Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
Normal
I found two items interesting.One of the documents implied that Ikara was added as it was the only A/S weapon that could fully utilise the Type 2016 sonar's range. You could argue the opposite, that in fact no previous RN sonar allowed Ikara to be used to its full potential range.Another document also justifies Ikara by describing it as a "close" A/S weapon. Obviously Soviet SSMs like Granit were much longer ranged than those around when Ikara was developed, and torpedo engagement distances also grew larger as Soviet sonars improved (and detection distances grew as stealth improved), so what was once a stand-off missile like Ikara was by 1980 considered to be a close-in weapon (making the STWS torpedo mountings on other frigates positively last-ditch defence!). Presumably SKR/Nimrod was looked upon at the long-range A/S 'weapon'. There were efforts like Ikara M7 with a turbojet sustainer around this period too, to give the Ikara longer legs.To me it feels like they were cramming everything onto Type 43, perhaps reasoning that ASW ship numbers would suffer if they were built so sacrificing a double-ended Sea Dart ship to add ASW capability would salvage something. Against Regiments of Backfires and Oscars lobbing Granits about, it feels like the RN was caught between trying to defend against two formidable threats using late 1960s tech (albeit upgraded if GWS.31 went ahead). The result was bound to be big, expensive and ultimately sub optimal. Given the analysis of that time indicated a NATO task force could be wiped out within 2 days from aerial attack alone, it's not surprising the politicians thought "why bother?".
I found two items interesting.
One of the documents implied that Ikara was added as it was the only A/S weapon that could fully utilise the Type 2016 sonar's range. You could argue the opposite, that in fact no previous RN sonar allowed Ikara to be used to its full potential range.
Another document also justifies Ikara by describing it as a "close" A/S weapon. Obviously Soviet SSMs like Granit were much longer ranged than those around when Ikara was developed, and torpedo engagement distances also grew larger as Soviet sonars improved (and detection distances grew as stealth improved), so what was once a stand-off missile like Ikara was by 1980 considered to be a close-in weapon (making the STWS torpedo mountings on other frigates positively last-ditch defence!). Presumably SKR/Nimrod was looked upon at the long-range A/S 'weapon'. There were efforts like Ikara M7 with a turbojet sustainer around this period too, to give the Ikara longer legs.
To me it feels like they were cramming everything onto Type 43, perhaps reasoning that ASW ship numbers would suffer if they were built so sacrificing a double-ended Sea Dart ship to add ASW capability would salvage something. Against Regiments of Backfires and Oscars lobbing Granits about, it feels like the RN was caught between trying to defend against two formidable threats using late 1960s tech (albeit upgraded if GWS.31 went ahead). The result was bound to be big, expensive and ultimately sub optimal. Given the analysis of that time indicated a NATO task force could be wiped out within 2 days from aerial attack alone, it's not surprising the politicians thought "why bother?".
