To keep on track (we've had countless P.1121 discussions), we have to really get a grip on the timelines here.
Harold Macmillan formed his Cabinet on 10th January 1957, chosen to do its bidding at his will.
The Defence White Paper was circulated in draft form to the Cabinet on 15th March.
That's just under two months to get on top of his brief, for the civil servants to do a through analysis and compose a coherent defence strategy.
So its clear that such rapid progress indicates the prime concern the government had with defence policy and that this was following a trend already in motion. The 1954 white paper on military aircraft procurement following the Swift fiasco had raised some important concerns, the Strath Report in 1955 had painted a bleak picture if detterence failed and what the implications were for the entire nation, the Air Staff had already decided to stop the Avro 730 by early 1957.
Its also clear that similar policies were being enacted in Washington, Paris and Moscow. This was not an isolated policy on the whims of one man. A lot of groundwork had already been laid down under the previous Churchill and Eden governments.
On manned fighters, I don't think that the "no more manned fighters" is really an accurate description of what was actually discussed. The first draft was rather more circumspect about the timing and progress of SAM defences, the later use of the term "due course" is suitably vague as to mean sometime in the future. If anything its less definite than the 1958 date given in the first draft for experimental deployment to begin.
These are quotes from the versions the Cabinet discussed; first draft 15th March:
Defence of Deterrent
(a) Since peace depends upon the effectiveness of the deterrent, it is essential that any would-be aggressor should not imagine he could readily knock out the bomber or rocket bases. Though great cities cannot at present be protected against nuclear attack, the defence of the very much smaller target presented by an airfield is an altogether more manageable task. There is every reason to believe that fighters would be able to interfere sufficiently with enemy bombers for the short time needed to enable the retaliatory force to take off.
(b) The Government have accordingly decided that air defence must be provided for the nuclear deterrent. A manned fighter force of adequate size for this purpose will be maintained. This will later be replaced by a ground-to-air guided missile system. In order to gain experience it is proposed to deploy a small number of guided missile units, equipped with the first British weapons of this kind, starting in 1958.
(c) There are grounds for hoping that it may ultimately prove possible to devise missile defences even against attack by ballistic rockets. Research on this problem, in collaboration with the United States Government, is being intensified.
Draft 30th March:
Defence of the Deterrent
16. Since peace so largely depends upon the deterrent fear of nuclear retaliation, it is essential that a would-be aggressor should not be allowed to think he could readily knock out the bomber bases in Britain before their
aircraft could take off from them. The defence of the bomber airfields or rocket launching sites is therefore an essential part of the deterrent and is, we believe, a feasible task. A manned fighter force for this purpose will be maintained and will progressively be equipped with air-to-air guided missiles. These fighter aircraft will in due course be replaced by a ground-to-air guided missile system.
17. The possibility is not being overlooked that scientific progress may eventually make it possible to devise a means of defence even against bombardment by ballistic rockets. Research on this problem, in collaboration with the United States, is being intensified.
