Basing Measures. The Air Force has stated that it would deploy ballistic
missiles armed with CAVs orother conventional warheads for PGS mission at bases
far from missiles armed with nuclear warheads and far from bases with storage
facilities for nuclear warheads.
42
The two potential sites include Vandenberg Air
Force base in California and Cape Canaveral in Florida. According to the Air Force,
“the new coastal basing sites would have no nuclear capability or association”
43
as
they would lack the facilities and equipment needed to handle or store nuclear
weapons. The coastal basing plan would also address concerns about debris from
missile launches falling on populated areas in the United States or Canada. If the
missiles were launched from the U.S. coast, rather than from bases in northern,
central states, then the debris would likelyfall over the oceans rather than over land.
The Air Force has also stated that it could deploy Minotaur missiles on mobile
launchers, horizontally in earthen berms, or above ground, rather than in the
hardened, vertical silos used at nuclear ICBM bases. The United States could then
declare, to Russia or other nations, that these new, modified launchers were equipped
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The United States uses a similar formula with its B-1 bombers. Although they were
originally equipped to carry nuclear weapons, they have been deployed at bases that do not
house nuclear weapons and redesignated as conventional bombers. Hence, their weapons
delivery status is determined by basing and declaration, rather than by their original nuclear
capabilities.
45
Air Force Space Command. Common Aero Vehicle White Paper. p. 8.
46
Ibid. p. 7.
47
Report to Congress on the “Concept of Operations” for the Common Aero Vehicle.
Submitted in response to Congressional Reporting Requirements, by Peter B. Teets, Under
Secretary of the Air Force. February 24, 2004. p. 4.
with conventional-only delivery vehicles. This declaration would further
demonstrate that the missiles at the two coastal bases were different from nuclear
ICBMs, even though it would not preclude the possible covert deployment of nuclear
warheads on the missiles.
44
Further, their deployment with a CAV reentry vehicle,
rather than a standard post-boost vehicle and warhead present on a nuclear-armed
missile, would reinforce this designation.
45
Cooperative Measures. The Air Force has proposed that the United States
institute a number of cooperative measures with other nations to add confidence to
the U.S. declaration that the Minotaur missiles deployed atcoastalbases would carry
conventional warheads. These measurescould include military-to-militarycontacts,
high level political consultations, and ongoing discussions to keep Russia and other
nations informed about U.S. plans for these missiles and to make them aware of the
observable differences between conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles. The Air
Force has referred to this process as a “strategic dialogue” that might, over time,
answer questions and ease concerns about the plans for and capabilities of long-range
ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads.
46
The United States could also invite other nations to observe test launches of
these missiles or to participate in exercises that include simulations with these
missiles. This might allow nations such as Russia to become familiar with the
operational procedures associated with ballistic missiles armed with conventional
warheads and to distinguish between these procedures and those associated with
nuclear-armed missiles. Further, the United States could allow Russia to conduct
short-notice inspections at the Minotaur bases, similar to, or even more intrusive
than, the inspections permitted at nuclear missile bases under the START Treaty, to
confirm the absence of nuclear weapons either on the missiles or in the storage
facilities.
47
Over time, these measures would not onlyprovide information about the
missiles and their missions, but might also build confidence and understanding
between the parties. The increased level of cooperation, and possiblydecreased level
of suspicion, might then reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation if the United
States were to launch ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.
The United States could also provide Russia with prior notification of planned
launches of ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, or the two nations could
set up a dedicated “hot line” for use after a launch, so the United States could inform
Russia of the launch and assure it that the missiledid notcarrya nuclear warhead and
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48
Air Force Space Command. Common Aero Vehicle White Paper. p. 11.
was not headed for targets in Russia. Further, as has been discussed on many
occasions over the years, the United States and Russia could share early-warningdata
at a joint facility so that Russia would have the information it needed to distinguish
between the launch of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile from a northern base and the
launch of a conventional-armed ballistic missile from a coastal base.
Mission Planning and Operational Measures. The Air Force has also
indicated that it could alter the trajectory of ballistic missiles armed with
conventional warheads so that they would not resemble the trajectories that would
be followed by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles on course for targets in Russia or
China.
48
As was noted above, CAV is have the capability to travel 3,000 miles
downrange and 3,000 miles cross-range, after release from its ballistic missile
delivery system. Hence, according to the Air Force, the missile could travel on a
“shaped trajectory” or, if launched from the East Coast towards the Middle East, a
southern trajectory,so that it would not flyover Russia or China, and make up for the
added distance by using the flight range of the CAV. The missile could also launch
with a “depressed trajectory,” then use the aerodynamic lift of the CAV to achieve
the range it would need to reach around the globe without flying over Russia.
Taken together, these three types of measures might help reduce the risks of
misunderstandings. But the accumulation of information during peacetime and
frequent communications during crises may not be sufficient address problems that
could come up in an atmosphere of confusion and incomplete information during a
conflict. Specifically, theargument in favor of usinglong-rangeballisticmissiles for
the PGS mission assumes that the United States might have little warning before the
start a conflict and might need to launch its missiles promptly at that time. This
scenario would allow littletimefor theUnited States to consult with, or even inform,
other nations about its intentions. If other nations are caught by surprise and fear
they might be under nuclear attack, they might also decide to respond promptly,
before the United States had the opportunity to convince them that the missiles
carried conventional warheads.
Further, routine data exchanges and on-site inspections can provide confidence
in the absence of nuclear warheads on the missiles on a day-to-day basis in
peacetime, but they cannot provide assurances that the warheads could not be
changed in a relatively short period of time or that the warheads were not actually
changed in the days or weeks since the last inspection. In addition, changing the
basing patterns or launch patterns of missiles to draw a sharper distinction between
conventional and nuclear-armedmissiles assumes both that othernationscanobserve
the differences and that they believe the different appearances indicate different
warheads. Finally, these measures would do nothing to alleviate concerns among
nations that did not participate in the cooperative programs. As a result, while the
measures described above can reduce the possibility of misunderstandings, they
probably cannot eliminate them.
