Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining the V-Force?

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At least without defining what "better" means? Cheaper, more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying, more Union Jack on it?
Although the thread has so far been dominated by the discussion on the feasibility (or not) of developing a British Polaris substitute the thread is also about what happens before and afterwards.

For example it also means a better V-Force. And for that it does mean a cheaper (strictly speaking more aircraft for the same money), more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying AND more Union Jack(s) on it!

And I'm doing that via the earlier rationalisation of the British aerospace industry.
This was intended to be part of the thread "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining an independent strategic nuclear deterrent?" However, I'm spinning this off into a separate thread as the original thread has been dominated by the British Polaris substitute.
 
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I would note at this point that the real V Force evolved rather sensibly.
Blue Steel despite its limitations is kept in small numbers until the Polaris subs enter service.
The Victors replace the Valiants as tankers leaving the Vulcans as free fall bomb carriers.
Because TSR2 and F111K are cancelled 48 Vulcans stay in service until Tornado arrives. The US help out by deploying a second wing of F111s to the UK.
Job done.
 
Derek Wood's Scenario 1945

Let us turn the clock back to 1945, and see what might have been done. Instead of the Ministry of Supply, a small compact ministry is set up to deal purely with aviation: it has strong and clearly defined ties with the operational requirements and planning branches of the Services and good links with the airlines. The fiat goes out that teams must be strengthened and the number of companies reduced – otherwise no contracts. Hawker Siddeley, in particular is told to stop internal competition among its teams and present one joint design to any particular specification. Firms are urged to specialise and stop trying their hands at everything from bombers to light aircraft. The Services are informed that they must consider the civil market and exports in any transport specification they issue.

Britain is far behind in high speed aerodynamics and there is a complete lack of understanding of what is transonic and what is supersonic. Pocketing its pride, the Government, calls for the assembly of one key high speed research/design team from Germany. It is brought to Britain with its facilities and put to work alongside a group of British companies and the Royal Aircraft Establishment with the intention of producing a transonic Derwent-powered prototype of a swept-wing aircraft on which to base future military types. The Miles M.52 straight wing Mach 1.5 research aircraft is well down the road and must be continued to the flight test stage. It is therefore, decreed that the programme be accelerated and the technical back-up reinforced. Arrangements are made for Miles to amalgamate its M.52 team with one of the larger companies, one condition being that it retains its identity as a division within that firm. M.52 contracts are guaranteed and the 5,000lb (2,268gk) thrust Rolls Royce Nene engine is specified.

Numerous technical problems are encountered and the first prototype is written-off in a heavy landing. All lessons learned are incorporated into the second M.52 which flies with a Nene incorporating aft-fan and burners in the exhaust duct. In the early summer of 1947, this aircraft successfully flies "through the barrier" in level flight, months ahead of the USA's rocket-powered Bell X-1. As a result of the German team's work RAE, three test-bed prototypes of a transonic aircraft are built to give vital aerodynamic knowledge. This is applied to a new generation of swept-wing fighters and bombers. The team is ultimately absorbed into one of the new unified industry groups.
 
If the UK had not been able to get Polaris I would have developed missiles to arm the V force and I would have cancelled TSR2 at the same time and put the money into converting Vulcans to missile carriers and kept Victor B2 as bombers.
To give the force more range and add missile carriers I would have ordered a substantial number of new build VC10s as tankers and missile carriers.
I might also have ordered FB111s with SRAM as an extra bit of insurance
 
The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part One

In the "Real World".
  • The first Valiant medium bomber squadron formed in January 1955.
  • The sole Valiant LRPR squadron formed in April 1955.
  • The first Vulcan B.1 squadron formed in May 1957.
  • The first Victor B.1 squadron formed in April 1958.
  • The first Valiant squadron was transferred from the Medium Bomber Force to the Tactical Bomber Force in January 1960.
  • The first Vulcan B.2 squadron formed in December 1960.
  • The first Victor B.2 squadron formed in February 1962.
  • 2 Valiant medium bomber squadrons became tanker squadrons in April 1962.
  • The 6 surviving Valiant squadrons (3 TBF, one LRPR & 2 tanker) were disbanded in May 1965.
  • The sole Victor SR.2 squadron formed in May 1965.
  • The first Victor K.1 squadron formed in May 1965.
  • The RN's Polaris submarines assumed the nuclear deterrent role in mid-1969.
    • 5 Vulcan B.2 squadrons became tactical bomber squadrons. They replaced the 3 Valiant squadrons disbanded in May 1965 due to metal fatigue.
    • 2 Vulcan B.2 squadrons were transferred to Cyprus where, they replaced 4 Canberra light bomber squadrons. However, they returned to the UK in the mid-1970s as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75.
  • One of the 5 Vulcan B.2 tactical bomber squadrons was disbanded in March 1972.
    • It's aircraft were converted to Vulcan SR.2s and they were used to form a squadron that formed in November 1973.
    • This allowed the the Vulcan SR.2 squadron to disbanded in May 1974, because its aircraft were wanted for conversion converted to tankers.
  • The first Victor K.2 squadron formed in June 1975.
  • The 6 Vulcan TBF squadrons & the sole Vulcan SR.2 squadron disbanded between December 1981 and December 1982.
  • However, one of the Vulcan B.2 squadrons was reprieved as a result of the Falklands War and served in the tanker role squadron from June 1972 until it disbanded in March 1984.
  • One of the 2 Victor K.2 squadrons disbanded in June 1986.
  • The second Victor K.2 squadron (No. 55) disbanded on 15th October 1993 over 38 years after No. 138 Squadron reformed on the Valiant B.1.
A total of 104 Valiants (of all marks), 50 Victor Mk 1, 34 Victor Mk 2, 45 Vulcan Mk 1 and 89 Vulcan Mk 2 was built. That's a grand total of 322 V-bombers, excluding prototypes.
 
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The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Two
Development and Production of the V-Bombers

Specification B.35/46 isn't issued sooner, its requirements are the same and the prototypes are ordered no earlier. However, the idea is that the "Big Two" aircraft firms and "Only Two" engine firms created 1945-48 in my version of history have the resources to put the Victor & Vulcan Mk 1 and Victor & Vulcan Mk 2 into service a few years sooner sooner.

It also helps is that they have the benefit of the work done by the German design team and that double the number of prototypes & pre-production aircraft were built to do the development flying.

There isn't a Valiant because the Air Ministry & Ministry of Supply want BAC (which Handley Page becomes part of between 1945 & 1948) to concentrate on the Victor. The money spent on the 3 Valiant prototypes IOTL pays some of the cost of the extra Victor and Vulcan prototypes.

128 Valiants were ordered IOTL and 24 were cancelled. ITTL 64 extra Victors and 64 extra Vulcans were ordered in their place. That increases the number of Victors built from 84 to 148 and the number of Vulcans built from 134 to 198 and the total number of V-bombers from 322 to 346.

IOTL 25 Victor B.2s were cancelled in part to punish Handley Page from not joining BAC or Hawker Siddeley. Hadley Page had been part of BAC for about 15 years by that point ITTL so the 25 aircraft weren't cancelled. That increases the number of Victors built from 148 to 173 and the total number of V-bombers from 346 to 371.
 
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The V-force have several major problems by 1960s:

* It was vulnerable to strikes against airbases. Britain home territory allowed neither for significant dispersion, nor for significant reaction time.

* It wasn't exactly very capable in reaching targets, since deep penetration of Eastern Europe air defenses for subsonic bombers from Britain would be problematic at best.

* It wasn't actually good as credible deterrence, due to abovementioned reasons.

The only possible solution for the vulnerability problem I could suggest is to, well, dig into hills and use a lot of concrete. The undeground hangars for V-bombers are possible. China build several hardened underground hangars for Xian H-6 bombers, which are roughly comparable in wingspan with Vulcan:

1704910219880.jpeg
One of Chinese large underground hangars, with 30-meters arc (currently used as storage for old planes)

Of course, hardened underground hangars would not protect against direct hit or close enough megaton blast. They can't be made as durable as missile silo. But if they are disperced among some area, they would not be destroyed at once - i.e. at least some bombers would survive the strikes against their bases and would be able to took off (maybe with the help of a large number of JATO, since runaway may be cratered).

The second problem - reaching their targets and being a credible deterrence - most likely could be solved by using a combination of standoff missiles (cruise, or aero-ballistic one), and decoy missiles (imitating the bomber radar signature to distract defenses).
 
The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Three
Engines for the V-Bombers

The Victor Mk 1 had AS Sapphire engines. The Victor Mk 2 was to have them too and as I understand it the cancellation of the Sapphire & change to the RR Conway was an important reason why the Victor Mk 2 entered service over a year behind the Vulcan Mk 2. Both marks of Vulcan had Bristol Olympus engines.

Except, ITTL Armstrong-Siddeley and Bristol Aero Engines become part of Bristol Siddeley Engines between 1945 and 1948 in my timeline. Therefore, no Olympus or no Sapphire ITTL. Which of the two engines draws the short straw in 1948? My guess is that it would have been the Olympus because the Sapphire first ran in 1948 and the Olympus didn't run for the first time until 1950.

The resources used to develop the Olympus after 1948 IOTL were put into the development of the Sapphire ITTL. Therefore, the result aught to have been more powerful Sapphire engines become more available sooner. The result for the V-bombers is more could be built as Mk 2s and less as Mk 1s. Also the production and operating costs of the V-Force may be reduced by having an all-Sapphire force.

Except, the 128 Valiants ordered IOTL (only 104 were built) had RR Avon engines would the 64 Victor Mk 1 and 64 Vulcan Mk 1 built in their place have Avon engines too?

I think not because Rolls-Royce isn't much bigger between 1948 and 1960 ITTL because it only had Napier and the engineers from that firm are working on turboprops and turboshafts in my timeline. Therefore, the Avons available at any given time ITTL are less powerful than contemporary Sapphires and the RAF would have wanted the V-Bombers to be fitted with the most powerful engine that was available.

The 128 Victors and Vulcans built instead of the Valiant aren't retired in 1965 due to metal fatigue.

Except the ex-Vickers engineers working with the ex-Handley Page engineers on the Victor ITTL may say . . . "Lets make it from DTD.683!" So @Hood it might not be too good to be true after all.
 
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The chief answer for V-Bomber bases was oversea dispersal and development of SAM defences.
Arguably the BARCAP mission and AWACS is the missing piece in the late 40's.

Which is actually something the RAF had investigated and should have invested in.
 
The chief answer for V-Bomber bases was oversea dispersal and development of SAM defences.
Oversea dispersal have a disadvantage of being too dependent on other nations politics. And SAM would not be of much use in case of ballistic missile attacks. If I recall correctly, RAF considered anti-ballistic defense for its main bases, but concluded that it would be too costly, would dangerously deplete the supply of plutonium (since in 1950-1960 non-nuclear ABM weren't exactly efficient), and would be too vulnerable to simple saturation.
 
The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Four
The V-Force 1955-60


From that thread

Plan H ended on 31st March 1955 with 152 medium bombers in 19 squadrons. That came from a document dated 30th June 1952. That document did not say which aircraft were to equip the 19 squadrons, but I have some handwritten notes that I made from another National Archives document. It shows 152 medium bombers in 19 squadrons on 31st March 1955. That is 48 Lincolns in 6 squadrons, 64 Washingtons (Boeing B-29s) in 8 squadrons and 40 Valiants in 5 squadrons. I didn't record the date of the second document in my notes but it my educated guess is that it dates from the summer of 1951.

The succeeding Plan J had 144 medium bombers in 18 squadron and 8 aircraft in one L.R.P.R. squadron at 31st March 1955 which is a total of 152 aircraft in 19 squadrons, i.e. the same number of squadrons and aircraft as Plan H. This document was dated 30th June 1952. The spreadsheet that I made from the original document shows 64 Lincolns in 8 squadrons, 56 Washingtons in 7 squadrons and 24 Valiants in 3 squadrons in the medium bomber force plus 8 Valiants in the L.R.P.R. squadron.

Plan J ended on 31st March 1958 with a force of 304 medium bombers in 38 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons. That came from a document dated 30th June 1952. The spreadsheet that I made from the original document shows that the 304 medium bombers in 38 squadrons were to consist of 112 Valiants in 14 squadrons, 80 Victors in 10 squadrons and 112 Vulcans in 14 squadrons, plus 16 Valiants in the 2 L.R.P.R. squadrons.

This is the only "squadron patterns" document I have that mentions the Valiant Mk 2. The 112 Valiant medium bombers on 31st March 1958 were to be a mix of Mk 1s and Mk 2s (it didn't say how many of each) and both reconnaissance squadrons were to be equipped with the Valiant Mk 2.

Plan K had 240 medium bombers in 30 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31st March 1958. That came from a document dated 6th February 1953. The spreadsheet I made from the original document shows 96 Valiants in 12 squadrons, 64 Victors in 8 squadrons and 80 Vulcans in 10 squadrons plus 16 Valiants in the 2 L.R.P.R. squadrons.

Plan K (Star) had 224 medium bombers in 28 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31st March 1958. That came from a document dated 1st April 1954. The spreadsheet that I made from the original document shows 80 Valiants in 10 squadrons, 64 Victors in 8 squadrons and 80 Vulcans in 10 squadrons plus 16 Victors in the 2 L.R.P.R. squadrons.

Plans K and K (Star) end on 31st March 1958. I suspect that if Plan K (Star) had continued beyond that date the medium bomber force would have increased to 240 aircraft in 30 squadrons by the end of June 1958 because this is what happened in the next document that I have. See below.

The 15th January 1955 version of Plan L ended on 31st March 1960 and according to the spreadsheet that I compiled from the original document the Medium Bomber Force was to have...
  • 224 aircraft in 28 squadrons at 31st March 1958. This is the same as Plan K (Star) and in common with that plan there would be 80 Valiants in 10 squadrons, 64 Victors in 8 squadrons and 80 Vulcans in 10 squadrons.
  • 240 aircraft in 30 squadrons at 30th June 1958 when there would be 72 Valiants in 9 squadrons, 72 Victors in 9 squadrons and 96 Vulcans in 12 squadrons. This is why I think Plan K (Star) would have shown 240 medium bombers in 30 squadrons at this date if it didn't end at 31st March 1958.
  • 240 aircraft (72 Valiants, 72 Victors and 96 Vulcans) in 30 squadrons were to be maintained from 30th June 1958 to 31st March 1960 which is when this version of Plan L ended.
In common with the earlier plans there would also be 16 L.R.P.R. aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31st March 1958. These squadrons would be equipped with the Victor or the Vulcan. A note in the original document said, "No decision has yet been made as to whether the Victor or the Vulcan will be chosen as the Valiant replacement in the L.R.P.R. role. These patters have been based, from the point of view of production, on the provisional assumption that the Victor will ultimately be selected."

What actually happened

The actual medium bomber force at 31st March 1955 was 50 Lincolns in 5 squadrons (i.e. 10 instead of 8 aircraft per squadron) and one Valiant squadron. The Valiant L.R.P.R. squadron that should have existed on 31st March 1955 wasn't formed until 1st April 1955.

According to my RAF squadrons 1950-70 spreadsheet there were 9 medium bomber squadrons (7 with Valiants and 2 with Vulcans) and one L.R.P.R. squadron equipped with Valiants at 31st March 1958. That's a total of 10 squadrons which is a quarter of what was expected at that date under Plan J and a third of what was expected under Plans K, K (Star) and the January 1955 version of Plan L.

This increased to 11 medium bomber squadrons (7 with Valiants, one with Victors and 3 with Vulcans) and one Valiant L.R.P.R. squadron at the end of June 1958 for a total of 12 squadrons. That is is 20 squadrons short of the 32 squadrons that should have existed at that date under the January 1955 version of Plan L.

This Timeline

The first V-bomber squadron still forms in January 1955. However, 371 were built instead of 322. Furthermore, they were delivered at a faster rate.

It wasn't fast enough for the 320 aircraft in 40 squadrons by 31.03.38 under Plan J or the 240 to 256 aircraft in 30-32 squadrons by that date under the later plans.

However, it would have been much larger than the 80 aircraft in 10 squadrons which was the actual V-Force at that date. The personnel for the extra squadrons would be formed by disbanding the Canberra light bomber squadrons at a faster rate.

Furthermore, it would have been a better quality force as it would be 50% Victor Mk 1 and 50% Vulcan Mk 1. The Real V-Force at that date had 72 Valiants in 9 squadrons and one squadron of 8 Vulcan Mk 1s.
 
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Maintaining the credibility of the V-force as deterrent requires the development of standoff weapons, equivalent to SRAM _and_ ALCM (probably can get away with the short AGM-86A version).

And probably the development of TSR2 or buying FB111 for a supersonic low level penetrator.


If I recall correctly, RAF considered anti-ballistic defense for its main bases, but concluded that it would be too costly, would dangerously deplete the supply of plutonium (since in 1950-1960 non-nuclear ABM weren't exactly efficient), and would be too vulnerable to simple saturation.
nuclear ABMs also have the advantage of causing a missed warhead to fizzle, potentially. It's why the first deliberate neutron bombs were on ABMs.

But yes, you would need a lot of plutonium for all the ABMs you'd need. Early on that's a limit, but later the UK had no problem with plutonium production.

Fortunately, the UK is just about small enough for a single major ABM installation like the US Safeguard system to provide protection. Especially if the lower altitude point defense SAMs are also ABM-capable. Think Spartans and Sprints. I'd guesstimate that the UK could get away with about a third the number of Spartans and about the same number of Sprints as planned by the US. Call it 180 Spartan-equivalents and 192 Sprint-equivalents.
 
Maintaining the credibility of the V-force as deterrent requires the development of standoff weapons, equivalent to SRAM _and_ ALCM (probably can get away with the short AGM-86A version).
There were Blue Steel and Skybolt IOTL. However, what I want to do is at least two posts away.
 
The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Five
The V-Force 1960-62


From the above thread.

This is the January 1957 version of Plan L for Bomber Command

Plan L Bomber Command January 1957.png


It shows a front-line of 200 V-bombers in 25 squadrons of 8 aircraft at the end of March 1962 which includes 23 squadrons of medium bombers and 2 long-range photographic reconnaissance (LRPR) squadrons as follows:
  • 24 Valiant B.1 & B.K.1 in 3 squadrons.
  • 24 Victor B.1s in 3 squadrons.
  • 56 Victor B.2s in 7 squadrons (i.e. 5 squadrons of medium bombers and 2 LRPR squadrons).
  • 16 Vulcan B.1s in 2 squadrons.
  • 80 Vulcan B.2s in 10 squadrons.
    • Plus.
  • 64 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons.
    • The earlier squadron patterns had 100 Canberra light bombers in 10 squadrons serving alongside the 240, 256 or 320 V-bombers in the first half of 1958.
That's 40 medium bombers in 5 squadrons more than the September 1957 version of Plan L. The extra squadrons were 3 of Valiants, one of Victor B.2s and one of Vulcan B.2s.

This is Bomber Command's portion of Plan M which covers the period from 31st March 1960 to 31st March 1965
I compiled the spreadsheet from a document dated 18th February 1960
that was provided by @yellowaster

Plan M Bomber Command.png


The salient differences between this plan and the September 1957 version of Plan L in Post 21 are:
  • There were 247 aircraft in 26 squadrons at 31/03/60 in Plan L. This included 132 Medium Bombers in 16½ squadrons and 12 L.R.P.R. aircraft one-and-a-half squadrons.
  • There were 196 aircraft in 20 squadrons at 31/03/60 in Plan M. This included 102 Medium Bombers in 12 squadrons and 8 L.R.P.R. aircraft in one squadron.
The Victor and Vulcan were behind schedule. That is the main reason why Plan L had more Medium Bombers and L.R.P.R. aircraft (34 aircraft in 5 squadrons) than Plan M.

The other reason was that a squadron of 8 Valiants was transferred from the Medium Bomber Force to the Tactical Bomber Force at the beginning of 1960.
  • There were to be 263 aircraft in 28 squadrons from 30/09/60 to 31/03/63 under Plan L.
  • There were to be 224 aircraft in 27 squadrons from 31/12/61 to 31/03/65 under Plan M.
Both plans included 144 Medium Bombers in 18 squadrons and 16 L.R.P.R aircraft in 2 squadrons. However, Plan L would reach this strength before Plan M which once again was due to slippages in the Victor and Vulcan programmes.

Both plans had peak strengths of 32 Victor B.1s in 4 squadrons and 24 Vulcan B.1s in 3 squadrons. However, this would reduce to:
  • 24 Victor B.1s in 3 squadrons and 16 Vulcan B.1s in 2 squadrons in Plan L.
  • 16 Victor B.1s in 2 squadrons and 24 Vulcan B.1s in 3 squadrons in Plan M.
Both plans had an eventual total of 48 Victor B.2s in 6 squadrons and 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons. This included 16 Victors in 2 L.R.P.R. squadrons. Plan M would reach this strength later than Plan L and as usual this was due to slippages in the Victor and Vulcan programmes.

Plan L had 71 Valiants in 9 squadrons at 31/03/60 and Plan M had 77 aircraft in 9 squadrons at 31/03/60. The reason for the discrepancy was that that Plan L had 56 Valiant medium bombers in 7 squadrons of 8 aircraft while Plan M had 54 Valiant medium bombers in 6 squadrons of 9 aircraft and 8 Valiant tactical bombers in one squadron.
  • Under Plan L the Valiants were to be reduced from 71 aircraft in 9 squadrons at 31/03/60 to 7 aircraft in one squadron at 31/03/62.
  • Under Plan M the Valiants were to be reduced from 77 aircraft in 9 squadrons at 31/12/60 to 47 aircraft in 6 squadrons in at 31/03/62.
This was because:
  • 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons were retained as Tankers and;
  • 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons were retained as Tactical Bombers .
The Valiant Tactical Bombers replaced the 64 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons that were in Plan L.

What happened

More than a few years ago I compiled a RAF Squadrons 1950-70 spreadsheet using C.G. Jefford's RAF Squadrons book as a guide.

According to the latest version the peak strength was the month ending 31st March 1962 when there were 16 medium bomber squadrons. That is 4 Valiant, 4 Victor B.1, one Victor B.2, 3 Vulcan B.1 and 4 Vulcan B.2 squadrons. That's 128 aircraft at a U.E. of 8 aircraft per squadron.

That doesn't include the 24 Valiants in the Tactical Bomber Force squadrons, the 8 Valiants in the L.R.P.R. squadron or the 7 Valiants in the ECM squadron.

2 of the 4 Valiant medium bomber squadrons (Nos. 90 and 214) became tanker squadrons on 1st April 1962. However, my source for that (Wynn's RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces) also says that No. 214 Squadron had been flight refuelling since August 1958 and No. 90 Squadron went into the FR role in October 1961. Which means that there were only 14 medium bomber squadrons at 31st March 1962.

If you remove them from the equation the peak strength of the Medium Bomber Force was the period from 31st December 1962 to 29th February 1964 when there were 15 squadrons which at a U.E. of 8 aircraft per squadron is a nominal strength of 120 aircraft.

The Differences

Plan L at January 1957 and Plan M at February 1960 both had 200 V-bombers in 25 squadrons at 31.03.62. However, the roles of some of the squadrons were different.
  • Plan L had 40 medium bombers in 5 squadrons more than Plan M.
  • This was because Plan M had.
    • 24 tactical bombers in 3 squadrons, which weren't in Plan L.
    • 16 tankers in 2 squadrons, which weren't in Plan L.
  • In Plan L 120 of the 184 medium bombers were Victor & Vulcan B.2s.
  • In Plan L 104 of the 144 medium bombers were Victor & Vulcan B.2s.
  • Both plans had 16 Victor PR.2s in 2 squadrons.
Plan L had 64 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons. Plan M had no Canberra light bomber squadrons, because they were replaced by the 24 Valiant tactical bombers in 3 squadrons.

The actual force at 31.03.62 included 160 V-bombers in 20 squadrons and no Canberra light bomber squadrons.
  • 112 Medium Bombers in 14 squadrons including 40 Victor & Vulcan Mk 2 aircraft in 5 squadrons.
    • That's 72 aircraft in 9 squadrons fewer than Plan L.
      • It's also 80 Victor & Vulcan Mk 2 in 10 squadrons fewer than Plan L.
    • That's 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons fewer than Plan L.
      • It's also 64 Victor & Vulcan Mk 2 in 8 squadrons fewer than Plan M.
  • 24 Tactical Bombers in 3 squadrons.
    • They weren't in Plan L, because there were 64 Canberras in 4 squadrons doing the same job.
    • They were in Plan M.
  • 8 LRPR aircraft in one squadron.
    • That's 8 aircraft in one squadron fewer than Plans L & M.
    • It was equipped with Valiants instead of the Victor PR.2 as intended in Plans L & M.
  • 16 tankers in 2 squadrons.
    • They weren't in Plan L.
    • They were in Plan M.
This Version of History

The number of aircraft and squadrons was exactly the same. However, there were considerable qualitative improvements.

As already related 64 Victor B.1 and 64 Vulcan B.1s were built in place of the 128 Valiants ordered. (Only 104 Valiants were built.) The 25 Victor B.2s IOTL were built ITTL. The 84 Victors & 134 Vulcans built in IOTL were delivered at a faster rate ITTL and a larger number was built to Mk 2 standard ITTL.

The result was that if all 20 squadrons weren't equipped with the Victor Mk 2 or Vulcan Mk 2 they soon would be.

IOTL 8 of the 20 squadrons were still equipped with Valiants. ITTL 4 would have Vulcans and 4 would have Victors.
  • The Valiant & Vulcan could carry 21,000lbs of conventional bombs. So no change there.
  • However, the Victor could carry 35,000lbs of conventional bombs. Thus the 4 squadrons equipped with Victors instead of Valiants could lift one-and-two-third times the weight of conventional bombs.
  • 3 of the 4 extra Vulcan squadrons were assigned to the Tactical Bomber Force.
  • 2 of the 4 extra Victor squadrons were the tanker squadrons. Therefore, the tanker force at 31.03.62 ITTL carried more fuel with the same number of aircraft as IOTL.
  • The sole LRPR squadron was also equipped with Victors instead of Valiants.
The ECM squadron was flying Victors instead of Valiants too.
 
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The limitations of the V force were clear to UK planners by the mid-50s and solutions were sought from the Avro 730 supersonic bomber, through Blue Steel 2 and Blue Streak to the eventual solution of transfering the deterrent to Polaris.
The use of 48 Vulcans to give SACEUR a theatre nuclear capability is less optimum than the F111K which is why the US deploys a second wing of F111s to Britain and probably had plans to stage FB111s out of UK bases. Tornado is not a satisfactory substitute for the Vulcan or F111K but by that time GLCMs were on the way.
A non NATO role for the V force was largely focused on the threat from Indonesia and China of limited local wars.
 
The various proposals to arm the Vulcans and TSR2 with stand off weapons have been well covered here and in excellent books (there is also an excellent thread on the Shipbucket site about an alt UK).
None were adopted because of the slow development time for UK missiles. Blue Steel had not been easy despite drawing on the US Rascal. Martel which was the only ASM to see service failed to deliver (RAF material intially mentions Martel being fitted to Vulcans and Nimrod's but it only served with Buccaneers).
 
nuclear ABMs also have the advantage of causing a missed warhead to fizzle, potentially. It's why the first deliberate neutron bombs were on ABMs.
Exactly. Albeit boosted fission warheads make quickly made such method of defense obsolete (they are immune to fizzle, since fusion reaction inside would ignite even with incomplete assembly - and neutron flow from fusion would "afterburn" the fission fuel around).

Fortunately, the UK is just about small enough for a single major ABM installation like the US Safeguard system to provide protection. Especially if the lower altitude point defense SAMs are also ABM-capable. Think Spartans and Sprints. I'd guesstimate that the UK could get away with about a third the number of Spartans and about the same number of Sprints as planned by the US. Call it 180 Spartan-equivalents and 192 Sprint-equivalents.
Yes, but the development of such system would be very costly. And probably only possible by mid-to-late 1970s, when digital fire control systems and phased array radars (capable of tracking multiple targets) would became reliable tech.
 
Exactly. Albeit boosted fission warheads make quickly made such method of defense obsolete (they are immune to fizzle, since fusion reaction inside would ignite even with incomplete assembly - and neutron flow from fusion would "afterburn" the fission fuel around).
That probably depends on the total yield of the fizzle. If you get 2 or 3 tons out of the fizzle, I don't think that will put enough energy into the secondary to cause fusion. If you get a kiloton or something, then yes you're going to ignite the fusion secondary.

And the closer the near miss with stronger neutron flux the smaller the fizzle in the target.


Yes, but the development of such system would be very costly. And probably only possible by mid-to-late 1970s, when digital fire control systems and phased array radars (capable of tracking multiple targets) would became reliable tech.
Early to mid 1970s, the US Safeguard base, the Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex, went online in 1975 but that was due to Congressional foot-dragging about approving a budget. The big Missile Site Radar is 1960s technology.
 
That probably depends on the total yield of the fizzle. If you get 2 or 3 tons out of the fizzle, I don't think that will put enough energy into the secondary to cause fusion. If you get a kiloton or something, then yes you're going to ignite the fusion secondary.
According to "nuclear weapon archive", the 1% of fission fuel going into reaction is enough to ignite fusion booster:

The fusion reaction rate typically becomes significant at 20-30 million degrees K. This temperature is reached at very low efficiencies, when less than 1% of the fissile material has fissioned (corresponding to a yield in the range of hundreds of tons). Since implosion weapons can be designed that will achieve yields in this range even if neutrons are present a the moment of criticality, fusion boosting allows the manufacture of efficient weapons that are immune to predetonation. Elimination of this hazard is a very important advantage in using boosting. It appears that every weapon now in the U.S. arsenal is a boosted design.

So apparently neutron flux is not a reliable way to disable nuclear warheads anymore.


Early to mid 1970s, the US Safeguard base, the Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex, went online in 1975 but that was due to Congressional foot-dragging about approving a budget. The big Missile Site Radar is 1960s technology.

Must admit, I forgot that Safeguard was designed in 1960s. Okay, so early 1970s are technically possible. But UK did not have any practical experience in anti-ballistic missiles (while Safeguard was based on significant amount of previous experiments and BMD works), so it would clearly took more time for UK.

P.S. Maybe it would be cheaper to just buy a Safeguard system from US? I doubt that USSR would protest much about a single site in Britain. At most, USSR may demand that Britain would be limited to one site only (or for USSR to reserve the right for one additional ABM site)
 
Another weird idea; what about ordering a jet flying boat strategic bomber? So it could be easily dispersed, independent of airfields. The Sea Master was rather good idea, and could be ordered in late 1950s; alternatively, a longer-range machine could be produced by British own industry (Britain have good experience with flying boats).

A fleet of large jet flying boats and tankers, disperced with their supply ships around British coastlines and Mediterranean would be next thing to invulnerable for pre-emptive strikes, and would be more persuasive deterrence than land-based bombers. The addition of standoff and decoy missiles could remedy their vulnerability problems.
 
Saunder Roe readily approves the above post.
Well, it would solve the vulnerability problem rather handily - and large jet flying boats is what British companies perfectly able to design and build in reasonable time. Also, it would placate both RAF and RN at least a bit.
 

Part Three
Engines for the V-Bombers

Except, ITTL Armstrong-Siddeley and Bristol Aero Engines become part of Bristol Siddeley Engines between 1945 and 1948 in my timeline. Therefore, no Olympus or no Sapphire ITTL. Which of the two engines draws the short straw in 1948? My guess is that it would have been the Olympus because the Sapphire first ran in 1948 and the Olympus didn't run for the first time until 1950.
Why not both engines?
 
If this Bristol Siddeley keeps two teams going you have AS-ex-Metrovick going down high temp/pressure single shaft route for high fast and Bristol team doing the twin shaft route for high efficiency.

Research efforts on both and pick a winner?
 
Must admit, I forgot that Safeguard was designed in 1960s. Okay, so early 1970s are technically possible. But UK did not have any practical experience in anti-ballistic missiles (while Safeguard was based on significant amount of previous experiments and BMD works), so it would clearly took more time for UK.

P.S. Maybe it would be cheaper to just buy a Safeguard system from US? I doubt that USSR would protest much about a single site in Britain. At most, USSR may demand that Britain would be limited to one site only (or for USSR to reserve the right for one additional ABM site)
Or at least buy the Safeguard radar from the US.



Another weird idea; what about ordering a jet flying boat strategic bomber? So it could be easily dispersed, independent of airfields. The Sea Master was rather good idea, and could be ordered in late 1950s; alternatively, a longer-range machine could be produced by British own industry (Britain have good experience with flying boats).

A fleet of large jet flying boats and tankers, disperced with their supply ships around British coastlines and Mediterranean would be next thing to invulnerable for pre-emptive strikes, and would be more persuasive deterrence than land-based bombers. The addition of standoff and decoy missiles could remedy their vulnerability problems.
That's certainly a bit off the wall, but it's probably the best option for the UK in terms of sufficient dispersal as to make hitting the planes before they take off ineffective at best, plus being much cheaper than building missile subs.

Still runs into the difficulties of getting the planes through the defenses on their way to the targets, however.
 
Or at least buy the Safeguard radar from the US.
Would still require defelopment the British ABM's and warheads. Not something Britain is very experienced in. Some refit of Thunderbird or Bloodhound with enchanced radiation nuclear warhead seems most likely (if I recall correctly, there were some ideas)
 
Still runs into the difficulties of getting the planes through the defenses on their way to the targets, however.
Yep. They probably wouldn't be much worse than V-bombers, but clearly not better also. The most practical way seems to use standoff cruise missiles (like Hound Dog) and onboard decoys (like Quail) to achieve penetration.
 
The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Six
Bomber Command at 31.03.64

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/a-different-v-force-in-the-1960s.36779/

From the above thread

This is Plan P which was dated March 1964 covered the period from 31st March 1964 to 31st March 1975.

Plan P Bomber Command at March 1964.png

The Command had 166 aircraft in 22 squadrons at 31/03/64 which was to decline to 158 aircraft in 20 squadrons at 31/03/65. The February 1960 version of Plan M had 224 aircraft in 27 squadrons on both of these dates.

The net difference at 31/03/64 was 58 aircraft in 5 squadrons as follows:
  • No. 51 Squadron with its 6 Elint aircraft (3 Canberras and 3 Comets) was transferred from Signals Command to Bomber Command.
    • That increased the total to 230 aircraft in 28 squadrons for a difference of 64 aircraft in 6 squadrons.
  • No. 18 Squadron with its 8 E.C.M. aircraft (7 Valiants and one Canberra) was disbanded on 31/03/63.
    • That reduced the total to 222 aircraft in 27 squadrons for a difference of 56 aircraft in 5 squadrons.
  • Both plans had one Canberra M.R.P.R. squadron, but it had 16 aircraft in Plan M and 8 aircraft in Plan P.
    • That reduced the total to 214 aircraft in 27 squadrons for a difference of 48 aircraft in 5 squadrons.
  • The remainder of the difference (48 aircraft in 5 squadrons) was because there were:
    • 40 Medium Bombers in 4 squadrons
      • 144 aircraft in 18 squadrons Plan M.
      • 104 aircraft in 14 squadrons Plan P, which included 2 squadrons at half-strength.
    • 8 fewer LRPR/strategic reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron.
      • 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons Plan M.
      • 8 aircraft in one squadron in Plan P.
Under Plan M the Medium Bomber & Strategic Reconnaissance Forces should have consisted of 160 aircraft in 20 squadrons as follows.
  • 16 Victor B.1 in 2 squadrons.
  • 24 Vulcan B.1 in in 3 squadrons.
  • 48 Victor B.2 in 6 squadrons.
  • 72 Vulcan B.2 in 9 squadrons.
The actual strength at 31.03.64 was 112 aircraft in 14 squadrons as follows.
  • 8 Valiants in 8 squadrons.
  • 24 Victor B.1 in 3 squadrons.
  • 24 Vulcan B1 in 3 squadrons.
  • 8 Victor B.2 in 2 half-strength squadrons.
  • 48 Vulcan B.2 in 6 squadrons.
This meant the quality of the force was worse too. 120 out of 160 aircraft (75%) were Victor & Vulcan Mk 2s in Plan M. However, the actual situation was that 56 out of 112 aircraft (50% of a force that was 25% smaller) were Victor & Vulcan Mk 2s. Furthermore, there was still a squadron of Valiants.

This was way behind the schedule in Plan M. The single Valiant reconnaissance squadron was replaced by 2 full-strength Victor Mk 2 squadrons by 30.06.61. The 4 Victor Mk 2 & 9 Vulcan Mk 2 medium bomber squadrons were to have been in place by 30.06.62 and been at full-strength.

Under Plan P the strategic reconnaissance squadron wouldn't convert to Victor Mk 2s until 30.06.65, the 2 Victor B.2 medium bomber squadrons would not reach full-strength until 30.09.64 and there wouldn't be 9 Vulcan B.2 squadron until 31.03.66.

Bomber Command at 31.06.64 in this "Version of History".

The Command had 174 aircraft in 22 squadrons instead of 166 aircraft in 22 squadrons because all 14 medium bomber squadrons were at full-strength.

However, the most important improvement was to the quality force.
  • IOTL only 8 out of 20 V-bomber squadrons (40%) were equipped with Mk 2 Victors & Vulcans.
    • That is there were 6 Valiant, 3 Victor Mk 1, 3 Vulcan Mk 1, 2 Victor Mk 2 (both at half-strength) and 6 Vulcan Mk 2 squadrons.
  • ITTL all 2- squadrons were equipped with Victor Mk 2s or Vulcan Mk 2s.
The most important improvements were having 24 Vulcan B.2s instead of 24 Valiant tactical bombers, 16 Victor K.2s instead of 16 Valiant tankers and 8 Victor SR.2s instead of the 8 strategic reconnaissance Valiants.
 
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Part Three
Engines for the V-Bombers

Except, ITTL Armstrong-Siddeley and Bristol Aero Engines become part of Bristol Siddeley Engines between 1945 and 1948 in my timeline. Therefore, no Olympus or no Sapphire ITTL. Which of the two engines draws the short straw in 1948? My guess is that it would have been the Olympus because the Sapphire first ran in 1948 and the Olympus didn't run for the first time until 1950.
Why not both engines?
I don't know whether I should be gratified or depressed to learn that I'm not the only blond on his forum.
If this Bristol Siddeley keeps two teams going you have AS-ex-Metrovick going down high temp/pressure single shaft route for high fast and Bristol team doing the twin shaft route for high efficiency.

Research efforts on both and pick a winner?
Because that defeats the object of the exercise.
 
Would still require defelopment the British ABM's and warheads. Not something Britain is very experienced in. Some refit of Thunderbird or Bloodhound with enchanced radiation nuclear warhead seems most likely (if I recall correctly, there were some ideas)
And that's likely acceptable as the stopgap. A dedicated ABM would have to be faster, if only to be detonating its own warhead farther away from the UK.


Because that defeats the object of the exercise.
Not sure you should give up the advantage in designing engines so easily. Having working twin-spool engines is good for bombers and transports. Most fighters can get away with single spools still you get into fighter turbofans.
 
And that's likely acceptable as the stopgap. A dedicated ABM would have to be faster, if only to be detonating its own warhead farther away from the UK.
Yes, it would probably work fine enough as stopgap - considering that the attack against Britain would be launched with IRBM (which are slower than ICBM, and easier to intercept). Since neither Bloodhound nor Thunderbird are capable of exoatmospheric interceptions, blanketing effect of nuclear detonations wouldn't be that much a problem. Combined with at least some hardened aircraft shelters, it would increase attack cost significantly.
 
Because that defeats the object of the exercise.
My two pennies. Olympus is the more powerful engine, so I'd go with Olympus over Sapphire.
Sapphire probably only really kept going once Metrovick got out the aero engine business because it was a backup for Avon - but Avon was always the aircraft designer's favourite choice and Sapphire seems to have always lacked behind the Avon. You could of course argue that Avon production might not be sufficent for everything to be Avon powered, but a second set of tooling is easier and cheaper.
Now whether Olympus is better than Conway is another arguement, but of course Olympus preceedes Conway date wise.
 
The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Seven
The Plan for the V-Force 1964-75 at March 1964

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/a-different-v-force-in-the-1960s.36779/

From the above thread

Plan P of March 1964 again.

Plan P Bomber Command at March 1964.png


The Medium Bomber Force

At 31/03/64 there were:
  • 3 squadrons Victor B.1/B.1A with 24 aircraft.
  • 2 squadrons Victor B.2 (Blue Steel) with 8 aircraft. (The squadrons were at half-strength.)
  • 3 squadrons Vulcan B.1 with 24 aircraft.
  • 3 squadrons Vulcan B.2 (Free Fall) with 24 aircraft.
  • 3 squadrons Vulcan B.2 (Blue Steel) with 24 aircraft.
Total - 14 squadrons with 104 aircraft. (Plan M had 18 Medium Bomber squadrons with 144 aircraft at 31/03/64.)

There were only 56 Mk 2 V-Bombers (8 Victors and 48 Vulcans) when there should have been 104 Mk 2 V-Bombers (32 Victors and 72 Vulcans).

The shortfall was partially due to the decision to reduce the number of Victor Mk 2s from 59 to 34. According to Wynn on Page 332 of RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces the Defence Committee decided to reduce the Victor Mk 2 order on 25th July 1960. It was also because the Vulcan B.2s and remaining Victor B.2s were delivered behind schedule.

There would be 112 aircraft in 14 squadrons on 30/09/64 which is when the Victor B.2 squadrons were planned to be at full-strength. However, this would be reduced to 96 aircraft in 12 squadrons at 31/03/65.

There would be a further reduction to 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons at 31/03/66. That is 16 Victor B.2s in 2 squadrons and 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons. All the Victor B.2s and a third of the Vulcan B.2s would be armed with Blue Steel.

I don't know when the decision to reduce the Medium Bomber force from 144 aircraft in 18 squadrons to 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons was made.

This force of 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons would be maintained until 31/03/70.

The Vulcan B.2 would be withdrawn between 01/04/70 and 31/03/73. That is:
  • 72 aircraft in 9 squadrons (including 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons armed with Blue Steel) on 31/03/70
  • 48 aircraft in 6 squadrons (including 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons armed with Blue Steel) on 31/03/71
  • 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons (including 8 aircraft in one squadron armed with Blue Steel) on 31/03/72 and...
  • No aircraft in zero squadrons on 31/03/73.
This left the 2 Victor B.2 (Blue Steel) squadrons which would be retained until 31/03/75.

24 Vulcan B.2 (Free Fall) aircraft in 3 squadrons were to have an overseas reinforcement role from October 1964 to 1970. Thereafter the task was to be taken over by the 3 Victor B.2 squadrons in Serials 2 and 10. That is the 2 Victor B.2 squadrons in the Medium Bomber Force and the Victor B.2 Strategic Reconnaissance squadron.

The original document says that there would be insufficient aircraft to back the Victor B.2 squadrons and the Victor O.C.U. to normal standard. This explains why the number of aircraft declines from 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31/03/72 to 14 aircraft in 2 squadrons at 31/03/75.

The Strategic Reconnaissance Force - Formerly the Long-Range Photographic Reconnaissance (L.R.P.R.) Force

At 31/03/64 there were 16 Victor B.2s in 2 squadrons that were in Plan M and 8 Valiants in one squadron in Plan P.

The Valiant squadron was to convert to the Victor B.2 in the first half of 1965. This was several years behind Plan M which had the first Victor reconnaissance squadron formed between 01/10/60 & 31/03/61 and the second squadron convert from Valiants to Victors in the first half of 1961.

As already explained 3 Vulcan B.2 (Free Fall) squadrons would have an overseas reinforcement role from October 1964 to 1970 and that thereafter the task was to be taken over by the 3 Victor B.2 squadrons, i.e. this one and the 2 Victor medium bomber squadrons.

The original document says that there would be insufficient aircraft to back the Victor B.2 squadrons and the Victor O.C.U. to normal standards which explains why the number of aircraft in the squadron declines from 8 at 31/03/72 to 7 on 31/03/73.

The Tactical Bomber and Tactical Reconnaissance Forces

At 31/03/64 there were 24 Valiants in 3 squadrons as per Plan M. These aircraft and the Medium Bomber Force were assigned to NATO.

The force was to be replaced by the TSR.2 on a one-for-one basis between 01/04/67 and 31/03/70. However, but the plan was to form 2 squadrons of 12 aircraft instead of 3 squadrons of 8 aircraft. The TSR.2s were earmarked to NATO rather than assigned to NATO. I don't know that the difference between earmarked and assigned was.

The Tactical Reconnaissance squadron was to convert from 8 Canberras to 8 TSR.2s between 31/03/69 and 31/03/70.

The Tanker Force

At 31/03/64 there were 16 Valiants in 2 squadrons as per Plan M.

A squadron of 8 Victor Mk 1 tankers was to be formed between 01/10/65 and 31/03/66 which would increase the size of the tanker force to 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons.

Another pair of Victor Mk 2 tanker squadrons would form between 01/04/66 and 30/09/66 and replace the Valiant tankers. However, these squadrons would have 7 aircraft each rather than 8 so there would be 22 aircraft in 3 squadrons instead of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons.

There was no note in the original document that says so, but it looks as if there weren't enough Victor Mk 1s to back this force because it would decline from 22 aircraft in 3 squadrons at 30/06/67 to 18 on 31/03/74 and be maintained at 18 aircraft in 3 squadrons until 31/03/75.

However, in This Timeline
The Medium Bomber and Strategic Reconnaissance Forces

There were 120 aircraft in 15 squadrons instead of 112 aircraft in 15 squadrons on 31/03/64, because all 15 squadrons were at full-strength. Furthermore, they consisted of 48 Victor Mk 2 in 6 squadrons & 72 Vulcan Mk 2 in 9 squadrons so 100% of the forces were equipped with Victor & Vulcan Mk 2s and there were no Valiants.

In common with OTL the forces were to be reduced from 120 aircraft in 15 squadrons to 96 aircraft in 12 squadrons between 01/10/64 and 31/03/66, but.
  • One Victor squadron was to be transferred from the Medium Bomber Force to the Tanker Force as OTL.
    • But it was a B.2 squadron instead of a B.1 squadron.
  • Two Victor squadrons were to be transferred from the Medium bomber force to NEAF instead of disbanding.
    • Plus they were B.2 squadrons instead of B.1 squadrons.
In common with OTL there was to be a further reduction to 24 Victor Mk 2 squadrons in 3 squadrons between 01/04/70 & 31/03/73, which would be maintained until 31/03/75. The number of aircraft in the squadrons wasn't expected to fall from 24 to 21 by 31/03/75 because plenty of backing aircraft were available.

The Tactical Bomber and Tactical Reconnaissance Forces

At present there isn't a TSR.2 in my timeline, because the RAF was forced to buy Buccaneers. However, at present I think the plan would have been for Bomber Command's Tactical Bomber Force to retain its 24 Vulcan B.2s in 3 squadrons until 31/03/75 and its sole tactical reconnaissance squadron to retain its Canberras until 31/03/75 rather than convert to the Buccaneer.

The Tanker Force

There were already 2 squadrons of Victor tankers at 31/03/64 in my timeline and the plan was that a third Victor squadron would be formed by transferring a medium bomber squadron to the Tanker Force between 01/10/65 and 31/03/66. IOTL the Victor tankers were Mk 1s and ITTL they were Mk 2s. The number of aircraft in the squadrons wasn't expected to fall from 22 to 18 by 31/03/75 because plenty of backing aircraft were available.

V-Bombers in the Overseas Commands

IOTL NEAF's 32 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons were to have been replaced by 16 TSR.2s in 2 squadrons by 31/03/71. As we know TSR.2 was cancelled and the Canberras were replaced by 16 Vulcan B.2s in 2 squadrons in 1969.

Although I've written that the RAF was forced to buy Buccaneers instead of TSR.2 I've decided to replace the 32 Canberra light bombers on Cyprus with the 16 Victor B.2s in 2 Bomber Command medium bomber squadrons were due to to disband between 01/10/64 and 31/03/65. In common with Bomber Command the single tactical reconnaissance squadron in NEAF would operate the Canberra until 31/03/75 instead of converting to the Buccaneer.

218 Victors & Vulcans of all marks were built IOTL. However, 371 were built ITTL because another 153 were built instead of the 104 Valiants built IOTL, the 24 Valiants cancelled IOTL and the 25 Victors that were cancelled IOTL. Furthermore, the total of 371 includes at least 148 (instead of 123) that were built as Mk 2s.

Therefore, there would have been enough Victors & Vulcans to convert the RAF's Canberra light bomber squadron in FEAF to V-bombers too. For that matter the stock of aircraft would have been large enough for the RAF to lend enough Victors & Vulcans to the RAAF & RNZAF to re-equip their Canberra light bomber squadrons in FEAF with Victors & Vulcans too. However, the squadrons in FEAF probably had Mk 1s instead of Mk 2s.
 
The AS team focused on higher inlet temperatures and supersonic performance. This favoured a single shaft engine and forms the basis of their work for the supersonic recce bomber and high speed fighters.

Their alternative path was in the engine to meet request ('54) for 30" diameter lightweight engines won by DH's compromise of a scaled Gyron Junior.....which was neither lightweight or 30"...

Whatever won would fit N/A.39 (Buccaneer) and N/A.47 fighter. With potential to F.155 submissions and supersonic soaker research contract.

AS team started on this as a scaled sapphire but it rapidly evolved with their experience into a new design.

Bristol worked on twin shaft developments of higher mechanical efficiency and like RR, the extensive use of titanium. Olympus was the first.

A scaled BE.30 Zeus development BE.33 was their 40" ootion.
Zeus was their competitor to RB.106 Thames as a Avon successor.

So it's a choice BSE would have, which engine to fund. Arguably winning the 30" Contract would radically change the future.
As such higher power, lower fuel burn engines on Buccaneer or whatever wins anti-ship/attack/strike/recce platform for the RN is likely to stomp home over other fighter/strike platforms.
The higher thrust would confer more fighter-like performance on Buccaneer, such engines being in lower drag than Speys.
 
Not sure you should give up the advantage in designing engines so easily. Having working twin-spool engines is good for bombers and transports. Most fighters can get away with single spools still you get into fighter turbofans.
The point of creating BSE a decade earlier is to avoid ten years of triplication. That is stop Armstrong Siddeley, Bristol & De Havilland producing competing designs and concentrate the three firms' resources on producing one design in each power-class.
 
My two pennies. Olympus is the more powerful engine, so I'd go with Olympus over Sapphire.
Sapphire probably only really kept going once Metrovick got out the aero engine business because it was a backup for Avon - but Avon was always the aircraft designer's favourite choice and Sapphire seems to have always lacked behind the Avon. You could of course argue that Avon production might not be sufficient for everything to be Avon powered, but a second set of tooling is easier and cheaper.
Now whether Olympus is better than Conway is another argument, but of course Olympus precedes Conway date wise.
Before I reply to that are you okay with Victor and Vulcan entering service in January 1955 instead of April 1958 and July 1957 respectively?
 
My two pennies. Olympus is the more powerful engine, so I'd go with Olympus over Sapphire.

Sapphire probably only really kept going once Metrovick got out the aero engine business because it was a backup for Avon - but Avon was always the aircraft designer's favourite choice and Sapphire seems to have always lacked behind the Avon. You could of course argue that Avon production might not be sufficient for everything to be Avon powered, but a second set of tooling is easier and cheaper.

Now whether Olympus is better than Conway is another argument, but of course Olympus precedes Conway date wise.
According to the Putnams on RAF aircraft since 1948 there wasn't much different between the Olympus engines on the Vulcan B.1 and the Sapphire engines on the Victor Mk 1.
Victor B.1​
11,050lbst A.S. Sapphire Mk 202 or 207.​
Victor B.2​
19,750lbst Rolls-Royce Conway R.Co.17 Mk 201​
Vulcan B.1​
11,000lbst Bristol Olympus Mk 101​
or​
12,000lbst Bristol Olympus Mk 102​
of​
13,000lbst Bristol Olympus Mk 104​
Vulcan B.2​
17,000lbst Olympus Mk 201​
20,000lbst Olympus Mk 302​

For what it's worth No. 1. The Victor B.2 was originally to have had six ASSa.9 Sapphires rated at 14,000lbst each. That is according to "V-Bombers, Valiant, Vulcan and Victor" by Barry Jones. According to him this was because Handley Page didn't believe Rolls-Royce's figures for the Conway.
However, the Sapphire ASSa.9 was principally being developed for a "thin-wing" Gloster Javelin variant for photo-reconnaissance role to Specification PR.118D. The Ministry of Supply decided to drop the project, together with the development of its engine, so the Sapphire 9 was dead. This placed Handley Page in a dilemma, with the result that they had little option but to do away with the Phase 2 and proceed with Phase 2, trusting in Rolls-Royce's predictions for the Conway.
Before fact checking I'd thought that a Sapphire producing as much thrust as Olympus Marks 201 & 301 was under development for the Victor Mk 2. However, could the Sapphire have been made to produce 20,000lbst ITTL? Or could BSE have developed a bypass engine in the 20,000lbst class to rival the Conway ITTL?

The 104 Victor & Vulcan Mk 1s built instead of the Valiant might have Avon engines because the aircraft that they were built instead of had Avon engines. However, in the interests of standardisation there might be some "musical engines" with all the first-generation V-Bombers having the Sapphire and some of the other aircraft that had Sapphire engines IOTL having Avon engines ITTL.

For what it's worth No. 2. As far as I know early Sapphires were better than early Avons. E.g. the first-generation Hunters with Sapphire engines performed better than the first-generation Hunters with Avon engines. Is that correct?
 
However, could the Sapphire have been made to produce 20,000lbst ITTL?
From my notes

P.173
48" diameter, 25,200lb dry, 314lb/sec

P.172F
44" diameter, 21,700lb, 264lb/sec

P.159 mass flow 330lb/sec
21,750lb
 
Before I reply to that are you okay with Victor and Vulcan entering service in January 1955 instead of April 1958 and July 1957 respectively?
I'd back that ambition (one that I share as will be become clearer in a post I'm planning for the Rationalisation in 1950 thread).
 
As far as I know early Sapphires were better than early Avons. E.g. the first-generation Hunters with Sapphire engines performed better than the first-generation Hunters with Avon engines. Is that correct?
The Avon was less forgiving of gun gases for sure.

I'm torn, if I had to make a 50/50 choice I'd vote O and not S, but if pushed for S then I say, yes use it on more aircraft than ITTL.
 
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