This is also all wound up in wider UK AD strategy, as early as the mid 50s the UK gave up trying to defend the whole of the UK against air attack and soon abandoned even trying to provide defence to populated areas
Wasn't the problem here (or at least one of the major problems) affordability?
- which further eroded the market for British missiles and systems.
Granted, subject to affordability of course - what would you have ditched to pay for a Bloodhound battery or two around every major city? Or are you positing that large-scale adoption at home would automatically translate into sales abroad?
with the decision not to pursue ABM the UK essentially embraced annihilation in case of war.
But IIRC the thinking there was that there was no realistic way to stop all the incoming ICBMs because there wasn't enough fissile material for both the ABM warheads (nuclear was essential, and probably still is) and those for the deterrent; and even a moderate proportion of enemy warheads getting through would be enough to render the British Isles uninhabitable. So you might as well protect the deterrent, if anything, and let the other side know that if it tries any bullshit it's losing several of its major cities.
In any case, the whole point of the nuclear deterrent is that both sides know they face annihilation (or in the case of a USSR vs. UK war with the US inexplicably sitting on the sidelines, too much pain for Krushchev to justify pushing the button).
