Designing Escort ships

[uk 75]

The armament of escort ships has become increasingly complicated.
Up until 1960 a typical Royal Navy frigate needed only a gun of some kind and anti submarine mortars or torpedos. Accordingly the vessels could be built in some numbers.
By 1970 the helicopter had become an essential tool for any RN escort ship. A basic point defence missile system (Seacat) had replaced the 40mm gun.
In the 1970s more missiles arrived. Ikara for ASW Exocet for anti-ship and Seadart and Seawolf for air defence.
26 gun and helicopter carrying Leander class ships gave way to smaller numbers of conversions (Leanders with Ikara, Exocet or Seawolf) and new build ships (T42 with Seadart and T22 with Seawolf).
By the end of the Cold War the new RN frigate (T23) carried a range of weapons unimaginable in 1960. A large ASW helo (Merlin) could be carried. Harpoon SSMs and Seawolf PDMS could deal with Soviet threats that had emerged since 1960.
Not surprisingly (except to journalists and the public) the numbers of escort ships fell dramatically.
The end of the Cold War froze RN frigate procurement for thirty years. But the 12 remaining T42 Air Defence destroyers were eventually replaced by six T45 destroyers. In US terms this was like replacing Perry class frigates with Burke destroyers.
Since 1991 RN ships have had to be able to take on a broad range of peacetime policing and relief tasks while still being able to shoot down missiles in the Gulf or provide air defences for the 2012 Olympics.
The threat from China, N Korea, Iran and Russia is not as coherent as that posed by the Soviets in the 80s. But the range of weapons at their disposal is daunting.
The six T45 are being joined by handfuls of T26 and T31 frigates. Each one of these ships is probably more capable than the whole RN frigate force in 1960 but numbers have shrunk to the figures of the 1939 battleship and battlecruiser fleet.

 

[Scott Kenny]

On some levels, I think that the UKRN has really let their force levels drop below a sustainable point.

There was a time when they had zero deployable submarines. Two or three were in drydock for scheduled maintenance, the others were all broke for some reason or another.

You really need about 12 ships of any given type to be able to have 3 at sea. You should be able to have 4 at sea with 12 ships of the type, but there may be one down for whatever reason. Nobody likes admitting it, but it's life and things break.

 

[uk 75]

Until 2014 the main focus for the UK"s limited defence budget was the "war on terror" sending our small force of Army and Royal Marines around the world.
The RAF had to give up its Harrier and Tornado forces to focus on Typhoon and F35B.
The 1997 Strategic Defence Review commited the RN to building two new aircraft carriers. But with no extra money the RN had to reduce its escort and SSN force.
I have always believed that decisions in 1966, 1970 and 1981 to focus on SSNs and escorts rather than carriers were correct. The SSN force reached double figures and 13 T23 frigates entered service replacing old more manpower intensive ships.
Choices are never positive. I would have used the money spent on QE/PoW to build more SSNs and add to the escort force.
Savings could still be found by removing the amphibious sealift forces. Most of the time the RM fly into trouble spots or operate in penny packets from escorts. In a NATO contingency allied (US) shipping would be available.

 

[faditrav1]

Excellent analysis! The Royal Navy's evolution and the incorporation of advanced technology are truly impressive. However, the decreasing number of ships and increasing threats highlight the critical need for strategic planning.

 

[zen]

This is an odd thread.
No actual questions
No alternative design of ship or fleet
No speculation.
Maybe the closest is this.

I would have used the money spent on QE/PoW to build more SSNs and add to the escort force.

Which presumes that the money which was mostly spent well after the devastating delays in SSN build had long since hit, should be spent on more Astutes.
Yet this was the period of the Two Wars (Afghanistan and Iraq), so the Army had priority and Defence budget was effectively shrinking.

 

[zen]

Savings could still be found by removing the amphibious sealift forces. Most of the time the RM fly into trouble spots or operate in penny packets from escorts.

In this regard one might entertain something like this.

Should the Royal Navy consider an alternative approach to Multi-Role Support Ship design? | Navy Lookout

www.navylookout.com

Notice this was developed in Australia 30 years ago. Making it possible for the UK to jump on this concept by the late 1990's. If not just trial a prototype from the mid-90's.

 

[EwenS]

In this regard one might entertain something like this.

Should the Royal Navy consider an alternative approach to Multi-Role Support Ship design? | Navy Lookout

www.navylookout.com

Notice this was developed in Australia 30 years ago. Making it possible for the UK to jump on this concept by the late 1990's. If not just trial a prototype from the mid-90's.

Something now rejected by Australia in favour of this.

Australia Taps Damen for Landing Craft Heavy Requirement - Naval News

The Australian Government has selected a design by Damen Shipyards Group as the preferred option for the Australian Defence Force's Landing Craft Heavy

www.navalnews.com

There is something inherently more risky about placing your props & rudders in the shallow water closest to the beach.

 

[zen]

True and to be fair, some interesting ideas were being bandied about. Of which this was just one.
But the concept of distribution over a larger number of smaller vessels is always one to ponder.

 

[Scott Kenny]

There is something inherently more risky about placing your props & rudders in the shallow water closest to the beach.

Use the tugboat cycloid props (Voith-Schneider prop) instead of regular props. And put a steel hat on the end so that there's less to hit bottom.

Voith Schneider Propeller - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Scott Kenny]

True and to be fair, some interesting ideas were being bandied about. Of which this was just one.
But the concept of distribution over a larger number of smaller vessels is always one to ponder.

That has arguments from the transported-forces side in favor of carrying the smallest units possible, company or even a platoon per ship. That way the loss of one transport-load has the least effect on the operation. It also allows for the ships to be sent out to each land at a different spot if there happen to be many such locations possible.

But the argument from the navy side is each landing ship still requires a crew, and basically the same size crew whether you're carrying an entire battalion or a single platoon (allowing for an increase in the cooks to feed all the grunts onboard).

 

[zen]

That has arguments from the transported-forces side in favor of carrying the smallest units possible, company or even a platoon per ship. That way the loss of one transport-load has the least effect on the operation. It also allows for the ships to be sent out to each land at a different spot if there happen to be many such locations possible.

But the argument from the navy side is each landing ship still requires a crew, and basically the same size crew whether you're carrying an entire battalion or a single platoon (allowing for an increase in the cooks to feed all the grunts onboard).

In the context of the times, it seems a strong counter argument that we needed many smaller forces to deploy to many small situations.
The end of the Cold War was defrosting longstanding issues that had never been resolved from when the freeze had settled over them.

The Reinforce Norway role effectively dissolved with the dissolution of the USSR.
While the events like Sierra Leone, etc effectively required modest forces deployed quickly.

So UK75 isn't wrong to argue that the UK forces ought to have focused on such 'Firefighting' forces.

 

[Scott Kenny]

In the context of the times, it seems a strong counter argument that we needed many smaller forces to deploy to many small situations.
The end of the Cold War was defrosting longstanding issues that had never been resolved from when the freeze had settled over them.

The Reinforce Norway role effectively dissolved with the dissolution of the USSR.
While the events like Sierra Leone, etc effectively required modest forces deployed quickly.

So UK75 isn't wrong to argue that the UK forces ought to have focused on such 'Firefighting' forces.

I agree, but that gets into the problem of manning the ships.

You still need on the order of 80 crew for a minimally combat-capable ship that carries a company of grunts. And a full set of officers.

If you can't find crew for ships needing 240 crew each, you can't find crew for 3 ships each needing 80.

 

[zen]

The thing is the Graceful Degradation model of distributed forces isn't just a model for coping with the loss of some in conflict.
It's also a model for scaling forces to meet finances.

While the Efficiency model of high capability/capacity forces is much more an all-or-nothing one. In which slow to decide to build (because of costs) and slow to deploy (because of cost/rarity) provides ministers only two options.
Keep affording this, or cut it all.

So Graceful Degradation isn't just something to cope with wartime losses, but peacetime cutbacks.

As long as seed kernel of capability exists. Scaling back up is a matter of progressive increases.

But all-or-nothing means resurrection in time of need becomes a horrendously expensive effort.