Stretched Type 82

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In Rebuilding the RN Brown notes 'In 1967 consideration was given to a stretched Type 82 to replace the Tiger class as helicopter ships' (DEFE 16/617 (PRO))

Were any drawings made?
 
Have checked Shipbucket yet? To my recal there were lots of variatios of the Bristol class. Some of those migth have been based on some real image
 
gollevainen said:
Have checked Shipbucket yet? To my recal there were lots of variatios of the Bristol class. Some of those migth have been based on some real image
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Well, the only problem is that there are too many "Alternate Universe" drawings, many of which that are poorly differentiated from genuine proposals.
 
PMN1 said:
In Rebuilding the RN Brown notes 'In 1967 consideration was given to a stretched Type 82 to replace the Tiger class as helicopter ships' (DEFE 16/617 (PRO))

Were any drawings made?
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Well, there was a profile of a hangar equipped Type 82 that appeared on the Navweaps/Warship1 forum, which apparently was scanned from the dustjacket of an uncited book.

It looks as if it dates from the mid-60s, judging by how the shape of the Mk8 housing varies from the final design, and it doesn't appear to be stretched - although there appears to be a towed array aft of the flight deck.
 

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TinWing said:
gollevainen said:
Have checked Shipbucket yet? To my recal there were lots of variatios of the Bristol class. Some of those migth have been based on some real image
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Well, the only problem is that there are too many "Alternate Universe" drawings, many of which that are poorly differentiated from genuine proposals.
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As one of the originators I actually agree, but it's getting everyone else aboard for the changes to the album that's the problem.
Anyway, the stretched T82 that is being referred to here is probably this one:
GBDDGType82Bristol4AU.gif
 
I was the originator of the scanned drawing - it wasn't uncited at that time, but has been reposted several times since without the citation. It is from the back cover of Rawson and Tuppers "Basic Ship Theory", third edition. I have spoken to my Prof. (David Andrews) about it and we are not sure of the exact providence.

RP1
 
This design appears on Shipbucket, and, with the addition of Exocet and a helicopter, would appear to be a considerable improvement on the original design.
 
This is another of those 60s projects which have not survived so far.
The impression quoted above was suggested as being a student's drawing
rather than something from Bath or the RN.
We have been very good here in ferreting out material from the NAO or
asking people who worked on projects to "spill the beans" (it is after all
half a century ago!).
The only real source we have on these designs are the ones looked at by the
Fleet Working Party and published in Brown/Moore. The Type 82 hulls were
on order, and it would have made sense to use them as helicopter ships after
the first ship was completed as a Seadart/Ikara trials ship.
The second 82 is mentioned as being "Exeter".
 
uk 75 said:
This is another of those 60s projects which have not survived so far.
The impression quoted above was suggested as being a student's drawing
rather than something from Bath or the RN.
We have been very good here in ferreting out material from the NAO or
asking people who worked on projects to "spill the beans" (it is after all
half a century ago!).
The only real source we have on these designs are the ones looked at by the
Fleet Working Party and published in Brown/Moore. The Type 82 hulls were
on order, and it would have made sense to use them as helicopter ships after
the first ship was completed as a Seadart/Ikara trials ship.
The second 82 is mentioned as being "Exeter".
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I recall reading, relatively recently, that the old Admiralty were quite meticulous at keeping comprehensive records of details of warship designs, and not just those designs which finally made it to be afloat. However, once the modern Ministry of Defence came into existence (1964), there was a much greater 'culling' of files, so that might explain why there SEEMS to be a lack of physical documentation from then onwards.... :(
 
From the 50s onwards there almost seems to have been a scorched earth policy in the UK with regards to cancelled projects where considerable effort seems to have been put into destroying everything involved with the project. With aircraft, prototypes and tooling were destroyed, sketches, notes and documentation are significantly easier to dispose up than those.

Any idea why this occurs? It almost seems to be an all or nothing attitude, the decision has been made so any means of reversing it is removed from the equation all together. Even retiring platforms, rather than being placed in reserve appear to be sold or scrapped in next to no time, almost strikes me as arrogance, a "we are right to do this" and ensuring no one is ever able to prove them wrong.
 
I've been once asked why there were such difficulties finding even design studies for cold war ships from every country including France, USA, Great Britain or the Soviet Union, despite the ships of that era was already decommissioned and basically reaching the 50 year time period of most secret documents shoudl be declassified by nature regarding military hardware.
Think about the USN Long beach, Kidd, Kitty Hawk classes for example we not really know about the various design studies proposed for these classes before the final versions accepted.
But the answer I've got that the documents holding the plans and proposals were stored digitally but on such old storage devices they are basically cannot be read anymore, as the computers used to store these data are either replaced by newer ones or maybe if lucky stored in 1-2 museums which would of course not allow them to be activated again to read the required data. It's like you have data on big and small floppy disks when you have a PC with only USB ports!

Though the Russians seems to find many proposals probably because their IT industry was not that advanced at that time and they used the good old paper with pen and pencil method for proposals.
 
.

For pre-80s ships the problem SEEMS to be nuclear weapons storage (even ships like HMS Forth (Depot Ship) have been hidden). Likewise for nuclear submarines there are restrictions.

Then after the introduction of computer design programs there is the problem of output from either old obsolete programs, or non-availability of up-to-date programs.

MOD "obviously" must have had correspondence, briefings and reports on paper before e-mails ruled but these SEEM to be unavailable.

Since the time that e-mails became acceptable for decision making I don't know what will happen with electronic media.

I know that the NMM have asked that archives should be kept, even if for future generations, but we all know that the MOD are hardly co-operative in such matters.
 
From everything I have read the Type 82 program was very well run and the ship delivered the required capability within cost and schedule estimates a rarity before and since and repeats were expected to be cheaper, built faster and potentially with greater capability.

I understand that the Type 42 destroyers were built as cheaper, more numerous alternatives but have wondered how many improved Type 82s could have been built instead. By improved I am thinking an all GT propulsion in COGOG or COGAG arrangement's or even a CODAG set up, Limbo deleted and a helo hanger installed and a switch to the improved radars of the Batch II and III Type 42 or better, i.e. much along the lines of the ships being discussed here.
 
The problem with re-engining a T82 is that no GT provides the same output as the COSAG plant which provided 74,600shp. Using a Olympus/Tyne COGAG would provide around 65,000shp. The question would be how would the drop in SHP effect the ships performance overall and would the two Tyne provide on 11,400shp sufficient power for 18knots.

In Friedmans Nuclear Navy he states that there was a variant of the Olympus developed that was capable of 35,000shp which would give sufficient power to maintain performance; I have however never seen any reference to this engine anywhere else and do not believe it ever entered service.

As for the secondary power plant the obvious solution is the provision of Spey's, however the problem there is entry into service, the earliest service entry was 1988 with the Japanese Navy.
 
JohnR said:
The problem with re-engining a T82 is that no GT provides the same output as the COSAG plant which provided 74,600shp. Using a Olympus/Tyne COGAG would provide around 65,000shp. The question would be how would the drop in SHP effect the ships performance overall and would the two Tyne provide on 11,400shp sufficient power for 18knots.

In Friedmans Nuclear Navy he states that there was a variant of the Olympus developed that was capable of 35,000shp which would give sufficient power to maintain performance; I have however never seen any reference to this engine anywhere else and do not believe it ever entered service.

As for the secondary power plant the obvious solution is the provision of Spey's, however the problem there is entry into service, the earliest service entry was 1988 with the Japanese Navy.
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An option could have been three or four Olympus i.e. as planned and then implemented with the USNs Spruance Class' LM2500s. Alternatively retain COSAG for the first follow on batch then switch to a new propulsion systems for the second batch. The other option could be a MTU 20V or similar series diesel or multiple smaller units, maybe even an earlier adoption of CODLAG.
 
A very rough estimate for a Tyne/Olympus COGAG fit is 15 knots on the Tynes, 25.7 knots on both plants. Hardly impressive, and you'd have stability issues resulting from replacing a heavy steam plant with a gas turbine plant of 40% the capacity.

Go four four Olympus, and you can cruise on one engine with burst performance up to 30 knots, which is more respectable. Not sure how the RN would feel about trailing one shaft at 18 knots, though - GTs of that era really wouldn't appreciate running at half power. Or rustle up a pair of 14,000 hp diesels from somewhere, those'll do quite nicely as ballast to replace the steam plant too.
 
I remain intrigued by the original suggestion of a Type 82 with helicopter capability.

Given that the earlier studies based on Seaslug ships had evolved from destroyer-sized ships into
through deck cruisers not dissimilar to the eventual Invincibles, I am puzzled why a smaller ship
was again considered. It is hard to see what capability could have been fitted into an 82, unless
it was an attempt to keep the three proposed hulls (Exeter and co) in the programme. In which
case they might have been simply hangar versions of the built Type 82.

Someone, somewhere must know someone who was involved with the 82 programme when the
ships were cancelled.
 
So it could be done but it would be a major redesign, definitely a batch II or III rather than a repeat Bristol so probably would have to be repeats with the original COSAG plant. How many modified Bristols, with no limbo and a helicopter hanger, could be afforded instead of Type 42s?

Logically then the repeats could be followed by a new design which would be more of a hybrid (probably more conventional layout) Type 82 / Type 44, i.e. double ended plus Seawolf.
 
This has been covered on this forum multiple times. Bristol was neither on time or budget, the Type 82 design was abandoned after her because she was too expensive to be Leander/GP frigate replacement. Thats why it was decided to put Sea Dart and Ikara on separate hulls- in order to keep the total number of hulls up.
 
JFC Fuller said:
This has been covered on this forum multiple times. Bristol was neither on time or budget, the Type 82 design was abandoned after her because she was too expensive to be Leander/GP frigate replacement. Thats why it was decided to put Sea Dart and Ikara on separate hulls- in order to keep the total number of hulls up.
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Has it?

I have read all of the topics on the Type 82 / Bristol / Sea Dart I could find on here, conducted another search on reading your reply and have come up empty handed in terms of information on Bristols schedule and budget performance.

I do not contest that she was expensive, or that design changes, scope creep, late systems changes, inflation and budget cuts affected the project, but when these are factored in the project performed well, especially when it is considered that numbers were reduced down to what was virtually a single technology demonstrator. Brown writes glowingly of how the project was managed, the quality of the design, its similarity in concept and capability to other large escorts being built for other navies at the time. It was also good value for money when compared to the County class, delivering a much higher level of capability, at similar (corrected) acquisition cost and, through its smaller crew and more modern systems, lower cost of ownership.

The decision to put Sea Dart and Ikara on separate hulls was not a cheaper option in any way except for minimising expenditure in a small window. Ikara was only installed on one new build RN ship (Bristol herself) the rest were mid life upgrades of Leanders, less expensive than fitting it to new ships but meant the system was retired at about half life as the hulls wore out and significantly more money had to be spent building new ships earlier. As for the Type 42s, yes they were retained in service far longer than intended, but as designed were not intended to be upgraded or improved during their service lives which drove up sustainment costs and resulted in compromises on capability.

IMO, the decision to go for single role ships, both modified serving vessels at half life and new build austere vessels, very nearly resulted in a hideously expensive block obsolescence, averted only by the end of the Cold War. It wasn't even a calculated risk, it was simply a case of ignoring professional advice to reduce outlays in the short term and push the problem out a decade or so.

There is also the factor of hull numbers but the question has to be asked, when does individual lack of capability make the extra numbers irrelevant? The fact that most of the single role escorts were only viable as part of escort groups, i.e. when they were being escorted by more capable ships themselves, and were also pretty much useless in warm war scenarios makes the extra numbers an expensive extravagance. A single Type 82 was more capable than a single County in all but maybe NGS and helicopter support (irrelevant in a taskforce setting but easily fixed by deleting Limbo and installing a hanger) and was arguably as effective, if not more so, than a Type 42 and Ikara Leander operating in consort, as well as cheaper to own and operate. Considering the dramatic reduction in numbers, even after the compromises made to maintain them, it is clear in hindsight that choosing numbers over individual capability was a mistake.

It is really too bad the RN didn't manage to push through with their larger, more flexible designs and concepts, the Cruiser destroyers, DLGs, Escort Cruisers and support them with smaller less flexible vessels, the Type 19, or even and enhanced Type 21 and other new build types instead of the still very expensive but much more limited Type 42, Type 22 and 23, that were all progressively morphed into more GP vessels but never as capable or flexible as larger ships supported by smaller ships wouold have been.
 
Its all already on this forum, its also in Friedman and multiple other books. Bristol was expensive so to get more hulls Ikara and Sea Dart were split between multiple platforms.

In 1967 Bristol was projected at £20 million (already considered impractical) and ended up at £25 million. Type 42s were estimated at £15 million, it was cheaper and thus got more hull numbers.

Your opinion is not based in fact. Type 42s were successfully upgraded, it would have been no easier to upgrade a Type 82.

All of this is well documented, the relevant files are open and I and many others have read them, Friedman and others have used them to produce excellent narratives of the period.
 
I believe it would have been much easier to upgrade T82's rather than the T42's due to it's larger size. When limbo was deleted it would have been possible to have fitted STWS, there was also plenty of deck space to have fitted Phalanx without having to sacrifice boats. The removal of Ikara also opened up possibilities, I've wondered about the possibility of fitting a GWS26 VLS for Seawolf or the fitting of ABL for Tomahawk cruise missiles or alternatively the fitting of a large battery of Harpoon.

I realize these are cloud cuckoo land ideas, most of the refit's undertaken after the Falklands appear to have been to reduce the operating cost by deleting systems and allowing the reduction of manning levels. The only real upgrade Bristol received was the replacement of the 965 radar with 1022.
 
JFC Fuller said:
Its all already on this forum, its also in Friedman and multiple other books. Bristol was expensive so to get more hulls Ikara and Sea Dart were split between multiple platforms.

In 1967 Bristol was projected at £20 million (already considered impractical) and ended up at £25 million. Type 42s were estimated at £15 million, it was cheaper and thus got more hull numbers.

Your opinion is not based in fact. Type 42s were successfully upgraded, it would have been no easier to upgrade a Type 82.

All of this is well documented, the relevant files are open and I and many others have read them, Friedman and others have used them to produce excellent narratives of the period.
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Did you actually read my post? Your response appears to indicate you did not.

I stated " As for the Type 42s, yes they were retained in service far longer than intended, but as designed were not intended to be upgraded or improved during their service lives which drove up sustainment costs and resulted in compromises on capability."

As for fitting Ikara and Sea Dart to separate hulls some how being cheaper than building additional large ships I totally disagree. Look at the crew sizes alone, 250+ each for both the Sheffields and Leanders, vs just short of 400 for Bristol. Fuels costs, maintenance, cost and ease of upgrades. How about if you need to send a ship to a possible low to moderate threat conflict zone, with single role ships you really should send a task force, with multi role ships you can actually just send one. What if you needed NGS, area air defence, point defence , ASW and ASSM? Following your logic you would send a Type 42 and a Batch 1 Leander and a Batch II or III Leander, or even a County or a Type 22, yes much cheaper than a single large ship, well actually I think you could probably afford to send two Bristols or a Bristol and a notional County DDH Sea Wolf conversion instead.

Brown mentions, and if I recall correctly Friedman does as well, that political and civil / public service types have an aversion to large expensive ships, well large expensive single platforms of any type, irrespective of how effective they are compared to smaller, notionally cheaper alternatives. They simply do not understand that if a minimum overall capability is required greater numbers of less capable ships will rapidly become a more expensive, less flexible option than a smaller number of more expensive ships. Individually less capable ships are individually less capable which means their short falls have to be made up elsewhere or the missions that require those capabilities will not be possible. Because the same people who balk at buying capable but expensive ships are the ones who require the missions to be conducted they then need to approve other means of meeting the requirements, i.e. fitting Ikara to aging frigates and using them to escort the new cheap destroyers. Because neither the Type 42 or Ikara Leanders can easily embark Exocet you then need to add a Batch II or III Leander as well. There's another issue, Ikara works best with a helicopter fitted with a dunking sonar to localise the contact, where does that come from?

Yes this is hindsight but it is also common sense and was actually what many in the RN believed they needed and was the best way forward, its there in the works of Brown and Friedman. The RN saw the need for large multi role escorts and also for getting additional large ASW helicopters to sea as well. Even discounting the doomed desire for conventional carriers, the RN wanted helicopter carrying Escort Cruisers, Bristols and Type 19s.

It would be an interesting exercise to tally the costs of the proposed / desired fleet, verses the actual. This is why I ask such questions as how many improved Bristols could have been afforded instead of building the Type 42s and converting the Batch I Leanders. Using nothing more than the figures you provided above sixteen Type 42s at £15 million a piece providing a budget of £240 million, meaning nine Bristols at £25 million a piece. Factor in that repeats should be cheaper, even if modified, and that you would no longer need to fit Ikara to the Leanders means we are probably talking at least ten or maybe as many as twelve. Lets look at it from the crewing perspective, sixteen Type 42s with say 260 crewmen each, that's 4160 plus 397 for Bristol, that's ten ships, not counting the Leanders which could be retained as GP frigates, or given a batch II or III upgrade instead, they could even be sold overseas as is freeing up crew and cash for additional Bristols, Type 19s, 21s, or 22s.

I know I will not change your mind but that's not really an issue because what I am after is a discussion and usable data to determine what could have actually been afforded had the UK continued to build and develop, not just Bristols, but larger, more capable multi role ships. If you don't want to participate, that fine, if you think I'm an ill informed tosser that's up to you, I really don't care. What I am interested in is extrapolating the aborted plans and concepts of the past, particularly in the case of ideas that keep coming up again and again, i.e. larger more capable and flexible escorts that are invariably shelved in favour of cheaper, less capable ones that are intended to be more numerous but rarely manage to be.

Actually, the Type 42 was meant to be followed by the vastly more capable Type 43, Brown doesn't mention how many were desired but obviously they were seen as a complement to the Type 42. Were they a replacement for the Counties and/or an alternative to the Batch III Sheffields, this would suggest eight to twelve hulls planned. Had the Bristols been continued would these ships have followed them or been subsumed by additional evolved Bristols as the greater capability of the lager ships made them unnecessary with the Bristols being upgraded to Sea Dart II.
 
I read your post, it was just a repeat of the previously incorrect content from your previous one. Bolding and underlining incorrect text does not make it correct. Type 42s were no more or less designed for upgrades and modifications than Bristol yet they were successfully upgraded and there was no particular cost associated with them being upgraded that would not also have been present with Bristol.

The history of the period is well documented with a wealth of excellently researched books having been produced by some outstanding authors. The basic reality remains the same, the RN needed hull numbers in order to meets its commitments, it could not do that with Type 82s (this was discovered even prior to CVA01 cancellation); there is an entire file in the national archives at Kew containing the documents that outline this and this is referenced by Friedman and Ed Hampshire, the data exists in archive form and has been published. It was an internal RN analysis that produced the T42 not some political/civil service conspiracy.
 
Voldakov if you want to discus alternative history then go to the alternative history section of this site. You have a case but this is not the section to explore it.
 
JFC Fuller said:
I read your post, it was just a repeat of the previously incorrect content from your previous one. Bolding and underlining incorrect text does not make it correct. Type 42s were no more or less designed for upgrades and modifications than Bristol yet they were successfully upgraded and there was no particular cost associated with them being upgraded that would not also have been present with Bristol.

The history of the period is well documented with a wealth of excellently researched books having been produced by some outstanding authors. The basic reality remains the same, the RN needed hull numbers in order to meets its commitments, it could not do that with Type 82s (this was discovered even prior to CVA01 cancellation); there is an entire file in the national archives at Kew containing the documents that outline this and this is referenced by Friedman and Ed Hampshire, the data exists in archive form and has been published. It was an internal RN analysis that produced the T42 not some political/civil service conspiracy.
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I assume "Rebuilding the Royal Navy Warship Design Since 1945" is one of the "excellently researched books having been produced by some outstanding authors" you were referring to, please reread chapter 6 Sea Dart Destroyers, because you and I obviously have interpreted it very differently. Unless of course you are claiming to be more knowledgeable than David Brown and that he was in fact incorrect. I have been buying and reading books by Friedman and Co. since before I went to Uni and regularly refer back to them when discussing relevant topics.

I haven't read the archives you have, I even envy your opportunity to have done so and greatly appreciate you sharing the knowledge, which is one of the reasons I joined the site. I am however put out by your attitude and tone, I have worked for many years with people who actually do the things you write about and not one of them exhibits the arrogance and hubris you exhibit at times.

What, may I ask, do you do besides read archives? For my part I built, maintained, upgraded, certified ships and submarines, I participated in CDRs, pilots and authored, updated and reviewed corporate and project plans, I also audited project elements and managed continuous improvement projects. I, while not at the level of Brown, or others like him (including some quite exceptional individuals I have had the good fortune of working with over the years whose experience and competence dwarfs mine), am intimately aware of what goes into designing, building, maintaining and upgrading modern warships and while I do not doubt that there are others on here with similar or greater knowledge I do not appreciate your "go suck eggs" tone.

In essence I spent years creating (and accessing for project reasons) the sort of records your inevitable successors (in a couple of decades time when they are declassified) will be digging out of archives to find out the truth of what happened on particular projects. This doesn't mean I don't admire the information that members on here have been able to uncover, or that I don't appreciate the analysis that follows. I love coming on this site and encountering things of which I had never been aware, what I do not enjoy is being shut down and dismissed in what appears to be little more than one upmanship.

Zen, fair comment, some of what I have written (to illustrate what I have been unsuccessfully trying to get across to JFC Fuller) is definitely in the realms of "what if" so I will do my best to avoid straying in future. My interest in this thread is the fact that a stretched Type 82 was investigated, a ship that could easily have been a contemporary to the USN Kidd Class, and fits the model of the sort of ship my experience has taught me that navies definitely desire, as they have been proven (given the same, or similar core systems) to provide greater capability and flexibility, for longer at lower cost. I am particularly interested in the costing side of things and what is and is not included, as I have seen first hand how political factors have driven up in service costs and impaired performance, ultimately increasing cost of ownership and am curious to what degree this occurred on the projects discussed in this thread.

In a nutshell I believe a stretched Type 82 would not only have been more capable than the ships actually acquired but would also have been better value for money. I am trying to discuss this in a reasonable manner and hope that others may have access to information I do not, or am simply unaware of, that will help me prove or disprove my hypothesis. Steel is cheap and air is free is a commonly used phrase that is mostly, in my experience correct, in particular in the case of vessels intended to serve more than 25 years. Where it is not so true is when the service life is not expected to be longer than the systems life, i.e. less than 25 years or even down to 15 or so years. I have worked on projects that the intended service life was 30 years plus and others with an expected 14 years plus a possible 7 year extension (that turned out to be over optimistic) and the way the ships are designed and built is very different as a result, something most are unaware of. This is the sort of stuff I am interested in and how it affected procurement, verses through life costs and the ability to upgrade and life extend various designs, in this case the actual and stretched Type 82 and the Type 42.
 
1) This isn't the thread for this and you have laid waste to one that was perfectly serviceable until you got to it

2) Pointing out that you are wrong isn't arrogant ; Type 82 was un-affordable in the required numbers, thats why the RN only built one and then transitioned to the frigate destroyer force in the late 1960s then maintained that all the way through to today.
 
JFC Fuller said:
1) This isn't the thread for this and you have laid waste to one that was perfectly serviceable until you got to it

2) Pointing out that you are wrong isn't arrogant ; Type 82 was un-affordable in the required numbers, thats why the RN only built one and then transitioned to the frigate destroyer force in the late 1960s then maintained that all the way through to today.
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1) Saying I have laid waste to the thread is arrogant and somewhat childish, sounds like something my six year old would do, I cut the toast into rectangles instead of triangles so now he can't eat it. I'm used to arguing with children as well as adult who choose to cherry pick to win points instead of discussing things in a mature manner.

2) You believing me to be wrong doesn't actually mean I am wrong, all it means is you think I am. Saying I am wrong and making sweeping claims that it has all been discussed before means nothing when you are unwilling or unable to provide supporting references or data. Besides you have not responded to my point that the text I underlined was conclusions drawn from a chapter from Browns Rebuilding the RN. Please feel free to refer to it, reread it (I assume you have read it) and rebut my assumptions with your own interpretations.

3) I am beginning to suspect that you have holes in your knowledge and experience base that prevents you from actually comprehending what I am discussing. Do you have any project of industry experience? have you ever worked on a major, or even minor defence project, or perhaps even in automotive, civil construction, oil and gas, mining, or power generation? I would hope that if you had you would be able to understand the difference a planned life cycle make to a design, is it planned to replace the asset / facility / infrastructure at a certain point, or is it intended to upgrade it to meet changing circumstances and evolving requirements. This is bread and butter to me but I have witnessed the difficulty some from outside those types of industries have adapting.

4) You disagreeing with me and baiting me with condescending, if infantile, one upmanship puts me in good company as I have noticed that the members you tend to argue with the most often are among those I respect the most. Its a bit of a shame really as I participate to discuss and learn while you seem to glory in lecturing and shutting down discussions, I have read back far enough to see you do this with various members over and over again in multiple threads going back years, in fact didn't you originally post under Sealord Lawrence? You would have a lot more credibility if you didn't argue with the same vehemence on shaky ground and opinion as when you have established and supported facts supporting you.
 
And I suppose the earth is flat as well.

You'd probably win a pub debate with a drunken audience of your mates but as far as reasoned discussions go you suck.

If anyone has killed this thread its you Walter, there were a number of responses to my query before you chipped in, a bit like when the boring old conservative uncle intrudes on the conversation at the family gathering, everyone just drifts away, desperate not to make eye contact, while he is focused on trying to assert himself over the young upstart.

Anyway I've just emailed off my article so time to go to bed and get some shuteye, I may come and play tomorrow and see if the other have come back or if they are still avoiding you. I strongly suspect that if you pulled your head in or just went away, you know "if you don't have anything nice to say...." the thread would come back to life quite nicely. Actually why don't we try that, you go away for say a week, don't comment on this thread at all and see if it comes back to life, I suspect it would.
 
Nope, the Earth is round, and the RN abandoned the Type 82 because its cost made it impossible to build it in sufficient numbers as outlined by surviving documents at Kew and referenced in works by both Ed Hampshire and Norman Friedman. It is also hinted at in Rebuilding the Royal Navy which gives useful cost numbers.
 
JFC Fuller said:
Nope, the Earth is round, and the RN abandoned the Type 82 because its cost made it impossible to build it in sufficient numbers as outlined by surviving documents at Kew and referenced in works by both Ed Hampshire and Norman Friedman. It is also hinted at in Rebuilding the Royal Navy which gives useful cost numbers.
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That's it in a nutshell, "surviving documents", you really don't know and are just assuming that the surviving documents provide you with the whole story, irrespective of what was actually discussed, planned or aspired to at the time. You could phrase your responses along the lines of, "I have seen/found no evidence of that....surviving records suggest.....I really don't think so....In my opinion" but instead you take the line "you are wrong....you have laid waste to....previously incorrect....your opinion is not based on fact...etc". See the difference?

You style is childish, the sort of ridiculous attempts of meritless point scoring that make modern politics so frustrating and ineffective. It is more important to you to appear to be right and to appear to know more than to actually contribute to an open discussion that increase knowledge and understanding, you would rather shout down than discuss.

I've provided my background and asked you yours but you do not answer. Instead you choose to continue to restate the same insufficient non answer over and over again. I conceded that the Type 82 was more expensive to procure to but wanted to discuss in greater depth whether this would still be the case when assessing the total capability cost of a class of up to a dozen large multi role platforms verses two dozen smaller single role ones, but you continued with it was too expensive, its too expensive, its too expensive; saying it over and over again doesn't make it true, it just demonstrates an unwillingness or in ability to look outside the square (or the archive) to discuss and analyse other possibilities and interpretations.

No analysis, no justification, no attempt to explain where you are coming from which leads me to wonder if you really have any understanding of warship requirements formulation, design, construction, let alone operational matters or through life considerations. In this you strike me more as an accountant looking at ledgers than any sort of expert (yes I've worked with them too and seen the results when the true experts were unable to "sell" the need go big).

I have dealt with a supply chain "expert" who sort of reminds me of you. He stated he was not going to do a single thing I was explaining that he needed to do because it wasn't in the contract, to which I responded that it was in the contract, he then yelled (thumping a copy of the lead contract sitting on his desk between each word) "WERE . DOES . IT . SAY . IN . THIS . DOC . U . MENT . ON . MY . DESK . THAT . I . HAVE . TO . DO . ANY . OF . THAT", "IF . IT . IS . NOT . WRITTEN . NEITHER . I . OR . ANY . OF . MY . MAN . AGE . RS . WILL . WASTE . ONE . SEC . OND . ON . IT". I reached across, picked up his copy of the lead contract (that I suspect he had printed purely as a prop), opened it to the appropriate section outlining the contractual obligations of the shipbuilder, showed him the line that stated "shall demonstrate compliance to all contracted requirements", turned to the appendix listing said requirements and handed it back to him.

It not only had to be written for him to believe it, it had to be shown to him and explained. Simply discussing it with him wasn't enough, providing him with a government endorsed Plan, signed off by the Chief of Naval Engineering wasn't enough, in his blinkered world it had to be in the contract and in the end had to be explained to him by his functional manager (a company director and board member) before he believed it. Very very good at asserting his opinion, very very good at drama and shutting others down, exceptional at winning arguments and limiting what he was actually responsible and / or accountable for, but frigging useless at what he was actually hired to do. Fortunately you are not as important as he was, I mean its not like you are in a position to order several million dollars worth of non conforming material, from a dodgy facility in China, without giving the build assurance group a chance to assess the supplier, but you do rub me up the same way as this goose did.

Anyway, nuff said, I'm bored of this, I want to talk about ships not your failings and how you remind me of dangerously arrogant individuals I have encountered professionally.
 
zen said:
Voldakov

Still not the thread or the section for this.

If you have not the desire to start your own thread, then I suggest you look at existing ones in the correct section of this site.

I shall even recommend....

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,18223.0.html

Thanks for that, great read! ;D

I will have a think on where this best belongs as it is really turning into a marine engineering / capability development discussion of the merits of large/capable/flexible but individually expensive, verses smaller/less capable/ less flexible but more numerous and individually cheaper, or even long service life with planned midlife modernisation, verses, short service life with no midlife modernisation.

I do wonder if Mr Mitty will let anyone discuss any of this anywhere though as he does seem to see himself as a bit of a thought policeman.
and

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,26547.0.html
Click to expand...
 
And again, Type 82 was too expensive and would have resulted in a dramatic reduction in available RN escorts, thats why it was abandoned, this is discussed by both Ed Hampshire and Norman Friedman.
Click to expand...
In fairness, part of Volkodav's argument is that the loss in hull numbers would be compensated for by an increase in capability of individual hulls. I'm not entirely sold on that argument - probably valid in wartime, but for the RN in peacetime and in that era, there were a lot of 'presence' missions where any hull, however limited the capability, was perceived as better than no hull at all.

Comparing actual costs is difficult due to inflation, it's probably fair to base it on acceptance dates. BRISTOL came in at £24,217,000 in 1972, whilst SHEFFIELD was £23,200,000 in 1975 - equivalent to £17 million in 1972. On the same metric, BROADSWORD came in at £27.8 million in 1972 prices, more than BRISTOL. That gives you 21 Type 82 for the price of 14 Type 42 and 10 Type 22.

For that, you get
  • 7 more Sea Dart systems, with nearly 3 times as many missiles
  • 10 more 4.5" Mk 8 guns
  • 21 more Ikara systems

In exchange, you lose
  • 3 hulls, more or less equivalent to 1 deployment
  • At least 24 helicopters, potentially 34 depending on how you count the Type 22s
  • 20 Sea Wolf systems (on 10 ships)
  • 6 towed array sonars

The hull numbers are actually more or less a wash, and it's not obvious to me that the gains are worth the losses. Quite possibly the opposite, in fact - you lose a lot of ASW capability and don't add that much in AAW. You also add a requirement to run steam machinery at considerable cost and manpower.

You could, theoretically, design a GT-powered ship with Type 82-like capabilities, plus a helicopter, towed array and Sea Wolf. It would be a completely new design, and very expensive indeed.
 
The main concerns at this time were hull numbers and manpower.
The RN (and all NATO) navies had to declare ships to SACLANT and other related geographical commands and these took the form of hull numbers. If you look at the Canadian DDG thread and look at the PhD thesis linked there, you'll find it was the same in the RCN. Hull numbers drove everything, if a NATO commitment was 40 escorts then you needed to find 40 ships or argue an alternative. At the time of Type 82s genesis the RN still had a global fleet and escort requirements. There just would never be enough dual-purpose ships to fill the shrinking numbers of escorts despite the need for them. At this time Atlantic convoying and ASW was still the main Atlantic role. Type 82 seems really to have been a high-end flotilla flagship and carrier escort. A split Seadart destroyer and Ikara destroyer/frigate made sense in that both ships could be deployed wherever their roles were most demanded.

Manpower was the other problem, the Type 82 was expensive to man and expensive to run (Bristol seems to have been very buggy and never really became an operational warship). As has been pointed out earlier, it was simply too big for the available British gas turbines at a time when the RN wanted to move to all gas turbines to cut fuel costs and manpower (engineering staff especially). Type 82 was just too big to work well as a mass produced ship, Ikara was perhaps the most un-compact ASW missile of its era, it required a different Sea Dart mounting, still had Limbo which was by then an anachronism and once Type 988 had been cancelled the ship was probably too large in having been designed for its antenna (weight, volume and topweight).

Also, inflation and national economics meant that salami slicing was likely to be the order of the day. Type 42's hull was chopped for no good reason other than to appease the Whitehall beancounters, I thin kin that kind of scenario a fleet of Type 82s was very unlikely. I think the Type 42 and Type 19 split probably made the most sense, but of course eventually even one of those had to be cut.
 
RLBH,

Your numbers are not that far out; whenever same year cost numbers are seen for the Type 82 and Type 42 they show a Type 42 being roughly 60% the cost of a Type 82. (Figures in Friedman and Rebuilding the RN). For instance, the 1967 estimates have Type 82 at £17 million and Type 42 at £10.5 million. Type 42s were designed to (it varied as the specification shifted) between £10.5 and £12 million and were £13.5 by the end of 1968. HMS Cardiff seems to have been ordered on a tender price of £15 million (but ended up twice that, apparently due primarily to labour shortages). Ed Hampshire describes the Type 42 as being half the cost of a Type 82.

Your capabilities list is quite comprehensive but there is one piece missing. All to often forgotten is that the Type 42 had the same sonar fit as HMS Bristol, it just used Lynx and onboard torpedo tubes for ASW weapons delivery so once you get past the headline of the Ikara system you actually find that you lose a significant amount of ASW capability too by having fewer Bristol's rather than more Type 42s.

Type 82 seems to be a lesson in what happens when you design a ship without actually stopping to worry about the costs until its too late. Type 82 started out as a Leander replacement, by mid-1963 it was estimated as being as much as three times as expensive as a Leander and in 1965 the design was estimated as being as expensive as a County class destroyer- and the cost just kept going up. It really is no wonder that the NIGS concept never went anywhere in that context. The decision to pursue smaller all gas-turbine ships was a very sensible move that paid dividends for the next three decades. Possibly the only significant change I would make would be to have listened to some of the voices within the RN design community that were pushing for a bit more length (30 or 40ft depending on the source) and displacement (about 600 tons according to R.J Daniel) in the initial Type 42 design.
 
JFC Fuller said:
Your numbers are not that far out; whenever same year cost numbers are seen for the Type 82 and Type 42 they show a Type 42 being roughly 60% the cost of a Type 82. (Figures in Friedman and Rebuilding the RN). For instance, the 1967 estimates have Type 82 at £17 million and Type 42 at £10.5 million. Type 42s were designed to (it varied as the specification shifted) between £10.5 and £12 million and were £13.5 by the end of 1968. HMS Cardiff seems to have been ordered on a tender price of £15 million (but ended up twice that, apparently due primarily to labour shortages). Ed Hampshire describes the Type 42 as being half the cost of a Type 82.
Click to expand...
It's actually quite illuminating to see just how expensive a Type 22 was - more than a Type 82! But then they were very advanced ships for their day.
Your capabilities list is quite comprehensive but there is one piece missing. All to often forgotten is that the Type 42 had the same sonar fit as HMS Bristol, it just used Lynx and onboard torpedo tubes for ASW weapons delivery so once you get past the headline of the Ikara system you actually find that you lose a significant amount of ASW capability too by having fewer Bristol's rather than more Type 42s.
Click to expand...
It's there implicitly; I think you could quite easily argue either way for Lynx or Ikara but at the end of the day Lynx could be had on a smaller and cheaper ship than the British interpretation of Ikara!

The sheer profligacy of some of the ASW equivalents to Type 42 - thinking here of DS 381 - is astonishing. Ikara, Lynx and double Limbo is definitely one, and probably two, weapon systems too many.
 
Gentlemen,

I must admit to being puzzled as to why you both are getting so worked up. The question that I posed remains on the table.

Somewhere there must be someone who knows what a stretched Type 82 with helo deck might have looked like. I accept that
no drawings may have been done, and that it may have just been a series of numbers and stats.

Furthermore, let us get some perspective, we are talking about a possible project fifty years after it was looked at. I cannot really
see why we need to get worked up. I for one just see it as a bit of harmless historical interest.
 
That's quite interesting, probably makes a good argument that warship costs don't follow the retail price index. Which is fair, I can't remember the last time I saw corvettes on BOGOF at Tesco.
 

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