Put yourself in the shoes of the (quite junior) first filterer of Bids. He passes his appraisal to funder-politicians, but only after deleting the nonsenses. Here: ML (oddjob bits and bobs, including dodgy ejection seats), SAL (repair cobbler, not designer), Miles (in 1949...unproven team, post-scandalous liquidation), EE (civilly virginal). Picture yourself pondering what to do with "these Whittles", 1942. You cannot put production to Power Jets who have no factory. Or (much later) what to do with combat UAVs when General Atomics, unproven newbie, came up with novelty: who he? Best to lift their ideas, paying if we must, and give them to a proper firm. US could have put reaction thrust into a proven reciprocist, not to supercharger newbie GE.
That is why armchair critics should be ignored (Martin Baker MB- competitors to Hawker/Supermarine; Miles blended-body Transatlantic, or bullet-supersonics). Risk. So-called dumb officials simply tried to measure risk: reward. We now know GE and GA were gamechangers.
Modest response to this 1949, and to BEAC's 1953 Rapide Replacement tenders were in part because they were unfunded trawls. BEAC had secured procurement independence 10/1/49, freed from MoS knowing what was best for them. This Spec was moribund. BEAC would fly Rapides to 1/5/64, Dakotas to 19/5/62. It also duplicated Brabazon Type 5A (HPR Marathon, 25 on order by MoS for BEAC)/5B (DH Dove, soon Heron, which BEAC would buy). It was BEAC's 2/52 rejection of Marathon that would trigger the 1953 trawl...to no purpose.