Cruiser Baseline (CGBL)

[Triton]

According to the Global Security web site the US Navy studied a destroyer design given the cruiser mission:

By the 1980s, with the advent of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers, the distinction between a cruiser and destroyer was blurred. According to the US Navy, a cruiser was focused on anti-air warfare [AAW], and was focused on providing air defense to an aircraft carrier. The destroyer was focused on anti-surface and anti-submarine duties, while also having a substantial anti-air capability.

From the very first studies, the DDG was given two contradictory roles: 1) to be a smaller force-number-builder and 2) fix things that were perceived to be wrong with the CG 47. Specifically, it was felt that a ship armed with Tomahawk, unlike a carrier escort, could fight while hurt. Even if the ship were slowed and had lost a combat system capability in one or more areas, if it could receive Tomahawk targeting data and launch, the self-guiding missile would be fully functional. Thus the DDG received a steel superstructure, increased blast overpressure resistance, more armor, a collective protection system and radar cross section reduction measures. Thus there is a historically anomalous situation of the destroyer being a more survivable ship than the cruiser.

A question that has continually come up is "what if a new cruiser, with weapons the same as the CG 47 class, were designed starting with the DDG and expanding into the cruiser mission?" In order to have a math model of such a ship for future technology studies, Navy Preliminary design created the Cruiser Baseline (CGBL). The study also included weapons systems modularity and increased service life reserves. The resulting ship had a waterline length of 600 feet, a beam of 69 feet, a displacement of about 13,500 tons plus a 30+ knot speed.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/cruiser-cold-war.htm

 

[smurf]

Compare the RN 5000ton "cruiser-destroyer" of the 1950s (See Norman Friedman's Postwar Naval Revolution
or even Admiral Fisher's desire in 1910 or so to replace light cruisers with an 1800ton "super-Swift" based on the experimental 36knot flotilla leader HMS Swift.
The RN Tribal destroyers just before WWII had their origins in a version of this idea - that a ship the size of a large destroyer could take over some cruiser functions.
Nothing new under the sun?

 

[Triton]

The CGBL--A Product Improved Version of the CG 52 by Paul Sims.

http://www.navalengineers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/2008%20Proceedings%20Documents%20%28Papers%20and%20Presentations%29/ASNE%20Day%202008/paper21.pdf

 

[MihoshiK]

The CGBL--A Product Improved Version of the CG 52 by Paul Sims.

http://www.navalengineers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/2008%20Proceedings%20Documents%20%28Papers%20and%20Presentations%29/ASNE%20Day%202008/paper21.pdf

Damnit, the side view is completely fuxx0red. I wanted to use that for Shipbucket.

Still, an interesting article.

 

[M. A. Rozon]

I would dearly love to see all of the drawings without any of the distortion. :'( Does anyone at all have them?

:

 

[Grey Havoc]

Unfortunately, Roughead appears to have forgotten this study when he forced through the Flight III Burke program (it's going so badly, they are now talking about going to a Flight IV design!).

 

[TimothyC]

I would dearly love to see all of the drawings without any of the distortion. :'( Does anyone at all have them?

:

Link.

Scroll down to The CGBL section and Download the JAR file - It's a self extracting presentation executable. I've attached three of the slides bellow

 

[Grey Havoc]

Problem is, the bright sparks behind the current Flight III effort seem to have totally ignored the CGBL.

 

[TimothyC]

It would also help if I had quoted the correct person.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Problem is, the bright sparks behind the current Flight III effort seem to have totally ignored the CGBL.

What?

 

[Grey Havoc]

Problem is, the bright sparks behind the current Flight III effort seem to have totally ignored the CGBL.

What?

They were claiming, for one thing, that they could deliver Flight III with 'minimum changes' to meet requirements. That proved to be optimistic, at best. They should have gone with a clean sheet design, or at the very least used the CGBL as a baseline. It's highly likely, IMO, that Congress is going to s**tcan the entire exercise within the next few months.

 

[Grey Havoc]

In reverse order I was;

(a) Answering your question

and

(b) What makes you certain that Flight III will survive the next few months, if I might ask?
(If it makes you happier we can move this discussion to a new thread.)

 

[Grey Havoc]

New thread is here.

 

[Grey Havoc]

The CGBL--A Product Improved Version of the CG 52 by Paul Sims.

http://www.navalengineers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/2008%20Proceedings%20Documents%20%28Papers%20and%20Presentations%29/ASNE%20Day%202008/paper21.pdf

Interesting how the author suggested using CGBL rather than the CG 52 as a comparison model to help explain to the taxpapers (and unstated, Congress) the seemingly excessive size of both the DDG 1000 destroyer and the CG(X) design back in 2008.

 

[Grey Havoc]

There is currently an interesting effort over on Shipbucket to reconstruct what the CGBL would have looked like: http://shipbucket.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=1374

 

[TimothyC]

There is currently an interesting effort over on Shipbucket to reconstruct what the CGBL would have looked like: http://shipbucket.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=1374

Yeah, it's going slow because I get easily distracted, and I'm busy with my current class load. My current goal is to work on it over the summer semester when I'm not so swamped with classwork. That will also give me a chance to contact some people to dig up some further resources.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Good job so far!

 

[TimothyC]

Just an update to the above, I've finally pushed this drawing off into Release Candidate territory, and it can still be found here.

 

[that_person]

Does anyone still have the PDF?

 

[uk 75]

Not sure if this is the right thread to post this comment but the moderators can move it.
The postwar US Navy seems to have got very confused about what category of ships it was building.
For a long time the only new build cruiser was the formidable Long Beach. The other large nuclear ships Bainbridge and Truxtun together with their conventional powered versions of the Leahy and Belknap classes were called frigates and then destroyer leaders.
The California and Virginia classes started life as DLGs but became cruisers.
Confusingly the Spruance class air defence ships with similar armament to the Belknaps were never ordered while the ASW versions were simply destroyers.
The RN meanwhile abandoned cruisers altogether in favour of the County class destroyers. In USN terms these were closer to destroyer leaders.
The mighty AEGIS air defence system was initially planned to go on Virginia class cruisers as well as converting Long Beach and even a proposed nuclear strike cruiser. In the end the Spruance hull was used for the DG later CG 47 class.
Confusing but if you follow the weapons fit of the ships it does become a bit clearer.
A cruiser has more and longer range anti air missiles than a destroyer.

 

[TomS]

Confusing but if you follow the weapons fit of the ships it does become a bit clearer.
A cruiser has more and longer range anti air missiles than a destroyer.

Only superficially. The difference in numbers of missiles between the CG-47 and DDG-51 isn't that important, and they carry exactly the same types of missiles. There are even designs for DDG-51 flights that match the CG-47s in numbers of missiles.

The fundamental difference as far as the USN is concerned is that cruisers have the facilities to effectively serve as AW (the air warfare commander in a formation, particularly a Carrier Battlegroup). That means room for extra staff and extra displays and consoles in CIC.

The Strike Cruiser concept is something quite different; a ship designed to function as the core of a Surface Action Group. In many ways, it's a response to a parochial desire by the surface warfare branch to have an independent role outside of escorting the carriers.

The notion that modern warships should fall into categories equivalent to WW2 warships is a source of continuing confusion, IMO. The idea that a modern "cruiser" needs more or better weapons than its "destroyer" cousins is deeply flawed. What it needs is a better ability to perform battle management, which means better radar and C2 spaces for people not involved directly in running the ship itself. Arguably, a modern C2 node like this could even get away with fewer weapons than the ships it commands, if networked battle management works as advertised. (If it fails, the AW C2 node should be able to fight effectively as a self-contained unit, however).

 

[Yellow Palace]

The Strike Cruiser concept is something quite different; a ship designed to function as the core of a Surface Action Group. In many ways, it's a response to a parochial desire by the surface warfare branch to have an independent role outside of escorting the carriers.

The 'Strike Cruiser' concept is really built around the cruise missile, not air defence systems; its role was filled by the reactivated IOWA class.

The notion that modern warships should fall into categories equivalent to WW2 warships is a source of continuing confusion, IMO.

Especially because even WW2 warships don't actually fit into those categories very well if you start looking at them too closely. I have a lot of time for the Soviet designation system that tried to abandon the destroyer/frigate/corvette paradigm entirely, although they didn't quite manage to get rid of cruisers.

 

[uk 75]

If I understand correctly the argument for cruisers over destroyers (using the terms loosely) in a future USN mix is to provide space for command and control functions.
The US looked at cruiser style command ships in the 60s. There are various drawings in Friedman.
In the absence of the Iowa's and the need for longer ranged, even hypersonic surface to surface missiles is that also a fit for a cruiser?

 

[TomS]

The Strike Cruiser concept is something quite different; a ship designed to function as the core of a Surface Action Group. In many ways, it's a response to a parochial desire by the surface warfare branch to have an independent role outside of escorting the carriers.

The 'Strike Cruiser' concept is really built around the cruise missile, not air defence systems; its role was filled by the reactivated IOWA class.

Very true. When it emerged that almost any surface ship could become a cruise missile platform -- thanks to the brilliant decision to redesign the Mk41 to accept Tomahawk -- a lot of the pressure for a strike cruiser type ship evaporated.

Ultimately, the VLS Spruances became more effective Tomahawk ships than the Iowas.

The notion that modern warships should fall into categories equivalent to WW2 warships is a source of continuing confusion, IMO.

Especially because even WW2 warships don't actually fit into those categories very well if you start looking at them too closely. I have a lot of time for the Soviet designation system that tried to abandon the destroyer/frigate/corvette paradigm entirely, although they didn't quite manage to get rid of cruisers.

Absolutely! The USN's choice to call it's next major surface warship program the Large Surface Combatant rather than CG-Next or some such was actually very sensible. Except that Congress didn't understand it.


Which actually circles back to something I meant to mention in uk 75's OP.

The postwar US Navy seems to have got very confused about what category of ships it was building.

I'd say they were actually pretty clear-eyed. They knew the new battle force escorts did not have much to do with pre-war cruisers in design or operations. So they made a clean break by not calling them cruisers. The decision to call them frigates in particular made a lot of sense, in terms of USN tradition and history. USN age of sail frigates were large, powerful, and for much of the early Navy era (up to the Civil War at least) the dominant ships of the US fleet. Using DLG as the type designation made sense because of the ships' direct lineage from the abortive post-war destroyer leaders. But also confused matters because it made it easy for people to think they were just oversized destroyers.

And then Congress got involved. They didn't understand that US DLGs were equivalent to Soviet Raketny Kreyser, so there was great panic about a largely non-existent "cruiser gap."

And of course this was further complicated by the fact that European navies had largely settled on the term "frigate" to replace the hodgepodge of older names for small escorts. So we get the great 1975 redesignation that aligned US DEs with European frigates but turned most US frigates into cruisers.

 

[TimothyC]

Does anyone still have the PDF?

I probably do in my archives. You'll have to give me a day or so to look for it.

 

[muttly]

I am lost. I fail to understand why they fret over the what they call it.
As long as it meets the needs of the navy, call it what ever you like.

 

[TimothyC]

Does anyone still have the PDF?

I probably do in my archives. You'll have to give me a day or so to look for it.

So, I did still have it. What's even better is that I have a version that I got later where the line drawings of the CGBL and the stretched Ticonderoga were not corrupted (someone had uploaded the copy I am sharing here to nanopdf), and that's what is being attached to the this post. I've also attached a ZIP of the presentation JAR file that I screenshoted before to get the images in this post. The zip file will decompress to a JAR file, which, if the user has Java (not Javascript) installed (which is not the case for me at the moment), can be run as a self-executing presentation. It was made using Impatic, and while one can de-compress the JAR, you get a collection of java .class files, and the presentation in a .imp format, which I have yet to be able to convert to anything readable.

I am lost. I fail to understand why they fret over the what they call it.
As long as it meets the needs of the navy, call it what ever you like.

Because Navies are political organisms, and procurement is controlled by what Congress will fund. Congresscritters then have to be able to go, and justify their decisions and votes to their constituents, which makes the nomenclature even more political. The CGBL paper includes the following:

The CGBL was a “product improved” version of the CG 52 created with the ASSET ship synthesis model. It had full design margins, full service life reserves, clean ballast fuel system and all-electric auxiliaries. Military mission improvements included radar cross section reduction, a steel superstructure with increased fragment protection, and a Collective Protection System which increased the displacement considerably. The math model of the ship was used for several years to conduct technology evaluations such as composite superstructures and new machinery. As the DDG 51 class became the most well known ship in the fleet, that class became the preferred baseline for technology studies and the use of the CGBL declined.

The CGBL is of historical interest now as a “missing generation” of a transitional type that could have been built in between the CG 52 class and the DDG 1000 and the CG(X). It has been noted that those two ships are predicted to be much larger than the in-service cruisers. However, the CGBL had dimensions of a waterline length of 620 feet, a beam of 69 feet and a full load displacement of 13,675 tons. The size of the DDG 1000 and the CG(X) alternatives are easier to explain if compared to the CGBL rather than the CG 52

 

[muttly]

Back to politicians again. Ships have to be called varies classes to
complete a navy. I guess call it a large multi mission cruiser hybrid.

 

[that_person]

This is a presentation on the CGBL from 2007/9 (can't remember which), by Mr. Philip Sims. Mr. Sims worked on various Cold War projects, including the development of the Perry, CVV, the Iowa/Des Moines Reactivations, the Strike Cruiser iirc, and various SC-21 studies. He was a lead engineer for NAVSEA when he retired in the late 90s or early 2000s.

 

[isayyo2]

Thanks @that_person it was such an interesting read! The 40ft plug into CG-52 was totally new to me, very fascinating.

 

[TomS]

This is a presentation on the CGBL from 2007/9 (can't remember which), by Mr. Philip Sims. Mr. Sims worked on various Cold War projects, including the development of the Perry, CVV, the Iowa/Des Moines Reactivations, the Strike Cruiser iirc, and various SC-21 studies. He was a lead engineer for NAVSEA when he retired in the late 90s or early 2000s.

Man, I wish I had seen this data back in the day. Really excellent description of the problem.

 

[Tzoli]

Longhull Ticonderoga would mount more missiles or extended VLS storage?

 

[TomS]

Longhull Ticonderoga would mount more missiles or extended VLS storage?

No. It was intended to restore the buoyancy and stability margins that had been lost from the DD-963 hull design with the addition of AEGIS and especially with the change from Mark 26 to VLS (which was much heavier/denser).

 

[Yellow Palace]

No. It was intended to restore the buoyancy and stability margins that had been lost from the DD-963 hull design with the addition of AEGIS and especially with the change from Mark 26 to VLS (which was much heavier/denser).

Given the crowding of the class, the additional internal volume for offices, accommodation etc. would probably be a useful side benefit, even if it wasn't the design intent.