Canadian SSN requirement 1987-89

[Grey Havoc]

Since we don't already have a topic on this:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a201669.pdf


http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442607.pdf

It was 1987 before the next White Paper was issued, this time by the Progressive
Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Entitled Challenge and
Commitment,12 this document stated explicitly that the previous Liberal government had
gotten it wrong. The Liberals had been overly optimistic about the course of East-West
relations, had undermined Canada’s credibility with its allies, and had allowed a
dangerous “commitment-capability gap” to emerge within the CF. In the meantime, new
factors had emerged, especially the advent of cruise missiles and the growing strategic
importance of the Arctic, which directly threatened North American and Canadian
security. To meet these challenges, the Mulroney government pledged to dramatically
increase defense spending. It would acquire new and more tanks for the ground forces in
Germany, additional surface ships and LRPAs, and, most ambitiously, a fleet of 10-12
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) capable of under-ice operations. The SSNs
were also justified on the grounds of the need to assert Canadian sovereignty in waters
American SSNs were known to transit.

Of all the three White Papers discussed above, the 1987 document “got it wrong” the
most profoundly and had the shortest life. Its tone reflected the increased East-West
acrimony of the early 1980s and thus found itself caught by the rapidly changing
situation of the Gorbachev years. Within a few months after its release, the Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed. The Mulroney government might be
excused for not predicting the subsequent abrupt end to the Cold War, but it had also
completely misread the domestic situation. While public opinion polls had shown some
concern about poor Arctic sovereignty and the state of the CF equipment, there turned
out to be very little support for SSNs or for major defense expenditures given the
improved international security environment.13 In addition, it turned out that the Minister
of Defence had secured only tepid and conditional support from his cabinet colleagues,
especially the Minister of Finance, on the funding formula necessary to implement
Challenge and Commitment.14

The Mulroney government began to hedge on its defense pledges and deliberately
avoided discussing the White Paper during the 1988 federal election campaign. Once
returned to office, its 1989 budget essentially gutted the 1987 White Paper, cancelling
the SSN program and postponing the tank purchase. Subsequent budgets further reduced
defense expenditures, eventually abandoning new tanks and other equipment, although
continuing with the building of 12 new frigates and plans to replace land and seaborne
helicopters with the EH 101. Between 1989 and 1992 planned DND expenditures were
reduced by $5.6 billion.15



12. Canada DND, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada,
Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Service, 1987.

13. See Michel Fortmann and Edouard Cloutier, “The Domestic Context of Canadian
Defence Policy: The Contours of an Emerging Debate” Canadian Defence Quarterly,
Vol. 21, Special No. 2, 1991.

14. Bland, “Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada,” op. cit., p.13.

15. Canada DND, Canadian Defence Policy, Ottawa: April, 1992, p.14.

A couple of quick observations on the second paper:

"Of all the three White Papers discussed above, the 1987 document “got it wrong” the
most profoundly." I wonder about that.

"Improved international security environment", yeah right. Although given that the paper was written (1994) during the 'End of History' era, I suppose his mistake was somewhat understandable. The Canadian public's attitude towards defence during the late eighties is another matter, however.

 

[Archibald]

French nuclear attack subs (of the Rubis class, the smallest in the World) were reportedly considered.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

A couple of quick observations on the second paper:

"Of all the three White Papers discussed above, the 1987 document “got it wrong” the
most profoundly." I wonder about that.

"Improved international security environment", yeah right. Although given that the paper was written (1994) during the 'End of History' era, I suppose his mistake was somewhat understandable. The Canadian public's attitude towards defence during the late eighties is another matter, however.

Well the threats we face now and in the past 20 years are a drop in the ocean compared to the threat of the Soviet Union: over running Western Europe, South Africa and the Middle East with mechanised forces, interdiction of global shipping, nuclear destruction of the world. Kind of makes the Axis of Evil/Rogue States and Al Qaeda look like fluffy bunnies.

 

[Grey Havoc]

You're forgetting the Chinese Dragon, and the Russian Bear is beginning to stir again, albeit still sluggishly for the moment.

IMAGE CREDIT: Canadian Military Journal collection
Original caption: A French Rubis Class SSN, a type that had been given serious consideration by the Canadian Navy.​

IMAGE CREDIT: Canadian Military Journal collection
Original caption: A British Trafalgar Class submarine, a follow-on to the Swiftsure Class of SSNs that was also being considered for Canadian acquisition.​

Back to the eighties and a bit more background:

In 1931, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had ruled that it was the exercise of authority within a territory that was the principal consideration when dealing with matters of sovereignty. This control even superceded prior claims to discovery or contiguity.23 In 1985, during the passage of the Polar Sea through contested waters, an international tribunal would have undoubtedly found Canada’s claim to Arctic waters as historic internal waters “...indifferently pursued and inconsistently expressed,” which would have seriously damaged the Canadian legal position.24 During another boundary dispute in the Gulf of Maine, which went before the ICJ from 1981 to 1984, the Canadian lawyers emphasized events in recent (the previous decade) history, while the United States focused upon historical occupation. In the event of a similar case over the North West Passage, an idea officially endorsed by the Canadian government in 1985, the presence of even a few Canadian submarines in the region would have gone a long way toward establishing a precedent of Canadian control and occupation.25 Thus while ‘gunboat diplomacy’ may not have been a solution in the strictest sense, it was intended to provide Canada with a vital legal precedent when and if Canada was ever forced to prove its occupation of its northern waters,

The SSN purchase was not meant to accomplish this goal of asserting Canadian control independently; it was merely the keystone in a larger attempt to bring a Canadian presence to the Arctic. In addition to the nuclear submarines, Beatty had asked for an underwater sonar detection system, five forward operations sites for air defence fighters (at Rankin, Inuvik, Yellowknife, Iqualit, and Kuajjuaq), a new headquarters and more equipment for the Canadian Rangers, a new High Arctic training centre at Nanisivik, new reconnaissance aircraft, a northern-terrain vehicle fleet, and a Polar Class 8 icebreaker.26 Thus, the defence of Arctic sovereignty was a serious concern that the Conservative government had pledged itself to addressing by bringing a Canadian military presence into the Arctic to ensure Canadian security while safeguarding Canadian sovereignty.



23. Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security? (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), p. 315, Note 31.
24. Library of Parliament: Political and Social Affairs Division, Canadian Defence Policy Backgrounder (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1988), p. 20.
25. Ibid.
26. It was also at this time the DEW line was being taken over by Canadian forces and refurbished to create the Northern Warning System; Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence Update 1988-89 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1988), pp. 10-13.

A few errors, such as implying that the death throes of the Soviet Union was apparent to the Canadian government in late 1988, but still worth a read.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Here's another more recent viewpoint.

Orignally spotted over at Bharat Rakshak:

PARIS — One's name was Rubis, her rival's Trafalgar. The first was a French submarine, the second British. Neither sub class now guards Canada's Far North sovereignty. Yet some 18 years ago, Ottawa almost decided to buy up to a dozen such nuclear-powered U-boats to defend its long-contested claim over the water and seabed of those vast polar territories in red on your map.

Now Europeans gape as five nations press claims to "our" energy-and-minerals-rich Arctic seabed. They chuckle as a metre-high titanium Russian flag planted on the ocean floor panics our current prime minister into going north as our sovereignty goes south. They marvel at his surface-only Canadian response: a few, years-late coastal patrol ships, modest military and naval bases, and an amateur militia of Inuit "Rangers."

Again Canada defends its North with bombast, symbols and long-to-happen half-reforms. It abandons effective presence on "its" Arctic seabed where the riches lie. Only under-ice nuclear subs can patrol there: this summer, HMCS Corner Brook, a second-hand diesel-electric submarine, travelled north, but couldn't go far under the ice.....


.......How much is sovereignty worth? Is that a question you could even imagine another French expert on sovereignty, Charles de Gaulle, asking? Beatty sums up Canada's choice by quoting former Canadian vice-admiral Charles Thomas: "You can have as much sovereignty as you're willing to pay for."

So how much are we game to pay?

Fooling itself, but not the world, Canada still hopes to defend its vast, contested Arctic with little gestures, loud words and loose change.


Ottawa Citizen September 10, 2007 (canada.com)

One major mistake though: "France offered its technology "without restriction," while the U.S. (owning the Trafalgar's technology) would not relent."

Actually it was a combination of a 1958 US/Great Britain agreement on barring transfer of nuclear technology to a third country, and a 1959 agreement between the US and Canada barring the latter from receiving nuclear technology from a third country, which is what gave the US leverage vis a vis the Trafalgar. I would have categorised the US attitude as more reluctant than 'would not relent', though.

 

[Archibald]

ok, so I dug one very bizarre connection.

in 1968 captain Cousteau (the famous oceanographer with the red beannie hat) started the Argyronete (sea spider) project with French government support. It was the world largest civilian submarine at the time, 300 tons, and was to be a support platform for divers from the oil industry operating at depth of 1000 ft.
By 1971 the Argyronete had become a money pit and construction was stopped. the project very nearly sunk Cousteau and the French government was left with a big submarine hull in Marseille.
10 years later Argyronete was brought back as SAGA with sterling engines borrowed from Swede SSK. Ten years later, in 1987, SAGA spent three years in trials, and then... was abandonned. Nowadays it is a museum in Marseille.

what picked my curiosity was that SAGA sterling engines - AIP - was only a beginning. France wanted a SAGA-N, you guess - SAGA was to get a nuclear reactor.
And then Canada become involved in the project, at the exact same time - 1985-88 - as the Canada-class project.
The way I see it, SAGA-N was related to France Rubis-class offer to Canada.

see here - https://books.google.fr/books?id=txw0bWkfgHQC&pg=PA23&dq=%22SAGA-N%22%22canada%22submarine&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzhc2f44jeAhVuqIsKHVF9ArAQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=%22SAGA-N%22%22canada%22submarine&f=false

https://www.google.fr/search?q=%22SAGA-N%22%22submarine%22&hl=fr&source=lnms&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwikmvOx44jeAhVyoosKHaQpArIQ_AUICSgA&biw=1472&bih=936&dpr=1

 

[THO88]

In a shocking turn of events, Australia will be cancelling their conventional submarine contract with France and will be building nuclear boats with US and UK assistance. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09...-biden-australia-nuclear-submarines/100465628

What are the odds we see this same deal offered to the Canadians next?

 

[Moose]

In a shocking turn of events, Australia will be cancelling their conventional submarine contract with France and will be building nuclear boats with US and UK assistance. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09...-biden-australia-nuclear-submarines/100465628

What are the odds we see this same deal offered to the Canadians next?

There's a lot less, a LOT less, Submarine industry in Canada to transfer SSN tech to. If Canada decides they want to go that route, it will likely require buying or leasing rather than building domestically. If they were interested, I think there's plenty of juice to support it in the other nations. But the offer probably isn't made until they know it will be accepted.

 

[DWG]

If Canada retains any SSN ambitions, then this is the obvious moment to invoke them, because the US won't be able to scotch them as it has in the past without looking petty and stupid.

And bringing the Canadians into the deal is clearly worthwhile because that would make it the CAUKUS

 

[THO88]

In a shocking turn of events, Australia will be cancelling their conventional submarine contract with France and will be building nuclear boats with US and UK assistance. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09...-biden-australia-nuclear-submarines/100465628

What are the odds we see this same deal offered to the Canadians next?

There's a lot less, a LOT less, Submarine industry in Canada to transfer SSN tech to. If Canada decides they want to go that route, it will likely require buying or leasing rather than building domestically. If they were interested, I think there's plenty of juice to support it in the other nations. But the offer probably isn't made until they know it will be accepted.

I agree about the lack of a submarine industry but they do have a robust civilian nuclear sector, which in my opinion is the harder of the two industrial bases to develop. Canada’s vicinity not only to the US but to Electric Boat in Connecticut, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Maine, Bremerton Naval Shipyard in Washington and the Naval Reactors prototypes and labs in NY and PA make the logistics of both nuclear and submarine technology transfers far easier.

Regardless, I do agree the best initial course of action would be the lease of an American sub to cut their teeth in SSN operation and take hold of the situation while the iron is hot. Similar to what the Indians did with the Soviets.

 

[uk 75]

Thought I would re-visit this thread after the announcement of the US/UK Australian agreement. Canada also has many reasons to need a nuclear submarine force.

The US could transfer some Los Angeles class boats to Australia and Canada to get them started.

 

[Archibald]

The reasons are slightly different AFAIK. Australia needs SSN because it had immense distances to patrol. Canada wanted them to patrol under the ice longer and more safely.
Indeed Canada could be part of the new deal along Australia.
A move which, in passing, would somewhat screw France a second time - since back then Rubis were the prefered option.

they do have a robust civilian nuclear sector

CANDU indeed.

 

[ceccherini]

The reasons are slightly different AFAIK. Australia needs SSN because it had immense distances to patrol. Canada wanted them to patrol under the ice longer and more safely.
Indeed Canada could be part of the new deal along Australia.
A move which, in passing, would somewhat screw France a second time - since back then Rubis were the prefered option.

they do have a robust civilian nuclear sector

CANDU indeed.

Basically they are the leader in building reactors that are completely unrelated to a submarine program and weapon development in general, so the large canadian nuclear sector has basically no advantage at all over Australia in the submaine propulsion field. No enrichment capability neither experience in PWR

 

[uk 75]

It would be valuable in a crisis for countries like Canada and Australia to have the most potent naval weapons available as soon as possible.
Washington and London should give serious attention to this, even to the extent of transfering US and UK SSNs. to the RAN and RCN complete with crews and support/manufacturing capability.
Recent history has shown that the only way to take down an enemy intent on building up an aggressive surface fleet to support amphibious assaults is by the timely deployment of SSNs.

 

[that_person]

The reasons are slightly different AFAIK. Australia needs SSN because it had immense distances to patrol. Canada wanted them to patrol under the ice longer and more safely.
Indeed Canada could be part of the new deal along Australia.
A move which, in passing, would somewhat screw France a second time - since back then Rubis were the prefered option.

they do have a robust civilian nuclear sector

CANDU indeed.

Doesn’t the Canadian military have significant budget issues as is? I also vaguely remember something about the Victorias/Upholders being in really bad shape?

I kind of think the “protecting the Arctic” idea is a mute point. The Russian Navy is a shattered mess that spends most of its time rusting in port. Even China can’t make serious claims to the Arctic and protect them. All the other countries with Arctic territory are “friendly” nations and allied to the US and NATO.

The only time Canada had only real chance of buying an SSN was in the late 80s with the Cold War and Soviet Navy still going on/existing. That era ended over 30 years ago…..
Something about Canada buying SSNs just doesn’t add up in my mind.

 

[THO88]

Basically they are the leader in building reactors that are completely unrelated to a submarine program and weapon development in general, so the large canadian nuclear sector has basically no advantage at all over Australia in the submaine propulsion field. No enrichment capability neither experience in PWR

I have to disagree with this statement. Having a robust nuclear industry that consist of 19 commercial reactors and several research reactors, including the associated workers, companies, regulatory bodies and educational institutions that support them is 100% relevant. Having politicians and a population that is already acclimated to nuclear power is huge as well. The fundamentals of nuclear physics and nuclear power generation are the same regardless of whether they're on a submarine or on land.

Also, The CANDU is a type of PWR that operates on the same basic principals as the reactors used on US and British submarines, not that this matters because I doubt Canada would design a reactor from scratch anyway. Like Australia is going to do, they would outright purchase or license produce US and British technology. Same for the HEU. They would probably buy it from the US and the UK.

 

[THO88]

Doesn’t the Canadian military have significant budget issues as is? I also vaguely remember something about the Victorias/Upholders being in really bad shape?

I don't know about the budget situation for their entire defense establishment but I do know they are currently making massive investment in their Navy to include new replenishment ships, artic patrol vessels and up to 15 new destroyers based on the British Type 26. Oddly, the only thing not included in this plan are new submarines. They insist on extending the life of the four Victoria class subs, which have been nothing but heartache since acquiring them second hand from the UK.

The conspiracist in me wants to think this omission is because they're in secret negotiation with the US & UK to get them some nuclear boats of their own

 

[Hood]

Can we keep this topic on thread please, this thread is for the Canadian SSN programme 1987-89, which pushing 35 years ago.
Musings on future Canadian SSNs is more suited to the Military forum than here.

 

[ceccherini]

Basically they are the leader in building reactors that are completely unrelated to a submarine program and weapon development in general, so the large canadian nuclear sector has basically no advantage at all over Australia in the submaine propulsion field. No enrichment capability neither experience in PWR

I have to disagree with this statement. Having a robust nuclear industry that consist of 19 commercial reactors and several research reactors, including the associated workers, companies, regulatory bodies and educational institutions that support them is 100% relevant. Having politicians and a population that is already acclimated to nuclear power is huge as well. The fundamentals of nuclear physics and nuclear power generation are the same regardless of whether they're on a submarine or on land.

Also, The CANDU is a type of PWR that operates on the same basic principals as the reactors used on US and British submarines, not that this matters because I doubt Canada would design a reactor from scratch anyway. Like Australia is going to do, they would outright purchase or license produce US and British technology. Same for the HEU. They would probably buy it from the US and the UK.

CANDU are PHWR, not PWR. The fundamental of nuclear physics are understood in every physics department around the world but what matter is the technical capability to produce a specific technology that Canada never developed. In Australia even opposition agrees on SSN on condition to never develop a civilian nuclear industry, demonstrating that the public opinion is maybe concerned with the size of the military spending, not so much with a specific set of equipment. Civilian regulations and authority are completely different from the military ones. So Canada sub program of the '80s would have needed basically the creation of a wholly new industrial sector, something that has not happened to the majority of the civilian nuclear power because their civil program born as a spin off of their military program.

 

[uk 75]

Can we keep this topic on thread please, this thread is for the Canadian SSN programme 1987-89, which pushing 35 years ago.
Musings on future Canadian SSNs is more suited to the Military forum than here.

The Canadian interest in/requirement for SSNs didn't stop in 1989. Arguably their purchase of the troubled Upholders was because of similarities between these boats and RN SSNs.

 

[THO88]

CANDU are PHWR, not PWR. The fundamental of nuclear physics are understood in every physics department around the world but what matter is the technical capability to produce a specific technology that Canada never developed. In Australia even opposition agrees on SSN on condition to never develop a civilian nuclear industry, demonstrating that the public opinion is maybe concerned with the size of the military spending, not so much with a specific set of equipment. Civilian regulations and authority are completely different from the military ones. So Canada sub program of the '80s would have needed basically the creation of a wholly new industrial sector, something that has not happened to the majority of the civilian nuclear power because their civil program born as a spin off of their military program.

What is commonly referred to as a pressurized water reactor (PWR), is actually a pressurized light water reactor (PLWR) and is a sub categorization under the larger PWR category as is the CANDU pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR). They use most of the same basic components but as the name implies, the PLWR uses light water as primary coolant and the PHWR uses heavy water. An analogy would be the difference between a diesel engine and a gasoline engine, which are both sub categories of the reciprocating, internal combustion engines. There are commonly used commercial reactors such as boiling water reactors (BWR) and gas cooled reactors (GCR) that are vastly different from a PWR. To make another analogy, a PWR to a BWR/GCR is like comparing an internal combustion gas engine to a steam or gas turbine.

But I understand your point. Naval reactors are extremely complex and specialized pieces of equipment that cannot be copied and pasted from commercial reactors. All I'm saying is that the learning curve wouldn't be as steep for Canada compared to Australia.

Can we keep this topic on thread please, this thread is for the Canadian SSN programme 1987-89, which pushing 35 years ago.
Musings on future Canadian SSNs is more suited to the Military forum than here.

Copy, I'll take any further comments to that sub forum. But one last comment.

I'm not Canadian and I don't want to get into politics, but the Conservative candidate for prime minister said he would push to join the AUKUS alliance (https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/16/trudeau-otoole-canada-security-alliance-512217) which would in theory give him access to the same nuclear technology as Australia. Apparently it's a tight race and the fact he not only wants to join the alliance but is a conservative (who generally are more in favor of higher military expenditure), perhaps there is a real chance Canada would pursue an SSN.

 

[Apophenia]

I'm not Canadian and I don't want to get into politics, but the Conservative candidate for prime minister said ...

Which is 'not political' how?

that_person touched it with a needle when they said: "... Canada buying SSNs just doesn’t add up...".

The Mulroney Tories put SSNs in their 1987 White Paper on Defence with an emphasis on securing the North West Passage.
Then-Minister of Defence, Perrin Beatty, made clear that a key role of Canadian Forces SSNs would be as a bargaining chip in asserting Canadian sovereignty over the NWP which his American ally insisted was an international waterway.

Ironically, while American, British, and French submarines trespassed claimed Canadian sovereign waters in the 1980s, those three countries were the only realistic suppliers of SSNs to the Goverment of Canada. The Canadian citizenry at large may have been hostile to nuclear-powered-anything but, let's face it, that was just one of Ottawa's hurdles.

As for the politics involved, the 1987 White Paper may be relevant to current situations better-discussed in the Bar or Military sections. But, I would argue, current politics are completely irrelevant to the proposals of the late '80s.

 

[THO88]

Which is 'not political' how?

Maybe it's a American or New York adage but when I said "I don't want to get into politics", I just meant I was only going to reference politics in a factual or historical context and not interject my personal opinion regarding the merit of any current politician or political position.

 

[uk 75]

The moderaters may want to move my initial post which revitalised this thread and subsequent contributions.
I think this thread is relevant today as unlike Australia Canada has previously looked at buying SSNs. The history of that interest is worth knowing.

 

[Avimimus]

Don't we have treaty commitments with the United States that prevent us from fielding nuclear powered submarines?

 

[Apophenia]

Don't we have treaty commitments with the United States that prevent us from fielding nuclear powered submarines?

I don't believe so. But the US doesn't really need such a treaty to influence Canada. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) gives the US Congress a direct say via Foreign Military Sales (FMS). When the future Canada class SSNs were being considered, Washington made its displeasure obvious diplomatically. But, actually, all the US government needed to do was to block export of any US-supplied components via FMS.

Of course, that would only give the US control over potential export of British Trafalgar class subs. But without a US or British option, DND would have been restricted to the French Rubis class. Thus, no competition, no industrial offsets, etc. So, even if much of the citizenry didn't already loathe the idea, a no-choice SSN procurement would have been a tough sell.

The GoC priority of the day was heavily pitching the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. It was a tough sell at the time and it wouldn't have been made any easier if voters became aware that Washington could more or less veto Canadian procurement projects to suit their own policies. In the end, it became easier all around for Ottawa to kick Arctic sovereignty into the long grass.

 

[Yellow Palace]

But, actually, all the US government needed to do was to block export of any US-supplied components via FMS.

Oddly enough, FMS wasn't the route that the US used to kill the proposal. The 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement allowed the US to prohibit the UK from exporting naval reactor technology, even if no US components were involved. And a similar US-Canada agreement in 1959 allowed the US to prevent the Canadian government buying naval reactors from a third party.

FMS (or ITAR, for that matter) might have been able to kill the TRAFALGAR option, but the RUBIS derivative would probably have been totally free from US-supplied components, or could have been made so - France has always placed a lot of value on not being dependent on other countries for defence equipment. From what I've read, the RUBIS option was less preferred technically but was expected to be easier politically as there was less US involvement.

None of this actually prohibits Canada from having naval reactors. It just means that they either need US approval for the import (whether directly from the US, from the UK, or from France) or to be an entirely Canadian development. Given the well-developed Canadian nuclear industry, I suspect that an all-Canadian naval reactor would be perfectly possible, if it was something the government really wanted to pursue.

 

[Archibald]

The Rubis are among the smallest SSN ever designed, which has pros and cons. One has to start somewhere, and France started small - which probably was a drawback compare to British own SSNs.
Great Britain started building SSNs many years before France - Dreadnought first, then: Valiants, Churchills, Swiftsures...

• Dreadnought — one boat, 1959–1960
• Valiant class — 2 boats, 1962–1965
• Churchill class — 3 boats, 1967–1970
• Swiftsure class — 6 boats, 1969–1979

• Trafalgar class — 7 boats, 1979–1991

12 submarines by 1979, when France started the Rubis...

19 - 6 by the end of Cold War in 1991.

• 
  

  Pennant no.	Name	Laid down	Launched	Commissioned	Decommissioned	Homeport
  S601	Rubis	11 December 1976	7 July 1979	23 February 1983		Toulon
  S602	Saphir	1 September 1979	1 September 1981	6 July 1984	July 2019	Toulon
  S603	Casabianca	19 September 1981	22 December 1984	13 May 1987		Toulon
  S604	Émeraude	October 1982	12 April 1986	15 September 1988		Toulon
  S605	Améthyste	31 October 1983	14 May 1988	3 March 1992		Toulon
  S606	Perle	22 March 1987	22 September 1990	7 July 1993		Toulon

What I realized recently is, unlike France or the USA, they build SSNs before boomers.

France started with the Redoutable-class and then built the Rubis.

USN build Nautilus and Skipjacks (among many others SSNs) before moving to the "41 for Freedom" boomers.

But GB build Dreadnought and Valiant-class before the Resolution-class.

 

[Grey Havoc]

According to the old Forecast International document linked below, the Rubis-class SSNs offered to Canada would have actually been the somewhat upgraded Améthyste sub-class.

https://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_old_pdf.cfm?ARC_ID=1737

Although the design was not well suited to its requirements, the French Navy did acquire the Rubis class, perhaps in the hope of enhancing its export profile. A derivative of the same basic design, featuring a limited degree of main machinery silencing, was undertaken later in an attempt to produce a version with better anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. As a result of those changes, units five and six of this batch became known as the Améthyste class. The same design was also offered to the Canadian Navy to satisfy a requirement for up to 12 nuclear-powered submarines for patrolling Arctic waters. The competition for this project came from the British Trafalgar class. However, a Canadian investigation of the Rubis design found it to be unsuited to their requirements. Further, as a result of the investigation, reservations were expressed about the safety of the entire nuclear propulsion system, with particular reference to the single steam loop and the cramped reactor compartment.

 

[Cjc]

I never much understood why the us was so agenst the Canadian ssn deal. The us has never cared particularly much about artic sovrenty (unless it deals with Alaska) and 12 nucular subs seems like a much more useful nato help then a single division in Germany could be (assuming canada wasnt planing on doing both) . Yet Washington seems to have done more to stop this deal then say keeping weponds out of Iran, so weird.