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As has been said elsewhere, the Operational Requirements branch was just as subject to personal opinions and analysis just as much as all of the other branches of the Air Ministry, its top brass and the MoS.But they sometimes had a sound grasp, as early as October 1946 one committee mused that improved AA defences might one day force jet-bombers back to low altitudes - and B.35/46 was barely out of the draft stage. It took 17 years before the V-Force moved back down low, but as CNH has reminded us, the Air Ministry never lost sight of low-altitude bombing.I think with hindsight, the Air Ministry was quick to grasp new technology and how it might be used - I might say too quick, being easily seduced by the possibilities of the new. They knew progress in aviation was racing ahead (the B-58 Hustler made its first flight as the Vulcan and Victor entered service) and perhaps worried by the resources the UK had they knew if they didn't aim high that the results might fall consistently short of US and Soviet efforts. It was up to the Ministry of Supply to try and match these cutting edge requirements with what the industry could realistically achieve and here the MoS had the tougher job and its clear this soon led to a breakdown in relations and trust.I have noticed that the finance branch, in particular the F.6 position, were just as tough as the Treasury and demanding the retention of old kit and being just as loath to spend out more on running costs.
As has been said elsewhere, the Operational Requirements branch was just as subject to personal opinions and analysis just as much as all of the other branches of the Air Ministry, its top brass and the MoS.
But they sometimes had a sound grasp, as early as October 1946 one committee mused that improved AA defences might one day force jet-bombers back to low altitudes - and B.35/46 was barely out of the draft stage. It took 17 years before the V-Force moved back down low, but as CNH has reminded us, the Air Ministry never lost sight of low-altitude bombing.
I think with hindsight, the Air Ministry was quick to grasp new technology and how it might be used - I might say too quick, being easily seduced by the possibilities of the new. They knew progress in aviation was racing ahead (the B-58 Hustler made its first flight as the Vulcan and Victor entered service) and perhaps worried by the resources the UK had they knew if they didn't aim high that the results might fall consistently short of US and Soviet efforts. It was up to the Ministry of Supply to try and match these cutting edge requirements with what the industry could realistically achieve and here the MoS had the tougher job and its clear this soon led to a breakdown in relations and trust.
I have noticed that the finance branch, in particular the F.6 position, were just as tough as the Treasury and demanding the retention of old kit and being just as loath to spend out more on running costs.
