Divergence on the Runway: An Alternate History of Military Aviation (1956-1982)

kpuscas

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Quick background:

I like building what-if scale model aircraft, especially cold-war timeframe and I have a collection of kits that I wanted to weave into a comprehensive story. To that end as a thought experiment I did a little alternative history. The timeline basically starts in the late 50s to the early 80s. The timeline is driven by a couple of key what-if events that will be pretty clear once you read it. Now obviously I had to take many liberties with the likelihood of some events, decisions, politics, technical details etc… but in the end it's really about wanting to build some interesting kits.

Now the really interesting part of this was I took a rather stale, bullet-point timeline and fed it to Google's Gemini AI. We've been playing around with a number of AI tools at work lately. I asked it to take the time line and write it up for an aviation-history audience. Surprisingly what the AI came up with is actually pretty good. It pulled in some additional relevant facts that I didn't give it (example the competitors for West German fighter evaluations) and had a pretty good understanding of the context of the events and their meaning (such as the importance of the USAF buying some F-107s). The Gemini AI came up with the content, the title, sub-headings, etc... I made a couple of small tweaks but this is 95% AI generated. I'm not that good a writer. So purely as entertainment, here is what it generated.


1956: The USAF Ultra Sabre Lives
In a move with lasting repercussions, the USAF hedges its bets. The F-105 Thunderchief becomes the primary fighter-bomber, but production lines for the potent F-107 remain open, with the USAF going ahead with the original purchase of 30 aircraft, catering to allies seeking a dedicated strike platform. This dual-pronged approach sets the stage for a transatlantic twist.

West Germany's Fighter Feud (1957-1960):
The scramble is on as West Germany seeks a next-generation fighter to replace its aging F-84s and F-86s. The competition is fierce, with the American F-104 Starfighter, French Mirage III, and British English Electric Lightning all vying for the lucrative contract. However, a bribery scandal erupts in 1959, derailing the F-104 selection and casting a long shadow over its reputation.

Canada Steps Up (1958-1961):
In a surprising turn, Canada throws a curveball. They select the F-107 for license production under the designation CF-107, a decision likely influenced by the USAF's continued interest in the platform. This bolsters Canada's nuclear strike capabilities and complements their existing CF-105 Arrow interceptor program.

The Rise of the F-8I Crusader (1962-1964):
Across the Atlantic, a new contender emerges. Chance-Vought Aerospace (CVA) proposes a collaborative venture with West Germany to develop a multi-role export fighter based on the F-8 Crusader. Dubbed the F-8I Crusader (International), this aircraft promises advanced capabilities at a competitive price. The F-8I boasts a strengthened wing, additional air-to-ground ordnance options, and co-production agreements with Messerschmitt and Dornier, solidifying a significant international partnership. The F-8I's success lures further partners, with Italy's Fiat and Spain's CASA joining the program in 1964.

UK Military Aviation Scramble (1964-1967):
While the F-8I enjoys international acclaim, the United Kingdom faces a different reality. The cancellation of new aircraft carriers forces the Royal Navy to re-evaluate its fighter needs. The high cost of retrofitting existing carriers and the F-4 Phantom program leads to the abandonment of the FAA's F-4K/M project. Desperate for a solution, the FAA explores two seat a carrier-borne variant of the F-8 (designated FR.8), leveraging the French F-8E(FN) and equipped with Red Top air-to-air missiles. The RAF, meanwhile, opts for a straight purchase of F-4D Phantoms however budget constraints result in only 78 Phantoms purchased. As an offset to the injured UK aerospace industry and capitalizing on the groundwork laid for the F-4K/M, an agreement with the US is reached to establish MRO facilities in the UK for servicing all European based Phantoms. However, the UK's woes continue as the joint AFVG program with France is cancelled in 1967, further narrowing their strike options. Mounting costs and project delays with the F-111K program force its cancellation as well, leaving the RAF without a clear path forward for either deep strike or long-term air defense needs.

The Rise and Fall of Panavia (1968-1973):
In an attempt to forge a European air combat solution, Panavia, a multinational consortium formed by the UK, West Germany, Netherlands, and Italy, is established in 1968. However, tensions and disagreements over design philosophy and cost-sharing lead to the Netherlands and Italy pulling out by 1972, effectively dissolving the consortium.

A Scramble for Solutions (1974-1978):
With the collapse of Panavia in 1972, the landscape for European fighter development shifts dramatically. West Germany moves first by reigniting its partnership with CVA, this time for a follow-on to the successful F-8I. The ambitious "Super Crusader" emerges, based on the Super V-1000 proposal, offering improved performance and multi-role capabilities. The F-8S Super Crusader program is officially launched in 1974, featuring a strengthened wing with multiple hardpoints, a powerful engine, and a new multi-mode radar

Italy, left without a clear path forward for a new generation fighter, makes a surprising move. In a bid to bridge the capability gap, they select the Swedish SAAB 37 Viggen family for its air-air, air-ground and reconnaissance needs, striking a co-production deal with Aeritalia.

The UK's Fighter Conundrum (1974-1977):
With the MRCA no longer a solution the UK is back to the drawing board. The F-4E Phantom offers a familiar, if aging option, but the F-8S Super Crusader's multi-role capabilities and potential German collaboration are tempting. American offerings like the F-15 and F-14 boast impressive performance, but their high cost and air superiority focus make them less suitable. The dream of an indigenous British multi-role fighter lingers, but the harsh reality of financial constraints and the need for foreign partnerships becomes increasingly evident.

The Seeds of a New Partnership (1976-1978):
The UK, closely following the American F-16 and F-18 competitions, recognizes the limitations of single-engine fighters and the improbability of securing production licenses for the Hornet. Domestic development is a dead end without international collaboration. Enter Dassault Aviation of France with a bold proposal in 1977. The Mirage 4000, a privately funded new fighter project, is presented as a potential partnership opportunity. Intrigued by the Mirage 4000's capabilities and the prospect of manufacturing partnerships, the British government joins forces with Dassault on the program. Canada, also seeking a replacement for their aging CF-101 Voodoos (interceptors) and CF-107s (strike aircraft),joins the project in 1978. Canadair becomes a major partner, securing licensing and production rights for a variant designated the CF-4000.

Taking Flight: The New Guard Arrives (1977-1982):
The skies come alive with new metal as the first F-8S Super Crusader takes flight in 1977. Deliveries to Germany and Spain begin in 1979, while Greece selects the F-8S to replace its aging Mirage IIIs. Meanwhile, the first prototype of the Mirage 4000, designated FGR.3 by the RAF, takes to the skies in 1979. This advanced aircraft boasts a powerful engine, a sophisticated radar, and a variety of weapon options, solidifying its position as a true multi-role fighter. By 1982, the RAF receives its first operational FGR.3s, while the Canadian Air Force welcomes its initial CF-4000s. The arrival of these new fighters significantly bolsters the airpower of both nations, marking a turning point in their aerial defense capabilities.Australia even places an order for the FGR.3, further solidifying the type's international presence.

Looking Ahead: A New Era Dawns
This alternate timeline paints a fascinating picture of what could have been. The F-8I Crusader's success as a collaborative program paves the way for future partnerships, while the UK's struggle to find a suitable fighter highlights the challenges of balancing cost, capability needs, and international cooperation. The Mirage 4000 stands as a testament to the potential of privately funded, multinational fighter development. As we reach 1982, one wonders: Will this new era of international collaboration in combat aircraft design continue? How will the performance of the F-8S Super Crusader compare to its American counterparts? Will the success of the Mirage 4000 program pave the way for even deeper Franco-British-Canadian cooperation on future projects? This alternate history leaves us with a multitude of intriguing possibilities, a testament to the ever-evolving landscape of military aviation.
 
Intriguing project ... but here are some some spoilsport notes on the Canadian Forces and DND designations ...

The RCAF '10x' series designations began in response to Avro Canada model numbers. Since the C.101 navigational trainer concept died early on, the '101' number remained free for later use with an ex-USAF 'Century Series' fighter. The same was not true of the number '107' - it was already spoken for in the form of the RCAF's CP-107 Argus patrol aircraft.

So, to be more realistic, perhaps 'CF-117'? (The RW Dassault 20 CC-117 didn't enter service until 1967.)

However, the notion of a 'CF-4000' to match Dassault's Mirage 4000 number is, frankly, a ludicrous jump. You can also eliminate 'CF-140' from consideration - by 1978, the CP-140 Aurora was already in play (despite procurement numbers still being wobbly).

Adding to my growing pedantry, in 1982, there was no 'Canadian Air Force' to welcome 'CF-4000s'. At that stage, 'CAF' stood for the Canadian Armed Forces. Properly, the 'air force' was the Air Command element of the CAF.

You describe Canada's licensed F-107 as a programme which "bolsters Canada's nuclear strike capabilities and complements their existing CF-105 Arrow interceptor program." A nit-pick is that, like the RW CF-104, this would have created "Canada's nuclear strike capabilities" since no such role existed previously to "bolster".

And that "complements" raises other questions. Were Canadian-built F-107s fitted with Orenda Iroquois engines? Or, in your ATL, were all Arrows J75-P-3 powered? And, on that subject, for the F-107s to complement the CF-105s, the Arrow programme must survive. If the CF-105 persists, why would Canada be interested in the Mirage 4000?

I hope that the above is useful in tweaky your storyline -- I'm not just trying to be persnickety :)
 
Intriguing project ... but here are some some spoilsport notes on the Canadian Forces and DND designations ...

The RCAF '10x' series designations began in response to Avro Canada model numbers. Since the C.101 navigational trainer concept died early on, the '101' number remained free for later use with an ex-USAF 'Century Series' fighter. The same was not true of the number '107' - it was already spoken for in the form of the RCAF's CP-107 Argus patrol aircraft.

So, to be more realistic, perhaps 'CF-117'? (The RW Dassault 20 CC-117 didn't enter service until 1967.)

However, the notion of a 'CF-4000' to match Dassault's Mirage 4000 number is, frankly, a ludicrous jump. You can also eliminate 'CF-140' from consideration - by 1978, the CP-140 Aurora was already in play (despite procurement numbers still being wobbly).

Adding to my growing pedantry, in 1982, there was no 'Canadian Air Force' to welcome 'CF-4000s'. At that stage, 'CAF' stood for the Canadian Armed Forces. Properly, the 'air force' was the Air Command element of the CAF.

You describe Canada's licensed F-107 as a programme which "bolsters Canada's nuclear strike capabilities and complements their existing CF-105 Arrow interceptor program." A nit-pick is that, like the RW CF-104, this would have created "Canada's nuclear strike capabilities" since no such role existed previously to "bolster".

And that "complements" raises other questions. Were Canadian-built F-107s fitted with Orenda Iroquois engines? Or, in your ATL, were all Arrows J75-P-3 powered? And, on that subject, for the F-107s to complement the CF-105s, the Arrow programme must survive. If the CF-105 persists, why would Canada be interested in the Mirage 4000?

I hope that the above is useful in tweaky your storyline -- I'm not just trying to be persnickety :)
All fair , I didn't really pay any attention to proper naming, just took the lazy "put a 'C" in front of it" approach. I might go back and ask the AI what convention would be correct. Be interesting to see what it says.

I did think about the engine. Since part of this little experiment was playing around with the Google AI I asked it if it thought the Iroquois engine was an option for a CF-107. I don't have the exact chat conversation handy but basically it said it could have been an option though would have probably had a slight negative impact on performance. I did assume that the Arrow did befall its same fate largely to make the Mirage offering all that more imperative as a replacement for the Voodoo.
 
All fair , I didn't really pay any attention to proper naming, just took the lazy "put a 'C" in front of it" approach. I might go back and ask the AI what convention would be correct. Be interesting to see what it says.

I did think about the engine. Since part of this little experiment was playing around with the Google AI I asked it if it thought the Iroquois engine was an option for a CF-107. I don't have the exact chat conversation handy but basically it said it could have been an option though would have probably had a slight negative impact on performance. I did assume that the Arrow did befall its same fate largely to make the Mirage offering all that more imperative as a replacement for the Voodoo.

It would be most interesting to find out if Google AI can fully understand NDHQ's designation approach (we mere mortals certainly struggle to find its overall logic!).

Interesting that the Google AI suggests "a slight negative impact on performance" by substituting the Orenda Iroquois engine. A simple Google Search quickly reveals the opposite of that assessment.

- The F-107A's YJ75-P-9 was rated at 17,200 lbf dry and 24,500 lbf in reheat.

- The Orenda Iroquois PS.13 put out 19,350 lbf dry and 25,600 lbf in reheat. [1]

Substituting the Orenda turbojet also provides a weight advantage - J75 dry weight was 5,875-to-5,960 lbs versus only 4,650 lbs for the Iroquois.

If Google AI isn't just inventing 'facts', perhaps it was factoring in fuel consumption? In that regard, the Orenda had a slight advantage in full burner while the J75 had the edge dry. Obviously, the low-level tactical delivery of nuclear free-fall bombs relies less upon afterburners than does bomber interception. Also, since sfc is measured in lb/lbf hr, the Iroquois's higher output is working slightly against it.

For the record, sfc for the Orenda Iroquois PS.13 was 0.85 dry/1.9 wet. I couldn't find specific sfc figures for the F-107A's J75-P-9 but the later J75-P-19W (F-105D) is listed at 0.79/2.2.

Going back to the Mirage 4000 as a CF-101 replacement, remember that the former has only 2/3rds the range of the Voodoo. And none of the Mirage 4000's electronics would be NORAD compatible without adding customization expense to the Canadian order.

______________________________

[1] The CF-105 Mk.1's interim J75-P-3s only generated 16,500/23,500 lbf and thus don't make for a great comparison.
 
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