AMDR ships

[Grey Havoc]

I'm creating this topic to bring together any information that becomes available on AMDR, especially since it increasingly seems that the class that was originally intended to be equiped with the (downgraded, supposely lower cost version) system, the Burke Flight III is a developmental dead end that may not even make it off the drawning board, and a clean sheet design (cruiser? - quite likely to be nuclear powered) will have to be subsituted, assuming of course, that with the failure of Flight III, AMDR doesn't get cancelled like Typhoon was ultimately.


Tuesday, April 5, 2011

Something Isn't Quite Right With AMDR

If you haven't seen it, I encourage you to watch the video of the testimony given by Eric Labs and Ronald O'Rourke in front of the House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. There is an exchange in the middle of the hearing where the DDG-51 Flight IIIs and AMDR is discussed, and once again Ronald O'Rourke discusses the Cobra Judy program. This isn't the first time Ronald O'Rourke has brought up Cobra Judy in testimony, but it is important to note.

Below are the relevant discussion materials from the printed testimony. First Eric Labs of CBO to set the stage.


DDG-51 Flight III. The Navy’s strategy to meet combatant commanders’ demand for the increased capabilities of ballistic missile defense ships—as well as to replace Ticonderoga class cruisers when they retire in the 2020s—is to modify the DDG-51 destroyer substantially, creating a Flight III configuration. That configuration would incorporate the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), now under development, which is larger and more powerful than the radars on earlier DDG-51s. Adding the AMDR would require increasing the amount of power and cooling available on a Flight III ship in order to operate the radar effectively.25 Those changes, and associated increases in the ship’s displacement, would make a DDG-51 Flight III at least $500 million, or about 30 percent, more expensive than a new Flight IIA, by CBO’s estimate.

However, there appears to be some question as to whether the hull of the DDG-51 will be able to accommodate the changes envisioned for Flight III. In particular, if the AMDR proved too large to fit inside the deckhouse (the main superstructure above the hull) of a DDG-51 without raising the ship’s center of gravity and destabilizing it, the Navy would need to lengthen the ship, further increasing its displacement and cost substantially. Overall, the Navy plans to buy 24 DDG-51 Flight III ships between 2016 and 2031. If the Navy does not need to lengthen the DDG-51’s hull, those Flight IIIs will cost an average of $2.4 billion, CBO estimates, compared with the Navy’s estimate of $2.0 billion.
Note, the $2.4 billion is for a DDG-51 Flight III destroyer where the hull is not increased to accommodate the AMDR. The Navy is estimating the cost at $2.0 billion, which I think is an optimistic figure even with a bulk purchase.

Below is the testimony by Ronald O'Rourke of CRS.

DDG-51 Program

Other risks for the DDG-51 program include cost and schedule risks associated with restarting Flight IIA DDG-51 production, technical risks associated with developing the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) and other elements of the combat system for the Flight III DDG-51, and the previously mentioned risk of construction cost growth on Flight III DDG-51s. Some observers are concerned about the Navy’s ability to develop the AMDR on the schedule needed to begin procuring the first Flight III DDG-51 in FY2016 as currently planned. The Navy could manage this risk by deferring the procurement of the first Flight III ship to FY2017 or later, if necessary, and instead continue procuring Flight IIA ships.

An additional question relates to the fleet’s future air and missile defense capability. The version of the AMDR to be carried by the Flight III DDG-51 is to be considerably more capable than the SPY-1 radar carried by the Flight IIA DDG-51, but considerably less capable than the larger version of the AMDR that was to have been carried by the CG(X) cruiser. The Navy canceled the CG(X) program in favor of developing and procuring Flight III DDG-51s reportedly in part on the grounds that the Flight III destroyer would use data from off-board sensors to augment data collected by its AMDR. If those off-board sensors turn out to be less capable than the Navy assumed when it decided to cancel the CG(X) in favor of the Flight II DDG-51, the Navy may need to seek other means for augmenting the data collected by the Flight III DDG-51’s AMDR. One option for doing this would be to build a small number of adjunct radar ships equipped with a very powerful radar. Such a ship could be broadly similar to the Cobra Judy replacement ship. CRS presented the option of building an adjunct radar ship in testimony to this subcommittee in July 2008.

The Navy in FY2012 intends to conduct preliminary design work for the Flight III DDG-51. Since the Navy intends to procure Flight III DDG-51s through FY2031, a potential oversight issue is whether the Navy is designing the Flight III DDG-51 to accommodate an electromagnetic rail gun (particularly in light of that weapon’s newly identified potential for being an air and missile defense weapon) and/or a higher-power (i.e., 200 kW to 300 kW) solid state laser.
It is interesting to me that both Eric Labs and Ronald O'Rourke are expressing concerns regarding the AMDR even while the radar is in the very early stages of program development. Something else is interesting... when the Navy discusses the AMDR, I've noticed the radar is always discussed as part of a sensor system in the context of a network. Now, for the second year in a row, Ronald O'Rourke has raised the issue of Cobra Judy to Congress.

Something isn't quite right here.

As I understand it, the AMDR is still in the requirements development process, so why is there so much concern while the requirements are being developed? I think Eric Labs and Ronald O'Rourke know something the rest of us don't.

When Ronald O'Rourke talks about Cobra Judy, I think it is because he is sending a big warning to Congress that they need to be paying attention. If I was guessing, I think it means he knows that in order for the Navy to fit the AMDR into an unmodified DDG-51 Flight III, the specification that will be stated in the upcoming requirement for the AMDR will be reduced, and because of that there is a capability gap that needs a solution like Cobra Judy.

Go back and listen to any testimony, speech, or public discussion of a Navy official discussing the AMDR and you'll find it is always discussed in the context of a networked platform with the E-2D and other offboard sensors. Navy leaders pick their words carefully, so I think what the Navy is trying to do is settle on a radar that is good, but can only really do the job when it is networked with everything else.

Why? I think the Navy has done a study and realized the DDG-51 can't support the bigger radar needed to do the job without a plug, and based on Eric Labs estimates provided by the Navy - no plug is planned. The DDG-51 without a plug doesn't have the size and it doesn't have the power for the AMDR capability that would be able to independently meet all the requirements alone. I believe Ronald O'Rourke has somehow realized this along the way, and is suggesting to Congress to give serious thought to building a bunch of Cobra Judy type platforms because without those big sea radars (or DDG-1000s that have enough power and space to carry the better radar), the future fleet has a blind spot. Even with the Cobra Judy option though, the reliance on data networking in the future Navy is an obvious single point of failure that our enemies must be salivating at.

Ronald O'Rourke is one of the smartest guys I've ever met when it comes to naval affairs. I refuse to believe that his discussion related to the suggestion for Congress to think about the Cobra Judy is rooted in a parochial issue - rather it is a warning about some legitimate unspoken issue with the AMDR the Navy is thinking about under current plans.

I think this goes back to the decision to truncate the DDG-1000, because the DDG-1000 has both the size and power to take on a bigger AMDR than an unmodified Burke which has very little room for growth left. The Navy must force the AMDR into the Burke hull in order to justify that decision by Admiral Roughead, so a lot of sacrifices will be made along the way to avoid second guessing the truncate decision.

The House and Senate need to pay attention, because rail guns and solid state lasers are coming faster than people think. A Flight III Burke without significant engineering modifications that includes significantly more power or integrated power is going to be a lemon class of capital ships built unable to field the latest technology at the time they are being fielded - much less 20 years later, half way through their expected life.


Posted by Galrahn at 1:00 AM
Labels: AMDR, Force Structure, Navy Tech


http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/04/something-isnt-quite-right-with-amdr.html

 

[Antonio]

"Military" is the right place.

Moved.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Right, sorry about that.

 

[Grey Havoc]

AMDR Competition Heats Up


Apr 14, 2011



By Michael Fabey



Northrop Grumman has proven the increased duration of gallium nitride-based high-power transmit/receive (T/R) modules — a development that could pay dividends in the company’s efforts to secure major military radar-related contracts, including the U.S. Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR).

AMDR is considered the brass ring of U.S. military sensor contracts, a next-generation radar system designed to provide ballistic missile defense, air defense and surface warfare capabilities. AMDR will consist of an S-band radar for ballistic missile defense and air defense, X-band radar for horizon search, and a radar suite controller that controls and integrates the two radars.

The Navy expects AMDR to provide the foundation for a scalable radar architecture to defeat advanced threats, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes in its report on Pentagon acquisition programs released earlier this year.

GAO estimates the cost of the AMDR program at about $15.7 billion — a price tag that has many shaking their heads, including contractors vying for the program. GAO reports $2.3 billion for research and development and another $13.4 billion to buy the radar systems.

The major competitors for AMDR include Lockheed Martin, which developed and deployed the stalwart Aegis defense system; Raytheon, which developed a dual-band radar system for the truncated DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program; and Northrop, also a major radar-program player that reportedly has been looking to leverage the technology honed for active, electronically scanned array (AESA) systems developed for U.S. combat aircraft.

The recent successful tests of the gallium nitride-based high-power T/R modules “prove that the AESA is capable of reliable operation while producing much greater radar sensitivity, at higher efficiency and lower cost,” Northrop says in a statement.

The T/R modules were tested by using high-stressing operational long-pulse waveforms, which operated on the modules nonstop for more than six months in tests conducted by the company’s Advanced Concepts and Technology Div.

The modules operated more than 180 days during continuous high-power testing, essentially proving they can last six months, or 4,000 hr.

“This new level of maturity also supports technology readiness for the next generation of Northrop Grumman’s high-performance, low-cost AESA radars, and opportunities for cost reduction and performance upgrades to our current AESA product line,” says Steve McCoy, vice president of the Advanced Concepts business unit within the company’s Electronic Systems sector.


http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/04/14/02.xml&headline=AMDR

 

[Grey Havoc]

Testing Proves Advanced Technology For AMDR

Apr 22, 2011

By Michael Fabey


WALLOPS ISLAND, Va.—As competition heats up for the U.S. Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) program, the focus will be on developing the S-band digital beamforming technology on a shipboard platform in time for the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer Flight III upgrades planned for later this decade.

Digital beamforming is an approach to phased-array antenna pattern control that provides performance advantages over conventional analog beamforming techniques, including improved operations in environmental clutter, according to Lockheed Martin.

S-band digital beamforming technology was demonstrated last year and earlier this year during testing at the Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea) testing site at Wallops Island on the Virginia Eastern Shore, Navsea and contractor officials have confirmed.

A joint U.S. and U.K. effort spearheaded by Lockheed and BAE Systems demonstrated the S-band digital beamforming for full radar operations in a littoral and maritime environment, tracking targets in both a sea and “land-clutter” environment, Navsea officials say.

The tests were part of the Advanced Radar Technology Integrated System Test-bed (Artist), which uses two advanced, multifunction S-band active phased array radars —one for each nation—“to develop technology and assess techniques for defeating emerging threats, such as smaller, faster targets in dense clutter,” according to Lockheed.

The tests also used reflectors located on Wallops and Department of Interior land north and south of the Navsea island facility, Navsea says.

The testing measured environmental data to provide evaporation ducts information and signal propagation estimates, taking advantage of NASA environmental radars and sensors, as well as Navy sea and wave buoys.

Allan Croly, director of Lockheed Martin’s naval radar programs, says Artist “leverages our combined technology experience and the open architecture inherent in our radar designs to jointly evolve capabilities, avoid duplication of efforts, and reduce cost and risk for future radar development.”

The future of radar development—at least on the U.S. Navy side—resides with AMDR. The AMDR is designed to provide ballistic missile defense, air defense, and surface warfare capabilities. It will consist of an S-band radar for ballistic missile defense and air defense, X-band radar for horizon search, and a radar suite controller that integrates the two radars.

The Navy expects AMDR to provide the foundation for a scalable radar architecture to defeat advanced threats, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes in its recent report on Pentagon acquisition programs released earlier this year.

The GAO estimates the cost of the AMDR program at about $15.7 billion—a price tag that has many shaking their heads, including contractors vying for the program. GAO says it would cost about $2.3 billion for research and development and another $13.4 billion to buy the AMDR radar systems.

The major competitors for AMDR include Lockheed, which developed and deployed the stalwart Aegis defense system; Raytheon, which developed a dual-band radar system for the truncated DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program; and Northrop Grumman, also a major radar-program player that reportedly has been looking to leverage the technology honed for its active, electronically scanned array radar systems aboard many Pentagon aircraft.


http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/04/22/02.xml&headline=Testing

 

[Racer]

First look built in a Burke Flight III:

http://www.raytheon.com/rtnwcm/groups/public/documents/image/rtn11_sas_img4.jpg
http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/technology/rtn11_sastradeshow/navalradar/index.html

 

[Racer]

You can install 4 mighty gasturbines (LM 2500 G4+, or RR MT30), that's enough.

 

[TomS]

AB class already has 4 LM2500 and it is widely accepted that they are not enough.

Right, but the LM2500+G4 is a fairly radical departure: 47,000 shp in basically the same footprint as the current 26,000 shp LM 2500. Fuel consumption would be higher, of course, and the existing drivetrain would never take it, but you'd be redoing that as a GT-electric system anyway.

 

[TomS]

And of course it is really easy to redesign a warships machinery spaces....oh wait...

They're already discussion switching to IPS for Flight III -- that can be done more or less in the footprint of the existing machinery (generators and propulsion motors in place of the reduction gears) though that isn't the best way to do things.

 

[Grey Havoc]

AMDR Opens Up Competition For U.S. Navy Radar

May 19, 2011

By Michael Fabey


Northrop Grumman and Raytheon are embracing the U.S. Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) program as a way to break the Lockheed Martin Aegis system’s lock on naval integrated ship and ballistic missile defense (BMD).

But Lockheed officials point to their more than 40 years of experience developing and deploying Aegis as a reason the company should be favored for AMDR work.

While the recent Aegis Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 12 upgrade with its multimission signal processor has added some limited integrated air and missile defense capability, AMDR is the first Navy radar that will be “purpose-built” for those simultaneous functions, notes Capt. Doug Small, AMDR program official at Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea).

“The AMDR is more sensitive than SPY radar,” Small says. “Ballistic-missile-defense targets drive radar sensitivity. There’s no substitute for having detect-and-track at a long distance.”

But, Small says, “to do simultaneous air defense [with BMD], you have to spend less time doing air defense. It’s a radar resource issue.”

AMDR is solving that issue with digital beamforming, which will allow the radar to form and use a series of beams to locate and track targets. “The ability to create multiple beams digitally means you spend less time doing other certain functions,” Small says.

Lockheed says it demonstrated S-band digital phased-array antenna beamforming during recent trials at the Navsea testing site at Wallops Island, Va., through a joint U.S./U.K. radar effort as part of the Advanced Radar Technology Integrated System Testbed (Artist), which combines advanced, multifunction, S-band, active, phased-array radars (Aerospace DAILY, April 22).

“The technology is matured and ready to enter full engineering development for fielding on the Navy’s Flight III DDG,” says Brad Hicks, Lockheed Martin vice president of naval radar programs.

Leveraging its work and experience with active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars for aircraft, Northrop has its own U.S. digital beamforming program — the U.S. Marine Corps’ Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), which features an 8 X 10.5-ft. panel of several hundred multichannel transmit-receive modules with distributed receivers and exciters for anti-air warfare modes.

“We don’t see another way around this [AMDR] except with an AESA, “ says Arun Palusamy, Northrop’s director of integrated air and missile defense and naval strategy.

Northrop Grumman has an equity stake in an Australian company, CEA Technologies, which is delivering an advanced AESA S-band radar and X-Band illuminators for the Royal Australian Navy’s Anzac-class anti-ship missile defense upgrade program.

Further, the company touts its past shipbuilding participation in the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program, which initially was planned to mate X- and S-band radars in an AMDR-like suite atop a composite deckhouse structure. A similar radar suite is being developed for the CVN-78 Ford-class aircraft carriers.

The DDG-1000 radar suite since has been scaled back, but Navy officials acknowledge that the vessel’s Dual-Band Radar was a stepping-stone to AMDR.

The prime contractor for the DDG-1000 radar system is Raytheon, which also teamed with Northrop on the Cobra Judy Replacement program that marries a shipboard S-band phased array with an X-band dish to collect BMD data.

“AMDR is similar to the work [on] Zumwalt, CVN-78 and Cobra Judy,” says Denis Donohue, Raytheon’s director of above-water sensors.

“The program is very, very important to us,” adds Jim Barry, Raytheon’s technical director for seapower capabilities. “It’s right at our sweet spot.”

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/05/19/02.xml&headline=AMDR

 

[bobbymike]

U.S. Navy's AMDR Program Sets Big Goals

Jun 1, 2011

By Michael Fabey

Northrop Grumman and Raytheon see the U.S. Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) program as a way to break the stranglehold Lockheed Martin’s Aegis system has on naval integrated ship and ballistic missile defense (BMD). But Lockheed Martin believes the five-decade-long Aegis pedigree should make the company the front-runner for AMDR.

AMDR is the brass ring for Navy radar programs. A solid-state radar designed to provide maritime defense for air, ballistic missile and surface warfare, AMDR will consist of S-band radar for BMD and air defense, X‑band radar for horizon search and a system to control and integrate the radars.

The Navy expects AMDR to be the foundation of scalable radar architecture that defeats advanced threats, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes in a report on Pentagon programs released this year. The GAO estimates the cost of the AMDR program at $15.7 billion—about what the Navy now budgets, on average, for annual shipbuilding costs. The GAO states AMDR will cost $2.3 billion for R&D and $13.4 billion for procurement.

The Navy will not release cost estimates, but Capt. Doug Small, program officer for Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea), acknowledges that GAO used information from the Navy AMDR office to develop its estimates. “We’re working hard to balance a tough set of requirements for this radar with its costs,” Small says.

The Navy wants AMDR to be an ultra-sensitive radar system with more power and agility than the SPY radars used in the Aegis system, which are being enhanced for increased BMD. While the recent Aegis ACB 12 upgrade with its multimission signal processor has added limited integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) capability, AMDR is the first Navy IAMD radar purpose-built for those simultaneous functions. “AMDR is more sensitive than SPY radar,” Small says. “BMD targets drive radar sensitivity. There’s no substitute for having detect-and-track [capability] at a long distance.” But he adds, “To do simultaneous air defense [and BMD], you have to spend less time doing air defense. It’s a radar resource issue.”

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/dti/2011/06/01/DT_06_01_2011_p28-323747.xml&headline=U.S.%20Navy%27s%20AMDR%20Program%20Sets%20Big%20Goals

 

[Grey Havoc]

Trouble for DDG-51 Flight III? You can count on it.

 

[Grey Havoc]

U.S. Navy Radar Programs Solidify BMD Commitment


Jun 13, 2011

By Michael Fabey
Washington



Contractors vying for the U.S. Navy’s proposed Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) say they can deliver the system for much less than the government’s cost estimate because of their extensive experience building similar radar programs in recent years.

Such arguments are becoming increasingly important as Washington scrambles to find bill-payers while eyeing expensive defense programs.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates the AMDR would cost $15.7 billion—close to the Navy’s entire annual shipbuilding budget. The service says the estimate is based on data provided by AMDR program officials, but contractors say the GAO calculations rely mostly on historical data on building sophisticated radar systems largely from scratch. That fails to account for technology and production advancements made by other military projects that can be leveraged to develop and deliver AMDR, contractors say.

“Lockheed Martin’s development costs for the AMDR—based on what we understand from the data—is significantly less than the development costs cited by the GAO,” says Brad Hicks, Lockheed’s vice president of naval radar programs.

That Navy AMDR officials did not even flinch at such an estimate indicates their commitment to the program and acceptance of its high cost, as well as the rising importance of ballistic missile defense (BMD) as a Navy mission priority.

AMDR combines an S-band radar for BMD and air defense and an X-band radar for horizon search, with a controller to integrate simultaneous operation of the two. The Navy also is revamping its Aegis radar system to perform BMD missions—while opening up the network to more contractor competition.

The enhanced Aegis system is on its first deployment as part of the U.S.’s European Phased Adaptive Approach for BMD, aboard the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey CG-61 in the Mediterranean.

The Monterey’s commanding officer, Capt. Jim Kilby, says the enhanced BMD upgrades will lead ship and fleet commanders to rethink how they deploy the upgraded ships. “It’s like how the Tomahawk [missile] was when it first rolled out into the fleet,” he says.

The Navy and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plan to nearly double the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships to 41 by the end of 2016. Some Pentagon and Navy officials have started to talk openly about possibly changing the U.S. nuclear posture, cutting back from the traditional nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers and ballistic-missile submarines to a dyad focused on the Navy and MDA efforts.

But developing the BMD focus takes time and money, as the Aegis system has shown. The February 2008 shoot-down of a defunct U.S. space satellite by the USS Lake Erie CG-70 proved the system’s capability, and an MDA test in April demonstrated its “launch-on-remote” system against an intermediate-range warhead separating from its booster missile. But it took nearly three decades for the Navy and industry to bring Aegis-like capability to the fleet.

“Aegis is a very large, integrated and complex system,” says Bill Bray, director of Integrated Combat Systems for the Navy’s Program Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems.

When Aegis baselines were developed in the 1970s, “combat systems were developed for a platform they were landing on and every platform ended up with its own combat system,” Bray says.

Cruisers and destroyers have their own Aegis systems—and certain groups of each ship would get their own baselines, depending on when they were delivered or available for an upgrade. They all have the basic Aegis core, but with different baseline capabilities, integrated systems and system architectures.

This means that when there is a problem, all the baselines have to be addressed; it is not possible to fix just the core software package and redeliver it.

Aegis development cost estimates range from $30 billion to $80 billion, including ship integration, according to some analysts. Even Lockheed Martin says it is not sure, but the latest Aegis system industry standard cost is about $1 billion per ship.

Some critics say an “Aegis Mafia” has started to grow in the Navy, steering the service along any course that benefits the radar system and away from anything that does not. “I don’t buy that ‘Mafia’ reference,” Hicks says. “Yes, we’re the incumbent, but we recognize the importance of the competition and welcome it.”

However, Navsea says it wants to end the “30-year monopolies” of Aegis and some other programs and develop systems that are designed more openly to increase the Navy’s acquisition options.

The Aegis Advanced Capability Build (ACB) upgrades are meant to do just that, starting with ACB 08 in 2008 and continuing next year with ACB 12.

The Navy expects to release a request for proposals by the end of this month for ACB 16, which should open Aegis to a full-fledged competition and move the Navy closer to AMDR development.

Lockheed touts its “Aegis culture” in attempting to capture AMDR work, citing its work on the transmit-receive module packages and digital beam-forming, a key AMDR technology.

The company says it demonstrated AMDR-like beam-forming with the Advanced Radar Technology Integrated System Testbed (Artist), which combines advanced, multifunction S-band active phased-array radars.

Leveraging its work and experience with active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars for aircraft, Northrop Grumman cites its own digital beam-forming project, the U.S. Marine Corps G/ATOR, which features a panel of AESA radars with distributed receiver and exciter modules for anti-air-warfare modes.

“We don’t see another way around this [AMDR] except with an AESA,” says Arun Palusamy, Northrop Grumman’s director of integrated air and missile defense and naval strategy.

Northrop Grumman also points to its participation in the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program, which initially was planned to mate X‑ and S- band radars in an AMDR-like suite, such as the one being developed for the CVN-78 Ford-class aircraft carrier.

Raytheon, the prime contractor for the DDG-1000 radar system, collaborated with Northrop on the Cobra Judy Replacement program that marries shipboard S- and X-band phased arrays to collect BMD data. Raytheon provides the Cobra Judy Replacement S-band system’s back-end signal processing.

“AMDR is similar to the work to Zumwalt, CVN-78 and Cobra Judy,” says Denis Donohue, Raytheon’s director of above-water sensors.

AMDR will be a magnitude better than anything the Navy has fielded or planned, says Capt. Doug Small, Navsea’s AMDR program official.

Already BMD is causing Navy officers to reexamine their missions. “We’re no longer defending just a ship,” Kilby says. “We’re defending cities. We’re defending whole populations.”


http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2011/06/13/AW_06_13_2011_p46-332053.xml&headline=U.S.

 

[Grey Havoc]

DDG-51 Restart Raises Questions

Jul 8, 2011


By Michael Fabey
Washington



As requirements grow for the proposed DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Flight III-class destroyers, so does concern that the U.S. Navy may try to pack too much into the ships and end up with a program that is behind schedule and over budget.

The ship was selected as the fastest and most affordable way to endow the Aegis defense system with enhanced ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. And yet it is the need to field the radar necessary for BMD upgrades that is driving additional requirements for the DDG-51 Flight III.

The radar is the Navy’s proposed Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), which the U.S. Government Accountability Office says will cost the Navy $15.7 billion to develop and procure (DTI June, p. 28). The Navy needs the radar for simultaneous BMD and air defense at a level that is a magnitude better than what it will have with the Aegis upgrades planned through this decade.

The service conducted a hull-radar study that prompted it to reduce procurement of its most advanced destroyer, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class, to three from seven and restart the DDG-51 line. The Flight IIIs will be designed through the middle part of this decade because it is faster and more cost-effective to enhance the Aegis system and put AMDR on those ships than the Zumwalts.

“While our radar-hull study indicated that both DDG-51 and DDG-1000 were able to support our preferred radar systems,” Navy officials told Congress, “leveraging the DDG-51 hull was the most affordable option.” The estimated cost for two new DDG-51s is $3.5 billion, while the current price for each Zumwalt is a bit more than $3 billion.

The study is classified, but a former high-ranking Navy officer familiar with it said, “Some pieces of it got hijacked. People who had an agenda drove the study for a solution.”

Analysts and radar component competitors say the Navy pushed to restart the DDG-51 line because of pressure from Aegis supporters in the service to boost that program. Aegis contractor Lockheed Martin, though, denies that there was undue influence within the Navy. Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes, Aegis warships are “suitable” for BMD because they carry a large arsenal of SM-3 interceptors—destroyers have 90‑96 vertical launch system missile tubes, depending on their flight.

There’s a growing worry, the CRS says, that the Navy will fall short of the number of Aegis-equipped ships it needs, especially for its BMD missions under the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which deploys vessels to European waters to defend allies from ballistic missile attacks.

There is also concern, CRS notes, “that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations could strain the Navy’s ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for non-BMD missions.”

The DDG-51 restart and Flight III procurement are intended to allay those concerns. The Navy’s 30-year fiscal 2011-40 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring 24 Flight III DDG-51s from 2016-31.

“The 51 class is a top-shelf platform relative to other platforms,” says Mike Petters, CEO of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), which builds the ships. “It’s such a good platform, the U.S. Navy decided to go back to it.”

But analysts, industry radar experts and even Navy officials acknowledge the Raytheon dual-band radar being developed for the Zumwalt (and for the Ford-class carrers) would have been tweaked just as easily for BMD. They also say the Zumwalt has other attributes—such as a lightweight composite deckhouse and integrated hybrid-electric propulsion system—that would have compensated for the AMDR’s weight and appetite for power.

AMDR competitor Northrop Grumman is talking about using composites similar to those in the Zumwalt for its DDG-51 Flight III version. The company is teaming up with HII—the former Northrop Grumman shipbuilding unit building the DDG-1000 composite deckhouse as well as the DDG-51—for its AMDR bid.

And there is talk about developing a hybrid drive similar to the Zumwalt’s to provide more power for the AMDR in Flight III.

Analysts and contractors say it’s starting to appear that the Flight IIIs will be heavily modified to accommodate the AMDR. But the Navy’s top shipbuilder executive warns against that course. “Sometimes we get caught up in the glamor of the high technology,” Petters says. “The radars get bounced around. They get changed. Their missions get changed . . . The challenge is if you let the radars drive the ships, you might not get any ships built.”


Article link here

 

[Creative]

Additional images.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Now May Be Time To Weigh Destroyer Options

Aug 30, 2011


By Michael Fabey



With U.S. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus’ recent acknowledgment that the service has a mind to refit its older DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers with hybrid-drive technology as well as design the new Flight III ships with similar propulsions systems, the Navy should take the advice of many defense analysts and do a true analysis of alternatives (AOA) to determine the best course to take for the future fleet.

Analysts have lamented that the Navy has never done a true AOA for destroyers and cruisers to find the best ship fit – upgraded DDG-51s, downgraded DDG-1000 Zumwalts or CG(X), or even something brand new. That criticism came before the Navy talked about retrofitting old Arleigh Burkes and outfitting new ones with costly hybrid drives.

“Although the first Flight III ship would not be procured under Navy plans until [fiscal] 2016, the Navy plans to begin preliminary design work on the Flight III DDG-51 in FY2012,” the Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes in its latest update dated July 27. “An alternative to the Flight III DDG-51 that Congress may wish to consider would be a new-design destroyer that would be more capable in certain respects than the Flight III DDG-51, but more affordable than the CG(X). If development of a new-design destroyer were begun in [fiscal] 2012, the first ship might be ready for procurement as early as [fiscal] 2018.”

The Navy’s proposal to cancel the CG(X) and instead procure Flight III DDG-51s, CRS notes, does leverage “substantial analytical work” from the CG(X) AOA, additional Navy studies that were done to support the 2008-2009 proposal to end DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-51 procurement, and the 2009 Navy destroyer hull/radar study that examined options for improving the air defense and ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 destroyer designs through the installation of an improved radar and combat system modifications.

But the CRS report points out that some destroyer and cruiser program skeptics argue, “The CG(X) AOA focused mainly on examining radar and hull-design options for a cruiser with a large and powerful version of the AMDR (Air and Missile Defense Radar), rather than radar- and hull-design options for a smaller destroyer with a smaller and less powerful version of the AMDR.”

Further, CRS cites skeptics’ concerns that, “The Navy’s 2009 destroyer hull/radar study was focused on answering a somewhat narrowly defined question: what would be the lowest-cost option for improving the AAW [anti-air warfare] and BMD performance of a DDG-51 or DDG-1000 by a certain amount through the installation of an improved radar and an associated modified combat system? An adequate analytical basis for a proposed program change of this magnitude would require an AOA or equivalent study that rigorously examined a broader question: given projected Navy roles and missions, and projected Navy and DOD capabilities to be provided by other programs, what characteristics of all kinds (not just AAW and BMD capability) are needed in surface combatants in coming years, and what is the most cost-effective acquisition strategy to provide such ships?”

These are questions a true AOA would answer.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/08/30/01.xml&headline=Now

 

[Grey Havoc]

GAO Probing U.S. Navy DDG-51 Line Restart

Sep 12, 2011



By Michael Fabey



Congressional investigators at the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) are scrutinizing the U.S. Navy’s decision to restart production of DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, a GAO official confirms.

GAO is trying to determine the underlying basis for the Navy decision to select DDG-51 as the “best hull form to meet future surface combatant requirements” Belva Martin, GAO director of acquisition and sourcing management for a variety of programs, including Navy ships, tells Aviation Week.

GAO’s acknowledgment of the investigation comes in the wake of recent Aviation Week news articles and analysis about the impact of the restart decision and updated Navy plans for the Arleigh Burke and DDG-1000 Zumwalt destroyer—the ship-class type whose fleet was truncated to accommodate the additional DDG-51s (Aerospace DAILY, June 28, Aug. 1).

In the beginning and middle of the previous decade, the Navy had been on course to phase out the Arleigh Burkes and build the Zumwalts. The DDG-1000s were to include a raft of Navy-desired technologies including a hybrid-drive propulsion, a composite deckhouse and a Dual-Band Radar that would be a stepping stone for the service’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The DDG-1000s also were designed to incorporate significantly enhanced coastal firepower, for which the U.S. Marine Corps has been clamoring.

The ship appeared to meet all of the requirements that the Navy had established for a new destroyer going back to the 1990s, and the service planned to buy dozens of the new vessels to replace its aging DDG-51 fleet, based on a design going back to the late 1970s. But as the research and development funding mounted—it would wind up being about half of the ship’s $20 billion total program acquisition bill by this year, according to Navy and government reports—opponents began to question whether all the technology would be worth the price.

Still, the program remained on cost and schedule—until the latter half of the last decade when the Navy brass abruptly changed course, truncating the Zumwalt buy to three ships and restarting Arleigh Burke production with an eye toward a redesigned Flight III DDG-51 to accommodate, among other things, AMDR. Indeed, Navy officials say the main impetus behind the destroyer acquisition change was the growing mission need for AMDR and ballistic missile defense (BMD). Citing a “hull-radar” study, the Navy brass said the Aegis defense system-equipped DDG-51s offered the most affordable and quickest way to get BMD-capable ships into the fleet. Zumwalts, they said, would not be able to accommodate the standard missiles used for BMD.

But Navy and industry sources familiar with the hull-radar study say it was narrowly focused and molded to support a Navy preference for Aegis-equipped Burkes. Further, Navy and industry documents and sources say the launching equipment on the Zumwalts can be tweaked relatively easily to accommodate any standard missile. Further, the Zumwalt was designed to support new technological developments for BMD and other missions, while the older DDG-51 design does not.

Navy officials say they want the DDG-51s to be redesigned for technology improvements, but there are no cost projections. As a production model ship, the Zumwalt now will cost about $3 billion and a Flight III DDG-51 less than two-thirds that amount; but analysts expect the DDG-51 projection to grow significantly, especially with the desired technology accommodations.

GAO’s probe will focus on the cost, schedule and other related issues associated with the restart program, Martin says. The report, expected in January, also will examine the DDG-51’s projected ability to integrate new technology, she says, especially AMDR.

A Navy spokesman declined to comment on any GAO investigation, but said Navy comments would be included in the GAO’s report.



http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/09/12/02.xml&headline=GAO

 

[Grey Havoc]

Not good:

Navy Drops Advanced Radar From Aegis Upgrade

Oct 13, 2011



By Michael Fabey



U.S. budget woes have claimed another victim — the required integration of the U.S. Navy’s proposed Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) with its next planned Aegis combat system upgrade.

The Navy is removing the engineering requirements to include its proposed AMDR as a “price competition line item” in the request for proposals (RFP) for the next round of Aegis capability upgrades, known as Advanced Capabilities Build (ACB) 16.

Instead, the AMDR integration engineering “load” requirement will become a “sample problem,” the Navy says. A sample problem, according to those familiar with the proposal, will carry much less weight in the final award decision than a competition line item requirement.

The move is being made, the Navy says, “to account for a reduction in the capabilities/requirements in ACB 16 to align with the latest set of Navy requirements.”

Those familiar with the program say the Navy needed to make the change to better align ACB 16 with budgets. The service had to reduce the scope of the program to be able to afford it.

Navy officials say they have no further comment on the changes at this time. The service anticipates releasing the new RFP amendment Oct. 21.

Lockheed Martin, which is the legacy Aegis prime contractor and is competing for ACB 16, had no comment. A spokesperson from Raytheon, another competitor, says, “We are aware of pending changes to the Aegis RFP and remain committed to delivering a competitive proposal.”

ACB 16 is the planned set of improvements for the vaunted ship shield that would allow it to incorporate advanced technology. The Navy had earlier decided to skip the planned ACB 12 upgrades to address budgetary concerns and to obtain better equipment and software.

One of the core requirements for ACB 16 was supposed to be the inclusion of the AMDR, the Navy’s proposed futuristic radar system that is meant to seamlessly combine ship defense technology with ballistic missile defense (BMD).

AMDR will cost an estimated $15.7 billion to develop and procure, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. The Navy says it needs the program to defend its ships against the latest maritime threats while performing BMD, which has become a major mission for the service.

Indeed, U.S. Navy BMD is the cornerstone of President Barack Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense in Europe, and the U.S. is taking significant steps to bolster its Aegis-equipped fleet to meet those mission needs.

The Navy is restarting the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer production line to deploy additional Aegis-equipped vessels more quickly and affordably.


Link

 

[Demon Lord Razgriz]

I saw this coming a mile away. : Why simply fix the issues with the Zumwalt when you can cram a Zumwalt into a Burke, and then fix all those problems?

 

[Moose]

I saw this coming a mile away. : Why simply fix the issues with the Zumwalt when you can cram a Zumwalt into a Burke, and then fix all those problems?

Bingo

 

[Grey Havoc]

Via Militaryphotos.net:

U.S. Destroyer Plans In Doubt

Dec 22, 2011



By Michael Fabey mike_fabey@aviationweek.com
WASHINGTON



An exclusive Aviation Week Intelligence Network investigation into the U.S. Navy destroyer fleet and its accompanying combat systems strongly suggests the service will have to upend some $121.8 billion worth of plans for their development, effectively solidifying the grip of incumbent contractors on the work at the very time Navy brass say they’re trying to break such monopolies.

Given rising maintenance costs and the current budget environment, it’s unlikely the Navy will be able to afford newly designed DDG-51s, wholesale new changes to their Aegis systems or the proposed Air and Missile Defense Radar.

The Aviation Week Intelligence Network’s (AWIN) five-part “Come About” series details the Navy’s miscues in building its destroyer fleet and developing an accompanying shipboard combat system. It is the result of a yearlong examination that included scores of interviews with Navy and contractor program officials, defense analysts, subject matter experts, Navy and Pentagon leaders, testing officials and a host of others associated directly or indirectly with the programs. As part of the project, AWIN captured, analyzed and vetted millions of computer records to provide a clearer picture of the funding trends and expectations for these programs.

Even a cursory analysis shows the service could save up to $14.3 billion — according to some government estimates of procurement and life cycle costs — if the service bought DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers in the coming decades instead of newly designed variants of the venerable DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class, although other factors must be taken into account.

Part of the reason for the systems’ potentially high price tag, analysts note, are the starts, stops and sudden shifts in destroyer fleet plans in recent years. Still, such a potential overall cost disparity — revealed for AWIN subscribers in the “Come About” series — is drawing attention and more analysis in some quarters.

Further feeding that need for greater scrutiny are questions surrounding the Navy’s decision in the latter half of the past decade to truncate the Zumwalt fleet to three ships and restart the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke line — concerns that have prompted a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation that is due to deliver a report in January. The DDG-51 restart is needed, the Navy says, to fulfill the service’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) mission obligations, which envision the destroyers equipped with Lockheed Martin’s venerable Aegis Combat System, ready to take down enemy missiles with Raytheon’s Standard Missile-3 interceptor.

Some analysts speculate that the GAO will recommend that the Navy ditch its current plan to buy more Burkes — including redesigned models in years to come — and build more Zumwalts instead because the DDG-1000s will offer greater growth potential for more weapons and lower life cycle costs, which will likely save the Navy more money in the long run.

What is not speculation, though, is that Navy officials have provided contradictory and often misleading public statements about what destroyers they need and why. Neither Burkes nor Zumwalts were designed specifically for BMD, but the Navy brass has contended the DDG-1000s could not accommodate Standard Missiles — a contention that is untrue, according to Navy documents, analysts and industry sources.

Another indisputable fact is that the current fleet of destroyers and their Aegis Combat Systems needed for missile defense are a maintenance mess. It could cost the price of an entire new destroyer or more just to get the vessels and systems shipshape and an additional untold sum of money to keep the Burkes and their radar systems in good working order through the coming decades.

It is this huge repair bill, plus mounting maintenance costs and the budgetary battles being waged on Capitol Hill, that make top naval analysts think it is unlikely the Navy will be able to afford the newly designed Burkes, wholesale new changes to the ships’ Aegis shields or the proposed Air and Missile Defense Radar, the supposed linchpin for future BMD.

Subscribers to AWIN can find links to the entire Come About series, as well as supporting data tables, graphics and links to pertinent sources, by clicking here. [Link at original article]


Article

 

[Grey Havoc]

From Navy Recognition, by way of MilitaryPhotos.net:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmTHjzID6XM&feature=player_embedded

Lockheed Martin has submitted its final proposal to the U.S. Navy to design, build, integrate and test the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) for the future DDG-51 Flight III class destroyer. The scalable AMDR S-band radar and radar suite controller will provide significantly increased sensitivity for simultaneous long-range detection and engagement of advanced anti-ship and ballistic missile threats.

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=537

 

[Triton]

"Radar Blip"
By Michael Fabey Washington
Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology
February 25, 2013

Source:
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_02_25_2013_p10-545494.xml

It is the best of times and the worst of times for the U.S. Navy's air and missile defense radar (AMDR) program.

On the technological and program front, AMDR is in fine shape. The competing contractors tout the capability and affordability of their suites and systems, while the leading platform for the ship—the Flight III Arleigh Burke DDG-51-class destroyer—is proceeding as planned.

But there is the impact of sequestration, now slated to take effect on March 1, under the 2012 U.S. Budget Control Act. In such an austere scenario, the only relief afforded to the Navy and other services would be authority for reprogram funding.

In deciding how to reprogram money, Navy officials will have to decide whether to fund maintenance and support for existing missions or for vital but future service needs such as AMDR or the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). That could be a losing game, officials acknowledge, for assets yet to come. This is especially true as current—and improved—vessel platforms and systems such as the SPY radar-based Aegis system suite are proving capable for ship and ballistic missile defense (BMD).

The choice of which contractor to develop and build AMDR likely will depend on which team offers the best price in meeting the Navy's requirements, according to officials at Northrop Grumman, one of the competitors.

“The requirements are out there,” says Carl Herbermann, Northrop Grumman's director of surface radar development. Instead of trying to increase performance, he says, Northrop can focus on the best cost savings for levels set by the Navy.

Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates say AMDR will cost $2.2 billion for R&D and $13.2 billion for up to 24 radars, although industry sources say it can be done for much less. AMDR is slated to have a 15-dB gain over SPY-1D. Patrick Antkowiak, Northrop Grumman's vice president and general manager for advanced concepts and technologies, declines to say whether the GAO estimates are correct, but acknowledges affordability will be key. Northrop Grumman and competitors Lockheed Martin and Raytheon say the technology has advanced quickly and become more affordable. Navy officials agree

 

[JFC Fuller]

Triton, thanks for posting,

It is worthy of comment that after all the posturing and scheming throughout the 90s and early 2000s we are back to an Arleigh Burke with a improved AC, upgraded generators and new radars.

 

[sferrin]

Triton, thanks for posting,

It is worthy of comment that after all the posturing and scheming throughout the 90s and early 2000s we are back to an Arleigh Burke with a improved AC, upgraded generators and new radars.

And how much wasted money? How much more are these going to cost over the Flight IIAs? Of course the answer is, "far more than the different configuration would merit". Last I heard on of these Flight III Burkes will end up costing almost as much as a Zumwalt. Which begs the question, "how much would a Zumwalt cost if we kept building them?"

 

[Triton]

AMDR reminds me of the late 1960's SABMIS concept:
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,8305.0.html

 

[Triton]

Source:
http://news.usni.org/2013/01/29/opinion-right-destroyer-right-time
http://mostlymissiledefense.com/2013/01/30/navys-next-destroyer-to-increase-radars-capability-in-terms-of-sn-by-a-factor-of-about-thirty-january-30-2013/

 

[Grey Havoc]

NavWeek: Radar Shove (Ares blog)

However, the lower costs carry some caveats. For example, the first radar suites will be cheaper because they won’t have as much capability.

“The X-band portion of AMDR will be comprised of an upgraded version of an existing rotating radar (SPQ-9B), instead of the new design initially planned,” GAO notes. “The new radar will instead be developed as a separate program at a later date and integrated with the 13th AMDR unit.” There are 22 planned AMDRs.

“According to the Navy, the SPQ-9B radar fits better within the Flight-III DDG 51's sea frame and expected power and cooling,” GAO says. “While program officials state that the upgraded SPQ-9B radar will have capabilities equal to the new design for current anti-air warfare threats, it will not perform as well against future threats.”

That last line is no small matter. The Navy has been saying for years that it needs AMDR to address those “future threats” and the service says it needs that radar sooner rather than later. Either those threats are not as big a deal as some have suggested or the nation could be taking an awfully big risk with these early versions of AMDR-Lite.

GAO also notes additional software development will be required to integrate the S-band and SPQ-9B radars – and for other areas, too. “According to program officials, software development for AMDR will require a significant effort,” GAO says. “A series of software builds are expected to deliver approximately 1 million lines of code, with additional testing assets also being developed. Software will be designed to apply open system approaches to commercial, off-the-shelf hardware. Integration with the SPQ-9B radar, and later the AMDR-X radar, will require further software development.”

Okay, so for the lower costs of AMDR-Lite, we also face cost risk associated with more software development. Anything else?

“The Navy plans to install a 14-foot variant of AMDR on Flight III DDG-51s starting in 2019,” GAO says. “According to draft AMDR documents, a 14-foot radar is needed to meet threshold requirements, but an over 20-foot radar is required to fully meet the Navy's desired integrated air and missile defense needs. However, the shipyards and the Navy have determined that a 14-foot active radar is the largest that can be accommodated within the existing DDG-51 deckhouse.”

GAO reports that Navy officials say AMDR is being developed as a scalable design, but a new ship would be required to host a larger version.

So again, to get the AMDR the Navy really wants, the nation has some new designing and building to do. Many defense analysts say the modifications that could be required on the Flight III Burke to accommodate AMDR, other systems or weapon advancements the Navy has been considering for several years could be cost-prohibitive.

 

[Triton]

I presume that the Huntington Ingalls Industries LPD Flight II Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ship proposal would use the new AMDR.

Source:
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,18872.msg184499.html#msg184499

 

[Sea Skimmer]

Most likely, but AMDR-S is still three different projects, only one of which has a partial demonstrator and only then because its using entirely new AESA technology. As of now, any notional company proposal for a BMD ship is only going to be able to design on the basis of weight/power/cooling requirements for desired power-aperture.


The LPD-17 for BMD concept though is rather old, it goes back at least to the early years of the new century and appeared in the analysis of alternatives for CG(X) and other BMD related studies. This was well before AMDR existed at all.

 

[Triton]

Most likely, but AMDR-S is still three different projects, only one of which has a partial demonstrator and only then because its using entirely new AESA technology. As of now, any notional company proposal for a BMD ship is only going to be able to design on the basis of weight/power/cooling requirements for desired power-aperture.


The LPD-17 for BMD concept though is rather old, it goes back at least to the early years of the new century and appeared in the analysis of alternatives for CG(X) and other BMD related studies. This was well before AMDR existed at all.

Though you have to wonder about the timing of the unveiling of the model of the Huntington Ingalls Industries LPD Flight II BMD at the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space Exposition 2013 earlier this month, the video, and HII's marketing push for LPD Flight II. We also know that last year Vice Admiral Tom Copeman, commander of U.S. Surface Forces, sent out a series of memos as part of his “Vision for the 2025 Surface Fleet” in which he advocates cancelling DDG-51 Flight III.

 

[Moose]

This proposal is a bit different from earlier studies to use the LPD-17 hull. Those like CG(X) which intended to produce a large missile defense ship usually assumed a rather dramatic re-design of the deckhouse and machinery spaces compared to the San Antonio class as-built, and some even included nuclear power. Here, HII is trying to sell their LPD-17 Flight II concept by pointing out how they believe the Flight II design could be adapted to other missions the Navy is trying to address.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

My understanding is the original LPD-17 BMD concept was actually two main concepts with subvariants that did as you say, include nuclear power at times. The first main one was sort of like this with large fixed radars covering the entire horizon, and the other main concept would have mounted one or two large steering radars similar to those mounted on USNS Howard O. Lorenzen. The advantage of the later concept would have been considerably greater range and above all discrimination capability for the amount of money the radar cost via fewer but much larger antennas, but of course at the price of only sector scanning. This was attractive in the context of sea based KEI, since the odds of simultaneous threats requiring KEI engagement appearing multiple sectors would be rather low. Such a ship could stand off at very long range, at which point a 90 degree scanning sector becomes enough to cover the width of a nation the size of time.


Around the same time it was also just proposed to build a few more units of what became Howard O. Lorenzen with some level of improved capability but possibly no self defense what so ever in ordered to keep them as cheap as possible. That ship cost about 1.5 billion and an LPD-17 without BMD capability is already around 1.8 billion.

 

[Moose]

Yes the idea returning to large steering radars for a dedicated BMD ship has been kicked around in several forms, you could even call SBX-1 a cousin of that concept, but most SWOs I've met loathe the idea so I don't know how much traction it ever got.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

They might come around when Flight III Burkespam is canceled and any possible deployment of a AMDR hull is then put back to ~2030 by which time a clean sheet destroyer will easily be well over four billion dollars and in direct competition with the SSBN(X) program which remains an enormous black pit of unfunded construction. Our Dutch friends, one of only three fleets in the world with a functional tested ABM capability, made it work just fine with a steering SMART-L radar meanwhile.

 

[Triton]

NavWeek: AMDR -- Pulse Check
Posted by Michael Fabey 2:22 PM on Apr 26, 2013

Source:
http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3ac2cfa34f-aa15-4f07-a14e-aede420f3e0c

For years now, the discussion revolving around the U.S. Navy’s vaunted proposed air-and-missile-defense radar (AMDR) – as it related to the Navy’s even-more vaunted, and proven, Aegis combat system – has been how much better and even different AMDR would be than the existing ship shield.

But now, Navy officials are saying, folks should be looking at that AMDR-Aegis relationship in a whole new light. They are not competing systems at all – AMDR is an evolution of Aegis.

“We’ll be adding a new proven radar to the Aegis combat system,” says Capt. Doug Small, AMDR program manager.

True, the Navy’s Aegis combat system remains the current gold standard for missile defense and the system’s planned improvements will make an even more effective missile shield.

But AMDR’s technology will allow ships to provide greatly improved simultaneous ballistic and air missile defense for only slightly more weight, coolant and power needs, which all translates to less acquisition cost and about the same maintenance costs as existing Aegis systems, Small says.

The three contractor teams vying for AMDR – led by Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon – have all already proven necessary technologies for AMDR, he says.

And AMDR will be able to operate with only a fraction of the resources needed to run all of dual-band radar (DBR) or even existing Aegis SPY radars to conduct similar missions, he says.

As initially proposed, AMDR will consist of an S-band radar for BMD and air defense, an X-band radar for horizon search, and a radar suite controller that controls and integrates the two radars.

But there have been some recent changes to that plan.

“The X-band portion of AMDR will be comprised of an upgraded version of an existing rotating radar (SPQ-9B), instead of the new design initially planned,” GAO notes. “The new radar will instead be developed as a separate program at a later date and integrated with the 13th AMDR unit.”

There are 22 planned AMDRs.

AMDR-S with the SPQ-9Bs – also called “spook nines” – will provide every bit of anti-air Warfare (AAW) coverage and protection that AMDR would have offered with the AMDR X-band radar, despite some analysts’ assertions to the contrary, Small says.

Technology advancements, Small says, have not only made the AMDR just as – or even more – capable as hoped, but at a much more affordable price tag, Small says.

The AMDR’s total price tag will be about $5.8 billion, says a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, compared to the $15.2 billion projected last year.

That kind of cost reduction – coupled with the association with the Aegis mystique – will certainly make AMDR much easier to accept throughout Navy circles, especially the surface-ship crowd.

Going forward, though, the Navy will have to take great pains to ensure the competitiveness of the AMDR program. The service can ill afford to have this effort be seen as just an extension of the “Aegis Mafia,” often seen as a stumbling block to competitiveness.

AMDR cannot be seen as just another baseline improvement for Aegis – and therefore the automatic property of Lockheed, the combat system’s creator and prime contractor throughout the decades.

The Navy has taken great pains thus far to make sure AMDR is a separate competitive effort. It needs to stick to that course.

 

[Moose]

In other words, they're dialing the program back drastically in order to make it work on DDG-51 Flight III. To the point where it's become an overpriced marginal upgrade rather than the generational upgrade it was sold to Congress as.

 

[Triton]

Northrop Grumman promotional video for AMDR:

Published on Apr 11, 2013

Northrop Grumman is leveraging its extensive history of military S-band radar development along with modular, open architecture approach to provide a solution for AMDR that will scale to multiple ship classes and help protect the U.S. Navy fleet for the next forty years.

http://youtu.be/iuuRszQoIdY

 

[bobbymike]

http://defensetech.org/2013/06/11/navy-to-equip-destroyers-with-next-gen-radar/#more-20550

 

[jjnodice]

It was announced on October 10 that Raytheon has won the contract to produce the AMDR radar:

http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20131010-911641.html
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/amdr-competition-the-usas-next-dual-band-radar-05682/

That's a big win for them!