Got mine last week but managed to hold off on reading it until I had a quiet weekend to myself.
I have to admit, I'm somewhat disappointed. The proofing and editing seemed "off", leading to some very clumsy sentences (and at times even paragraphs), but the other major problem is that for some of the aircraft bought or attempted to be sourced from abroad (e.g. the four-engined He177 variant), our esteemed colleague has told us almost everything about the airplanes' foreign development history and very little if anything about how the design was evolved or modified while in Japanese hands (and by whom).
The same goes for some of the indigenous Japanese designs, in which we get a full developmental history of the service aircraft (built, flown and operated against enemies) from which the design was evolved but very little on the actual Secret Project. I accept that in some cases this is because the relevant data were reduced to ashes sometime before 15 August 1945, but at times this comes across as padding.
On the other hand, many of the projects for which good development histories are available (and some for which they are not) are interesting, bordering on the bizarre, and bonus points are due for providing tabulated summaries of dimensions and performance (whether realised or projected) and to what stage the project progressed (if any). One also gets the feeling as a unifying thread that much as with the Luftwaffe's design/procurement cycle, there were inter-service rivalries and top-down interference that led to enormous and unaffordable waste and duplication (for example, the idea that anyone in those days could possibly run TWO Manhattan Projects not just in parallel but in secret competition with each other just beggars the imagination), and much effort was also expended going up blind alleys best left unexplored (the Americans - and to a lesser extent the British, once the immediate threat to Britain had evaporated - could afford this; Germany and Japan could not, and even less so as the war went on). In addition, both Germany and Japan seem to have been beset with difficulties in developing reliable powerplants for their next-generation aircraft while the British and Americans, for all the various failures they had, never seemed short of an engine to turn to (or to improve to ever-higher levels of performance).
One also sadly gets the idea that Germany and Japan were ultimately content to fight their own separate wars, despite the fact that they had the same enemies in common. I suppose that was a result of having the national ideologies that they did, but whatever the case, the almost complete lack of useful co-operation between two initially very formidable enemies is something for which the Allies can be thankful.