstrike is option to destroy the Enemy military asset like ICBM silos in first strike senario
Countervalue is launch during Enemy attack and destroy him totally, by target his cities and industry zones.

Yes, it would have taken time to get from the 1961-62 situation to a 'fully flexible' response. Also there were expected to be a large number of duds, so each strategic target had to eat 3 warheads to ensure its destruction.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Well, Korea was a bit of a surprise that it didn't go nuclear.

Yes, that's mostly because the US didn't actually have enough nukes to use, but that wasn't the impression that the US was giving the world.

I am sure that the next war, after the Russian-Ukrainian one, will be with the widespread use of tactical nuclear weapons. Massive strikes with conventional weapons for two years are available only to the Great Powers and do not lead to a quick victory.

While I agree with your analysis, I really hope you're wrong. Because I don't see any use of tactical nukes that doesn't lead inexorably to a full strategic exchange.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think you can't have a flexible response if you don't have a large array of different weapons to provide the options.

 

[uk 75]

There was quite a gap between opting for flexible response and getting NATO equipped to do it.
The Bundeswehr and US Army had poor training and morale issues which were not sorted out until the Schmidt reforms in W Germany and the end of the Vietnam war for the US. Even then it took until the 1980s for equipment like Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams to enter service along with US Apaches and A10s that made a determined conventional forward defence possible.
Even then the US had to provide early reinforcement with III Corps in N Germany to make up for the continuing weaknesses of the Belgians, Brits and Dutch. BAOR still reckoned on having to ask for nuclear release earlier than suited NATO.

 

[uk 75]

The nightmare scenario that never happened was US use of tactical nukes in Vietnam to relieve its besieged forces.
There are some parallels with US use of SAC B52s to bomb Hanoi (the first time Gs went to war) and current Russian use of Tu95s and cruise missiles to hit Ukraine.
As far as I know the USSR and China never considered giving N Vietnam the means to hit US bases in Thailand and Guam, which would be analagous to using US supplied weapons to hit targets in Russia and Belarus.
Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons would depend on the circumstances making their use more decisive than Russia's existing array of weapons. Assuming that they would not be used against cities (ceasing to be tactical) then the example of possible US use in Vietnam is instructive. Unless a significant military defeat could be avoided by using a nuke the downsides of doing so are too great, even for Putin.
Once a tactical nuclear weapon is used by Russia the West will be faced with an awful choice. Hitting Russian bases even with NATO conventional strikes will give Putin an excuse to widen the war to launching airstrikes on NATO countries with weak air defences Worse still Russia can carry on using its tactical nuclear weapons where it chooses knowing that NATO will not start a nuclear war by responding in kind.
As with Chamberlain's fear of Germany bombing London in 1938 (they couldn't until capturing French airfields) the West is more deterred by its own deterrent than its opponent. Even when war broke out in 1939 the RAF was not permitted to bomb the Ruhr while Germany wiped out Warsaw. Ukraine and Russia know this all too well.
And contrary to popular caricatures Chamberlain was a cleverer and more decisive politician than any of the West's current leaders.

 

[alertken]

uk75#18: giving N Vietnam the means to hit US bases in Thailand.
That would have been done by Sov personnel because the kit was complex, which is why Putin now says Ukraine's use of Storm Shadow et al is evidence he is fighting NATO: minions can't cope with clever. But today they can: spotty kids can hack amok. The asymmetric Threat is just as great as the NBC Threat...greater if you think a rational actor will be deterred from NBC, but that he can deny his use of cyber and sabotage.

A to OP's Q is RoC #16. Flexible & Appropriate Response was additional to, not replacement for MAD. It was the solution to FRG's quandary of watching idly as others danced mushrooms on its territory. That had diverted effort from 1961 to hardware notions of mixed-manned AW Forces. The software solution was FRG joining NATO Nuclear Planning Grp and 16/1/68 adoption of MC14/3,Final . Healey-Schröder Report to NPG 29/5/69 led to “Provisional Political Guidelines for Initial DefensiveTactical (AW)Use”. Protectors would confine detonations <200kT in FRG. The context was to overcome "suicide or surrender" faced with an iron thrust to Bremen. Nuclear Rattling Threat to capitals continues to be deterred by MAD.

 

[Rule of cool]

“Provisional Political Guidelines for Initial DefensiveTactical (AW)Use”. Protectors would confine detonations <200kT in FRG.

I wondered when that became policy, it was the reason why the WE.177C was 190kt. Initially the RAF wanted something like 300 x 300kt and 100 x 100kt WE.177s, but in 1962 the British Cabinet capped the yield at 10 or 20kt, which the WE.177A was.

However the original point remains, you can be flexible with nuclear weapons deliver when you have enough to deliver, by the early 60s the RAF for example had enough Yellow Suns, US nukes and Red Beards that they could be choosy on what they dropped on whom.