British Island Bases Strategy

[Border Reiver]

Has any research been carried on the subject of the British Island Bases Strategy of the late 1960s ? My understanding is that the idea was use Indian Ocean islands as bases for RAF F-111s when the Navy's aircraft carriers were withdrawn. One island which was seriously considered was Aldabra but this met with opposition from environmentalists and the whole idea was abandoned when Britain withdrew from East of Suez. Of course the idea was revived in the late 1970s by the Americans using Diego Garcia.

 

[alertken]

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,10513.0.html

http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P3347.pdf

UK Prime Minister H Wilson: “nuclear policy must help to provide some reassurance to (out-of-NATO-area) non-nuclear powers” Defence,Cmd.2592, 23/2/65,P.7. "Our frontiers are in the Himalayas".1965.

His Labour Party had won UK General Election, 16/10/64 on a platform including Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament, but on that very day China made its first A-Test. India was agitated. Wilson was supportive of India (he had been a protege of Stafford Cripps, who had negotiated with Jinnah and Gandhi). UK had signed, 5/8/63 the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and was working in UN to produce (5/3/70) a Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Bomb was the political equivalent of today's eco-Agenda.

On 22/2/66 Wilson: chopped CVA-01 and reduced East of Suez presence;
- ordered 10 F-111K T.1 (followed 1/2/67 by 40 S.2). They would be cross-operated from Darwin with RAAF F-111C, deployed forward to Butterworth, Gan and other dotlets: US was wholly supportive of all this and contributed to the cost of Diego Garcia, which first must be ethnically cleansed. The unspoken presumption was that Forward Operating Bases would be provided in India.

Vulcans deployed as Operation Matterhorn started this Aid-to-India from Tengah, 26/4/65. UK's hope was to deter India from squandering and proliferating on its own Bomb. We failed. So we quit the Indian Ocean completely 16/1/68.

 

[zen]

This is the Alternative History and Future Speculation section, not a History section.

 

[TsrJoe]

Re. https://theses.gla.ac.uk/1058/1/2009dyndalphd.pdf

 

[CJGibson]

This looks interesting.

Thanks Joe

Chris

 

[Yellow Palace]

One of the little nuggets buried away in the thesis is this passage about the 1965 Working Party and the number of aircraft required to carry out tasks in support of maritime forces:

The British forces directly required for maritime tasks included:

(a) AEW and Air Defence:

• 6 Comet type AEW or 12 NAST 6166 (the proposed new organic AEW for CVA-01).
• 53-56 Phantom aircraft
• 12 Victor tanker aircraft

(b) Maritime Reconnaissance (excluding A/S tasks100):

• 9 Comet aircraft for reconnaissance

(c) Tactical Recce and Strike:

• 17 F.111A or 24 Buccaneer II+
• 6 Victor tanker aircraft

(d) ANDAMAN Patrol:

• 4 Comet type AEW or 11 NAST 6166
• 12 Phantom aircraft
• 3 Victor tanker aircraft

[...]
In addition to these maritime tasks, a force of one TPS 34 and
UPS 1 radar system, 12 air defence fighters and one flight of Bloodhound and one flight of ET 316 SAM system
would be required to protect the islands used as mounting bases. (Just in line with the earlier discussed ‘Island
Strategy’ concept.
[...]An additional 17 Comets were needed to cover the entire region in A/S operations. However, this forces was also
needed with the alternative with carriers, and thus excluded from the calculation of forces required.

In total, then, that requires cramming onto potentially just three airfields a total of:

• 80 Phantoms,
• 17 F-111s,
• 36 Comets (10 AEW & 36 maritime reconnaissance), and
• 21 Victors

Just the four-engined types is nearly three times what Ascension supported in the Falklands, and that was demanding enough. Adding nearly a hundred fast jets on top of that? And it still doesn't include any strategic or tactical transport, or the strike aircraft needed for non-maritime tasks. Two of the bases - Gan and Cocos Island - have virtually no ramp space, so that third 'host nation' base is going to be doing some very heavy lifting.

Of course, a mobile airfield or two might be quite useful in this scenario... yes, it might take a week or two to get a carrier from one side of the Indian Ocean to the other, but getting diplomatic clearance to operate 150 combat aircraft, then deploying them, doesn't happen overnight either!

 

[Yellow Palace]

Some gems from the Air Historical Branch:

https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/our-history/air-historical-branch/regional-studies-post-coldwar-narratives/defence-policy-and-the-raf-1956-1963/

The Foreign Office had been suggesting 'mini-bases' on islands since at least 1959. Locations which seemed possible then included Masirah, Gan, Socotra, the Seychelles, Mauritius, Cocos, and Labuan. Some of those found their way into the Mounting Base proposals.

Aldabra was, in 1962, to have been operational by 1966. As was a staging post and tanker base at St Helena. Masirah was to be operational in 1970, and Cocos Island in 1973. An additional staging post at Coëtivy was proposed alongside Gan, but was abandoned by 1960.

Staging posts were to be equipped similarly to Gan. Operating bases would be similar to Akrotiri, except that domestic accomodation would only be provided for the peacetime staging role, and that on an unaccompanied basis.

Wait... St Helena?

It appears so. I assume this isn't an error, since the airfield on Ascension was already up and running.

 

[GK Dundas]

One of the little nuggets buried away in the thesis is this passage about the 1965 Working Party and the number of aircraft required to carry out tasks in support of maritime forces:



In total, then, that requires cramming onto potentially just three airfields a total of:

• 80 Phantoms,
• 17 F-111s,
• 36 Comets (10 AEW & 36 maritime reconnaissance), and
• 21 Victors

Just the four-engined types is nearly three times what Ascension supported in the Falklands, and that was demanding enough. Adding nearly a hundred fast jets on top of that? And it still doesn't include any strategic or tactical transport, or the strike aircraft needed for non-maritime tasks. Two of the bases - Gan and Cocos Island - have virtually no ramp space, so that third 'host nation' base is going to be doing some very heavy lifting.

Of course, a mobile airfield or two might be quite useful in this scenario... yes, it might take a week or two to get a carrier from one side of the Indian Ocean to the other, but getting diplomatic clearance to operate 150 combat aircraft, then deploying them, doesn't happen overnight either!

Yes there is something to be said for self propelled sovereign territory. That apply either subtle or less than subtle pressure to a problem and then leave just as subtly.

 

[Rule of cool]

IIUC there was concerns with the political reliability of some of the proposed bases, which was a major problem given they were all too far apart to be mutually supporting and losing one would virtually destroy the strategy.

The reason why the Lightning F6 was fitted with over-wing ferry tanks and the Hunter FGA9 was selected over the Gnat was due to the distances between existing airfields EoS.

 

[Yellow Palace]

IIUC there was concerns with the political reliability of some of the proposed bases, which was a major problem given they were all too far apart to be mutually supporting and losing one would virtually destroy the strategy.

That's why the Chagos Archipelago was detached from the Seychelles, in a rather ethically dubious way. There were plans to do something similar with Aldabra and some associated islands which were actually fairly well advanced, I'll have to try and find the source.

 

[Yellow Palace]

There were plans to do something similar with Aldabra and some associated islands which were actually fairly well advanced, I'll have to try and find the source.

Here we go:

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2850&context=gc_etds

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V009.pdf

Interestingly, Coetivy was also one of the bases the US was interested in alongside Diego Garcia and Aldabra. It does seem that the Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroche islands (or island groups, it's not entirely clear) actually were included in the British Indian Ocean Territory at its creation, but were returned to the Seychelles at independence - evidently, as they were no longer needed for military purposes. It was felt that (see here) Farquhar was well suited to an airfield but not an anchorage; Desroche, an anchorage but not an airfield; and Aldabra was suitable for both.

Wait... St Helena?

It appears so. I assume this isn't an error, since the airfield on Ascension was already up and running.

This actually makes a fair amount of sense, when you start looking at it. Via the Cable Route, it's 4,800 nautical miles from Ascension to Aldabra. But it's only 4,100 nautical miles from St Helena to Aldabra. If you can't refuel en route, that 700 mile reduction is huge. I have no idea where you put a 9,000 foot (or longer, Aldabra was to have had 12,000 feet!) runway on St Helena, mind you - the 6,000-foot one that's just been built was enough of a challenge.