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Remember, MCAS is a flying qualities fix, not a flight safety fix. So Max should be flyable without it. It's MCAS driving the tailplane in the wrong direction when it failed that caused the crashes, not something inherent in the Max aerodynamics. So what we need is an MCAS with redundancy and that fails passively, unlike the current iteration. Redundancy means a hardware fix, failing passively is likely a combined hardware/software fix. And similarly for whatever it was FAA discovered.

Edited to add: The other alternative would be to take MCAS out and mandate a separate type rating for Max vs 737 NGs, That's dependent on flight qualities without MCAS being in the acceptable range.

Edited to further add. Being pedantic, the MCAS failures were hardware/systems, not software. The software responded correctly to the signal it was receiving from the failed AoA vane. The failed vane was hardware, the failure to allow for it was systems.

<blockquote data-quote="DWG" data-source="post: 357574" data-attributes="member: 414">Remember, MCAS is a flying qualities fix, not a flight safety fix. So Max should be flyable without it. It's MCAS driving the tailplane in the wrong direction when it failed that caused the crashes, not something inherent in the Max aerodynamics. So what we need is an MCAS with redundancy and that fails passively, unlike the current iteration. Redundancy means a hardware fix, failing passively is likely a combined hardware/software fix. And similarly for whatever it was FAA discovered.Edited to add: The other alternative would be to take MCAS out and mandate a separate type rating for Max vs 737 NGs, That's dependent on flight qualities without MCAS being in the acceptable range.Edited to further add. Being pedantic, the MCAS failures were hardware/systems, not software. The software responded correctly to the signal it was receiving from the failed AoA vane. The failed vane was hardware, the failure to allow for it was systems.</blockquote>

[QUOTE="DWG, post: 357574, member: 414"] Remember, MCAS is a flying qualities fix, not a flight safety fix. So Max should be flyable without it. It's MCAS driving the tailplane in the wrong direction when it failed that caused the crashes, not something inherent in the Max aerodynamics. So what we need is an MCAS with redundancy and that fails passively, unlike the current iteration. Redundancy means a hardware fix, failing passively is likely a combined hardware/software fix. And similarly for whatever it was FAA discovered. Edited to add: The other alternative would be to take MCAS out and mandate a separate type rating for Max vs 737 NGs, That's dependent on flight qualities without MCAS being in the acceptable range. Edited to further add. Being pedantic, the MCAS failures were hardware/systems, not software. The software responded correctly to the signal it was receiving from the failed AoA vane. The failed vane was hardware, the failure to allow for it was systems. [/QUOTE]

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