‘BLACK SWAN’ Class Sloop-Of-War

Grey Havoc

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Via HP&CA, a new MOD concept for the Royal Navy:

Version: 20120516

Joint Concept Note 1/12: Future 'Black Swan' Class Sloop-of-War: A Group System
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The aim of this Joint Concept Note is to act as a catalyst for a conceptually led change to both the procurement and the employment of future maritime capabilities with investment in systems not platforms.


The future ‘Black Swan’ class sloop-of-war is a manned ship that will act as the core for a group of manned and unmanned platforms which, as an integrated system, will provide the units of power required by those surface assets tasked with the protection of Sea Lines of Communication and sea control. At an acceptable financial cost, operating in groups, the sloops will provide both the quantity of platforms and the quality of systems that will be demanded of the Royal Navy in the future operating environment. In operations other than war, the increased hull numbers will provide the capabilities required to fulfil the maritime security tasks demanded by a maritime nation as well as the global presence required to engage with the international community.



The name of the concept is drawn from the ‘Black Swan’ and modified ‘Black Swan’ class sloop-of-war, which were built during World War II to protect shipping and gain sea control. Like this concept, the key to the tactical proficiency of the sloops was not the single ship but rather the ‘group system’ with capability measured collectively in groups rather than individually in single platforms. The most famous of these being Captain Johnnie Walker’s 2nd Support Group, which - comprising of six ‘Black Swan’ class sloops - was the most successful anti-submarine group of the war.

Detailed specs

Joint Concept Note 1/12


This concept is probably DOA. Someone should have told the MOD that Transformation and the like is dead and buried. 'Systems not platforms' is what brought about such disasters as the LCS.
 
Please notice NO chef ! The 8 man crew will live on pot noodles and micro waved meals ! Wonderful recruiting material
 
The 8 man crew will live on pot noodles and micro waved meals ! Wonderful recruiting material
Well, as that's the staple diet of 50% of the UK's male population, I don't think there's any problem........ :p


cheers,
Robin.
 
There are rumblings suggesting that this concept could be revived. Oh dear.
 
The problem is not with the concept but with the execution, i.e. whether the investment is sufficient to deliver the required capability.

What tends to happen with any acquisition is treasury (or it equivalent), as well as other areas of government both political and bureaucratic, see defence spending at best as an insurance policy and / or an arm of foreign affairs, and occasionally in certain times as a vote winner, most of the time it is seen as an unnecessary burden on a nations finances. So when you are talking big ticket items it is all or nothing, when you can break the big ticket items down into smaller packets delivering the same overall capability but usually at greater overall cost, it provides the politicians and bureaucrats the opportunity to chip away at capability progressively (somewhat stealthily) in a way that is impossible with big ticket items.

The thinking tends to follow the pattern of :
  1. We need to have two groups (carriers/cruisers/destroyers/frigates) on station.
  2. To achieve this we need sufficient platforms, to provide one group at each of the two stations, ideally two on station, two in port ready to relieve those on station and two in refit or reserve.
  3. We can get away with one groups worth of ships in refit or reserve instead of two, i.e. 2:2:1 instead of 2:2:2 ratio of station:port:refit/reserve.
  4. One station can make do with less capable ships due to a lower threat level, i.e. an escort cruiser instead of a carrier.
  5. Three carriers is more than required to support one station but two leaves insufficient redundancy.
  6. A pair of escort cruisers equipped with STO/VL aircraft can replace the mission critical capabilities of a carrier.
  7. Cruiser/destroyers can replace the capability currently provided by cruisers and destroyers operating together.
  8. Cruiser/destroyers are built to destroyer standards, therefore a destroyer can substitute for a cruiser destroyer within the group.
  9. Each helicopter with a dunking sonar can substitute for a frigate in the group screen, such helicopters are carried in sufficient numbers by the escort cruiser to permit two to three frigates to be deleted from the group.
  10. Deploying large ASW helos on frigates increases flexibility.
  11. With helos on frigates, only one, instead of two escort cruisers are required per group.
  12. A lone escort cruiser is not large enough to operate a useful number of Harriers and the required number of helicopters to support the screen, therefore there is no point operating harriers at all.
  13. Destroyers provide an area air defence and C3I capability, and frigates operate helicopters, therefore the Escort cruiser is more of a liability than an asset.
  14. Without the escort cruiser there is no vital asset to defend against air attack, therefore the self defence capability of the frigates is sufficient and destroyers are no longer required.
  15. Due to the capability provided by modern frigates and their helicopters, and the fact there is no screen as such any more, a pair of frigates will suffice for each station.
  16. There is no need for both frigates to be specialist ASW vessels, one can be GP.
  17. The GP frigate does not need a large ASW helicopter, a smaller one (that can carry torpedos) will suffice
  18. Without the requirement for silencing and operating a large ASW helo, the GP frigate does not need to be as large and capable so can be smaller and cheaper.
  19. The larger ASW frigate is overkill for the lower threat station, therefore can be replaced by the smaller cheaper GP frigate.
  20. Two GP frigates are overkill for the lower threat station so one can be replaced by an OPV.
  21. Having three type of ships is uneconomical and the GP frigate can do most of what the ASW frigate can do.
  22. Having two ships on each station is overkill.

Original requirement, one carrier, an escort cruiser, a cruiser, two to four destroyers and four or more frigates per station, with sufficient ships to provide for relief groups for each station and to cover extended maintenance periods. Final requirement, minimum two GP frigates and two OPVs, with an additional example of each when possible.

Reframe this as the complete fiction that you can buy 40 destroyers (or 1000 bombers) for the price of one battleship, completely ignoring the different capabilities and its even worse. Ignore the irreplaceable capability of the larger platforms and concentrate on the numbers that can be bought of the smaller platform, then once the larger platform is no more, cut numbers of the smaller to the same or even fewer than the original large.
 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Future Black-Swan Class-sloop-of-war would not make much sense, as the Royal Navy is funding the construction of the Type 26, 31 and 32 frigates and Type 83 destroyer, meaning that if they were to fund this, it would eat away at the others' budgets. Apart from that, it would would add another ship that would have different parts and would require different training programs. Finally, the River-class patrol vessels sort of fill the niche of the flexible ship for lesser duties, along with the Type 31 for more important jobs. If anything, the UK would need a corvette, and even that is mostly surplus to requirements.

That being said, it can be said that this is influenced, in one way or another, the Type 31 itself.
 
Interesting article on CimSec, https://cimsec.org/black-swan-option-navys-future-surface-combatant/.

I hope they forgot to check because this seems unlikely. "The Black Swan was planned to be crewed by eight sailors, leaving room for 32-60 embarked personnel depending on configuration".

Quoted as being 3,150 tons it certainly sounds optimistic.

I know.
 
Interesting article on CimSec, https://cimsec.org/black-swan-option-navys-future-surface-combatant/.

I hope they forgot to check because this seems unlikely. "The Black Swan was planned to be crewed by eight sailors, leaving room for 32-60 embarked personnel depending on configuration".

Quoted as being 3,150 tons it certainly sounds optimistic.

I know.

Those were the numbers in the MoD document -- 8 core crew, up to 32 "mission planners" running the embarked unmanned assets. The report talks about 40 for most missions, down to 16 for minehunting.
 
Thanks mate but. for that size ship? Watches etc? Systems? Seems to be very short handed but I'm not from the navy.
 
Thanks mate but. for that size ship? Watches etc? Systems? Seems to be very short handed but I'm not from the navy.
An ETV (emergency tow vessel) of 2,000GT has a crew of 8 and 3,300GT ETVs have a crew of only 12. For simple navigation, a crew of 8 would have been sufficient for the RN’s Black Swan concept. I always thought that the concept looked like an ETV, anyway, despite no mention being made of “bollard pull.“
 
How can any vessel in the region of 3,000 tons have a crew of '8'. No way Jose. ANY vessel in the military will need much more than that just to run the ship with watches let alone systems and weapons. I have not seen any suggestion the future Black Swan class was to be for towing only.
 
How can any vessel in the region of 3,000 tons have a crew of '8'. No way Jose. ANY vessel in the military will need much more than that just to run the ship with watches let alone systems and weapons. I have not seen any suggestion the future Black Swan class was to be for towing only.

Smaller ETVs run on a crew of 8, larger ones seem to aim for twelve.

In theory, the idea behind the new Black Swan was that the core crew of 8 would just run the ship (something like OIC, three bridge crew, three engineers, and a rover). All weapons or unmanned vehicle operations would be done by the 30+ supplemental crew that come with those systems. It's LCS-ultralite.

Now, even just 8 for the ship is probably not enough if you plan to be at sea for weeks or months at a time (which ships like those ETVs do not do). And we've seen how hard it is to integrate "core crew" with "mission crew" on the fly.
 
Which is what I was on about. As you said tho', there are some very optimistic folk out there willing to actually put their ideas into reality. Experience in tanks for my part, leads me to the opposite view. When you really need a crew of 8 to run the thing, one goes down with Covid or whatever. No doubt they can call out a doctor to fix them........
 
Its not actually a dumb idea it you think of them as a new age APD or assault transport, or the other specialist derivatives of the USN WWII DEs. Also look at them as more alternatives to LCIs/LCMs, fast MCMs etc.

There was a USNI article a while back suggesting a small corvette using marinised combat aircraft systems could have significant combat capability at comparatively low cost, with a low crewing requirement.

A base design with a five or more person engineering function, and another five or more seaman function, including navigation sensors and basic weapons systems is in the realms of what is currently seen on patrol boats. A 25 or 30mm Typhoon could easily be replaced with a 40 or 57mm system providing greater lethality and potentially CIWS functionality.

The specialist crew and the systems they are responsible for wouldn't simply be dropped in, they would be fitted usually during an availability and the additional crew would train and work up with the existing crew. Again this is like patrol boats (in the RAN at least) as the boarding parties and RHIBs they use are additions to the crews, not an integral part of the base crew, i.e. PBs in northern waters have them, those in eastern waters often don't, boats in northern waters, during peak activities often embark additional personnel from army and even airforce for security, medical etc.

Steel is cheap and air is free, take your patrol boat crews, your MCM crews, your LCM/LCH crews, and put them in 3000t plus sloops capable of fulfilling the specialist roles when fitted to do so.
 
8 does seem a tad too few.
12 might be a more practical number and allows for
4 per 8 hour watch
3 per 6 hour watch
2 per 4 hour watch.

The latter being a reasonable period to sustain sifficient concentration to avoid hazards, communication engagement and monitoring of displays. Safe in the knowledge you have 6 other people awake if needed and only 4 asleep.
 
Looking over the postwar history of the RN it has battled against crew and budget shortages to get as many hulls in the water as possible.
This seems reasonable as a ship cannot be in more than one place at a time.
Unfortunately this need for as many hulls with as few crews and cost as possible feeds through into poorly armed ships that either perform too many roles badly or one role at too high a cost.
Weapons and sensors eat up budgets and require better skilled crews so each new development makes the hulls vs crew/cost balance worse.
It is no accident that the RN now has only 6 specialised air defence ships against double that or more in the 70s/80s.
A similar situation applies to other units
Not that the UK is alone in this. No replacements are in sight for the US Tico cruisers other than more Arleigh Burkes. The Burkes replaced Leahy, Belknap, Coontz and Adams class ships at the end of the Cold War. One can only wonder what type of Eurofrigate ship might end up replacing the Burkes?
 
How can any vessel in the region of 3,000 tons have a crew of '8'. No way Jose. ANY vessel in the military will need much more than that just to run the ship with watches let alone systems and weapons. I have not seen any suggestion the future Black Swan class was to be for towing only.

Smaller ETVs run on a crew of 8, larger ones seem to aim for twelve.

In theory, the idea behind the new Black Swan was that the core crew of 8 would just run the ship (something like OIC, three bridge crew, three engineers, and a rover). All weapons or unmanned vehicle operations would be done by the 30+ supplemental crew that come with those systems. It's LCS-ultralite.

Now, even just 8 for the ship is probably not enough if you plan to be at sea for weeks or months at a time (which ships like those ETVs do not do). And we've seen how hard it is to integrate "core crew" with "mission crew" on the fly.
Yup, the idea was for a very basic ship, with incredibly lean crewing, based on the most optimistic interpretation of merchant marine practice. I think you'd probably have been looking at CO, maybe a Chief Engineer, and two watches. Ideally, each watch would probably have a combined engineer/warfare officer role, and two multipurpose ratings. Such a thing would give the RN's branch system kittens, which was the entire point.

Black Swan was really intended to get people thinking about lean crews and about the relationship between 'platform' and 'system', not necessarily 'we should cancel the frigates and buy this now'.
 
.

I'm all for "lean manning" (or whatever it is now called), however ;

1: Who does the quality catering ? Or is the ship to be on "short" patrols with Marks & Sparks microwaveable meals ?

2: Training ? Are all positions going to be fully trained up on shore ( HA ! )

3: Who is the "captain" going to be ? The vessel's ship handler, or the commander of the specialist mission commander ?

This rather reminds me of RFA's with special detachments on them.

.
 
1: Who does the quality catering ? Or is the ship to be on "short" patrols with Marks & Sparks microwaveable meals ?
Microwave meals were exactly what was proposed.
2: Training ? Are all positions going to be fully trained up on shore ( HA ! )
I believe that was the intention - good luck, I say! Of course, you could embark a training mission package.....
3: Who is the "captain" going to be ? The vessel's ship handler, or the commander of the specialist mission commander ?
The whole thing gives the impression of the ship handlers being 'demoted' to taxi drivers by the combat systems lot.
 
The whole thing gives the impression of the ship handlers being 'demoted' to taxi drivers by the combat systems lot.
Isn't this the reality of any ship that is only a platform for a mission? Not that the "next after God" guys are likely to ack it, but...
 
The whole thing gives the impression of the ship handlers being 'demoted' to taxi drivers by the combat systems lot.
Isn't this the reality of any ship that is only a platform for a mission? Not that the "next after God" guys are likely to ack it, but...
There is a reason why the RN doesn't have Deck Officers, but Warfare Officers. On a normal ship, they run navigation and combat systems, though, so they don't have to decide which one is more important.
 
If the UK built this, they'd learn like the US did with the LCS that civilian lean manning doesn't work with military sensors and equipment loads. IIRC they doubled the crew on LCS from what they'd originally planned.

8-12 crew is enough to have your engineers and bridge crew in 3 sections. Where are your lookouts and your radar watches? Got any sonar system?
 
Looking over the postwar history of the RN it has battled against crew and budget shortages to get as many hulls in the water as possible.
This seems reasonable as a ship cannot be in more than one place at a time.
Unfortunately this need for as many hulls with as few crews and cost as possible feeds through into poorly armed ships that either perform too many roles badly or one role at too high a cost.
Weapons and sensors eat up budgets and require better skilled crews so each new development makes the hulls vs crew/cost balance worse.
It is no accident that the RN now has only 6 specialised air defence ships against double that or more in the 70s/80s.
A similar situation applies to other units
Not that the UK is alone in this. No replacements are in sight for the US Tico cruisers other than more Arleigh Burkes. The Burkes replaced Leahy, Belknap, Coontz and Adams class ships at the end of the Cold War. One can only wonder what type of Eurofrigate ship might end up replacing the Burkes?
Obviously modern systems are more expensive, but does the cost of training really go up? My grandfather who flew lightnings said that it was a remarkably complicated machine to operate and that modern aircraft tend to be simpler, which is of course because of their technological advantage.

And regarding modern systems being more expensive; why is that? If you look at a given radar system, the computers inside of it will probably be relatively cheaper for their computing power than the ones from radars 50 years ago. Why are modern systems always so expensive? Is it simply my own idiocy or is it the usual kickbacks?
 
Looking over the postwar history of the RN it has battled against crew and budget shortages to get as many hulls in the water as possible.
This seems reasonable as a ship cannot be in more than one place at a time.
Unfortunately this need for as many hulls with as few crews and cost as possible feeds through into poorly armed ships that either perform too many roles badly or one role at too high a cost.
Weapons and sensors eat up budgets and require better skilled crews so each new development makes the hulls vs crew/cost balance worse.
It is no accident that the RN now has only 6 specialised air defence ships against double that or more in the 70s/80s.
A similar situation applies to other units
Not that the UK is alone in this. No replacements are in sight for the US Tico cruisers other than more Arleigh Burkes. The Burkes replaced Leahy, Belknap, Coontz and Adams class ships at the end of the Cold War. One can only wonder what type of Eurofrigate ship might end up replacing the Burkes?
Obviously modern systems are more expensive, but does the cost of training really go up? My grandfather who flew lightnings said that it was a remarkably complicated machine to operate and that modern aircraft tend to be simpler, which is of course because of their technological advantage.

And regarding modern systems being more expensive; why is that? If you look at a given radar system, the computers inside of it will probably be relatively cheaper for their computing power than the ones from radars 50 years ago. Why are modern systems always so expensive? Is it simply my own idiocy or is it the usual kickbacks?
Integration of all the bits. One item is easy to get working. Two items will take FOUR TIMES the time to integrate. Three items will take NINE TIMES as long.

Goes up by the square of the number of items to integrate.
 
8-12 crew is enough to have your engineers and bridge crew in 3 sections. Where are your lookouts and your radar watches? Got any sonar system?
Two watches, not three. RN practice normally only has three people on the bridge - OOW, helm, and lookout. Add an engineering rating to each watch, a CO, and a Chief Engineer, and you're at ten to drive the ship. Radars, sonars, and the likes would be crewed by the naval party (IIRC up to 40 or 50 personnel) that comes with the mission systems.

I'm not saying it was a good idea, but that's what the thinking was.
 
Two watches, not three.
6 on, 6 off? (or 4-4)

Nah, mate, pull the other one, it's got bells on.

Port and sleepless watchstanding SUCKS, and is a great way to have accidents because the crew is exhausted.


RN practice normally only has three people on the bridge - OOW, helm, and lookout. Add an engineering rating to each watch, a CO, and a Chief Engineer, and you're at ten to drive the ship. Radars, sonars, and the likes would be crewed by the naval party (IIRC up to 40 or 50 personnel) that comes with the mission systems.

I'm not saying it was a good idea, but that's what the thinking was.
Makes me wonder how long the person who suggested it had ever spent on port-and-starboard watches... You're basically useless after a week.
 
Makes me wonder how long the person who suggested it had ever spent on port-and-starboard watches... You're basically useless after a week.

Blue/Gold* was an interesting alternative -- basically 12 on, 12 off, but only about half of those 12 were active watchstanding. Of course, this depends on having an adequately large crew to fill at least two full Condition III watches, so you only have to wake the off shift for General Quarters.


* Different from the SSBN alternating crew scheme.
 
Makes me wonder how long the person who suggested it had ever spent on port-and-starboard watches... You're basically useless after a week.
Probably someone who'd looked at how many short-sea merchant ships operate with a crew of four, and hadn't quite realised that those ships (a) very rarely get shot at, and (b) have shockingly high accident rates due to the crew not getting enough rest.
 
Blue/Gold* was an interesting alternative -- basically 12 on, 12 off, but only about half of those 12 were active watchstanding. Of course, this depends on having an adequately large crew to fill at least two full Condition III watches, so you only have to wake the off shift for General Quarters.


* Different from the SSBN alternating crew scheme.
That does seem to require breaking skimmers of the habit of "if the sun is up, so are you" BS that leaves the usual night workers racked out for stupid reasons in the middle of their sleep time. IIRC the pet peeve was Man Overboard drills at 9am or so. After the 3rd bunch of chemlights went overboard at 0300 the message was received that the drill team was screwing their night workers.
 

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