LowObservable said:
Why thank you Bill. However, as requested already, I much prefer to have the actual transcript of what was said. But don't worry, I have gotten a hold of it myself. See
here - makes quite interesting reading. In fact, I strongly recommend all those here have a good, careful read of it. Might be enlightening... :
The following are a few key points I would like to highlight from the speech (note that the bits in quote markings are from the Maj. Gen.). However, unlike some, I am not trying to simply cherry pick bits and report them out of context therefore if you don’t believe what I have written/selected I urge you to just go back and read what was actually said...
Putting it in context
First up Maj. Gen. Christopher Bogdan provided quite a useful statement in regard to the overall complexity of the F-35 Program:
This program is so incredibly complex variant to variant that to label it a single program and think of it that way sometimes does it an injustice.
So what I’d ask you to do at times when we’re looking at how these programs perform, remember that it’s just not a single program. It’s really three airplane programs built into one. That makes it hard sometimes.
This is quite an important consideration IMHO. Why? Well, as has been pointed out numerous times, when trying to use other platforms such as the Super Hornet as a point of comparison, please remember that you are not necessarily comparing ‘apples with apples’.
Moreover, please also remember the complexity of the customer side of the equation too and the fact that this adds to the complexity of the issues those responsible have to deal with (I challenge many here to try to accomplish what they are doing):
...the construct of this program with three services, eight partners, two FMS customers today, many more knocking on the door...So that is not an excuse for where the program’s been and it’s not going to be an excuse for where the program’s going. It is just a reality that we have an awful lot of people that are trying to take care of in this program.
Now one point that has been reported as a criticism from Maj. Gen. Bogdan has been the software. However, let’s just read what he actually said:
...when you’re staring ten million lines of code in the face on just the airplane alone, and another ten million almost off on the ground, that should scare anybody. The software is simply not easy to do.
IMHO, this is simply a statement emphasising how large the task was to start with. No-one is disagreeing with him here from the program. We will revisit this issue again further down.
Now as to all the constant bemoaning what should have happened (as seems to be the penchant of many here), and more specifically the issue of “Concurrency”, I simply point you to these comments from the Maj. Gen:
...concurrence...The first thing I’ll tell you about it is, it is what it is. We can’t go back and rewrite history. We can’t go back and change decisions that were previously made.
The Plan
Now the Maj Gen., also made comments regarding what has happened in recent years – something that some in the media have partially reported. However, once again shall we have a look at what was actually said:
What’s been going on for the last two years under Admiral Venlet’s leadership? The way I use an analogy here, that is we have this gigantic aircraft carrier called the Joint Strike Fighter program. And it was sailing, and quite frankly it was sailing and it was going to run aground. Admiral Venlet and his team with Lockheed Martin and the help of OSD have steered that ship another way.
Note my emphasis re Lockheed Martin. I have done this since people need to recognise that this activity has been a joint activity. It is not simply a case that big, bad Lockheed Martin has been hauled in from doing the wrong thing – they are actually part of the solution!
And as for an assessment of where we stand now and the outlook for the future:
...the Admiral went out and said we’re going to put a realistic plan in place. In my five weeks here I would tell you not without some risk and not without some hard work and not without our industry partners performing, we can get there. We can. That’s something, like I said, that bodes well for the program today.
Now before you go off saying “sure, but how likely is that?” or “wait until the next problem”, let’s also look at what was said next:
...there was some margin built in there so we were not pie in the sky...And if folks don’t think things are going to go wrong in the next two to five years on this development program, I’ve got to tell you otherwise. We’re going to find things that we didn’t know about and we’re going to have to deal with them...
This is exactly what some here, including myself have been saying all along!
Testing
Moving on to testing and his reported comments regarding test points etc, once again, let’s look at what was actually said:
We need to rework the enterprise so that we can start measuring what’s really important in test. I can tell you, it’s not the test points, it’s not test hours, it’s not test flights. It’s more capability based and it’s different than that. [
But having said that...we’re ahead of the plan. That’s a good thing.
We did have some major accomplishments this year also...We finished the first full-flight testing of the Air Force variant, all 8,000 hours. We’ve dropped our first weapon. We’ve continued to expand the envelope of getting ready for live weapons releases. We’ve completed all the air starts on both the A and the B models and we’re getting ready for complicated high angle-of-attack testing...So my perspective on the test program. We’re making progress. We’re measuring that progress. I’m not sure we’re measuring the right progress, but the test program is starting to create some momentum and that’s a good thing.
Yet again, not quite the doom and gloom story that some here would have you believe. And yes, it is still quite a challenge and there will undoubtedly be some less then desirable things that will be discovered, just as the Maj Gen has said himself:
...I expect that we’re going to find some more bad news as we move along. If we didn’t, I’m not sure we’d consider ourselves doing adequate testing.
But that’s why you do testing – to find things now rather then in actual combat!!!
Real feedback from the 'frontline'
A short comment re the progress on the actual progress on the ground (i.e. aircraft getting to the services) from the Maj Gen:
We have airplanes. In fact we have 19 airplanes down at Eglin that are training pilots today. Training maintainers today. That’s an astounding thing. It’s an astounding thing because quite frankly we’re only about a third of the way through the flight test program. So you have operators out there in the Marine Corps and the Air Force, and soon our international partners with the UK and the Dutch coming down very shortly, who are flying this airplane every day. They’re not flying complex missions, they are flying training missions that have a lot of operational restrictions on them but they’re flying the airplane and it’s not in a test environment. That’s a good thing. That’s a good thing because we’re learning a lot about the airplane. I believe we have the appropriate processes in place to learn about the airplane in a safe way that we get our training and we get that information back into the program so that we can improve it as we move along.
Once again, certainly far from doom and gloom… :
Production
Now as to his comments regarding actual aircraft production:
...I would tell you that Lockheed Martin is showing some improvement in their production facility. Is it coming fast enough for us? No. Are they showing some good improvement? Yes. Would we expect them to be a little ahead of the learning curve, being on their fifth lot of airplanes? Yes. But we are where we are. What I can tell you is I am seeing some glimmers of hope in Lockheed Martin’s production and their facility that will help us down the road. Costs are coming down. Are they coming down as fast as we want them to? No. But they’re coming down. I would tell you that over time it will mean we’re going to get this reduction thing done pretty well.
That’s a fair enough comment and as has been stated before, no-one in Industry would disagree. However, just as has also been stated before, this is something that will come. However when dealing with small numbers there is only so many improvements that can be made. Sorry, but that is just the nature of the beast…
Software development...again
Coming back to the software issue, let’s look at more of the Maj. Gen.’s comments:
Although we’re doing okay in developing Block 2 software, we’re a little bit behind. If you want a number to put on it, I’d put on it in the last two years the department has fallen behind 90 to 120 days. Now, take that with a grain of salt because there are a million people out there who will give you a million different estimates on where we are on software.
What’s that? Take this assessment with a “grain of salt”? That can’t be correct can it? Isn’t this all doom and gloom? ??? Nope – seems like the Maj Gen is spot on and dare I say, seems to be echoing what some such as myself have be saying for quite some time… :
What’s worse, he then goes on to give some praise…
If you took a look and said I’m a little behind on Block 2, Block 3 is even harder. Oh, the sky is falling in. Not necessarily. I say not necessarily because Lockheed Martin to their credit, the government to our credit, recognized that software is a big big deal, and over the last six months or so we have put a concerted effort into improving both the government’s oversight and Lockheed Martin’s processes.
Now a comment on the perception that if only the F-35 people would listen to outside experts (I mean experts though, not some of the Armchair Generals and similar here! :
):
...one thing that is very very good in my opinion is we have used the expertise of outside, independent reviewers at the NavAir and the Life Cycle Management Center folks at Wright-Patterson, to share all of our design reviews for our software. Okay? That’s a really good thing. Those folks are very experienced. They’ve seen a lot of airplanes and a lot of software programs. To have them co-chairing all the design reviews of our software is a very good thing.
The other thing the government has done and Lockheed Martin has been a good teammate here, is whenever we move anything out of block of software, whether it’s from 2A to 2B, to 2B to the 3I, 3F, that is going to be done not under a veil. It is going to be transparent.
What? Can’t be right – Lockheed Martin getting some praise? ;D
ALIS
Moving on. Yet another aspect reported as coping a blasting from the Maj. Gen, has been the ALIS. Now though, let’s have a look at some of what he actually said:
ALIS...We had some problems leading up to this point. One of the big problems was security. You can imagine a system that has all that information about a Joint Strike Fighter in it. What parts do you need fixed? What pilots are qualified? What maintainers are qualified? What mission plan is going? ...We did some testing and found out we had some vulnerabilities. To Lockheed’s credit and to our credit we took that seriously. We did a pause on ALIS. We went back and fixed those vulnerabilities...And we’re in the end game of doing that security vulnerability testing...I believe we’re on plan by the end of November to have that resolved. I’m fairly confident we’re going to get there...
Please note my emphasising that last part. It’s currently late September and we should be there “by the end of November” – hardly the end of the world is it?! But maybe I am just being too easy…
Money
Now as to the comments re there being no more money. Well, once again, shall we read what was said:
So one of the tasks he and I have is to create culture within this enterprise, and I’m talking stakeholders, Lockheed Martin, subs, and with JPO. This is fundamentally a fixed price development program. There’s no more money and there’s no more time, so we’re going to have to make trades, we’re going to have to do this in a disciplined way.
Note that I am not trying to deny what was said. However, please note that this should not be simply taken as a criticism of Lockheed Martin…as some would like to have us believe. Rather, IMHO, this is exactly what it is – a recognition that this is a team effort and thus we need to all work together. Once again, no arguments here.
Production again...
Touching back on aircraft production again, we see what I take yet again as some guarded praise when discussing Lockheed Martin’s performance:
I see a glimmer of hope that production’s getting better...I believe they’re right on the edge of getting really, really good at this. Now I want to see them take that and translate it into lower costs in production on this airplane...
Sustainment
Now turning to the issue of Sustainment which has gotten some media coverage. I really welcome the following statements that put the long term cost estimates in some perspective:
...the long term sustained cost and strategy. We have a lot of estimates out there in the billions and trillions of dollars...Those numbers are so sensitive to the assumptions that you make that I’m not sure they can inform any of us today about what to do and what not to do.
...So we have on one side everybody woe is me, all the world is falling in, it’s going to cost a gazillion dollars. Then we have other folks that say no, it’s not, it’s only going to be this much more than the legacy airplanes...I’m not worried about the folks that say it’s going to cost the same as a legacy airplane. I’m not worried about people that say it’s going to cost a katrillion times more than legacy airplanes. What I will tell you is looking today, the basic strategy on the way we’re going to sustain this airplane has got to make some fundamental changes to it.
Sounds like a great idea from someone who wants to work in the real world. I couldn’t agree more! This also aligns with what I and others here have been saying all along!
Summing up
Now finally, let’s look at some of the Maj Gen’s closing statements:
...there is not a more complex program on the planet. We did it to ourselves a little bit. We did it because we had this grand vision. Whatever the reasons, this program is hugely complex and in order to manage a hugely complex program you need to make sure that your basic fundamentals of acquisition are in place. That means knowing where every penny is, knowing who every person on the program is and what they’re doing, know where every pencil is. What I mean by pencil is all the equipment. We’ve got to have that kind of discipline in a complex program like this. And it’s on both sides, by the way. It’s on both sides. The government and industry side.
Note the recognition of the need to be disciplined and the recognition that that is happening…on both sides! Sounds like someone who is looking to work to solve problems rather then to simply kick heads…
Now he also pointed out that some of the causes of delays and instability have come from outside of the likes of Lockheed Martin…remember my comment about it “taking two to tango”
:
Accountability...I’m not going to pick on Lockheed Martin here and say by God, the way to get the best outcomes on this program is to hold Lockheed Martin accountable. Yes. That’s one. But there are other accountabilities we need to talk about.
Stakeholders have to be accountable to this program. You can’t drive instability and change on this program on a whim. We have to worry about meeting your needs and not your wants.
Another element of accountability. We have to hold our JPO accountable. When we make promises to Lockheed Martin or we make promises to the department or we make promises to our stakeholders, we have to be held accountable to the same standard that I am going to hold Lockheed Martin to.
Overall, I have to say that I have found the comments of the Maj Gen. absolutely refreshing…and dare I say, quite far from what some have reported :
. However, just in case you don’t agree with my assessment above or think I have taken things out of context, why don’t you go back and read his comments in the raw form? I actively encourage you to!
