Good feedback folks!
uk 75 Challenger exists and has certain features which suit a country only operating a small number of tanks. It is cheaper to operate than Abrams and more rugged than Leopard.
Then you've already answered your own question
Proceed with
Challenger 3 upgrades and happily pay the costs of operating a distinct variant with no opportunity for individual replacements. And, in making such a decision, ignore all previous worries re: lack of commonality with NATO allies.
zen Note that Norwegian trials showed little difference between K2 and Leo2. That K2 was cheaper and Leo2 chosen for other political (European) reasons. Even if that will cost Norway more.....and probably arrive late.
It'd be interesting to know what those "political (European) reasons" were. None of the usual EU pressures apply to Norway. I suspect that a more 'local' parts supply was one issue. Would it have been any different had K2 production already been underway in Poland? Maybe not.
Cost: Not a deal-breaker for a nation with a sovereign wealth fund worth USD 1.4 trillion. But, as other
Leopard operators have recently discovered, there are other issues with buying German. For those tempted, I'd suggest a quick look at their
Bundessicherheitsrat (Federal Security Council) whose decisions are actually at the whim of the
Bundeskanzler (or, in the current case, his
Chef des Bundeskanzleramts).
Elan Vital Also seriously, comparing free export to a Ukraine at war with peacetime sales to the UK, a long-time NATO ally?
The two issues are not unrelated. Whitehall exercised its option to donate
Challenger 2s to Ukraine at war. It would not have had that freedom of action as a
Leopard operator. As recent events have shown, transferring German-made equipment to Ukraine is a lot more time-consuming and politically-complicated.
Of course, most armaments-making nations put some kind of restrictions on the re-export of such weapons. But most are bureaucratic amateurs compared to the
Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (Weapons of War Control Act) under the BDR's
Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (Foreign Trade Act). (If you're okay with all that red-tape, buy German - my country did).
It matters whether potential foreign suppliers will hamstring re-exports. But it matters to policy-makers not to the military (who, by definition, are losing re-exported assets). So, the real question here is: who is likely to insist upon such stringent controls? We know the Germans will. US FMS is not exactly an easy process either. But what about South Korea or Poland as licencee? It is worth asking.