Canada's naval strategy?

[Owens Z]

The Naval Aid Bill of 1912
Basically, the question of Canadian naval defense at this time became the question of political struggle between pro-Imperial conservatives and pro-autonomy liberals. The conservatives argued for the larger naval spending, but in terms of ships gifted for Royal Navy, for the purpose of common defense. Liberals, on the other hand, argued for smaller, but fully Canadian navy, build & crewed in Canada and not subordinated to Royal Navy. Initially Liberals won, pushing for a small navy of light cruisers and destroyers in 1911. But then they lost the elections (by antagonizing French-speaking population) and Conservatives immediately tried to push for their plan; pay for three dreadnoughts or battlecruisers, that would be operated by Royal Navy. They did not sucseed, though.
P.S. I wonder, what if both sides could reach a compromise by ordering a "fleet unit" - a battlecruiser, three light cruisers and a number of destroyers and submarines - like Australia did? If such compromize could be reached in 1911, they would probably order a HMS Tiger's sistership. Or possibly even two; Canada have two coastlines to defend, after all, so it make sence to order a pair of "fleet units", one for each.

Unlikely unfortunately.
What the Liberals really wanted was not to be saddled with the cost of Naval spending at all. Laurier had initially created the Navy to head off the increasing pressure to contribute more to the growing cost of Imperial Defence, cloaking it in the national sentiment of a separate Canadian Navy. Once that was done he did everything he could to avoid funding it any more than he had to.
Borden from the Conservatives meanwhile, wanted to use contribution to Imperial Defence as a way to raise Canada’s position within a relatively close Empire. He was not thrilled with the Navy he had had foisted on him, and did all he could to limit its access to the Treasury.
Outside of Borden’s desire to use Naval spending to increase Canada’s standing in the Empire and Laurier’s desire to avoid the same, neither had much use or desire for Naval spending. They preferred to perpetuate the proud Canadian tradition of having someone else pay for Defence. Part of the attraction of buying ships for the RN was that Canada would not face the cost of crewing and maintaining them. So the reasonable compromise of maintaining a Canadian fleet unit would have been to no ones political taste.

True enough I suppose. And Laurier’s line of critique of the 1912 bill was that it was a large sum of money that brought no benefit to Canadian businesses. If Borden for some reason decided to try and neutralize that criticism with a local fleet unit that would be available to the RN in the event of war, that might do it. I am not sure a local fleet unit would actually benefit local industry much (Canada had neither the funds nor the expertise to build such ships economically and even maintaining them would take some investment) but perhaps the impression could be maintained that it could.

Warship 2017 contained a "Warship Notes" short article by Ian Johnston about a "Canadian Super Yard" dating to 1910-11. He had been digging in the records of Fairfield in Glasgow and came across several plans for a new shipyard for Haifax in Canada, but with little additional information. There were 3 plans for yards if different sizes.
The largest covered 140 acres (none in Britain at the time exceeded 100 acres). It had 11 covered berths as 1x1,000ft, 1x800ft, 3x600ft, 6x500ft. There was also an 1,100ft dry dock capable of being divided in two.
On 9 March 1911 Fairfield's Chairman reported to the Board "negotiations regarding a Canadian shipbuilding programme and was authorised to proceed on the matter".

That’s very interesting. Sydney steel works were some of the largest in the British Empire and were connected to Halifax by both rail and coastal barge. And with some investment could probably learn to produce armour plate. Specialty items like large calibre guns (and possibly whole turrets, fire control equipment and the like would likely have to come in from Britain though. At least until and unless the capability was developed domestically.
I wonder where they would have put it?
Halifax Dockyard did not, I don’t believe, yet extend as far up the Narrows as it does currently. So maybe they could have put it there. More or less where Irving Shipyard or the container dock is now. It could also possibly have gone directly across the Narrows from the Dockyard in the area that is now the Dockyard Annex.
However, sounds like this may have been commercially owned with Fairfield’s involvement (unless they were just contracted to design it). If so, then perhaps a location in Bedford Basin would be chosen. Either near Dartmouth Slipways on the Dartmouth side or near Bedford on the Halifax side.
Either way, an interesting might have been. Thanks for that!

[I have taken the liberty of moving this discussion to its own new thread, to avoid stepping on the toes of Oberon_706's Australia-oriented thread.]

Dilandu points out that Canada had 2 coasts to defend in the first half of the 20th century, although I believe that was considered in Ottawa to be more like 1.13 coasts. Tentative plans for Royal Canadian Navy battleships were voted down. A third coast has since become important to Canadians: the Arctic Ocean. I first learned about the issues in summer 1985, when US Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea traversed the Northwest Passage from east to west without notice, claiming right of innocent passage through that international strait. The outrage in Canada at what was taken to be a slap in the face was not lessened when it was found that Canada had no ship capable of escorting Polar Sea through the ice. If I was understanding correctly back then, the headlines in Canada "The Americans don't recognize the Northwest Passage as our internal waters!" could have been more honestly written as "No other country in the world recognizes the Northwest Passage as our internal waters". The USA and Canada are of course allies, and quickly came to an informal agreement that USCG and USN ships, without relinquishing any rights, would pre-notify Ottawa of such voyages, and I believe that has held up for forty years (except for any secret submarine incursions). But Canada was stimulated to try to better assert its sovereignty over its vast Arctic lands and waters. The late 1980's 'Polar 8 Project' for a deluxe 37kt icebreaker eventually fell through, as has (so far) the 21st century's 'Polar Icebreaker Project' for two 26kt ships. As you might be aware, unlike most coast guards the Canadian Coast Guard is purely civilian with no police powers, their ships having no armament aboard, not even handguns. But their ships could call in a Canadian naval unit or an air strike if they came upon a real problem. Four British-built diesel-electric submarines, obtained in the 21st century by the Royal Canadian Navy as the Victoria class, though perhaps not fully successful, have seen service in the Atlantic but also in the Arctic Ocean and Pacific (out of CFB Esquimalt). Persistent rumors over the decades about Canadian interest in some nuclear-powered submarines, better able to operate under ice, have so far come to nothing, most recently possible Canadian desire to collaborate in the AUKUS sub deal.

With US interest in Greenland, the Arctic region is in the news again. (And I'm a fan of Devonian fossil Tiktaalik, found on barren Ellesmere Island.) Anybody here know more about recent Canadian plans and Royal Canadian Navy / Canadian Coast Guard three-coast strategy than I do? I would be interested in learning more, and I suspect I am not alone. Please weigh in.

 

[EwenS]

You have missed the Canadian Arctic / Offshore patrol vessel programme running for the last 10 years or so. The first of 6 Harry DeWolf was delivered in 2021 with the last now fitting out.

2 of a modified version for the Canadian Coast Guard are also under construction.

Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol vessel - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

And there is also the 12 Kingston class coastal defence vessels completed 1996-99.

Kingston-class coastal defence vessel - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[ArtosStark]

No other country in the world recognizes the Northwest Passage as our internal waters"

Not entirely true. The claim to sovereignty is pretty much exactly in line with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It has never been specifically brought before the UN for qualification nor has any nation specifically supported the Canadian claim. But at least by a plain reading of international law on the subject Canada has the better claim.

Now that doesn’t matter that much in regards to the US, they having never signed on to UNCLOS. And if Canada does not enforce it I am guessing the claim will be of little value in the long term. But still.

 

[Apophenia]

You have missed the Canadian Arctic / Offshore patrol vessel programme ... And there is also the 12 Kingston class coastal defence vessels completed 1996-99.

The Kingston class MCDVs have proven surprisingly useful in relatively ice-free Arctic waters during the Summer months. Being Polar Class 5 (PC 4 in the bow), the Harry DeWolf class AOPS will be that bit more useful. Still, we are still half a decade away from the CCG putting a hull for the mentioned PC 2 Polar Icebreaker Project in the water.

As for an RCN/CCG three-coast strategy, I'd love to hear about one. But strategy and doctrine play out in procurement. And NDHQ's record for focusing on Arctic soveriegnty has never been good.

The only true Arctic icebreaker in RCN service - HMCS Labrador (AW50) - only served three years before she was dumped on the DoT. There was nothing wrong with the ship (she served the DoT/CCG until 1987) the Admirals simply favoured NATO ASW over Arctic sovereignty patrols. (Want to see RCN planner bare their teeth? Just mention coastal patrol.)

In 2005, the Harper Tories announced a plan for 3 x new military icebreakers (without much specificity). The first of these 'Armed Naval Heavy Ice Breakers' were to be in the water within 5 years. Once again, the navy had no interest in going north. Instead, the push was for JSS and SCSC (now River class CSC) and ... well, anything but the Arctic.

Another fallout from 2005 was the Spring 2007 Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) project. Harper promised 6-to-8 ice-capable OPVs to replace the promised Armed Naval Heavy Ice Breakers. AOPS was to have an IOC of 2013. Alas, that announced IOC assumed that AOPS would be a lightly modified Svalbard class OPV. Instead, DND changed anything it couldn't gold-plate and the first Harry DeWolf class AOPS wasn't commissioned until 2021 - 14 years after they were first announced.

Of course, blame inevitably shifts to hapless politicians and their budgets (cuz that's easy and almost always true). But we can't pretend that the Admirals and PMOs don't play their parts.

JSS was mentioned above. With the years sliding away (especially if ALSC is included), we may forget that the very term Joint Support Ship came from the Dutch. Their in-service Zr Ms Karel Doorman is what JSS was supposed to be. A key difference was that Canada's JSS was also to be able to handle 0.7 metres of first-year Arctic sea ice. Instead, DND argued over lane metres for two decades before Maritime Staff selected a warmed over Berlin-class AOR in 2013. It has taken a decade to get a hull in the water ... but only because the CCG's Polar Icebreaker Project was pushed back yet again (this time to 2030).

So, again, I would love to hear about a three-coast strategy. Apologies if this sounds cynical but I will maintain skepticism until a future procurement specifically lists Arctic sovereignty patrols as a priority. Mention of a Polar Class rating would be nice too

 

[Rainbow1910]

Another fallout from 2005 was the Spring 2007 Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) project. Harper promised 6-to-8 ice-capable OPVs to replace the promised Armed Naval Heavy Ice Breakers. AOPS was to have an IOC of 2013. Alas, that announced IOC assumed that AOPS would be a lightly modified Svalbard class OPV. Instead, DND changed anything it couldn't gold-plate and the first Harry DeWolf class AOPS wasn't commissioned until 2021 - 14 years after they were first announced.

This is a bit of unfair framing regarding the AOPS program at the design stage. Anybody assuming AOPS would have just been a lightly modified Svalbard is not familiar with the Norwegian design and how its requirements compare to the requirements of Canada. Such a vessel would not be adequate for Canadian operations, and hence was not really considered. The ask for AOPS was a very unique vessel for a unique role, so the RCN grabbed something that would serve as a reasonable base and redesigned it to fit our requirements, considering we had lost all of our own sovereign ship design capability after the Halifax class.

 

[Owens Z]

There were rather more Canadian forces deployed on the West Coast from 1940 than might be imagined. These were built up after Pearl Harbor but were reduced again from early 1943 as the Japanese threat reduced.
Ground forces

www.canadiansoldiers.com

www.canadiansoldiers.com

www.canadiansoldiers.com

RCAF

The RCAF Journal - 2018 Volume 7 Number 2 - RCAF Journal - Royal Canadian Air Force - Canada.ca

The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Royal Canadian Air Force RCAFJ Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 2018

www.canada.ca

RCN
In the winter / spring of 1939/40 the RCN purchased 3 liners for conversion to AMCs. Their conversion was completed later in 1940 after which Prince Robert & Prince Henry were sent to patrol the Canadian West Coast and the South American coast looking for German merchant shipping seeking to return to Germany. The third vessel, Prince David, was deployed in the Caribbean until May 1942 when she was transferred to the Pacific. All three were re-roled during 1943.

HMCS PRINCE ROBERT F56 - For Posterity's Sake

HMCS PRINCE HENRY F70 - For Posterity's Sake

HMCS Prince David - For Posterity's Sake

The escort forces on the West Coast were rather more than "a few armed trawlers", being increased during 1942 and then reduced again in 1943 as the Japanese threat diminished. At its peak in mid-1942 the core of the escort forces were 7 Flowers and 13 Bangor class (the RCN used these as local escorts more than as minesweepers), all built on the West Coast yards. Even in Jan 1945 there were 4 Flowers and 7 Bangors still on the West Coast. These were split between Esquimalt & Prince Rupert.
In 1944 Canada was again looking to the active participation in the Pacific firstly via a contribution to the BPF which it was intended to build up from late 1945 to:-
2 light cruisers. Uganda was taken over in Oct 1944 while under repair in the USA. Ontario followed fresh from the builders in May 1945.
2 light fleet carriers. Intended to be in service by the end of 1945. Warrior & Magnificent were earmarked.
2 destroyer flotillas built around the modern 3 Tribals and 2 V class in RCN service plus the 4 Tribals building in Canada (the first completed in Sept 1945) and the 8 Cr class building in Britain (only Crescent & Crusader were transferred in late 1945 due to the end of the war).
Plus some 40 River class frigates and the AA cruiser Prince Robert.
And secondly via a contribution to Tiger Force with some 8 Lancaster squadrons in the final July 1945 plan.

EwenS pointed out in another thread that WW2 Canada paid more attention to its Pacific Coast than is generally supposed (although still much less than its effort against Germany). The province of British Columbia was explicitly on Japan's wish-list during its early-1942 "victory disease" era, to occupy in triumph after Allied capitulation. Thankfully that never occurred. To this day, Canada, a country of 40 million people, has a lot of coastline to look after, facing the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans.

 

[Owens Z]

Not entirely true. The claim to sovereignty is pretty much exactly in line with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It has never been specifically brought before the UN for qualification nor has any nation specifically supported the Canadian claim. But at least by a plain reading of international law on the subject Canada has the better claim.
Now that doesn’t matter that much in regards to the US, they having never signed on to UNCLOS. And if Canada does not enforce it I am guessing the claim will be of little value in the long term. But still.

You state "Canada has the better claim", as if you took me to mean that some other nation claims the Northwest Passage. And yes, I understand that Canada's "claim to sovereignty is pretty much exactly in line with UNCLOS" is the longtime position of Canada's attorneys. But just as no commercial or naval ship has to ask the permission of Spain and Morocco to pass the Strait of Gibraltar, of which every square inch is within twelve nautical miles of both countries, and just as no ship has to ask permission from Malaysia and Indonesia to pass the Strait of Malacca, which narrows to only 1.5nm wide, it is the position of most or all other nations in the world, including the USA, that the Northwest Passage is a "strait used for international navigation", with any ship having the right of innocent passage despite passing near Canadian islands. Of course, unlike the always-busy Gibraltar and Malacca straits, summer use of the Northwest Passage is still mostly a potential rather than a reality. And while Churchill, Manitoba on Hudson Bay has shipped out cargo intermittently since the 1930's, that lonely port is still not an economic success, I have heard.

Since WW2 the United States Navy has vigorously asserted right of innocent passage worldwide, to avoid having such rights restricted in practice from illegally expansive claims. See for example the 1981 Gulf of Sidra shootdown, the 1988 Black Sea bumping incident, and the continuing passages through the Taiwan Strait and the preposterous "nine-dash line". The fact that the USN and USCG de facto accede to Canada's claim seems a commendable deference to an important ally. But despite the felt need in Canada, it appears the Royal Canadian Navy and Canadian Coast Guard have made little progress in actual capabilities for those icy northern waters these past forty years. I hope they don't get put to the test by warships from less friendly nations.

 

[Owens Z]

...considering we had lost all of our own sovereign ship design capability after the Halifax class.

Thanks, Rainbow1910. That Canada can no longer design its own warships is news to me. I am not a Canadian taxpayer, but this decision seems foolish. With the UK, Canada famously fought and won the crucial Battle of the Atlantic, with the RCN's ASW expertise held to be only just less than the Royal Navy's. (The USN's flood of new-built destroyer escorts and escort carriers came in the last two years of the war, after the U-boat threat had mostly been mastered.) The RCN thereafter kept up its ASW expertise, to combat Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic. The copy of the Arco/Salamander An Illustrated Guide to Modern Warships that I bought as a kid praised the home-grown Iroquois-class ASW destroyers and their innovative 'Beartrap' haul-down equipment for helicopter landings in heavy seas, and the author concluded "the new class of destroyers (due in 1985) must be awaited with interest, for Canadian designers will doubtless have a few more surprises for the naval world".

Will Canada's decision to abandon its long experience of in-house warship design be as much a blow to its economy, its high-tech expertise, and its fighting capacity than was its controversial 1959 cancellation of the Avro Arrow?

 

[Apophenia]

This is a bit of unfair framing regarding the AOPS program at the design stage. Anybody assuming AOPS would have just been a lightly modified Svalbard is not familiar with the Norwegian design and how its requirements compare to the requirements of Canada. Such a vessel would not be adequate for Canadian operations, and hence was not really considered. The ask for AOPS was a very unique vessel for a unique role, so the RCN grabbed something that would serve as a reasonable base and redesigned it to fit our requirements, considering we had lost all of our own sovereign ship design capability after the Halifax class.

Accepted. Henceforth, I shall insert a [*hyperbole*] warning into my text (whenever my BP rises beyond healthy limits).

Perhaps I can put this to you as a question: Does the 8 years between announcing AOPS and putting the first Harry DeWolf hull into the water strike you an acceptable amount of time to get from a "reasonable base" to a redesign that meets "our requirements"?

In other words, is this the new normal?

 

[Apophenia]

Thanks, Rainbow1910. That Canada can no longer design its own warships is news to me. I am not a Canadian taxpayer, but this decision seems foolish. [...] Will Canada's decision to abandon its long experience of in-house warship design be as much a blow to its economy, its high-tech expertise, and its fighting capacity than was its controversial 1959 cancellation of the Avro Arrow?

Beyond a dearth of naval architecture firms suitable to DND, there is also the issue of skilled shipyard workers. (A rule-of-thumb is that skill-sets will have atrophied in the yard with a gap of 5 years and disappeared altogether within 10 years.)

The last Tribal class (DDG 283) was launched at Davie Lauzon in April 1971. It would be the end of April 1988 before the first Halifax class (FFH 330) was launched. So, a gap of a full 17 years between these two warship types.

In the intervening period, the two Quebec-based yards which had built the Tribals - Marine Industries at Sorel and Davie Shipbuilding at Lauzon - had crumped. By the time of the Halifax class, they had been conjoined as MIL Davie at Lauzon to build three of the FFHs (the rest being built by Saint John Shipbuilding in New Brunswick).

Since you mentioned the CF-105, take note that the prototype Arrow Mk.1 flew a year before Avro Canada had completed production of its CF-100 Mk.5 predecessor. Had the RCAF ordered the CF-105, the transition would have been relatively painless for the Downsview workforce. No such luck for Canadian yards building warships.

 

[DWG]

That Canada can no longer design its own warships is news to me.

It's certainly got the ability to seriously fiddle with an existing design, cf the Rivers, which have completely different sensors and weapons fits to the Type 26.

 

[Owens Z]

Beyond a dearth of naval architecture firms suitable to DND, there is also the issue of skilled shipyard workers. (A rule-of-thumb is that skill-sets will have atrophied in the yard with a gap of 5 years and disappeared altogether within 10 years.)
The last Tribal class (DDG 283) was launched at Davie Lauzon in April 1971. It would be the end of April 1988 before the first Halifax class (FFH 330) was launched. So, a gap of a full 17 years between these two warship types.
In the intervening period, the two Quebec-based yards which had built the Tribals - Marine Industries at Sorel and Davie Shipbuilding at Lauzon - had crumped. By the time of the Halifax class, they had been conjoined as MIL Davie at Lauzon to build three of the FFHs (the rest being built by Saint John Shipbuilding in New Brunswick).
Since you mentioned the CF-105, take note that the prototype Arrow Mk.1 flew a year before Avro Canada had completed production of its CF-100 Mk.5 predecessor. Had the RCAF ordered the CF-105, the transition would have been relatively painless for the Downsview workforce. No such luck for Canadian yards building warships.

"Dearth" means an inadequately small number—I had taken you to mean that the number of active naval architects in Canada today has fallen to zero. Did I mistake you, Apophenia? I of course agree about the requirement for skilled and experienced tradesmen, although the Depression-era shipyard workers of the United States were quickly padded out after Pearl Harbor six-to-one with green employees including women, by all accounts successfully. Nazi Germany had to do something similar for U-boat production late in the war, though they were less radical (no black women) and had less success. So expanding a shipyard's labor force to meet a dire emergency is possible, given experienced trainers. Quickly creating a capable naval architect from a Canadian oil or bank executive: not possible. As I said, sounds foolish.

An endorsement of a more rational spacing of laid-down ships was implicit in my response to you, and explicit in my pointing out the forty years (so far) of dawdling to obtain a big icebreaker suitable for Arctic service, to supplement elderly Louis S. St-Laurent and the smaller Pierre Radisson-class ships.

 

[ArtosStark]

You state "Canada has the better claim", as if you took me to mean that some other nation claims the Northwest Passage.

You misunderstand me. Canada claims that the passage is Canadian internal waters. The US claims that it is an international seaway. How that dispute will eventually be settled I don’t know. But going by straight reading of UNCLOS, Canada’s claim is the better one. Whether UNCLOS will be the determining factor in the final decision remains to be seen.

it is the position of most or all other nations in the world, including the USA, that the Northwest Passage is a "strait used for international navigation", with any ship having the right of innocent passage despite passing near Canadian islands

As far as I am aware no other country except the US has unambiguously taken a position on the status of the NWP. So this seems a little overstated. The US position is that the NWP is an international strait.

The status of the NWP is somewhat unique because in precious such disputes the US (and previously the UK) have depended on a decision by the International Court of justice in 1949 that preserve the right of innocent passage in waters that connect two parts of the high seas (which would apply to the NWP) and which transit already exists as a right (which arguably does not apply to the NWP) . The NWP has not yet been used for such transit for commercial purposes and no right to transit has yet been established or shown. So how this is handled will add something to the current body of precedent regardless.

But just as no commercial or naval ship has to ask the permission of Spain and Morocco to pass the Strait of Gibraltar, of which every square inch is within twelve nautical miles of both countries, and just as no ship has to ask permission from Malaysia and Indonesia to pass the Strait of Malacca

The fact that Spain and Morocco (and Britain) share the strait of Gibraltar and that closing it would cut a number of other nations off from the sea is largely why Gibraltar is international. Similar reasoning exists for Malacca.

If we look at the Magellan strait we see the counter example as despite connecting two very major oceans and being an important transit point for shipping is recognized as wholly under the control of Chile.

There is also a bit of a Grey Area in regards to the Great Belt in Denmark. Though operated much as an international waterway would be, this is due to pre-existing treaties that Denmark is bound to. The Belt is still legally Danish waters but operates as an international waterway would.

In other words it is not near so simple as you appear to claim.

 

[EwenS]

"Dearth" means an inadequately small number—I had taken you to mean that the number of active naval architects in Canada today has fallen to zero. Did I mistake you, Apophenia? I of course agree about the requirement for skilled and experienced tradesmen, although the Depression-era shipyard workers of the United States were quickly padded out after Pearl Harbor six-to-one with green employees including women, by all accounts successfully. Nazi Germany had to do something similar for U-boat production late in the war, though they were less radical (no black women) and had less success. So expanding a shipyard's labor force to meet a dire emergency is possible, given experienced trainers. Quickly creating a capable naval architect from a Canadian oil or bank executive: not possible. As I said, sounds foolish.

An endorsement of a more rational spacing of laid-down ships was implicit in my response to you, and explicit in my pointing out the forty years (so far) of dawdling to obtain a big icebreaker suitable for Arctic service, to supplement elderly Louis S. St-Laurent and the smaller Pierre Radisson-class ships.

What happened in WW2 especially in the USA in the shipyards hides another significant fact. Although welding had been used in ship construction in the 1930s, it assumed a far greater importance in WW2.

It took a team of 4 or 5 to put rivits in steel plates, each of which had learned a particular skill with a 5 year apprenticeship in the UK. And you also needed drillers and caulkers before and after the rivitting process.

History of rivet

Many new workers to the yards were taught to weld. That proved to be far easier to learn. It took a matter of weeks to teach someone to weld reasonably well. But while the first all welded vessel was built by Cammell Laird in the UK in 1919/20, its use in RN warships only increased gradually from about 1930. While there are for example many claims that Liberty ships were all welded, in fact only one yard was producing all welded Liberties. In the rest it was a mix of welding and rivitting. HMS Contest laid down in Nov 1943 and completed in Nov 1945 was the first all welded RN warship. And in WW2 there were a fair number of weld failures for a variety of reasons including design, temperatures in the yards as well as poorer quality metals and poor workmanship. Thee are things that would not be acceptable in yards today.

Today, welding is much more skilled than it was in WW2. The composition of steels is different, plates being welded seem to be much thicker than in WW2, welding techniques have changed. Welding aluminium for example is a real skill due to its much lower melting point.

First and Famous: Fullagar

We're taking an in depth look at Lloyd's Register's 'First and Famous' ships. These ships are significant in terms of design, technological advances, historic importance, or just ships everyone has heard of that we've classed. This post features the history of the Fullagar, the world's first...

hec.lrfoundation.org.uk

Future Trends and How to Overcome Welding Challenges in Shipbuilding with Innovation | MillerWelds

Welding has long played a key role in the shipbuilding industry. Here's how manufacturers are helping to meet demand, offset labor shortages and equip operators for safety and productivity.

www.millerwelds.com

 

[Owens Z]

You misunderstand me. Canada claims that the passage is Canadian internal waters. The US claims that it is an international seaway. How that dispute will eventually be settled I don’t know. But going by straight reading of UNCLOS, Canada’s claim is the better one. Whether UNCLOS will be the determining factor in the final decision remains to be seen.
As far as I am aware no other country except the US has unambiguously taken a position on the status of the NWP. So this seems a little overstated. The US position is that the NWP is an international strait.
The status of the NWP is somewhat unique because in precious such disputes the US (and previously the UK) have depended on a decision by the International Court of justice in 1949 that preserve the right of innocent passage in waters that connect two parts of the high seas (which would apply to the NWP) and which transit already exists as a right (which arguably does not apply to the NWP) . The NWP has not yet been used for such transit for commercial purposes and no right to transit has yet been established or shown. So how this is handled will add something to the current body of precedent regardless.
The fact that Spain and Morocco (and Britain) share the strait of Gibraltar and that closing it would cut a number of other nations off from the sea is largely why Gibraltar is international. Similar reasoning exists for Malacca.
If we look at the Magellan strait we see the counter example as despite connecting two very major oceans and being an important transit point for shipping is recognized as wholly under the control of Chile.
There is also a bit of a Grey Area in regards to the Great Belt in Denmark. Though operated much as an international waterway would be, this is due to pre-existing treaties that Denmark is bound to. The Belt is still legally Danish waters but operates as an international waterway would.
In other words it is not near so simple as you appear to claim.

I understand that you back your home country, ArtosStark, which of course is honorable. I don't have an example at hand, but your contention that of the 197-odd countries in the whole world, only 2 have a legal opinion about the Northwest Passage, is unbelievable. A German cruise ship (well, Bahamas flagged) passed through with passengers in 2006, and other cruise ships have done so since. A 2006 article in the Edmonton Journal newspaper about Canada's armed forces huffily banning the very name "Northwest Passage" stated that "Canada is at odds with much of the world over the status" of the Passage; see < http://www.canada.com/edmontonjourn...=6d4815ac-4fdb-4cf3-a8a6-4225a8bd08df&k=73925 >. So I gently suggest that you might be mistaken.

And your Strait of Magellan info is misleading. The UNCLOS Law of the Sea explicitly states that nothing therein supersedes already-existing treaties about specific waterways, such as the Montreux Convention with Turkey. An 1881 treaty between Chile and Argentina, as reaffirmed in 1984, established Chile's legal regime over the Strait of Magellan as a demilitarized zone with freedom of navigation to all comers without prior notice. That treaty remains in force. Today's Strait of Magellan status, far from being a counter example, is the same as what the USA maintains the Northwest Passage's status is.

(To be clear, if a nation along an international strait has a major naval war raging around it, or is itself at war, then any legal agreements might go out the window at least for the duration. The Montreux Convention has seen considerable strains since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I have heard.)

 

[Owens Z]

I like to visit the warships during the annual 'Fleet Week' festivities here in New York City. Often a ship of His Majesty's Royal Canadian Navy (as a rule, modest) is included. In 2019 it was WW2 veteran HMCS Oriole, a sail training ketch. The ketch was placed far down at the end of the line, beyond more imposing ships, and I don't think she had many visitors. The crew showed me around, and kindly gave me a handy cap. In 2023 it was HMCS Glace Bay, of the Kingston class that EwenS assumed I didn't know about. Great people. See my photos, attached. Maybe an RCN ship will participate in 2025's Fleet Week this May. If so, they will be welcome.

 

[Apophenia]

"Dearth" means an inadequately small number—I had taken you to mean that the number of active naval architects in Canada today has fallen to zero. Did I mistake you, Apophenia? I of course agree about the requirement for skilled and experienced tradesmen, although the Depression-era shipyard workers of the United States were quickly padded out after Pearl Harbor six-to-one with green employees including women, by all accounts successfully. Nazi Germany had to do something similar for U-boat production late in the war, though they were less radical (no black women) and had less success. So expanding a shipyard's labor force to meet a dire emergency is possible, given experienced trainers. Quickly creating a capable naval architect from a Canadian oil or bank executive: not possible. As I said, sounds foolish.

An endorsement of a more rational spacing of laid-down ships was implicit in my response to you, and explicit in my pointing out the forty years (so far) of dawdling to obtain a big icebreaker suitable for Arctic service, to supplement elderly Louis S. St-Laurent and the smaller Pierre Radisson-class ships.

There are a fair number of naval architecture firms working in Canada. Some of them design warships (up to corvette/OPV size) but none of them have proven acceptable to NDHQ or the RCN brass. So, yeah, let's call that "fallen to zero".

I absolutely agree with your wartime example - with even some quite small Canadian yards undergoing similar emergency transformations to those later mastered by their larger US equivalents. But, as you noted, this required "experienced trainers". But since the last Canadian-built FFH was launched almost 30 years ago, where is that domestic experience to come from?

 

[Apophenia]

As far as I am aware no other country except the US has unambiguously taken a position on the status of the NWP...

IIRC, Singapore has also made unambiguous statements on the NWP being international waters.

I can't think of any good reason why Singapore should care about Canadian sovereignty claims. Probably, Singapore is just keen to ensure continued US patronage (and that the nearby Malacca Strait remains open).

Singapore was probably also confident that they could suck up to the US without any serious response from Canada. After all, we continue to buy military products from Singapore.*

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* An OT example would be the recent C-UAS UOR for the Latvian deployment. We could has 'shopped local' and bought UAB EDM4S 'disruptor rifles' from Vilnius-based NT Service (whose UAB EDM4S) have seen action in Ukraine. Instead, DND chose the Orion-H9 by Singapore's TRD Systems.