Alternative Axis powers militaries by September 1940?

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anetos05

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Make them able to totally defeat Britain, it's empire and the Soviet Union (also China for the Japanese) while keeping the US at bay
 
CV12Hornet said:
I don't see how you could do this without going full Alien Space Bats.
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Its possible without alien space bats, but takes a revitalized timeline as opposed to a single point of divergence, something most people are not willing to realize through research. I would say most people expect one event or one super weapon, one assassination or one decision to change things dramatically, when the reality is that wars are all cause and effect on a grand scale--very rarely can one single thing change the outcome of something so interconnected. To make a realistic timeline, extensive cause and effect needs to be taken into account and factored into what takes place--except we cannot reasonably assume the response or outcome of these changes across the board at all times--and so, comes the guessing game. All we can do is guess based on x, y and z. I started a timeline like this, whereby I started in 1830, in order to realistically and historically alter the playing field of 1913/14. It took reevaluating dozens of treaties, secret treaties, minor wars, international scandals, assassinations, minor political figures, historical coincidences, minor expeditions, land disputes, historical catastrophes, specific autobiographies, etc., and tying them together in different ways, with different outcomes to create the cause and effect necessary to change things within a reasonable time scale. Having to guess within reason how a people, or a ruler, think about a given thing, is the hardest aspect to pick up on.
 
ArmchairSamurai said:
I would say most people expect one event or one super weapon, one assassination or one decision to change things dramatically, when the reality is that wars are all cause and effect on a grand scale--very rarely can one single thing change the outcome of something so interconnected.
Click to expand...

I once read (I think in one of Len Deighton's non-fiction books) that in 1940 and 1941 Britain produced ~100,000 and ~110,000 trucks and Germany produced ~80,000 and ~88,000.

There's your single, war-winning, super-weapon right there!

If Britain built ~100,000 trucks for ~50 divisions then Germany needed to build ~500,000 trucks for ~250 divisions. Even on simple total war potential numbers Germany should have built 40% more trucks than Britain.
 
Rule of cool said:
I once read (I think in one of Len Deighton's non-fiction books) that in 1940 and 1941 Britain produced ~100,000 and ~110,000 trucks and Germany produced ~80,000 and ~88,000.

There's your single, war-winning, super-weapon right there!

If Britain built ~100,000 trucks for ~50 divisions then Germany needed to build ~500,000 trucks for ~250 divisions. Even on simple total war potential numbers Germany should have built 40% more trucks than Britain.
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You are missing the point here. My point is there is a lot more going on in the bigger picture. Sure, a huge number of trucks alone is a big deal... except what would have to change to necessitate that divergence? You cannot just say so-and-so decrees this, or so-and-so buys this, and bam, because if it were that simple, why did that not take place to begin with? Where does the fuel for those trucks come from? The increased raw materials to build them? The factory infrastructure? Then you have to factor in how that would change the dynamics of the war with the addition of that many trucks. Would that mean more tanks are being built? More planes? More weapons? More ships? What difference would that make? If that were the case would any of the battles prior had happened at all, or happened the way they did? In addition, would you need something for those trucks to transport? Weapons? Men? Then factor in what about the enemies' response would be, would they increase production, would they outbuy raw materials available on the world market, would they buy from foreign manufacturers... and on and on ad nauseum.
 
ArmchairSamurai said:
You are missing the point here. My point is there is a lot more going on in the bigger picture. Sure, a huge number of trucks alone is a big deal... except what would have to change to necessitate that divergence? You cannot just say so-and-so decrees this, or so-and-so buys this, and bam, because if it were that simple, why did that not take place to begin with? Where does the fuel for those trucks come from? The increased raw materials to build them? The factory infrastructure? Then you have to factor in how that would change the dynamics of the war with the addition of that many trucks. Would that mean more tanks are being built? More planes? More weapons? More ships? What difference would that make? If that were the case would any of the battles prior had happened at all, or happened the way they did? In addition, would you need something for those trucks to transport? Weapons? Men? Then factor in what about the enemies' response would be, would they increase production, would they outbuy raw materials available on the world market, would they buy from foreign manufacturers... and on and on ad nauseum.
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No, I get it.

I just agree with @CV12Hornet that such broad-based changes, altering millions of decisions by millions of people to 'do better' requires the intervention of the supernatural.

That said, German truck production seems like a pretty hefty low hanging fruit that might have allowed the Germans to get that extra 30km in September 1941.
 
Rule of cool said:
altering millions of decisions by millions of people to 'do better' requires the intervention of the supernatural.
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That is a simple breakdown of what I am getting at. Historical fiction does not have to always be Turtledove and Dick in how they approach such changes i.e. the divine intervention you mention. What I am talking about is actually studying the timeline of events, in this specific case for OP, the interwar period, possibly even further to WW1, or even prior, and really digging. As I said earlier in relation to my own work, reevaluating dozens of treaties, secret treaties, minor wars, international scandals, assassinations, minor political figures, historical coincidences, minor expeditions, land disputes, historical catastrophes, specific autobiographies, etc. The changes do not necessarily need to be broad nor do they have to effect millions of people--they can but do not have to--at the same time multiple things in sequential order, or at random, can effect other things, or each other, to create the cause and effect necessary to achieve said results. Butterfly effect, snowball effect, etc. Its not simple, else we do stray into alien space bats because convenient solutions are preferred to intricate ones. All I am saying is that people expect a+b=c in developing a cause and effect scenario more they do rationalizing the Euler–Maclaurin formula, if that makes sense. I choose the latter.
 
ArmchairSamurai said:
That is a simple breakdown of what I am getting at. Historical fiction does not have to always be Turtledove and Dick in how they approach such changes i.e. the divine intervention you mention. What I am talking about is actually studying the timeline of events, in this specific case for OP, the interwar period, possibly even further to WW1, or even prior, and really digging. As I said earlier in relation to my own work, reevaluating dozens of treaties, secret treaties, minor wars, international scandals, assassinations, minor political figures, historical coincidences, minor expeditions, land disputes, historical catastrophes, specific autobiographies, etc. The changes do not necessarily need to be broad nor do they have to effect millions of people--they can but do not have to--at the same time multiple things in sequential order, or at random, can effect other things, or each other, to create the cause and effect necessary to achieve said results. Butterfly effect, snowball effect, etc. Its not simple, else we do stray into alien space bats because convenient solutions are preferred to intricate ones. All I am saying is that people expect a+b=c in developing a cause and effect scenario more they do rationalizing the Euler–Maclaurin formula, if that makes sense. I choose the latter.
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The vast, interconnected nature of things is why I believe people gravitate to panaceas. Personally, I prefer to identify points in history where the deterministic aspect converge to where things hinge on the decisions of the smallest group of people, this is even better when there is a lot of deterministic weight behind these decisions so a single decision can have an outsized impact. Post Suez Britain has a number of these inflection points, most notably the 1957 Defence White Paper, but there are others in that era.

WW2 does not have these convenient points with regard to industry capacity etc, which is compounded by a zig or zag on the battlefield making little difference as well, the US will always get the A-bomb. In contrast WW1 has numerous situations where a zig or zag might have outsized impacts.
 
Rule of cool said:
The vast, interconnected nature of things is why I believe people gravitate to panaceas.
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I agree wholeheartedly. Understanding something that interconnected is mind boggling; it is the sort of area of expertise that takes years of explicit study and many, many references sources--though even that does not guarantee total coverage. I still do not fully have a grasp on the history of European colonization of Africa as a example. Redrawing the map and thusly everything that happened to make it so, is a lot to unfold. There is so much crisscrossing history to digest--but then compared to WW1, the former is only a lesser aspect of a much wider geopolitical sphere at play. The rabbit hole only deepens.

Rule of cool said:
Personally, I prefer to identify points in history where the deterministic aspect converge to where things hinge on the decisions of the smallest group of people, this is even better when there is a lot of deterministic weight behind these decisions so a single decision can have an outsized impact. Post Suez Britain has a number of these inflection points, most notably the 1957 Defence White Paper, but there are others in that era.
Click to expand...
Very fair assessment.

Rule of cool said:
WW2 does not have these convenient points with regard to industry capacity etc, which is compounded by a zig or zag on the battlefield making little difference as well, the US will always get the A-bomb. In contrast WW1 has numerous situations where a zig or zag might have outsized impacts.
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I partially agree. There are some things that cannot change without a great deal of build up, yes. Perhaps for example the bombing of Pearl Harbor. That had been set in motion for a few decades at the least, if you do not count events prior to WW1. It was inevitable that Japan would wage war against the US. However, that is not say something like Operation Barbarossa being launched on time (without the impromptu invasion of Yugoslavia) is a divergence of equal breadth. Truly though, in regards to industry capability of the Axis powers, I will agree with you there--aside from German synthetic fuel production... I digress, I have long thought about the topic of rebalancing Germany's capacity to make panzers before 1939, as well as Japan's capacity to train pilots on a larger scale, and while I came up with a satisfying answer for both, it was not without its intricate buildup. I think I went back to the early 20s to get my desired results.
 
anetos05 said:
Make them able to totally defeat Britain, it's empire and the Soviet Union (also China for the Japanese) while keeping the US at bay
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May I have some clarification. Do you mean defeat the Allies by September 1940 or all the changes have to be by September 1940?
 
"Will Lemming Number One report to the cliff!"​

Please Note
  1. The following won't win the war for the Axis by themselves. The Allies will still win, but they will pay a higher price for that victory. More people will die. More people will be maimed. More people will have less severe "war wounds" for the rest of their lives. More people will be mentally scarred for life. The financial cost of the war will be greater, therefore bigger national debts when the war ends and more interest to pay on said debt for generations after. And last (but not least) the material destruction done by the war would be even greater, which would cost even more to repair and take even longer to repair.
  2. These are things that the Axis needs to do. They might not have had the time, manufacturing capacity and raw materials to do them, which in turn explains why the Axis didn't do many things that seemed obvious afterwards and some things that seemed obvious at the time and a few things that seemed obvious beforehand.
  3. Even if they had the wherewithal to make the extra/better equipment they might not have had the extra personnel to use it or the fuel to make it move.
  4. I half-agree with with any of you think that I'm using too much hindsight.
Alternative Kriegsmarine
  • Have torpedoes that worked. AFAIK that's a particularly low lying piece of fruit, because it's something that could have been done without: spending money that Germany didn't have, using raw materials that Germany didn't have; using people with the correct skills that Germany didn't have; and making them in factories that Germany didn't have.
    • And while they're at it the relevant parts of the Kriegsmarine has to produce an effective air launched torpedo for the Luftwaffe in adequate numbers. Either by developing one themselves or by buying them from other powers, like Italy, Japan or even Spain who AFAIK were making British air launched torpedoes under licence before the Civil War for their Naval Air Arm's torpedo-bombers.
  • Have more magnetic mines at the start of the war. AFAIK this was due to the Kriegsmarine being told that the war wouldn't break out until at least 1942 rather than a shortage of manufacturing capacity and a lack of raw materials.
    • Which brings me to the next point.
  • The Reichsmarine/Kriegsmarine needs a two-stage expansion plan.
    • Stage One: Build the largest fleet possible between when the Nazis came to power and 1938-39.
      • That means building existing designs, that they know will work, rather than new designs incorporating new technology that may fail.
    • Stage Two: Build the ships required to complete Plan Z between 1938-39 and circa 1945.
      • Now they can build the new designs incorporating (the now perfected) new technology.
    • And have an "Alternative Stage Two" to implement 1938-39 if it looks like war is coming earlier than expected.
    • The above is another way of saying use the time available to build more (and better) ships.
  • Submarines.
    • I might write a separate thread about them, but the short answer, is build as many as you can from the abrogation of the AGNA which was in the Spring of 1939.
  • Aircraft Carriers.
    • I might write a separate message about them, but the short answer is don't built the Graff Zeppelin class for what are scientifically known as "reasons" upon which I may elaborate in the separate message.
    • Instead use the resources to build the capital ships and cruisers that were under construction IOTL at a faster rate.
  • Capital Ships.
    • Build 6 Panzerschiffen 1929-36 instead of 3.
      • Germany had the legal right to do it under the Treaty of Versailles.
      • Germany had the industrial resources to do it.
      • Germany may not have had the money to do it.
      • HMG & HMT wouldn't have built more capital ships or cruisers to counter them even if the RN wanted to.
      • The French Government & MN will want to build more Dunkerques and/or Algeries to counter the 3 extra Panzerschiffen, but a shortage of suitable slipways probably prevents them from doing so.
    • No change to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
    • The Anglo German Naval Agreement gave Germany enough tonnage for the 3 OTL Panzerschiffen, The Twins and 3 Bismarck class battleships.
      • At October 1935 the plan was.
        • Ship "F" to be laid down 01.07.37 for completion 39 months later on 01.10.39.
        • Ship "G" to be laid down 02.11.36 for completion 39 months later on 01.02.40.
        • Ship "H" to be laid down 01.10.37 for completion 40 months later on 01.02.41.
      • In January 1937 the British announced the 3 capital ships that became Duke of York, Anson & Howe which the gave Germany the right to a fourth 35,000 ton battleship.
        • Ship "J" to be laid down 01.05.38 for completion 42 months later on 01.11.41.
      • In the event.
        • Ships "F" and "G" were laid down on schedule, but "F" (Bismarck) completed 50 months later on 28.08.40 and "G" (Tirpitz) completed 52 months later on 25.01.41.
        • A shortage of suitable slipways and tinkering with the designs meant that Ships "H" and "J" weren't laid down until 15.07.39 and 15.08.39 respectively to new designs armed with eight 16in guns and propelled by diesel engines.
        • "H" and "J" were ordered on 14.04.39, four sister ships ("K", "L", "M" & "N") were ordered on 25.05.39 and three battle cruisers ("O", "P" & "Q") were ordered on 08.08.39.
        • According to Whitley the Germans were working hard to make up the lost time.
          • 28,400 tonnes were ordered, delivered or in work on the slips for "H".
          • 18,300 tonnes were ordered, delivered or in work on the slips for "J".
          • 35,375 tonnes were in progress for "L" although she had not been laid down.
        • However, it was to be of no avail because the ships were suspended and then cancelled due to the outbreak of World War II.
      • It's crystal clear with hindsight and was reasonably clear at the time that these ships wouldn't be completed and shouldn't have been ordered in the first place. The resources put into them should have been used to complete the capital ships and cruisers that were already under construction and build more U-Boats.
    • ITTL building the 3 extra Panzerschiffen meant that Germany initially had the right to build two 35,000 ton capital ships in October 1935 instead of three, but due to the provisions of the AGNA and Second LNT the KM would have been aware of the RN's intention to increase its capital ship force from 15 to 20 ships which would have given enough tonnage for six Deutschlands, the Twins and four 35,000 ton capital ships.
      • Therefore and as if by magic, four Bismarck class battleships were laid down according to the schedules of October 1935 and January 1937.
      • Furthermore and as if by more magic, they were all built in the scheduled 39-42 months.
        • Bismarck was able to take part in Operation Weserübung if it still happened.
        • Tirpitz was able to take part in Operation Juno if it still happened.
        • Both ships were able to take part in Operation Berlin if it still happened.
      • Some of the magic was provided by the non-construction of Graff Zeppelin and Aircraft Carrier B ITTL, which provided the slipways and machinery for Ships "H" & "J", along with much of the steel for their hulls.
    • ITTL Germany could have ordered "L" to "N" in May 1939 and "O" to "Q" in August 1939, because (all other things being equal) the AGNA had been abrogated on 28.04.39. However, I think they wouldn't as it should have been clear that a war with France and Great Britain was imminent and that the Reich's shipbuilding resources had to be concentrated on building ships that could be completed in time to serve in said war.
  • Cruisers
    • Overview.
      • The Treaty of Versailles allowed Germany to have eight 6,000 ton cruisers.
      • The ANGA allowed Germany to have 35% of the British Commonwealth's cruiser strength.
        • When the agreement was made the First LNT was in force which allowed the RNs to have 50 cruisers (15 heavy and 35 light) which meant Germany was allowed 17-18 cruisers (5 heavy and 12-13 light).
        • However, the Treaty's tonnage quotas became a dead letter when the Second LNT was signed, which allowed the British to keep some cruisers that should have been scrapped at the end of 1936 and plan for a medium-term increase to 70 cruisers and a long-term increase to 100 cruisers.
        • That in turn allowed Germany to have 24-25 cruisers in the medium-term and 35 cruisers in the long-term.
      • IOTL Germany actually had 7 cruisers (one heavy & 6 light) on 01.09.39 plus another 10 (4 heavy & 6 light) under construction or on order.
      • But the British Commonwealth had 65 cruisers, which if the AGNA had still been in force would have given Germany the right to 23 cruisers.
      • ITTL Germany
    • Heavy Cruisers.
      • The Hipper class was a half-decent design with reliable high-pressure machinery, that didn't need as much maintenance and adequate endurance for ocean raiding.
      • Just as important German industry was able to complete them in the scheduled 3 years after laying down.
        • 06.07.38 instead of 29.04.39 - Admiral Hipper.
        • 15.08.38 instead of 20.09.39 - Blücher.
        • 23.04.39 instead of 01.08.40 - Prinz Eugen.
        • 29.12.39 instead of never - Seydlitz.
        • 02.08.40 instead of never - Lützow.
    • Light Cruisers IOTL.
      • The Germans wanted (AFIAK) to build Emden with eight 150mm guns in four twin turrets, but due to a lack of finance she had to be built to the OTL design. Maybe this was a good thing as the armament may have been too much for the hull and she'd have been as unsuccessful a ship as the succeeding "K" class.
      • The Germans wanted to rebuild the weak hulls of 3 "K" class cruisers, but a lack of resources and the start of World War II meant that only Karlsruhe was rebuilt.
      • The Germans wanted to strengthen the weak hulls of Leipzig and Nürnberg too, but again a lack of resources and the start of World War II meant that neither was rebuilt.
      • The Germans wanted to build Nürnberg to a new design displacing 8,000 tons, but they didn't have enough "men with drawing boards" to do it and design what became the Hipper class. So she had to be built as a repeat of Leipzig.
      • The Germans then spent so much time designing what became the "M" class, that none of the 6 ships ordered were laid down before 01.09.39 and they were all cancelled before any were laid down.
      • According to Whitley "M" was to be laid down on 01.11.39 and completed 30 months later on 01.05.42, which seems to be realistic to me as Nürnberg was built in 24 months.
      • Whitley, says that 11 "M" class were planned, which with the 5 Hipper class and 6 existing light cruisers would have given Germany a total of 24 cruisers which is roughly 35% of the British Commonwealth's medium-term target of 70 cruisers.
    • Light Cruisers ITTL.
      • I want to delay the construction of Emden so she was built as an additional "K" class ship.
      • I want to cheat on the "K" class and build them with 8,000 ton hulls (as proposed for Nürnberg IOTL) which were strong enough and didn't need to be rebuilt.
      • Then I want Leipzig and Nürnberg built to the proposed 8,000 ton design (which wouldn't need to be rebuilt either) and to keep building TTL-Leipzigs at the rate of 4 per year from 1936 so the situation at 01.09.39 was.
        • 16 on order, of which.
        • 15 were laid down 1936-39 at the rate of one every 3 months, of which.
        • 11 were launched, 1937-39 at the rate of one every 3 months, of which.
        • 7 were completed 1938-39 at the rate of one every 3 months.
        • The 16th ship was to be laid down in the last quarter of 1939.
        • The 12th ship was to be launched in the last quarter of 1939.
        • The 8th ship was to be completed in the last quarter of 1939.
        • The 9th to 16th ships were to be completed 1940-41 at the rate of one every 3 months.
      • That would have given the KM a total of 27 cruisers at the end of 1941, consisting of 5 Hipper class, 18 TTL-Leipzig class and 4 TTL-"K" class.
    • The total at 01.09.39 ITTL would have been 16 cruisers, consisting of 3 Hipper class, 9 TTL-Leipzig class and 4 TTL-"K" class, with another 11 (2 Hipper class and 9 TTL-Leipzig class) under construction or on order.
    • The British wouldn't be able to do anything about it because the Germans were only building cruisers in the numbers that the AGNA allowed them to and the British ordered cruisers at the rate of 7 per year from 1936 anyway so it would be difficult to build more. Plus the Germans were doing what the British expected them to do in the first place IOTL.
    • The French wouldn't be able to build more cruisers ITTL even if they wanted too (and they would) because they didn't have the shipbuilding capacity to build the cruisers that they wanted to build IOTL.
  • Z-Boats.
    • Build Z1 to Z22 to the Type 1936 design.
    • Build Z23 onwards to the Type 1936B design.
    • Or put another way.
      • Order Z23 to Z30 as additional Type 1936B instead of Type 1936A.
      • Order Z21 to Z42 as additional Type 1936B instead of Type 1935B
        • Which IOTL were reordered as Type 1936A.
          • Z31 to Z34 were built as Type 1936As.
          • Z35 to Z36 were built as Type 1936Bs.
          • Z37 to Z39 were built as Type 1936As.
            • And.
          • Z40 to Z42 were reordered yet again, this time as Scout Cruisers 1 to 3.
            • But only SP1 was laid down and she was scrapped on the slipway.
    • IOTL 40 Z-Boats were completed out of 56 ordered.
    • ITTL the number completed may be greater than that.
  • T-Boats.
    • Don't build the 10 F-Boats.
      • Build another 12 T-Boats Type 24 instead.
        • Or.
      • Build another 12 T-Boats Type 35 instead.
        • Or.
      • Built another 18 M-Boats instead.
        • IOTL F11 to F17 were cancelled in favour of 12 M-Boats.
      • My first choice is 12 T-Boats Type 24, because it's a proven design, with reliable machinery that can be built quickly.
    • Don't build the 21 T-Boat Type 35 & 37.
      • Build another 21 T-boat Type 24 instead.
        • Or.
      • Build another 21 T-Boats Type 39 instead.
        • Although I think that T1 to T12 would have been Type 39s and T13 to T21 would have been Type 41s.
      • My first choice to build 12 T-Boats Type 39 and 9 T-Boats Type 41.
        • Then all other things being equal.
      • T22 to T36 would have been T-Boats Type 44.
        • And.
      • They may get further with T37 to T51 and T52 to T60 ITTL.
    • They weren't able to get the T-Boats ordered from Dutch yards completed IOTL and they won't be able to get any of them completed ITTL. Again, this is something that's crystal clear with hindsight and was reasonably clear at the time. Therefore, the resources should be put into something else.
  • S-Boats.
    • Build twice as many S-Boats.
    • They're relatively cheap & AFAIK don't compete with anything else for scarce resources.
    • IIRC (from Whitley) the pre-war plan was for 150, which was cut back to 75 for reasons other than the usual shortages of money, shipbuilding capacity & raw materials and to concentrate on U-boat production. IIRC the Admirals thought they didn't need that many.
    • During the war expansion of the S-Boat force was limited by the supply of diesel engines, which Daimler-Benz could not build in the numbers required.
      • The shortage was so bad that the KM couldn't keep all the S-Boats it had operational.
      • Mercedes Benz said the overall volume of pre-war orders was not sufficient to warrant an increase in production capacity and that was the reason why it couldn't meet the increased demand for engines.
    • IOTL building more S-Boats before the war increased the volume of orders to the point where an increase in production capacity was warranted.
  • M-Boats.
    • The short answer is build the Type 43 from the start because it combined the reduced building time of the Type 40 with the heavy armament of the Type 35.
    • A total of 214 M-Boats were completed IOTL. However, more would have been built due to building them to an easier to construct design from the start and earlier standardisation on this versatile design. E.g. more were built instead of the Kriegs U-Jager KUJ1 to KUJ25 and Topedofangbooten TF1 to TF24.
  • Auxiliaries.
    • Build at least 18 Dithmarschen class oilers. However, that may be easier said than done because Germany only built 5 out of 9 planned IOTL and the fifth wasn't completed until March 1943 despite being laid down in February 1937.
Any resemblance to my Kriegsmaine threads on Alternatehisotry.com such as “No Aircraft Carriers and More Battleships for Germany” is intentional.
 
Not that again, the What if NAZI win the War...

Under 1940s situation, the NAZI were unable to win WW2, what happened.
One of biggest issue is lack of Manpower in Wehrmacht, they attack USSR with 3 million men.
Stalin trow everyone to frontline were 2 Russian face one German in 1941
At 1945 for each German soldier came 4 Russian soldier to kill him.

Second issue is Political meddling into War
Hitler Micromanaging the War effort,
Göring was high on Drugs.
Minister of War was the Speer an Architect working for Hitler megalomania buildings !
Himmler was fanatic delusional, but murderous efficient.

Manufacturing
The Third Reich was not effective, inflexible, focus more on quality instead of quantity.
Hitler was stun how much the USA and USSR could produce and trow into Battle.
like the 10000 Panzer vs 35000 T-34 Tank build from Tractor parts or the 49324 M4 Shermans Tanks.
T-34 use Diesel or fuel oil to drive, M4 Sherman used low grade Gasoline
while Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and SS were fighting for last high-octane gasoline reserve in 1944.

Waste of resources
As Soviets came closer to Third Reich and British and USA bomb them into Stone age ( Hitler must declare War to US of A )
Started the Nazi a frantic development for Wunderwaffen in hope to turn the tide.
Allot of that Stuff was Vaporware, others just waste of time like V3-Canon or French V2 bunkers.
build nearly completed then bomb into oblivion.
Thanks to SS, the V2 Rocket production killed more people as it use on battle field,
End 1944 the German industry run out of resources for production.
five months later the remains of Third Reich capitulated to Allies.
 
Michel Van said:
Under 1940s situation, the NAZI were unable to win WW2, what happened.
One of biggest issue is lack of Manpower in Wehrmacht, they attack USSR with 3 million men.
Stalin trow everyone to frontline were 2 Russian face one German in 1941
At 1945 for each German soldier came 4 Russian soldier to kill him.
Click to expand...
True.

Michel Van said:
Second issue is Political meddling into War
Hitler Micromanaging the War effort,
Göring was high on Drugs.
Minister of War was the Speer an Architect working for Hitler megalomania buildings !
Himmler was fanatic delusional, but murderous efficient.
Click to expand...
True, again.

Michel Van said:
Manufacturing
The Third Reich was not effective, inflexible, focus more on quality instead of quantity.
Hitler was stun how much the USA and USSR could produce and trow into Battle.
like the 10000 Panzer vs 35000 T-34 Tank build from Tractor parts or the 49324 M4 Shermans Tanks.
T-34 use Diesel or fuel oil to drive, M4 Sherman used low grade Gasoline
while Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and SS were fighting for last high-octane gasoline reserve in 1944.
Click to expand...
I'd disagree here.
Both M4 and German tanks were using the about same gasoline, up to 80 octanes. SS had no aircraft, so no high-octane gasoline for them either. Luftwaffe was a part of Wehrmacht; aero engines used the high octane fuel.
One does not make tanks from tractor parts.
Mass production requires a lot, besides having factories on the ready. Raw materials - besides the 'normal' stuff, like iron, steel and aluminium, a lot of 'fancy' metals are needed - tungsten, nickel, copper, chrome - and ww2 Germany was flush only in lead. Shortages of these 4 materials were severe already in 1940. Manpower supply (number of men/women + willingness to work) for SU and especially for the USA was better than for the Axis. German agriculture was less efficient than the US agriculture, with small farms and far lower % of mechanization, thus requiring horses and human power - not good when one fights the war out-numbered.
So there are many German factories without the 3rd shift, and a lot of them were operating with just one shift = end result was that production lagged badly behind the theoretical capacity.

Soviets were bank-rolled by the Americans come 1943, and a lot of help came already by late 1941 from the British. That left the Soviet industry to focus on the tip-of-the-spear stuff they were making (tanks, aircraft, artillery), while hi-oct avgas, Spam, boots, trucks, chemicals for explosives, and also the tanks and aircraft were coming from overseas.

Michel Van said:
Waste of resources
As Soviets came closer to Third Reich and British and USA bomb them into Stone age ( Hitler must declare War to US of A )
Started the Nazi a frantic development for Wunderwaffen in hope to turn the tide.
Allot of that Stuff was Vaporware, others just waste of time like V3-Canon or French V2 bunkers.
build nearly completed then bomb into oblivion.
Thanks to SS, the V2 Rocket production killed more people as it use on battle field,
End 1944 the German industry run out of resources for production.
five months later the remains of Third Reich capitulated to Allies.
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Waste of resources probably started out with the decision to make the Autobahn? Curtail that, invest the material, energy and manpower to make syn fuel factories and the effects the lack of natural hydrocarbons is better cushioned.

There is not a lot to do when it is 1943 and Germany fights in the West, South and East. Wunderwaffe projects or no.
 
The only way for Germany to win is to not be Nazi, but then a non-Nazi Germany would not have started the war. So the only way to win is like in "Wargames" is to "not play the game".
 
WW2 is a mixed bag for me, the toys are awesome but strategically it's uninteresting as the Germans had no chance of winning.

In contrast WW1 is endlessly fascinating because the Germans had a good chance of winning. However the toys aren't as interesting, apart from the battleships.
 
Rule of cool said:
WW2 is a mixed bag for me, the toys are awesome but strategically it's uninteresting as the Germans had no chance of winning.

In contrast WW1 is endlessly fascinating because the Germans had a good chance of winning. However the toys aren't as interesting, apart from the battleships.
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I agree to an extent. There were some very interesting concepts, prototypes and pre-production weapons / vehicles for WW1; they saw little to no use, because the war did not go beyond 1918. At the same time WW2 has its interesting points of divergence, and its points of convergence, that can be utilized if one were to look hard enough... whether or not you want to is up to you. I have a hard enough time getting past the lead up to WW1 and the war itself due to the sheer library of information I am digesting. I have not yet invested myself fully into the interwar and WW2 beyond my cursory archival stuff. I guess my point is that the interesting stuff is usually hidden, lost or so obscure that it takes years to find--if you know where to look that is.
 
The big difference between WW1 and WW2 is that WW1 could have been won on the battlefield whereas WW2 couldn't.
 
anetos05 said:
Make them able to totally defeat Britain, it's empire and the Soviet Union (also China for the Japanese) while keeping the US at bay
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Britain was not an island but an empire, although Rommel had occupied Gibraltar and Suez the lines of maritime communication and the Royal Navy would have continued to fight from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Germany did not have the maritime capacity to cover everything, it would only have been able to obtain good results with the Type 21 U boat if the war had started in 1941.
 
Rule of cool said:
The big difference between WW1 and WW2 is that WW1 could have been won on the battlefield whereas WW2 couldn't.
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The main difference is that in WWI young people got themselves killed enthusiastically and in WWII no one wanted to go to the front.
 
Justo Miranda said:
Germany did not have the maritime capacity to cover everything, it would only have been able to obtain good results with the Type 21 U boat if the war had started in 1941.
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Doenitz didn't want to start a war before 1945, not before allowing a force of 300 U-boot to be built.
 
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