The ARI.18223 RWR would definitely show indications for the Roland missile radar in the J-Band and Skyguard in the I-Band. The Argentine Type 42 Sea Darts would also be indicated in I and J-Bands. Mirage Cyrano II radars would also be indicated in the I-Band.
AN/ALQ-101(V)10 operated in 3 bands - 2.6-5.5, 4.85-9.7 and 8.9-16.5GHz (the older (V)8 previously used by the Buccs, and probably still available in 1982, did not have the low band).
It had 7 modes of operation, 1 silent, 1 linked to RWR, 2 manual and 3 automatic. I know for Jaguar only the automatic modes were used: Mode 1 XMIT1, Mode 3 XMIT2 and Mode 7 BOTH. XMIT1 was optimised for low-level use and for Firecan, Flapwheel, Gundish and SA-6; XMIT2 was optmised for use above 300ft for Firecan, Gundish (high scan rate), Jaybird, SA-2C & E, SA-3 and SA-6. It could also jam one channel of SA-N-3 to degrade that system.
BOTH was optimised for the Baltic for SA-N-1, SA-N-3, Muff Cob, Owl Screech 2, Hawk Screech and Sun Visor B.
For Desert Storm they devised two composite settings: 77 for use against Fansong C & E and Headlights, 78 was optimised for Flapwheel, Hawk Screech and Sun Visor B. Worryingly there was no discussion of Western system jamming but BOTH could apparently jam the RTN-10X radar.
Given that there are few Roland systems - really the main threat is from Skyguard and the EL M-2106 radars. It may have been possible to create specific settings for these, at least to degrade the radars' performance (but obviously not the K-Band Skyguard acquisition set).
For airfield attacks, against runways (in the absence of dedicated Durandal/JP.233 type weapons) 1,000lb GP freefall bombs worked best, but penetration of concrete runways was likely only from 65 degree dives. Freefall or retarded worked ok against grass strips. BL.755 was useless for anything except causing rubble but unexploded bomblets would hamper the repair teams. Either weapon was effective against parked aircraft, 30mm ADEN only being advised for aircraft parked in the open.
One other interesting vulnerability noted was manpower - aircrews were less easily replaced if their quarters/airfield buildings could be targeted, and ground crew would be near the aircraft out on the airfield.
