Not sure if you were trying to contradict my statement, but none of your data actually does. Even though you can probably up the velocities by some 0.2km/s for many if not most of the systems you list, the fact remains that those deployed pre-2002 stay below the threshold. And it follows that, according to the definition, the only ICBM-class interceptors in Russia (for the time being, with S-500/550 round the corner) are some five dozen point-defence 53T6s. The cut-off was placed at the value agreed upon for a reason, it was not pulled out of thin air!
The US deploys a similarly modest number of terrestrial GBIs, but these can ostensibly protect any location in the entire country, not just one city. Admittedly characterizing Moscow with its huge cluster of high value installations as a single target was not entirely accurate on my part, but basically the point stands. And as mentioned, that is before we even get into the highly mobile, possibly soon also on land, SM-3. Certainly crediting Russia with tens of thousands of interceptors available to ward of retaliation by US forces depleted in a first strike is egregious nonsense, by about two orders of magnitude.
If anything, it's the US which has been putting Russia in the predicament outlined in the article with its large arsenal of mobile and forward-deployed SM-3s, not the other way round! With the S-500/550 Russia may be on the cusp of clawing back some lost ground, but kindly remind me how long SM-3 has been around by now? And with the ABM Treaty gone (whose idea was that, again?), Russia is now well within its rights to deploy such a system anyway. If that's such a big problem for the US deterrent, then maybe this entirely predictable development should have been factored into the decision to leave 20 years ago?
No matter how you approach the issue, the argument made in the article remains a gross distortion of the facts, and abandoning the ABM Treaty remains a strategic blunder of monumental proportions. Simple as that.
