blackkite
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Bf 110 Contenders
blackkite
Don't laugh, don't cry, don't even curse, but.....
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Hi!
"The development of such a fighter began in the mid-thirties in several European countries. In France, it was Pote-63, in Poland - PZL R-38, in the USSR - “weaving” of V. Petlyakov and TIS N. Polikarpova. In Germany, the ministry of aviation issued five firms a task to develop a “strategic” fighter."
"The development of such a fighter began in the mid-thirties in several European countries. In France, it was Pote-63, in Poland - PZL R-38, in the USSR - “weaving” of V. Petlyakov and TIS N. Polikarpova. In Germany, the ministry of aviation issued five firms a task to develop a “strategic” fighter."
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blackkite
Don't laugh, don't cry, don't even curse, but.....
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Excellent information about Ago Ao.225. This design looks like.MB.902
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Cheers blackkite.
One thing is for certain, I wouldn't want to be taking off and landing on that narrow track landing gear.
Regards
Pioneer
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Genesis of the strategic heavy fighter
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the Luftwaffe attacked Poland with 2,300 modern combat aircraft.
The Polish Air Force only had 240 fighters and succumbed after just thirty days of fighting, hopelessly waiting for the squads of Moranes, Hurricanes and Battles with which their false French and British allies had promised to help. Such was the trust of the Polish Government in its Western allies that they had sold its most modern fighters P.Z.L. P.24 to Greece, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, retaining the obsolete models P.7a, P.11a and P.11c for the defence of the country.
The origin of this dangerous decision appears to be in the douhetiste mentality of the general Ludomil Rayski, commissioned to lead the Polish Air Force procurement programs since 1936. The writings of Giulio Douhet had convinced many influential persons in the mid-1930s that future wars would be won from the air by large fleets of bombers. Yet the combat experience gained in Spain and China showed that the bombers had to be escorted by fighters to be effective.
The limited range of the fighters of the time restricted the territorial ambitions of the countries to over 300 km beyond its borders. But Germany dreamt of the Urals, Italy dreamt of Egypt and Japan dreamt of China. Trying to overcome that limit was how concept 'strategic fighter', with powerful weapons and high range, was conceived. France, Germany, Poland and Japan invested large resources, with more ideological than scientific basis.
By the end of the 1920s Polish strategists believed feasible the expansion of their accesses to the sea through the annexation of German East Prussian territories. The lessons derived from the war against the soviets in 1920 were all wrong, as well as the belief that Germany was a country defeated. Erroneously, the Poles decided to devote a large part of their resources to the creation of a modern attack force, consisting of fast-bombers and long-range 'strategic-fighters' to force the future annexation of new territories.
The manufacture of the new single-engine fighters P.Z.L. P.50 and P.55 had to be delayed in favour of the twin-engine P.Z.L. 'strategic-fighter' P.38 Wilk. The expansionist policy carried out by the U.S.S.R. and the Third Reich in Manchuria, Spain, Finland, Austria and Czechoslovakia, alarmed the French and British forcing them to suspend the export of fighter aircrafts and engines to small European countries that were is such a need of them.
At the beginning of the year 1939 Poland was a blind between two monsters.
After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March, the general Józef Zając received the command of the Polish Air Force and commissioned the urgent production of four hundred P.Z.L. P.11g Kobuz fighters powered by a Bristol Mercury VIII engine. In June, the Polish Government began negotiations for the acquisition of the Seversky P-35 and Curtiss P-36 fighters. In August, after the French refused to export their few Dewoitine D.520, an agreement was signed for the acquisition of hundred-and-sixty Morane-Saulnier M.S. 406 that were finally retained in Le Havre after the German occupation of the Polish ports.
The British agreed to export only ten Hurricane Mk. I, one Spitfire Mk. I and hundred Battle bombers, but only the Hurricane L2048 arrived to Poland before the German invasion. At the end of August the Dornier Do 17P-1s of the Luftwaffe began to carry out reconnaissance flights over Poland at an altitude that the P.Z.L. P.11c of the Zasadzkipatrols could not reach.
On 1 September 1939, the Luftwaffe had 1,090 fighters Messerschmitt Bf 109, but most remained in Germany after the Declaration of war made by French and British on day 3.
The invasion of Poland only involved 429: thirty-six Bf 109 B-2 (462 kph) of the JGr 101, seventy-six Bf 109 C-1 (467 kph) of the I/JG21, forty Bf 109 D-1 (571 kph) of the JGr 102 and two-hundred-and-seventy-seven Bf 109 E-1 (547 kph) of the I/JG1, I/LG2 and I/JG 21. None of them was still armed with the 20 mm cannons used by the seventy-four Bf 110 C-1 and eight Bf 110 B-1 that were escorting the main force of bombers, formed by three-hundred-and-sixty-seven Dornier Do 17 and four-hundred-and-forty-four Heinkel He 111.
The day of the invasion, the Polish Air Force had less than 400 first-line aircraft and only 15 fighter squadrons equipped with thirty P.Z.L. P.7a, twenty P.Z.L. P.11a and hundred-and-eleven P.Z.L. P.11c. There were seventy-five more units of the P.Z.L. P.7a in second-line reserve units and fighter schools, one PZL P.11g, one P.Z.L. P.24 IV and two P.Z.L. P.50 prototypes.
With a maximum speed below the theoretical of 380 kph for the P.11c and of 327 kph for the P.7a, these outclassed airplanes were not only slower than the German fighters, but they did not even match the cruising speed of the bombers. Fortunately for the Poles, the Luftwaffe pilots had orders to fly at medium level to safely identify targets. Confident in the protection of the escort fighters and the ability of their rear-gunners, the German bombers did not avoid combat, so even the P.Z.L. P.7A had its opportunity, managing to shoot down two He 111, one Do 17, two Bf 110 and one Hs 126 losing in exchange 70 per cent of its forces.
The Vickers. E mod.1933 machine guns of the P.7a had a low rate of fire and tended to clog very often. They were mounted very low at the fuselage sides and the pilot could not watch the tracer bullets trajectory. These had been replaced by the indigenous FK Wz.33A in some planes.
The P.11a had much better visibility from the cockpit and one engine more powerful. But the armament was the same and no match for even a Dornier in performance.
The P.11c was designed with two additional Wz 36S machine guns located in the wings, but at the start of the war they had only been installed in one-third of the aircraft. Despite their limitations, Polish fighters were cleverly used by the Pursuit Brigade during the Warsaw defence. Its high-wing configuration allowed them to take-off from short airstrips, operating in small groups from numerous improvised airfields located around the capital and frequently changing base to avoid the photo reconnaissance of the Do 17 P-1 Fernaufklären. Its good rate of climb allowed them to quickly attack from below the bombers flying at medium level.
The P.11c could dive at 600 kph and it was superior in dogfight to the Bf 109 and to the Polikarpov I-16 Type 10. Its great structural robustness let them carry out manoeuvres at high G for which the pilots had been superbly trained. But its armament was insufficient to destroy the He 111. When firing too long burst, the excessive heat was blocking the synchronization system and the bullets struck the propeller blades.
The malfunction of the machine guns forced Lt. Col. Leopold Pamula from 114 Sqn to ramming a German fighter (possibly a Bf 109 B-2 of the JGr 101) over Lomianki.
Between 1 and 26 September the Polish fighters shot down 110 to 160 German and Russian airplanes in combat. The Luftwaffe lost 285 aircraft for various reasons and another 279 were damaged. The Polish Air Force lost 118 fighters.
Chronology of the disaster
On 10 May 1934 the German Government officially recognized the existence of the Luftwaffe.
In April the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) decided to update the concept 'strategic fighter' that had been developed in Germany during the First World War.
In July, the Polish Government approves the development of the P.Z.L. P.37 Łos medium bomber.
In September the Polish Department of Aeronautics approved the design of the 'strategic fighter' P.Z.L. P.38 Wilk.
On 31 October the French Air Ministry issued a specification for a multiplace léger de defénse, Potez 63, the French version of the so-called 'strategic fighter'.
On 28 May 1935 the Messerschmitt Bf 109 V1 prototype performed its first secret flight.
The prototype of the dive bomber Junkers Ju 87 V1 Stuka flew on 17 September.
All the work of design of the German 'strategic fighter' Messerschmitt Bf 110, was carried out during the summer of 1935.
In October the prototype Dornier Do 17 V1 was demonstrated at Bückeberg and the Polikarpov I-16 Type 5 at the Milan International Aeronautical Salon.
On 6 November 1936 the Legion Condor is constituted and the Polikarpov I-16 Type 5 enters combat in Spain.
On 10 January 1937 the Heinkel He 111 V4 prototype was revealed to the world.
In February the Bf 109 B-1 (462 kph) entered service with the JG 132 Richthofen and the Ju 87 A-0 performed its first bombing mission in Spain.
From 23 July to 1 August, the Bf 109 V13 with DB 600 engine and the Do 17 (450 kph) are presented to the international press during the 4th International Air Show at Dübendorf.
In November the Bf 109 V13, with DB 601 engine, reached the world speed record with 611 kph and the Polikarpov I-16 Type 5 entered combat in China.
In January 1938 the He 111 E was revealed, the government of Yugoslavia ordered 12 Hawker Hurricane Mk. I and the P.Z.L. P.37 bomber entered service.
On 13 March, Austria was annexed to the Third Reich and the Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 entered combat in Spain.
During the spring of 1938 the Bf 109 C-1 (467 kph) and the Bf 109 D-1 (571 kph) entered service.
In May the prototype P.Z.L. P.38 Wilk carried out its first flight equipped with two provisional Ranger engines.
In July the Bf 109 D-1 was revealed as the fastest service fighter in the world.
The Messerschmitt Bf 110 B-1 was revealed during the official visit of the French Chief of Air Staff Général Vuillemin in August.
On 28 September, the Munich Agreement was signed. The Hawker Fury, Gloster Gauntlet, Hawker Demon, Dewoitine D.510 and Loire 46 are painted in camouflage to be used as ‘emergency fighters’ due to the shortage of modern fighters still in production. The RAF has only six squadrons of Hurricanes and three Spitfire fighters.
In October the Wehrmacht occupied Sudetenland and the Polish Department of Aeronautics published the Sokół emergency fighter program specification.
In December, the Bf 109 B-2 was revealed, the Government of Romania placed an order for twelve Hawker Hurricane Mk. I. Polish preparation of the Plan W for the defence against the U.S.S.R. was completed.
The first flight the P.Z.L. P.38 prototype, powered by two Foka II engines, was made in January 1939. The delay of its mass production prevented the conversion of the 15 squadrons of P.Z.L. P.11c scheduled for that year.
The P.Z.L. P.50/I was officially presented and the Bf 109 E-1, capable of flying at 547 kph, entered into service in February.
On 15 March, German invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia and the Polish Government completed the preparation of Plan Z for the defence against Germany.
Hitler took the decision to invade Poland on 23 May.
In June, the Polish pilots testing the Seversky EP-1 and considered it faster and more manoeuvrable than the P.Z.L. P.50/I.
During the month of August, the Polish Government tried to acquire, without success, Dewoitine D.520, Morane 406, Hawker Hurricane Mk. I, Supermarine Spitfire Mk. I, Seversky P-35, Curtiss P-36 fighters and Fairey Battle bombers. The Dornier Do 17 P-1 began their missions of reconnaissance on Poland flying at 7,000 m, the P.Z.L. P.11c took 9 minutes to reach that altitude, but they were slower than the German aircraft and could not reach them.
On 23 August the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is signed, allowing the Third Reich access to resources of petroleum in Romania and Hungary and the Soviets regained the territories lost in 1920. The mobilisation of the Polish Army begins.
On 1 September, the German invasion takes place with four-hundred-and-twenty-nine Messerschmitt Bf 109 types B-2, C-1, D-1 and E-1, eighty-two Messerschmitt Bf 110 B-1 and C-1, twenty-one Heinkel He 46, eight Fieseler Fi 156, thirty-seven Henschel Hs 123A, one-hundred-and-eleven Henschel Hs 126 A-1, two-hundred-and-seventy-three Junkers Ju 87 B-1 , ten Junkers Ju 87 C-0, four-hundred-and-forty-seven Dornier Do 17 types E, F-1, Z-2 and P-1, three-hundred-and-two Heinkel He 111 types E, H and P, twenty-one Heinkel He 60 C, eight Heinkel He 115, twenty-seven Dornier Do 18 D and four-hundred-and-ninety-five Junkers Ju 52/3m.
On 17 September the Red Army occupied the eastern regions of Poland.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the Luftwaffe attacked Poland with 2,300 modern combat aircraft.
The Polish Air Force only had 240 fighters and succumbed after just thirty days of fighting, hopelessly waiting for the squads of Moranes, Hurricanes and Battles with which their false French and British allies had promised to help. Such was the trust of the Polish Government in its Western allies that they had sold its most modern fighters P.Z.L. P.24 to Greece, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, retaining the obsolete models P.7a, P.11a and P.11c for the defence of the country.
The origin of this dangerous decision appears to be in the douhetiste mentality of the general Ludomil Rayski, commissioned to lead the Polish Air Force procurement programs since 1936. The writings of Giulio Douhet had convinced many influential persons in the mid-1930s that future wars would be won from the air by large fleets of bombers. Yet the combat experience gained in Spain and China showed that the bombers had to be escorted by fighters to be effective.
The limited range of the fighters of the time restricted the territorial ambitions of the countries to over 300 km beyond its borders. But Germany dreamt of the Urals, Italy dreamt of Egypt and Japan dreamt of China. Trying to overcome that limit was how concept 'strategic fighter', with powerful weapons and high range, was conceived. France, Germany, Poland and Japan invested large resources, with more ideological than scientific basis.
By the end of the 1920s Polish strategists believed feasible the expansion of their accesses to the sea through the annexation of German East Prussian territories. The lessons derived from the war against the soviets in 1920 were all wrong, as well as the belief that Germany was a country defeated. Erroneously, the Poles decided to devote a large part of their resources to the creation of a modern attack force, consisting of fast-bombers and long-range 'strategic-fighters' to force the future annexation of new territories.
The manufacture of the new single-engine fighters P.Z.L. P.50 and P.55 had to be delayed in favour of the twin-engine P.Z.L. 'strategic-fighter' P.38 Wilk. The expansionist policy carried out by the U.S.S.R. and the Third Reich in Manchuria, Spain, Finland, Austria and Czechoslovakia, alarmed the French and British forcing them to suspend the export of fighter aircrafts and engines to small European countries that were is such a need of them.
At the beginning of the year 1939 Poland was a blind between two monsters.
After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March, the general Józef Zając received the command of the Polish Air Force and commissioned the urgent production of four hundred P.Z.L. P.11g Kobuz fighters powered by a Bristol Mercury VIII engine. In June, the Polish Government began negotiations for the acquisition of the Seversky P-35 and Curtiss P-36 fighters. In August, after the French refused to export their few Dewoitine D.520, an agreement was signed for the acquisition of hundred-and-sixty Morane-Saulnier M.S. 406 that were finally retained in Le Havre after the German occupation of the Polish ports.
The British agreed to export only ten Hurricane Mk. I, one Spitfire Mk. I and hundred Battle bombers, but only the Hurricane L2048 arrived to Poland before the German invasion. At the end of August the Dornier Do 17P-1s of the Luftwaffe began to carry out reconnaissance flights over Poland at an altitude that the P.Z.L. P.11c of the Zasadzkipatrols could not reach.
On 1 September 1939, the Luftwaffe had 1,090 fighters Messerschmitt Bf 109, but most remained in Germany after the Declaration of war made by French and British on day 3.
The invasion of Poland only involved 429: thirty-six Bf 109 B-2 (462 kph) of the JGr 101, seventy-six Bf 109 C-1 (467 kph) of the I/JG21, forty Bf 109 D-1 (571 kph) of the JGr 102 and two-hundred-and-seventy-seven Bf 109 E-1 (547 kph) of the I/JG1, I/LG2 and I/JG 21. None of them was still armed with the 20 mm cannons used by the seventy-four Bf 110 C-1 and eight Bf 110 B-1 that were escorting the main force of bombers, formed by three-hundred-and-sixty-seven Dornier Do 17 and four-hundred-and-forty-four Heinkel He 111.
The day of the invasion, the Polish Air Force had less than 400 first-line aircraft and only 15 fighter squadrons equipped with thirty P.Z.L. P.7a, twenty P.Z.L. P.11a and hundred-and-eleven P.Z.L. P.11c. There were seventy-five more units of the P.Z.L. P.7a in second-line reserve units and fighter schools, one PZL P.11g, one P.Z.L. P.24 IV and two P.Z.L. P.50 prototypes.
With a maximum speed below the theoretical of 380 kph for the P.11c and of 327 kph for the P.7a, these outclassed airplanes were not only slower than the German fighters, but they did not even match the cruising speed of the bombers. Fortunately for the Poles, the Luftwaffe pilots had orders to fly at medium level to safely identify targets. Confident in the protection of the escort fighters and the ability of their rear-gunners, the German bombers did not avoid combat, so even the P.Z.L. P.7A had its opportunity, managing to shoot down two He 111, one Do 17, two Bf 110 and one Hs 126 losing in exchange 70 per cent of its forces.
The Vickers. E mod.1933 machine guns of the P.7a had a low rate of fire and tended to clog very often. They were mounted very low at the fuselage sides and the pilot could not watch the tracer bullets trajectory. These had been replaced by the indigenous FK Wz.33A in some planes.
The P.11a had much better visibility from the cockpit and one engine more powerful. But the armament was the same and no match for even a Dornier in performance.
The P.11c was designed with two additional Wz 36S machine guns located in the wings, but at the start of the war they had only been installed in one-third of the aircraft. Despite their limitations, Polish fighters were cleverly used by the Pursuit Brigade during the Warsaw defence. Its high-wing configuration allowed them to take-off from short airstrips, operating in small groups from numerous improvised airfields located around the capital and frequently changing base to avoid the photo reconnaissance of the Do 17 P-1 Fernaufklären. Its good rate of climb allowed them to quickly attack from below the bombers flying at medium level.
The P.11c could dive at 600 kph and it was superior in dogfight to the Bf 109 and to the Polikarpov I-16 Type 10. Its great structural robustness let them carry out manoeuvres at high G for which the pilots had been superbly trained. But its armament was insufficient to destroy the He 111. When firing too long burst, the excessive heat was blocking the synchronization system and the bullets struck the propeller blades.
The malfunction of the machine guns forced Lt. Col. Leopold Pamula from 114 Sqn to ramming a German fighter (possibly a Bf 109 B-2 of the JGr 101) over Lomianki.
Between 1 and 26 September the Polish fighters shot down 110 to 160 German and Russian airplanes in combat. The Luftwaffe lost 285 aircraft for various reasons and another 279 were damaged. The Polish Air Force lost 118 fighters.
Chronology of the disaster
On 10 May 1934 the German Government officially recognized the existence of the Luftwaffe.
In April the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) decided to update the concept 'strategic fighter' that had been developed in Germany during the First World War.
In July, the Polish Government approves the development of the P.Z.L. P.37 Łos medium bomber.
In September the Polish Department of Aeronautics approved the design of the 'strategic fighter' P.Z.L. P.38 Wilk.
On 31 October the French Air Ministry issued a specification for a multiplace léger de defénse, Potez 63, the French version of the so-called 'strategic fighter'.
On 28 May 1935 the Messerschmitt Bf 109 V1 prototype performed its first secret flight.
The prototype of the dive bomber Junkers Ju 87 V1 Stuka flew on 17 September.
All the work of design of the German 'strategic fighter' Messerschmitt Bf 110, was carried out during the summer of 1935.
In October the prototype Dornier Do 17 V1 was demonstrated at Bückeberg and the Polikarpov I-16 Type 5 at the Milan International Aeronautical Salon.
On 6 November 1936 the Legion Condor is constituted and the Polikarpov I-16 Type 5 enters combat in Spain.
On 10 January 1937 the Heinkel He 111 V4 prototype was revealed to the world.
In February the Bf 109 B-1 (462 kph) entered service with the JG 132 Richthofen and the Ju 87 A-0 performed its first bombing mission in Spain.
From 23 July to 1 August, the Bf 109 V13 with DB 600 engine and the Do 17 (450 kph) are presented to the international press during the 4th International Air Show at Dübendorf.
In November the Bf 109 V13, with DB 601 engine, reached the world speed record with 611 kph and the Polikarpov I-16 Type 5 entered combat in China.
In January 1938 the He 111 E was revealed, the government of Yugoslavia ordered 12 Hawker Hurricane Mk. I and the P.Z.L. P.37 bomber entered service.
On 13 March, Austria was annexed to the Third Reich and the Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 entered combat in Spain.
During the spring of 1938 the Bf 109 C-1 (467 kph) and the Bf 109 D-1 (571 kph) entered service.
In May the prototype P.Z.L. P.38 Wilk carried out its first flight equipped with two provisional Ranger engines.
In July the Bf 109 D-1 was revealed as the fastest service fighter in the world.
The Messerschmitt Bf 110 B-1 was revealed during the official visit of the French Chief of Air Staff Général Vuillemin in August.
On 28 September, the Munich Agreement was signed. The Hawker Fury, Gloster Gauntlet, Hawker Demon, Dewoitine D.510 and Loire 46 are painted in camouflage to be used as ‘emergency fighters’ due to the shortage of modern fighters still in production. The RAF has only six squadrons of Hurricanes and three Spitfire fighters.
In October the Wehrmacht occupied Sudetenland and the Polish Department of Aeronautics published the Sokół emergency fighter program specification.
In December, the Bf 109 B-2 was revealed, the Government of Romania placed an order for twelve Hawker Hurricane Mk. I. Polish preparation of the Plan W for the defence against the U.S.S.R. was completed.
The first flight the P.Z.L. P.38 prototype, powered by two Foka II engines, was made in January 1939. The delay of its mass production prevented the conversion of the 15 squadrons of P.Z.L. P.11c scheduled for that year.
The P.Z.L. P.50/I was officially presented and the Bf 109 E-1, capable of flying at 547 kph, entered into service in February.
On 15 March, German invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia and the Polish Government completed the preparation of Plan Z for the defence against Germany.
Hitler took the decision to invade Poland on 23 May.
In June, the Polish pilots testing the Seversky EP-1 and considered it faster and more manoeuvrable than the P.Z.L. P.50/I.
During the month of August, the Polish Government tried to acquire, without success, Dewoitine D.520, Morane 406, Hawker Hurricane Mk. I, Supermarine Spitfire Mk. I, Seversky P-35, Curtiss P-36 fighters and Fairey Battle bombers. The Dornier Do 17 P-1 began their missions of reconnaissance on Poland flying at 7,000 m, the P.Z.L. P.11c took 9 minutes to reach that altitude, but they were slower than the German aircraft and could not reach them.
On 23 August the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is signed, allowing the Third Reich access to resources of petroleum in Romania and Hungary and the Soviets regained the territories lost in 1920. The mobilisation of the Polish Army begins.
On 1 September, the German invasion takes place with four-hundred-and-twenty-nine Messerschmitt Bf 109 types B-2, C-1, D-1 and E-1, eighty-two Messerschmitt Bf 110 B-1 and C-1, twenty-one Heinkel He 46, eight Fieseler Fi 156, thirty-seven Henschel Hs 123A, one-hundred-and-eleven Henschel Hs 126 A-1, two-hundred-and-seventy-three Junkers Ju 87 B-1 , ten Junkers Ju 87 C-0, four-hundred-and-forty-seven Dornier Do 17 types E, F-1, Z-2 and P-1, three-hundred-and-two Heinkel He 111 types E, H and P, twenty-one Heinkel He 60 C, eight Heinkel He 115, twenty-seven Dornier Do 18 D and four-hundred-and-ninety-five Junkers Ju 52/3m.
On 17 September the Red Army occupied the eastern regions of Poland.
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Post-2
The writings of Giulio Douhet had convinced many influential persons in the mid-1930s that future wars would be won from the air by large fleets of bombers. But the combat experience gained in Spain and China clearly indicated that the bombers had to be escorted by fighters to be effective.
The limited range of the fighters of the time restricted the territorial ambitions of the countries a little over 300 km beyond its borders, but Germany dreamt of the Urals, Italy dreamt of Egypt and Japan of China.
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Trying to overcome that limit was how the concept Zerstörer was conceived, a heavy fighter with powerful weapons and high range in which the Axis Powers invested large resources with more ideological than scientific basis. When the realities of war and the laws of physics were imposed over London in the summer of 1940, Göring was shocked to hear that his heavy Messerschmitt Bf 110 could not hunt the Hurricanes because these could make tighter turns. The Italians had similar luck with the Romeo 58 and Savoia 91 that never reached the production stage. Göring persevered in this error favouring the construction of three hundred units of the Messerschmitt Me 210, whose design flaws cost three million Reichsmarks and a major national scandal.
In Japan, the IJA ordered the design of the Kawasaki Ki.45, inspired by the operational philosophy of the Bf 110. After many tests using prototypes, the Ki.45-KAI-Ko entered service armed with two machine guns in the nose and one cannon of 20 mm in a ventral tunnel. Over the course of its first combat over Kweilin-China, on 12 June 1942, five Toryus of the 84th Chutai faced five Tomahawks of the AVG, losing three to zero. According to reports coming from the fighting in Burma - where the Ki.45 of the 21st Sentai faced the British Hurricane Mk.IIA and Mohawks Mk. IV - the IJA realized that the Toryu was not able to fight against single engine fighters.
The Ki.45 could face the British Beaufighters in New Guinea with dignity but it was almost impossible for this aircraft to bring them down, because of the low rate of fire of its antique cannon. The production of the Ki.45 was then reoriented towards ground attack specialized versions like the Ki.45-KAI-Otsu. This aircraft had a new 20mm cannon Ho-3 with a 50-round magazine in the nose and a 37 mm cannon Type 94, manually loaded, with a low rate of fire, in the ventral tunnel. It could carry two Type 98, number 25 land bombs of 242.2 kg under the wings.
Both the ‘Ko’ and the ‘Otsu’ versions were widely used in New Guinea, China and Malaya against trains, patrol torpedo boats and landing ships. In 1943 the surviving aircraft were sent to flight schools and replaced in combat units by the Ki.45-KAI-Hei. In this version, the 37 mm cannon was the Ho-203 automatic model with 25 rounds magazine and was in the nose. The ventral tunnel carried a Ho-3 of 20 mm. The ‘Hei’ retained the ability to carry two bombs of 250 kg.
All the airplanes of this model manufactured by the Tachikawa Arsenal had the barrel visible, protruding from the rounded extreme nose, while those manufactured by Akashi were covered by a conical fairing. The ‘Hei’ proved very useful in the fight against the Liberators, achieving some successes during the first months of 1943. When American bombers began to be escorted by Lightning fighters, the Ki.45 again performed ground attack missions. During the summer, the Ki.45 of the 5th, 13th and 45th Sentais suffered heavy losses against the 2nd generation fighters of the Corsair and Thunderbolt type, newcomers to New Guinea.
After receiving reports on the construction of airfields for the B-29 in China, the IJA began preparations for the defence of the Japanese mainland. The evaluation of the ‘Hei’ showed that the aircraft possessed good flight performances at high altitude, could fight using all its weapons between 8,200 and 9,750 m, without losing manoeuvrability, and up to 10,200 m with some weight loss, although it took it too long to reach that altitude.
On 15 June 1944, during a night raid on Yawata by the B-29 of the 468th BG, the ‘Limber Dragon’ 42-6230 was shot down by a Ki.45 of the 4th Sentai, piloted by Lt. Sadamitsu Kimura. On 29 July, the B-29 BS 42-6275 of the 794th BS, was shot down over Chengshen-China by a Ki.45 of the 25th Sentai. On 7 December, the ‘Round Trip Ticket’ 42-6262 of the 678th BS, was shot down over Manshu-Mukden by another Ki.45 of the 25th Sentai. On 22 January 1945, during an attack on the Nakajima factory of Tokyo, the ‘Rover Boy Express’ 42-24769 was downed near Konoike by a Hei of the 4th Sentai piloted by Isamu Kashiide. On 4 February, a Ki.45 of the 4th Sentai downed the ’Devil's Darling’ 42-24629 over Kobe. On 5 June, the 42-69665 was downed by a Ki.45 of the 53rd Sentai also over Kobe.
Some of these victories were achieved via frontal attacks by firing against the cockpit of the bomber from a distance of 100 m, or by 45 degrees diving against the engines. When the IJA ordered every Sentai of air defence to create an Air Superiority Company specializing in ramming, some ‘Hei’ were expressly modified by removing the armaments to make them lighter.
The Ki.45 proved to be very suitable as rammer because it had fast diving features that were superior to those of any other Japanese fighter. It was also very resistant to battle damage, especially when armoured plates were installed to protect the pilot. In this version, the radio operator was removed, and the rear opening of the cockpit was coated with metal plates. Even with its weight reduction, the Ki.45 weighed more than twice a Ki.44 which allowed him to cause much greater structural damage during collision.
In early March 1945, the B-29s began a series of low altitude night raids against the 67 major cities in Japan that were devastating. Despite what happened in Germany, the IJA had not foreseen the need to build specialized night fighters. Taken by surprise by the change in strategy of the Americans, the pilots of the Ki.45 improvised some night technical interception techniques, coordinating their attacks with the ground searchlights regiments. They also used a B-17 caught in Bandung for nocturnal visual localization practices. Some ‘Hei’ aircraft suffered field transformations for night fighting, fitting them with two Ho-5 guns of 20 mm angled at 35 degrees in Schräge Musik configuration.
The fires lit the undersides of the B-29s making them visible to the pilots of Toryus, Gekkos and Zeros that waited the opportunity of destroying them at a low-altitude firing at their belly from close range. When at the end of May 1945, the Superfortress came to the imperial capital city escorted by numerous Mustangs based on Iwo Jima, the Ki.45 survivors were sent on Tokko missions.
Kawasaki Ki.45 Toryu
The writings of Giulio Douhet had convinced many influential persons in the mid-1930s that future wars would be won from the air by large fleets of bombers. But the combat experience gained in Spain and China clearly indicated that the bombers had to be escorted by fighters to be effective.
The limited range of the fighters of the time restricted the territorial ambitions of the countries a little over 300 km beyond its borders, but Germany dreamt of the Urals, Italy dreamt of Egypt and Japan of China.
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Trying to overcome that limit was how the concept Zerstörer was conceived, a heavy fighter with powerful weapons and high range in which the Axis Powers invested large resources with more ideological than scientific basis. When the realities of war and the laws of physics were imposed over London in the summer of 1940, Göring was shocked to hear that his heavy Messerschmitt Bf 110 could not hunt the Hurricanes because these could make tighter turns. The Italians had similar luck with the Romeo 58 and Savoia 91 that never reached the production stage. Göring persevered in this error favouring the construction of three hundred units of the Messerschmitt Me 210, whose design flaws cost three million Reichsmarks and a major national scandal.
In Japan, the IJA ordered the design of the Kawasaki Ki.45, inspired by the operational philosophy of the Bf 110. After many tests using prototypes, the Ki.45-KAI-Ko entered service armed with two machine guns in the nose and one cannon of 20 mm in a ventral tunnel. Over the course of its first combat over Kweilin-China, on 12 June 1942, five Toryus of the 84th Chutai faced five Tomahawks of the AVG, losing three to zero. According to reports coming from the fighting in Burma - where the Ki.45 of the 21st Sentai faced the British Hurricane Mk.IIA and Mohawks Mk. IV - the IJA realized that the Toryu was not able to fight against single engine fighters.
The Ki.45 could face the British Beaufighters in New Guinea with dignity but it was almost impossible for this aircraft to bring them down, because of the low rate of fire of its antique cannon. The production of the Ki.45 was then reoriented towards ground attack specialized versions like the Ki.45-KAI-Otsu. This aircraft had a new 20mm cannon Ho-3 with a 50-round magazine in the nose and a 37 mm cannon Type 94, manually loaded, with a low rate of fire, in the ventral tunnel. It could carry two Type 98, number 25 land bombs of 242.2 kg under the wings.
Both the ‘Ko’ and the ‘Otsu’ versions were widely used in New Guinea, China and Malaya against trains, patrol torpedo boats and landing ships. In 1943 the surviving aircraft were sent to flight schools and replaced in combat units by the Ki.45-KAI-Hei. In this version, the 37 mm cannon was the Ho-203 automatic model with 25 rounds magazine and was in the nose. The ventral tunnel carried a Ho-3 of 20 mm. The ‘Hei’ retained the ability to carry two bombs of 250 kg.
All the airplanes of this model manufactured by the Tachikawa Arsenal had the barrel visible, protruding from the rounded extreme nose, while those manufactured by Akashi were covered by a conical fairing. The ‘Hei’ proved very useful in the fight against the Liberators, achieving some successes during the first months of 1943. When American bombers began to be escorted by Lightning fighters, the Ki.45 again performed ground attack missions. During the summer, the Ki.45 of the 5th, 13th and 45th Sentais suffered heavy losses against the 2nd generation fighters of the Corsair and Thunderbolt type, newcomers to New Guinea.
After receiving reports on the construction of airfields for the B-29 in China, the IJA began preparations for the defence of the Japanese mainland. The evaluation of the ‘Hei’ showed that the aircraft possessed good flight performances at high altitude, could fight using all its weapons between 8,200 and 9,750 m, without losing manoeuvrability, and up to 10,200 m with some weight loss, although it took it too long to reach that altitude.
On 15 June 1944, during a night raid on Yawata by the B-29 of the 468th BG, the ‘Limber Dragon’ 42-6230 was shot down by a Ki.45 of the 4th Sentai, piloted by Lt. Sadamitsu Kimura. On 29 July, the B-29 BS 42-6275 of the 794th BS, was shot down over Chengshen-China by a Ki.45 of the 25th Sentai. On 7 December, the ‘Round Trip Ticket’ 42-6262 of the 678th BS, was shot down over Manshu-Mukden by another Ki.45 of the 25th Sentai. On 22 January 1945, during an attack on the Nakajima factory of Tokyo, the ‘Rover Boy Express’ 42-24769 was downed near Konoike by a Hei of the 4th Sentai piloted by Isamu Kashiide. On 4 February, a Ki.45 of the 4th Sentai downed the ’Devil's Darling’ 42-24629 over Kobe. On 5 June, the 42-69665 was downed by a Ki.45 of the 53rd Sentai also over Kobe.
Some of these victories were achieved via frontal attacks by firing against the cockpit of the bomber from a distance of 100 m, or by 45 degrees diving against the engines. When the IJA ordered every Sentai of air defence to create an Air Superiority Company specializing in ramming, some ‘Hei’ were expressly modified by removing the armaments to make them lighter.
The Ki.45 proved to be very suitable as rammer because it had fast diving features that were superior to those of any other Japanese fighter. It was also very resistant to battle damage, especially when armoured plates were installed to protect the pilot. In this version, the radio operator was removed, and the rear opening of the cockpit was coated with metal plates. Even with its weight reduction, the Ki.45 weighed more than twice a Ki.44 which allowed him to cause much greater structural damage during collision.
In early March 1945, the B-29s began a series of low altitude night raids against the 67 major cities in Japan that were devastating. Despite what happened in Germany, the IJA had not foreseen the need to build specialized night fighters. Taken by surprise by the change in strategy of the Americans, the pilots of the Ki.45 improvised some night technical interception techniques, coordinating their attacks with the ground searchlights regiments. They also used a B-17 caught in Bandung for nocturnal visual localization practices. Some ‘Hei’ aircraft suffered field transformations for night fighting, fitting them with two Ho-5 guns of 20 mm angled at 35 degrees in Schräge Musik configuration.
The fires lit the undersides of the B-29s making them visible to the pilots of Toryus, Gekkos and Zeros that waited the opportunity of destroying them at a low-altitude firing at their belly from close range. When at the end of May 1945, the Superfortress came to the imperial capital city escorted by numerous Mustangs based on Iwo Jima, the Ki.45 survivors were sent on Tokko missions.
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blackkite
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Hi!
１．The UMBRA MB902 has a large fuel tank installed near the center of gravity between the front and rear engines same as Do335, while the AGO Ao225 does not have a fuel tank between the front and rear engines. Where is the fuel tank of the AGo225 installed? Wing tank only?
２． I feel that the area of the horizontal and vertical stabilizers of AGo225 is unusually large compared to MB902.
3. In AGO Ao225, the propeller is far away from the fuselage, which causes the length of the propeller drive shaft to increase and the weight to increase.
４． MB902 adopts a double propeller to reduce the diameter of the propeller, reduce the resistance, shorten the length of the landing gear, and reduce the weight of the landing gear, but the weight of the propeller increases, and the number of drive shafts and gears increases. I don't know which one is best. MB902 shape did not need reverse rotation engine.
5. My overall impression is that the AGO Ao225 seems to have a redundant design compared to the MB902.
１．The UMBRA MB902 has a large fuel tank installed near the center of gravity between the front and rear engines same as Do335, while the AGO Ao225 does not have a fuel tank between the front and rear engines. Where is the fuel tank of the AGo225 installed? Wing tank only?
２． I feel that the area of the horizontal and vertical stabilizers of AGo225 is unusually large compared to MB902.
3. In AGO Ao225, the propeller is far away from the fuselage, which causes the length of the propeller drive shaft to increase and the weight to increase.
４． MB902 adopts a double propeller to reduce the diameter of the propeller, reduce the resistance, shorten the length of the landing gear, and reduce the weight of the landing gear, but the weight of the propeller increases, and the number of drive shafts and gears increases. I don't know which one is best. MB902 shape did not need reverse rotation engine.
5. My overall impression is that the AGO Ao225 seems to have a redundant design compared to the MB902.
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blackkite
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As early as 1937 the Aerowerke Gustav Otto at Oschersleben participated in the RLM requirement for a heavy Kampfzerstörer with its FP-30 submission. It differed from the other firm’s projects in featuring wing mounted propellers driven remotely from two engines inside the fuselage. Besides AGO, Arado’s entry was the Ar E.561.
The point of origin for this project was the multi seat Ao 192 touring aircraft whose sleek lines a d good flying qualities were among the best of its class.
The two powerful DB601 engines coupled nose to nose and located in the wing root fuselage junction, were arranged to drive three bladed airscrews at the extremities of long, slim nacelles in the wings. In another variant of this design, a 24 cylider DB606 coupled unit was to have provided the power in place of the DB601’s.
A partial full size mock up of the FP-30 (Ao225) was built to study in detail the remote drive installation for various power plants.
Problems experienced with the design of remote drive mechanisms and angular beveled gearing as well as strong vibration tendencies led the AGO designers to consider the use of two separate wing mounted engines.
Because of the complexity of the remote drive system and its difficulty to manufacture, the RLM rejected the proposal on which work was terminated in favor of the Me210 and Ar240.
The RLM number 225 was later reassigned to the Focke Achgelis Fa225 autogyro, and only a few technical details of the Ao225 have survived.
Source : LUFTWAFEE SECRET PROJECTS GROUND ATTACK & SPECIAL PURPOSE AIRCRAFT, Dieter Herwig and Heinz Rode, Midland Publishing.
The point of origin for this project was the multi seat Ao 192 touring aircraft whose sleek lines a d good flying qualities were among the best of its class.
The two powerful DB601 engines coupled nose to nose and located in the wing root fuselage junction, were arranged to drive three bladed airscrews at the extremities of long, slim nacelles in the wings. In another variant of this design, a 24 cylider DB606 coupled unit was to have provided the power in place of the DB601’s.
A partial full size mock up of the FP-30 (Ao225) was built to study in detail the remote drive installation for various power plants.
Problems experienced with the design of remote drive mechanisms and angular beveled gearing as well as strong vibration tendencies led the AGO designers to consider the use of two separate wing mounted engines.
Because of the complexity of the remote drive system and its difficulty to manufacture, the RLM rejected the proposal on which work was terminated in favor of the Me210 and Ar240.
The RLM number 225 was later reassigned to the Focke Achgelis Fa225 autogyro, and only a few technical details of the Ao225 have survived.
Source : LUFTWAFEE SECRET PROJECTS GROUND ATTACK & SPECIAL PURPOSE AIRCRAFT, Dieter Herwig and Heinz Rode, Midland Publishing.
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blackkite
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Hi Arado Ar E.561.
Arado Ar E.561 1937 (Germany). Heavy Fighter (Project).
The Arado E.561 was an unusual heavy fighter project. Although externally it presents itself as a classic twin-engined like all other heavy fighters, its engine arrangement was very unusual. The two engines were placed side-by-side in the fuselage after the cockpit and connected to drive shafts in the wings that drive the propellers. As on the E.500, it had a crew of four, the pilot and co-pilot sitting side by side, and two gunners in the dorsal and ventral position. However, the complicated layout of the engines and transmissions prevented the E.561 from reaching production and it was left only a paper plane.
This design for a heavy fighter originates from 1937/1938. The fuselage was cigar-shaped, with the broad elliptical wings being mounted low on the fuselage. Although it looked as if there were two engines, one on each wing leading edge, this was not the case. A very novel feature for the E.561 was the way the engines worked. The engines were to be mounted in the wing root junction with the fuselage, and the four-bladed, variable-pitch propellers were driven by a shaft. The reason behind this design was that if one engine failed, then the other engine could drive both propellers at half speed. Another advantage was that the aircraft could have a sleeker design with the engines buried in the fusleage-wing junction. Two annular radiators were located on the front of the small propeller nacelles. The tail consisted of a horizontal tailplane, with two small fins and rudders located on the ends. The main landing gear rotated 90 degrees and retracted to the rear, and the tail wheel could be retracted as well. A four man crew was chosen: a pilot and co-pilot sat side-by-side, a rear gunner sat behind them and a final crewman manned the rear gun in the lower rear fuselage. Armament was to consist of four cannon in the fuselage nose, and twin machine guns in the rear of the cockpit canopy and in the lower rear fuselage. The Arado Ar E.561 never progressed past the initial design stage, probably due to the complicated engine and gearing arrangement.
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Arado Ar E.561 1937 (Germany). Heavy Fighter (Project).
The Arado E.561 was an unusual heavy fighter project. Although externally it presents itself as a classic twin-engined like all other heavy fighters, its engine arrangement was very unusual. The two engines were placed side-by-side in the fuselage after the cockpit and connected to drive shafts in the wings that drive the propellers. As on the E.500, it had a crew of four, the pilot and co-pilot sitting side by side, and two gunners in the dorsal and ventral position. However, the complicated layout of the engines and transmissions prevented the E.561 from reaching production and it was left only a paper plane.
This design for a heavy fighter originates from 1937/1938. The fuselage was cigar-shaped, with the broad elliptical wings being mounted low on the fuselage. Although it looked as if there were two engines, one on each wing leading edge, this was not the case. A very novel feature for the E.561 was the way the engines worked. The engines were to be mounted in the wing root junction with the fuselage, and the four-bladed, variable-pitch propellers were driven by a shaft. The reason behind this design was that if one engine failed, then the other engine could drive both propellers at half speed. Another advantage was that the aircraft could have a sleeker design with the engines buried in the fusleage-wing junction. Two annular radiators were located on the front of the small propeller nacelles. The tail consisted of a horizontal tailplane, with two small fins and rudders located on the ends. The main landing gear rotated 90 degrees and retracted to the rear, and the tail wheel could be retracted as well. A four man crew was chosen: a pilot and co-pilot sat side-by-side, a rear gunner sat behind them and a final crewman manned the rear gun in the lower rear fuselage. Armament was to consist of four cannon in the fuselage nose, and twin machine guns in the rear of the cockpit canopy and in the lower rear fuselage. The Arado Ar E.561 never progressed past the initial design stage, probably due to the complicated engine and gearing arrangement.
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ÐÑÐ¾ÐµÐºÑ Arado Ar E.561 бÑл ÑазÑабоÑан в наÑале 1937 года. Ðн должен бÑл ÑÑаÑÑ ÑÑжелÑм иÑÑÑебиÑелем, ÑоÑеÑавÑим в Ñебе вÑÑокие леÑнÑе ÑаÑакÑеÑиÑÑики и знаÑиÑелÑнÑÑ Ð¾Ð³Ð½ÐµÐ²ÑÑ Ð¼Ð¾ÑÑ. ÐаннÑй ÑамолеÑ...
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Arado Ar E.561 1937 (Allemagne). Chasseur lourd (Projet). Le Arado E.561 était un projet de chasseur lourd inhabituel . Bien qu'extérieurement il se présente comme un bimoteur classique comme tous...
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