Canada's naval strategy?

[Scott Kenny]

There is no mention of special Arctic features (ice-strengthened hull, insulated accommodations, etc.) in the otherwise-detailed video presentation of Captain Graham, the director of the Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette program. I queried Captain Graham about this matter a month ago, using his public email address as listed in the presentation, but he didn't respond. (I am after all a foreigner.) I'm interested in Canada's defense of its unpopulated northern regions, and in general, I think it would be wise to give all RCN and CCG ships at least moderate Arctic capability (i.e. a Polar Class rating), and to exercise that capability from time to time. But Scott Kenny, as we saw H_K thinks it unlikely that anything serious could fit into a design of 1.0 or 1.1 kt light displacement.

Apophenia mentioned earlier that the Kingston class has "proven surprisingly useful in relatively ice-free Arctic waters" during summers. Maybe real Arctic capability is another of those good-things-to-have that must be left off the Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette, due to Ottawa's weight constraint.

Well, I think we all know what I think of Ottawa's weight constraint...

 

[Owens Z]

The Merlin order was cancelled because of a spur of the moment decision in order to gain a couple of points in polling. As to saving money the they didn't save a penny.
Between cancellation fees and the lawsuits plus the cost of running two different competitions for replacement aircraft. And then purchasing a standalone micro fleet of S92s .
I suspect when it's all said and done we're probably looking at 2-3 times the original cost of Merlin purchase in favour of an aircraft that they to cook the specs of the competition in order for it to win.
And if my sources are correct they to rejig the competition at least two times because the Merlin had an annoying habit of winning.
And that does not even begin to cover the costs of modifying the various frigates and destroyers to first take the Merlin and then remodify them to take the Cyclone

This is pretty much what I had heard secondhand, GK Dundas. The cancellation penalty was a steep 500 million dollars (about C$950 million in today's currency).

I keep wondering how the RCN would have developed had we built the Merlins or rather the our variant of it .
I mean the City Class had pretty much designed around a helo with the Merlin's capabilities. Ironically it's now finally getting a modern aircraft that while it does have a lot of the capabilities that the Airforce and the Navy were looking for .
So many questions,so many possibilities.

I had wondered the opposite: that if the Royal Canadian Air Force had dropped its "assembled in Canada" demand (which it later did anyway), then the original 48-helicopter order could have been cheaper.

Canada had some major budget issues in 1993 when the big Merlin order was finally cancelled. Looking back, the real mistake was not sticking to that cancellation and buying some sort of standard US Navy spec S70 variants for the navy and perhaps surplus CH-46s for the less vital SAR function. As it turned out, those 15 reduced commercial specification EH101s have been embarrassingly expensive to operate and the long running S-92 saga was an expensive embarrassment. Considering the US State Department use of surplus CH-46s up until at least 2021, the CH-149 Cormorant buy was probably premature and unnecessary. I never exactly understood why a simple S70 derivative wouldn't have sufficed for the Canadian Navy. It's worth remembering that Canada only procured the original Sea Kings for carrier operations and then continued to use them after disposing of the Bonaventure essentially as surplus aboard their surface escorts with the vital development of the innovative Beartrap haul down. A direct replacement was never strictly speaking necessary.

Merlins are not used here in the United States (planned use for the President was cancelled in 2009), and my sole encounter was during a Sept 2022 visit of HMS Queen Elizabeth to New York Harbor. I took this photo of the carrier (see attached) from the Staten Island Ferry, with three Merlins on the flight deck. At least one of those flew up and down the East River. The Royal Navy's Merlins are configured for ASW, while the RCAF's are a variant of the transport version. As far as I have heard, the Merlin has in general been a success for its several users, and it remains in production by AgustaWestland. TinWing, you mention that Canada's Merlins (CH-149 Cormorants) have embarrassingly expensive operating costs. Presumably this is compared and contrasted to the operating costs of Canada's earlier CH-124 Sea Kings and/or today's CH-148 Cyclones, and/or compared to the US Navy's operating costs for its SH-60 Seahawks. Are the CH-149's especially expensive costs per flight hour due to inherent design faults? Or due to shoddy construction by the manufacturer? Or from buying too few aircraft to cover the expected duties? Or other? Please expand on Canada's actual experience with the CH-149 for us, TinWing. I and no doubt others would be interested.

 

[Owens Z]

An informative walk-around of the big CH-149 Cormorant (AW101 Merlin) helicopter by a Royal Canadian Air Force pilot of 103 Squadron based in Gander, Newfoundland can be seen at:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-n-t_4jtn0M&t=942s

 

[Scott Kenny]

TinWing, you mention that Canada's Merlins (CH-149 Cormorants) have embarrassingly expensive operating costs. Presumably this is compared and contrasted to the operating costs of Canada's earlier CH-124 Sea Kings and/or today's CH-148 Cyclones, and/or compared to the US Navy's operating costs for its SH-60 Seahawks. Are the CH-149's especially expensive costs per flight hour due to inherent design faults? Or due to shoddy construction by the manufacturer? Or from buying too few aircraft to cover the expected duties? Or other? Please expand on Canada's actual experience with the CH-149 for us, TinWing. I and no doubt others would be interested.

My initial assumption would be that the expensive operating costs are from buying too few aircraft to cover the duties, so each airframe is running through the big heavy checks faster than the original plans. And those heavy checks are expensive, time consuming, and force the aircraft not in depot for heavy checks to work even harder to cover for the missing airframes.