These 2 threads (with Space) dealing with Brit schemes dredge up kite dreams from industry and RPE sources. Paymaster MoS was lukewarm, Ministers were cold...and the airframe-centric parents of all UK GW teams were frigid: GW made no business sense. Unguessable R&D resource/time, for modest production volume, and likely modest, if any, lucrative exports. RAE pimped GW in ’48, urging firms to “detach some of your best men to work on something which is a doubtful starter, politically vulnerable, and perhaps even unprofitable”. For (to be) Thunderbird EE was chosen as vertically-integrated Prime: they accepted conditional upon not having “to put capital into the venture”. In practice remote from Group kin Napier (motor), Marconi (guidance), their reward at (Napier) Luton was to “put up their own buildings - or more accurately (MoS to fund) the operation”, inc. a new Stevenage site, later core (to be BAe.Dynamics/)MBDA A.R.Adams, Good Company, BAC, 1976, Pp4/28/61. Special Products appendage in 1960 at Vickers as BAC was formed: “junior partner of the Aircraft side (a) poor relation.” Special Director/Weybridge G.Edwards “wasn’t particularly interested in GW” Adams,P70.
MoS, 1955 for Blue Steel was “relieved (to find in Avro an A/c) constructor (prepared) to accept the challenge” J.E.Allen(Avro),Blue Steel& Devts,R.Ae.S 17/3/99. But quite soon Sir Roy Dobson could not see payoff to match the pain; production volume gently evaporated; owner HSAL bought DH for its Blue Streak business just in time for it to be cancelled, so little appetite remained to indulge Avro/WRD to do more origami darts. “few (contracts caused) such bitter feelings (as) even in ’56 (Avro puffed 1,000n.m. The view in MoS was that if they) could not perfect (100n.m.) how could they (do) 10xthat? (Weapons Research Divn, many ex-RAE staff untutored in matters of money) weak management structure (criticisms,) recriminations (were) common parlance” Wynn,P202/4.
The prime reason that projects in Chris Gibson's BSP/Hypersonics and now Vulcan's Hammer (extensively drawing on EE/Preston and Avro WRD doodles) are a) stimulatingly new to us, and b) origami, is that Ministers knew them all to be beyond the wit of the procurement process to deploy in the decade, nay century, of first funding. The wonder is not that Ministers did not proceed with so many, but that they did persevere with any. They became locked in to Seaslug and Blue Steel on platforms that, they were told, could not take US equivalents.
Here's a provocation for Brit GW/Space fans: name one project brought to the User on time, on Spec., on budget. And that continues. Even after BAE melded UK GW into MBDA, Meteor, for example, will be in its 3rd (do I mean 4th.?) decade before IOC. And if you concede the point do not whinge about dithering Ministers. Vast cascades of money, and infusion of Other Peoples' Industrial Property. If Ministers had not made 20-27 February,1950 US/UK (“Burns/Templer”) GW data Agreements, there would have been no UK GW industry.
