Planned UK carrier order of battle 1975

[uk 75]

I know this is a well covered subject but I was wondering if there is anywhere an RN document from 1965 or 1966 showing what its planned 1975 or so carrier fleet was supposed to look like.

Based on what has been posted here already here is a stab at what I think was intended

Fleet Carriers

1 CVA 01 type (Queen Elizabeth)

1 Audacious type (Eagle)

The air groups for the above would have resembled that actually deployed in Ark Royal in 1975
(1sqn Phantom 1 Sqn Buccaneer, Gannet AEW/COD , Sea King ASW Wessex SAR)

Hermes as also planned to continue in service. As far as I can find it was only planned to operate 1 or 2 squadrons of Bucaneers from this ship, with supporting helos. I suppose the squadrons would come from the Eagle/QE who would then operate 2 Phantom squadrons. Presumably Hermes was not expected to operate on its own.

Had AFVG or an equivalent been developed for service from 1980 or so, Hermes could have operated into the 80s as a mixed carrier again, with QE. Eagle would leave service as soon as CVA02 (Duke of Edinburgh) entered service in 1980-2

The Commando Ship and Helicopter cruiser force was presumably planned to be Bulwark/Albion and the three Tiger class. Replacement ships were being developed to be ordered once CVA 01 was out of the way and before CVA 02 main costs.

I assume this is what the 1965 plans envisaged. It is not hard to see why it was too much for a strapped British budget.

 

[Thorvic]

I know what you mean, we know upto 1966 there was a plan for a consolidated RN Fleet Carrier structure centered around the CVA-01 class and the Phantom/Buccaneer airgroup with P139 to replace the Gannet and AFVG or similar to eventually replace both the Phantom and Buccaneer (Both being 50s designs, large, heavy carrier aircraft with dated systems, where 60s technological leaps would have allowed for smarter smaller aircraft with better performance). However attention appears to focus on the cancellation and the rapid draw down and culling of the carrier fleet rather than what was actually envisaged.

We know in the PRO there are detailed plans for how the TSR2 was to be used, it would be nice to know what the RN's was for its fleet and its air arm before the butchery happened.

I was trying to get a grasp from the RN Phantom requirement and it appears that CVA-01 would replace Victorious which would run on till her replacement was ready, Hermes would operate as a Commando Carrier, Eagle would be Phantomised and Ark Royal would be brought up to Eagles standards and one of those would be replaced by CVA-02, by which time they would have either consolidated the force down to two modern carriers or gone for a Third CVA-01 class or something different to replace the last of the wartime carriers ( i suspect they would have settled on 2 at that point.

 

[uk 75]

Geoff

I think by cancellation the plan had whittled down to CVA 01 replacing Victorious and Ark Royal with Eagle being kept on as a Phantom carrier. This would have made sense I think as she was in better nick than Ark. Ark would have then been used for spares as Eagle was in real life.

By 1966 CVA 02 seems to have been kicked into the long grass rather like the Escort Cruiser new builds were in 1962.

Hermes, much derided by the RAF and Denis Healey, seems to have only been expected to serve as a strike carrier with Buccaneers (perhaps also as an emergency divert for Phantoms).

AFVG was at this stage unformed and rather like the 1962 Striker/Fighter is left until the Bucs and Phantoms have to go in the 70s.

The Ark and Hermes refits do not seem to have been planned until after CVA 01 is cancelled, but this is unclear in published sources.

A whole other area in 1965-6 is the search for a cheaper alternative to CVA 01 ranging from US carriers to a new build Hermes or Foch style ship. However, there is little published material on this and it does not seem to have gone very far.

We badly need a new Friedman book on British carriers

 

[Thorvic]

Well the Phanton FG1 requirement was dropped from 200 to 143 aircraft, when CVA-01 was cancelled in Feb 1966 the Phanton order dropped to 55 which was deemed sufficient for two carriers and one training establishment. So that indicates more than 3 carrier Airwings were still planned including no doubt a HQ flight at Yeovilton in addition to the Training unit.

It's a grey area and one we could do with a definative answer on.

I doubt we'll get a new Freidman on British Carrier Aviation as Seaforth have David Hobbs doing British Aircraft Carriers in the range that includes Freidmans recent RN books and the re-issued Battleships books.

 

[JFC Fuller]

After the 1963 carrier contraction (which occurred at a full cabinet session), both Ark Royal and Victorious were to be replaced by CVA-01 so no phantomisation was planned for that ship prior to the CVA-01 cancellation. After 1965 it was planned to Phantomise both ships to sustain the carrier force to the mid-70s but this was cancelled in 1968 when the abandonment of the carrier fleet was brought forward. Eagle had not yet begun a her modernisation so was decommissioned and in the end the Navy traded HMS Lion to keep the Phantomised Ark Royal going until the Invincible class arrived.

There were never any more than three air groups after the 1957 review, squadrons is a different matter though. That was deemed sufficient to support four active fleet carriers (the Navy had to fight for number four) with a fifth carrier in the reserve fleet. The carrier fleet shrunk first in 1963 then again in 1966 (with planned withdrawal in the mid 70s) and was finally culled in 1968 only for Ark Royal to be kept in lieu of HMS Lion until Invincible arrived.

Original (1957) planning was for the EoS carrier to have two strike squadrons, two fighter squadrons and an ASW squadron. The two WoS carriers would each have one squadron of fighters, one strike squadron and three ASW squadrons totalling:

ASW Squadrons: 7
Fighter Squadrons: 4
Strike Squadrons: 4

We know this because the plan was so unaffordable that as early as 1959 providing sufficient Buccaneers for this scheme was so challenging that the Admiralty was asking the cabinet defence committee to defer the decision for a year and to agree to reduce the front line Sea Vixen force to 38 aircraft from a planned 42.

Another curious point: As the carrier programme was fighting for its very life in 1963 the Cabinet Defence Committee (February) "agreed that the navy should not maintain a long-range strike capability when the Buccaneer Mark II reached the end of its useful life..."

 

[Thorvic]

Piece by piece.

Another curious point: As the carrier programme was fighting for its very life in 1963 the Cabinet Defence Committee (February) "agreed that the navy should not maintain a long-range strike capability when the Buccaneer Mark II reached the end of its useful life..."

I think you'll find thats becuase the missile age had kicked in SSBN's would cover the stategic nuclear strike and stand off air launched missles would take over the Tactical strike. Note the development of the Supermarine 583 and later the AFVG whilst aimed at a more efficient Interceptor than the Phantom as a Sea Vixen replacement they were going to use the same airframe with revised systems for the strike role using air launched missiles like Martel. The Admirality had picked up on the size and weight of the 50s designed Buccaneer & Pahntom and had determined they needs a common replacement as capable but smaller lighter and smarter using the best of the new technology coming along.

BTW In 1965 the FAA requirement was for 143 Phantom FG1when the first orders were placed.

 

[JFC Fuller]

What I actually found was this decision was taken by the Minister, seemingly based almost entirely on cost. This decision being taken in the same meeting that decided to defer OR.355 (combined TSR-2/Buccaneer replacement). The associated memos are suggestive that the navy offered up the Buccaneer replacement (including a "Buccaneer 3") and agreed to a joint programme with the RAF (P.1154) in order to save the carrier programme which was then in the process of contracting to three ships.

 

[uk 75]

Thanks chaps, I am following this with great interest.

Published artwork for CVA 01 is confined to an early picture (published in 1963-4 Janes) which shows the 1970s fighter/attackers and the late pictures from 1965/6 showing a standard Phantom Buccaneer airgroup.

Siginificantly no artwork has appeared showing CVA 01 with a P1154RN/Buccaneer airgroup or any other what-if permutation.

 

[Mike Pryce]

...agreed to a joint programme with the RAF (P.1154) in order to save the carrier programme which was then in the process of contracting to three ships.

The RN had little/no intention of actually ordering the joint P.1154, just using the planned money it 'saved' to secure the new carrier.

God forbid anyone should illustrate a P.1154 on board CVA.01- likely a flogging offence!

 

[uk 75]

There is an interesting discussion on another site which suggests that the RN believed McDonnell Douglas's early estimates of F4 performance and thought Phantoms could be operated off Hermes.

It is clear that from 1963 the Phantom was the only aircraft that the RN would look at as a Sea Vixen replacement.

Given that Ark Royal was the ship in worse condition it seems at first site odd that she rather than Eagle should be chosen for conversion. However, I assume this has to do with refit schedules and the need to have Eagle at see in the period under discussion.

Hermes if of course still in service with the Indian Navy so one might reasonably have expected that it could have served as a carrier into the 80s if the right aircraft had been available.

This is such a fascinating period one really hopes that a new book will appear.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The pre-66 plan was for Hermes and Eagle to be modernised to operate Phantoms and for CVA-01 to replace the un-phantomised Victorious and Ark Royal in 1971.

Ark Royal was not chosen instead of Eagle- the 66 review decided that both Ark Royal and Eagle would be modernised to operate Phantoms and that Ark Royal would be the first ship modernised so she began her refit in 1967. In 1968 it became necessary to cut defence expenditure further and it was decided that instead of sustaining the carrier force until the mid-70s it would be retired immediately. However, the RN ultimately traded HMS Lion to keep a carrier (to sustain fixed-wing skills until the arrival of the Invincible class), as Ark Royal's modernisation was already under-way she was retained and Eagle's modernisation was cancelled and she was decommissioned.

The only question (I believe) is why in 1966 Ark Royal was chosen over Hermes when the original plan had been to decommission Ark Royal and Phantomise Hermes.

 

[uk 75]

JFC

Thanks for the chronology on Ark and Eagle. It is hard to match the accounts in the published sources.

 

[Hood]

The decision to refit Hermes for Phantom rather than Ark Royal was probably down to either (or both) material condition and manpower availability. Her boilers and machinery may not have been in good condition (was she ever reboilered during her subsequent steam catapult refit?) and certainly her later years were dogged by poor reliability and parts stripping from Eagle (also penny-pinching played a part in that).
Also Hermes had already been built to take Type 984 and 32-track CDS (estimated 24-targets per minute interception rate) and had provision for tactical nuclear bombs. She also had boxed boilers, citadel NBC protection, remote machinery operation and AC electrics. Hermes had the fullest requirements the Navy wanted despite being too small to be an effective carrier with Phantoms and Buccaneers. The cost of adding these measures to Ark Royal would added to the refit costs and the time taken and would have required more manpower to run at a time when military manpower was shrinking and trained manpower retention was still not improving.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The reason for Hermes being the preference over Ark Royal prior to 1966 is self-evident, she was a more modern ship in better material condition. But it is that which makes the 1966 selection of Ark Royal over Hermes (which is the question I posed) so interesting, why was Ark Royal chosen over Hermes in 1966 when the original plan had been for Ark Royal to be decommissioned prior to Hermes?

By pure coincidence I finally acquired a copy of "From Spitfire to Eurofighter" by Roy Boot. He mentions a proposed Buccaneer variant (produced under contract) with a new nav-attack system using a Litton inertial platform and digital computer with a dual band search/mapping/attack radar and a separate terrain following radar along with the required cockpit, equipment and airframe changes. This was proposed in 1963 and was unofficially called the Mk.3, which was probably the Buccaneer 3 referred to at the Cabinet Defence Committee. Roy Boot specifically references this aircraft as being for the new aircraft carriers.

I must admit that I found myself imagining this new (Mk.3) nav-attack system installed in the B.129/P.140 supersonic (Mach 1.8-2) Buccaneer proposal.

 

[Hood]

I can only assume that the ability to carry around thirty Phantoms and Buccaneers tipped the Royal Navy's arguments away from the previous plan as money became tighter and options were running out. Hermes could only take 20 Scimitars and Sea Vixens and with that number dropping further with the bigger new aircraft and probable marginal landing conditions and limited deck space, the extra cost of refitting the Ark Royal probably seemed more logical to get double the effective airwing despite the obvious problems with serviceability and manpower. Doubtless they felt the Treasury would have more easily torpedoed an expensive refit of Hermes for around a dozen modern aircraft.

 

[JFC Fuller]

With the Phantom in mind keeping Hermes alongside Eagle seems (with hindsight) odd.

Now, to bring it back to uk75's original query. The question is whether the decision to keep Ark Royal instead of Hermes in 1966 was the product of some peculiarity of the defence review or whether the decision was already in the process of being taken within the context of the pre-66 carrier fleet plan. Or to put it another way, without the reductions of the 1966 review would the third carrier have been Ark Royal or Hermes?

We have two pieces of evidence immediately available. First is Healey's 1966 comment about Hermes only being able to operate twelve fighters and seven strike aircraft- and therefore being poor value for money. This suggests that the swap may have occurred even without the 66 reductions:

...and one of the three carriers concerned, H.M.S. "Hermes", would be carrying only seven strike aircraft in addition to her 12 fighters...

Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1966/mar/07/defence#S5CV0725P0_19660307_HOC_400

But at the same time it does not seem to have become clear just how limited (impossible) Hermes was with the Phantom until 1969-70 which suggests that she could have been retained under the pre-66 plan.

Finally, for uk75. The 1966 plan in Healey's own words:

Present plans are to modify two of our four existing aircraft carriers, H.M.S. "Ark Royal" and H.M.S. "Eagle", to carry the Phantom. The modifications will be carried out in the course of the "Eagle's" refit starting in 1970; and during the "Ark Royal's" refit planned to start at the end of this year [1966].

Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/...and-p1127-aircraft#S5CV0733P0_19660812_CWA_16

And the consequences following the 1968 review, this time from the then Parliamentary Undersecretary for the Navy:

No work was included in H.M.S. "Eagle's" 1966–67 refit as preparation for the operational use of Phantom aircraft. One small item, costing £750, was undertaken to permit trial launches of a lightly loaded Phantom to gain advance experience before "Ark Royal" is commissioned.

To equip H.M.S. "Eagle" in 1971 to operate Phantom aircraft would require an eighteen-month refit costing £15 million of which £3 million could be attributed to Phantom requirements. With the carrier phase out it would not be practicable to undertake this work within the planned remaining life of the ship.

Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1968/nov/06/hms-eagle#S5CV0772P0_19681106_CWA_121

 

[Hood]

One source that might hold some answers; PREM 13/2937, Armed Services. Aircraft Carrier Programme for Fleet Air Arm: future of HMS Ark Royal, dated 14 January 1966 - 13 June 1969.

While searching for National Archives sources for Hermes two other questions were prompted. What was the '1964/65 Special Refit', the subject of ADM 1/28855 (01 January 1963 - 31 December 1963) and was it ever carried out?
Also, FCO 7/90, Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: American and Latin American Departments: Registered Files (A and AL Series). GENERAL (A). Defence. Sale of HMS Hermes to Argentina. (01 January 1967 - 31 December 1968). While this is post-1966 defence review it raises questions whether selling her might not have been planned before the 1966 defence review. Certainly her sale in 1967-68 would have left the carrier fleet as Eagle alone unless Eagle was reinstated.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The other complicating factor here is this. The 1966/7 plan only seems to have really been for a fleet of one carrier. Victorious was to go in 1969 and Hermes in 1970. Ark Royal would become available in 1970 at the same time Eagle would go into refit so there would only be Ark Royal available. Eagle's refit is quoted as being 18 months which means she would likely not reappear until 1972. With the carrier fleet due to phase out in the "mid-70s" (one assumes 1974-1975 as Healey told McNamara that the UK would withdraw from EoS then) it seems sensible to believe that the arrival of Eagle in 1972 would be the end of Ark Royal.

In short, whilst prior to 1966/7 it had been planned for Hermes to go on to about 1980 it may only have been planned for Ark Royal to make it through one more commission ending in about 1972 under the 1966/7 plan. Therefore Ark Royal's material condition would have been less important in considering which two ships to keep under the 1966/7 plan that it would have been prior to that.

Digging back through the enormous amount of documents generated in this period it appears that this may all have been something of an accident of history. The initial post CVA-01 cancellation plan seems to have been to try and sustain a three carrier fleet through to 1975- this consisting of Ark Royal, Eagle and Hermes (only Ark Royal is mentioned as being planned for Phantomisation though clearly so was Eagle); the decision to delete Hermes and go down to two ships only coming later (once Ark Royal was under refit).

 

[starviking]

The other complicating factor here is this. The 1966/7 plan only seems to have really been for a fleet of one carrier.

I wonder if the pre-Diego Garcia plan of establishing a joint Anglo-American base on Aldabra Island in the BIOT was factored into those plans? The plan seemed to be going strong right up until it was cancelled (along with Victorious' last commission and the Chinooks) in November 1967:


"In overseas terms, we have decided not to proceed with the Aldabra project[Interruption.]—the establishment of a staging post in the British Indian Ocean territory"

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/Aldabra?day=1967-11-22&type=Commons

 

[Thorvic]

Think the performance of the Spey Phantom may have effected the plans between 65 and 67 as the difference between the theory of how the Phantom was expected to perform with the Spey engines and the lift modifications. I suspect the British Phantom would be abple to operate directly off Eagle with its new Catapults, Arrestor gear and new angled deck as she had only rejoined the fleet in 64. Ark Royal needed its Angled Deck changing to the full 8 degrees, new steam catapults and Arrestor gear.

Once the Spey Phantom had flown they discovered that the aircraft performance wasn't improved enough to allow operations off Hermes, Eagle could operate Phantoms but needed the water spray equiped new Jet Blast Deflectors fitting to protect the deck from the Speys on full afterburner with the extended nose gear pushing the flame directly at the flight deck. Landing performance wasn't great so this the lighter load, and in fact Ark Royal only operated with the Phantoms in light mode (Note they never carried their sparrows aboard ship or bombs unless they were going to be used or discarded before landing. Note also that McDonald Douglas then started to develop the F-4HL (High Lift) with a fuselage stretch to a Spey Phantom and a larger revised wing to provide higher lift for better take off and landing performance on the British Carriers and possibly some of their own Essex class.

After 66 and the cancellation of the CVA-01 pretty much earmarked the end of the Royal Navy Carrier fleets, they were retained to cover the EoS area and the withdrawal of Empire untill the F-111K were in service and the mounting bases set up to replace them, although they too were cancelled in 67 leaving the carriers to soldier to cover the withdrawal from Aden, Singapore etc.

Thats why UK75's question gets interesting as with an active carrier commitment what exactly would the force be like by 1975, given what was discovered about the much hyped Phantoms actual capabilities.

Eagle, Hermes and Victorious were all listed as Class A carriers as they had been refitted to modern standards whilst Ark Royal and Centaur soldiered on in the older class B standards. Spey Phantom was found to be unsuitable for the smaller carriers like Hermes and Victorious, Ark Royal would need a similar refit to Eagle to operate them and the new class of CVA-01 carriers were about to be ordered. Aircraft wise we had the smaller and lighter AFVG in development which would be suitable for both the Interceptor role and the strike role with the relevant systems, however it wouldn't be ready for service before the mid 70s. Would the FAA have opted to have the F-4HL developed, complete the order to the revised design and have the earlier F-4K remanufactured to F-4HL configuration, as these might then be able to operate safely off Eagle, Victorious and Hermes, or would they refit Ark Royal in place of Victorous and Hermes phantom refits to ensure 2 carriers could operate the full quota of Phantoms and have CVA01 replace one/two of the carriers. Would the AFVG coming along to replace the Phantom/Buccaneer then mean that Hermes could solider on with Sea Vixens and then by pass the Phantoms to jump to the AFVG mid 70s and have an an airgroup strength back to design levels.

If they were hoping to use Hermes later on perhaps with the AFVG and maybe Jaguar M perhaps we can see why the smaller carriers were mooted as replacements for CVA-01 as smaller modern and more compitable aircraft might have been available by the time the existsing carrier fleet was due to be replaced in the 70s.

 

[uk 75]

This has been an interesting and very helpful thread with lots of useful information for which I am very grateful. I wonder if the new British Aircraft Carriers book advertised for November will be as useful in this respect.

One of my reasons for interest is that I have a collection of 1-1250/1200 metal or resin waterline ship models including CVA 01 from Seavee as shown on Richard Beedall's site. I have Ark Royal in her 1970s guise and Eagle and Hermes in their 60s guises. I assume that if the pre 1966 options had been implemented neither ship would have looked very much different. Would Eagle have lost its 4.5 inch guns or gained a catapult catcher like Ark (sorry I forgot the correct term).

The Royal Navy must have severely regretted not having more of the Audacious class ships like Eagle and Ark Royal. Keeping the Illustrious class and trying to refit them had been an expensive mistake.

Hermes sent on to replace Albion in the Commando Carrier role and gave the RN its money's worth albeit in a different role.

But the biggest problem was the lack of a suitable Carrier capable fighter for the RN's small ships.
France had the Etendard but we had only paper designs.

 

[Thorvic]

Yeap Eagle would have lost the remaining guns amd probably would have got extra deck parking platforms like Ark Royal did. she would probably have had the fwd Sea Cat platform built up and have the 'Bridle Catchers' fitted to capture the catapult launch strops.
Yeap its was the Aircraft development and carrier development being out of synch that brought the issue to the fore. they needed the CVA-01 to operate the Phantoms and Buccaneers effectively, the older wartime carriers being that bit too small for a suitable number of the large heavy 50s designed jets. The wartime designs were however quite capable with the samller older carrier aircraft but the new generation of potential smaller and capable carrier aircraft wouldn't be devloped till the 70's. If there was a modern smaller carrier combat aircraft available then you could see them cancelling the CVA-01 and opting for a smaller cheaper carrier and keep the three class A carriers going whilst dropping the Ark Royal.

 

[orlovsky]

The other thing I want to check is the air-groups- did the number of air-groups fall with the number of carriers in 1963 to become three active fleet carriers and two air groups? I need to check.

I know this is an old thread, but the question is really interesting. I haven't seen the issue revisited, did you find anything specific on this?

How would they have operated a 3 carrier/2 airwings fleet? With 2 or 3 carrier crews, with 2 or 3 escort groups? The French navy while hoping for PA59 (Clem nr 3) was only concerned about the carrier, I haven't seen anything about the planes to go on it, like additional Etendard IV. Later, they operated 2 carriers with a single fighter squadron and ~1 3/4 crews. The plan for the new QE class looks similar (?). So this might have been an option.

I have also been wondering about the 140 F-4K on plan. Going from 50 for two squadrons Ark/Eagle, that would give almost six squadrons with 12 frontline planes. Did they plan two squadrons = 24 per CVA-01? Usually it's only 12-18.
As a curious add-on, the McDonnell report on the F-4K from 1964 was concerned about Phantoms fitting on Centaur's lifts. Now that would have been... ambitious.

 

[Archibald]

CVA-01, Audacious-class, Centaur-class, Tiger-class, Invincible-class. So many varied ships, and no clear, satisfying long-term solution - one that preserve the Phantoms, at least.
By this metric, Invincibles with Sea Harriers was probably the correct move... at least they were newly build ships, reasonable and not too expensive designs.

Just asking in passing, could more Invincible-class ships have been build ? 4, 5 or even 6 of them ?

 

[uk 75]

The original plan for the Command (previously Escort) Cruiser was 6 units. But this soon got reduced to three. Even three stretched UK resources in the inflation hit 70s. With manpower constraints as well. In practice only one could be operational.
This explains why the RN opted to go for just two big ships to replace them. Only one of them is likely to have to be crewed and equipped after initial trials, tests.

 

[orlovsky]

Did the RN really crew only one Invincible at a given time, or was that just the plan under the Nott review?

 

[uk 75]

From time to time two were in service at one time, but usually only one was available fully.

 

[Archibald]

Never realized this before. Then again, Clemenceau and Foch seldom sailed together. And when they did, there was not enough aircraft, choppers and sailors for the two. So one was a full blown strike carrier, and the other, a giant LPH.

 

[zen]

Did the RN really crew only one Invincible at a given time, or was that just the plan under the Nott review?

I think prior to Nott, more than one, but afterwards the plan was barely one. We got three because of the Falklands and Thatcher's bargin with the Admiralty.

 

[Archibald]

Never realized before how much Nott planned to eviscerate the RN...

 

[starviking]

Never realized before how much Nott planned to eviscerate the RN...

Not was an Army man, and a lawyer. Brown’s Rebuilding the Royal Navy points out he understood nothing about naval matters, him apparently even not understanding that ships can only be in one place at a time.

 

[Archibald]

Oh lord... McNamara, cubed...

1981: Royan Navy death Nott (runs for cover !)

 

[orlovsky]

For a different perspective on Nott:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/714000037

With an interesting bit on p 119: "The Falklands did result in the retention of a third Invincible-classcarrier but the restoration of the third carrier air group was not included. Consequently, the Navy has only really operated two carriers since then with the third either in long-term refit or store."

I admit that I do not understand the operational logic. The US Navy assumed that it could surge 80-85% of the carriers in conflict. With 3, you don't get even numbers, but about half the time, you have a third carrier with no (or just an improvised) air group?

But that might have been the case with the CVAs, too - if they had got three in the first place.

 

[orlovsky]

Never realized this before. Then again, Clemenceau and Foch seldom sailed together. And when they did, there was not enough aircraft, choppers and sailors for the two. So one was a full blown strike carrier, and the other, a giant LPH.

Another US navy metric: 1/3 forward deployed normally, 1/2 if pushed, but not sustainable longer term, as in Vietnam.

So the two Clems barely managed relaying each other as for Djobouti, Beyrouth or the Persian Gulf.

 

[uk 75]

Like all defence issues, hindsight is a wonderful thing.
The Falklands was an avoidable war. Rather like the current Covid crisis, Whitehall let the politicians take the hit for the failure of the institutions to see it coming and urge action sooner.
Without the Falklands in 1981 Nott's emphasis on our NATO commitments,especially the Central Front,would have been entirely uncontroversial.
The RN had never grasped that taking the nuclear deterrent from the RAF had been a poisoned chalice. Whereas Vulcans and Victors had many roles short of nuclear war and were visible at annual Battle of Britain shows, the nuclear submarine force was out of sight and out of mind.
The RAF had never forgotten or forgiven Mountbatten's role in trashing TSR2. Revenge came quickly in 1966 and CVA01.
But, the RN was still seen by the RAF as an archaic and overblown force.
Air Power was crucial to all the key UK defence roles. Nott was briefed accordingly.
Three carriers or even 4 meant that often only one could be guaranteed to be available.
Reducing the force to the two later ships and letting the RAN have Invincible was thus quite reasonable.
The amphibious warfare force (2 LSDs and 5 LSTs) was a legacy of the 1960s build up East of Suez. Its remaining NATO role to reinforce Denmark and Norway was to move largely lightly equipped infantry units. These could just as easily be flown in.
The escort ship force in 1980 was largely obsolete. Only the newT22 and T42 ships were of some use in the North Atlantic. The T21 and T12 plus even older units had no defence against Soviet missile attacks from surface,sub surface or air units.
Putting resources into the vital nuclear deterrent and the highly effective SSN force, which the US respected and the Sovs feared was the right call.

 

[EwenS]

For a different perspective on Nott:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/714000037

With an interesting bit on p 119: "The Falklands did result in the retention of a third Invincible-classcarrier but the restoration of the third carrier air group was not included. Consequently, the Navy has only really operated two carriers since then with the third either in long-term refit or store."

I admit that I do not understand the operational logic. The US Navy assumed that it could surge 80-85% of the carriers in conflict. With 3, you don't get even numbers, but about half the time, you have a third carrier with no (or just an improvised) air group?

But that might have been the case with the CVAs, too - if they had got three in the first place.

The theory until relatively recently was that to keep 1 ship on the front line you needed 3 as a bare minimum. That was one in refit, one working up and one on the front line. So at any one time you only need 2 air groups.

So looking at the SHARs there were two front line squadrons, 800 & 801, but in addition there was a training squadron 899.

In the 1980s the number of US carriers increased from 13 to 16 (excluding Lexington as training carrier). Of these usually 2 (one from each coast) would be out of service being SLEPed. Again the norm would have been about one third of the remainder operational, one third working up to deploy and the remaining third winding down post deployment and refitting. I suppose the operational ships could be boosted by extending deployments and accelerating work ups.

There were however only 12 front line carrier air wings for these carriers rising to 14 at a peak in 1986-88. So again just enough for those not in long term refit. There were in addition 2 training air wings that could be called on to augment the front line wings.

 

[orlovsky]

With a small fleet, the numbers won't even out. With those percentages, you'd have 0.4-0.5 carriers in long term refits. The question becomes, what to do with that "half" carrier? If it is in storage with no crew or air group, it doesn't ease the pressure on the two active carriers. So apart from having a - very expensive - reserve asset and splitting attrition over 3 instead of 2 units, what is the additional benefit?

 

[SSgtC]

For a different perspective on Nott:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/714000037

With an interesting bit on p 119: "The Falklands did result in the retention of a third Invincible-classcarrier but the restoration of the third carrier air group was not included. Consequently, the Navy has only really operated two carriers since then with the third either in long-term refit or store."

I admit that I do not understand the operational logic. The US Navy assumed that it could surge 80-85% of the carriers in conflict. With 3, you don't get even numbers, but about half the time, you have a third carrier with no (or just an improvised) air group?

But that might have been the case with the CVAs, too - if they had got three in the first place.

The theory until relatively recently was that to keep 1 ship on the front line you needed 3 as a bare minimum. That was one in refit, one working up and one on the front line. So at any one time you only need 2 air groups.

So looking at the SHARs there were two front line squadrons, 800 & 801, but in addition there was a training squadron 899.

In the 1980s the number of US carriers increased from 13 to 16 (excluding Lexington as training carrier). Of these usually 2 (one from each coast) would be out of service being SLEPed. Again the norm would have been about one third of the remainder operational, one third working up to deploy and the remaining third winding down post deployment and refitting. I suppose the operational ships could be boosted by extending deployments and accelerating work ups.

There were however only 12 front line carrier air wings for these carriers rising to 14 at a peak in 1986-88. So again just enough for those not in long term refit. There were in addition 2 training air wings that could be called on to augment the front line wings.

IIRC, the USN also had another Air Wing in reserve that could be deployed if needed.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The USN force objective in the 1980s was fifteen active carriers, the planned end state was for these to all be CVNs, this force was to be sustained by a continuous build program of one CVN every three years (beginning in FY90) with each CVN having a service life of 45 years. However, the existing fleet had been managed on the basis of having a thirty year design life and of that existing fleet seven ships had been ordered in a seven year period between 1951 and 1957. The only way to bridge the gap was the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) that added fifteen years to the life of each carrier, this was so involved (two and a half years or more in duration) that it effectively removed the ship from the active fleet. Therefore, through to at least the late 1990s the USN would have had sixteen carriers excluding the training carrier (Lexington, to be replaced by a Forrestal in the late 1990s when CVN-75 commissioned) but an active fleet of fifteen. Of those fifteen, usually, two would be in some form of overhaul or refuelling.

Ultimately this was to be covered by thirteen active and two reserve air wings. If mobilisation was required the reserve air wings would be assigned to the two carriers in overhaul. There was a very brief period in the mid 1980s (1986-88) when the number of active air wings was increased from thirteen to fourteen in addition to the two reserve air wings. The idea being that the carrier in SLEP could be mobilised to allow all sixteen carriers to be deployed. However, it could have taken nearly a year to get that ship active and the Navy was short of cash and planes so the fourteenth active wing was decommissioned and the force structure went down to thirteen active and two reserve.

With regard to the Invincibles and the Sea Harrier. The original plan was for 800, 801 and 802 FAA squadrons to be frontline squadrons with five aircraft each but the reformation of 802 was effectively cancelled by the 1981 Nott review. Following the Falklands, 800 and 801 seem to have deployed with eight aircraft each, which would have produced an active frontline of sixteen aircraft versus fifteen under the original plan. I have always assumed that 899 Headquarters Squadron was intended to provide a shadow squadron that could be mobilised in wartime when the third ship became available, just as the USN reserve air wings were intended to do and as actually happened during the Falklands (producing 809 Squadron). This would also have matched the shadow squadron model used by the RAF.

 

[uk 75]

The Falklands saw Illustrious enter service early to relieve Invincible. Later on Ark Royal would replace Hermes allowing for photos of all 3 Invincibles together.
I am not sure how many times this happened, but normally only one of the ships would be fully operational. A second ship (either just leaving or about to go into refit) was assumed to be available by NATO as Hackett mentions in WW3 vol2.