Preserving the US ICBM Force ?
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Byeman said:
You need to read my original post again and comprehend what I was SPECIFICALLY saying.
And that is there has never been a full range, over the pole missile shot with an active nuclear warhead that has successfully attacked a silo YET some on this sight are saying how seemingly EASY it would be to destroy our 450 ICBMs.
Yet Russia has claimed to have tracked Tridents (true or not true not me to say) on numerous occasion and have been close enough to torpedo them AND YET finding and sinking an SSBN is said to be IMPOSSIBLE.
AND that feeds back to my specific argument that having Triad including modernized ICBMs ADDS strong redundancy and resiliency to our deterrent at a VERY LOW cost overall.
We, therefore, don't gain anything from their elimination, yet adds IMHO tremendous risk by having all our warheads on 7 to 10 targets.
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Hell, look at all the firepower the US has had on call, essentially unopposed, in the Iraq wars. Even then they didn't kill 450 hard targets in the space of 2 minutes. (And nevermind the fact that if ICBMs were on the way to our missile fields we'd launch. 
This ain't 1960 and we could certainly get visual confirmation of an incoming strike to enable launch on warning.)
This ain't 1960 and we could certainly get visual confirmation of an incoming strike to enable launch on warning.)
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Byeman said:
If that's all that mattered, sure. There's this little problem of a decrepit industrial base that needs work though. Russia and China are both producing new ICBMs we need to reconstitute our ability to design and build them. And since we've already lost so much expertise you can be sure it won't be cheap.
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sferrin said:
Recent estimates would be around $20 billion more than a full refurbishment of MMIII so at a $4 Trillion federal budget and $17 Trillion economy IT IS relatively cheap for the defense of this great nation.
See my post over at Nuclear Weapons News about how much cheaper our nuke forces are then historically.
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If it were me, I'd refurb all the Minutman silos to be able to cold-launch Peacekeeper sized ICBMs. (How many did they have to destroy per treaty?) Then I'd shuttle 100 Peacekeeper sized missiles amongst them and blow the dust off Midgetman. 300 Midgetmen & 100 Peacekeepers. Use the increased throw weight of the larger missiles to enable the deployment of powered, manuevering RVs and/or higher yield warheads. Also keep the ability to swap that out for 10-15 RVs.
Way to over the top. It is not worth the extra cost. 300 Midgetmen & 100 Peacekeepers does not significantly increase the security of the USA over 450 MMIII with or with multiple RV's, and actually would decrease it due to the increase in national debt.
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Any increase in national debt would be chump change compared to even foodstamps. And not "over the top" in the least. It's not really much more than Russia has right now. Also, it would give us many more options and restore industrial base experience.Byeman said:
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Are Nuclear Weapons Getting a Smaller Slice of the U.S. Budget Pie?
March 3, 2014
By Douglas P. Guarino
Global Security Newswire
A B-52 bomber being prepared for refueling in 2002. The aircraft type has been in service since the 1950s, when nuclear weapons spending accounted for a larger percentage of the federal budget. A B-52 bomber being prepared for refueling in 2002. The aircraft type has been in service since the 1950s, when nuclear weapons spending accounted for a larger percentage of the federal budget. (Greg M. Kobashigawa/USAF/Getty Images) Has the percentage of U.S. federal budget dollars devoted to nuclear weapons activities declined in recent decades? The answer, generally speaking, is yes, but what that means and whether it matters depends on who you talk to. Sherman McCorkle cited the issue in an interview last month with Global Security Newswire. He leads a new Strategic Deterrent Coalition that is looking to convince Americans that maintaining existing nuclear weapons is essential to national security. McCorkle was asked to respond to growing concerns that an increasingly tight budget environment would make it impossible to follow through on the government's current plans for modernizing the nuclear arsenal. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, for instance, released a report last month asserting the current plan would cost at least $1 trillion over the next 30 years and would be fiscally impossible to implement.
McCorkle, chairman and CEO of the Sandia Science & Technology Park Development Corporation, said he doesn't put too much stock in such studies. His company is located near the Energy Department's Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, which works on nuclear arsenal-related projects. "I think most people in America have learned over the last three or four decades that [for] anybody's point of view, there can be a study that would support that view," he said. "There are as many studies are there are points of view." McCorkle added that over time, nuclear arms have taken a shrinking portion of the federal budget pie. "If you track in cost and dollars going back to the 60s, 70s, 80s … the cost of the nuclear deterrent vis a vis the total defense budget or vis a vis the United States budget … is a smaller percentage now than it was then. … It's a decreasing amount of both our defense budget and our national budget." While exact figures on all nuclear weapons-related expenditures can be difficult to pin down, nuclear-weapons activities do generally account for a smaller percentage of the U.S. defense budget today than they did in past decades. For example, in 1962, the military's strategic forces budget was $10.6 billion, or about 22 percent of the Defense Department's total $48.4 billion budget that year, according to Defense budget documents. The now-defunct Atomic Energy Commission, meanwhile, spent roughly an additional $10 billion on nuclear warhead activities, according to Stephen Schwartz, editor of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies' Nonproliferation Review. This means that, in 1962, nuclear weapons spending amounted to more than $20 billion, or roughly 18 percent of a $106 billion federal budget that year. This was at the height of the Cold War, when the United States was building up its nuclear arsenal in competition with the Soviet Union, the world's other superpower. In 2012 -- more than two decades after the Cold War ended -- the strategic forces budget was $12.6 billion, less than 2 percent of the $652 billion in defense spending that year. The Energy Department spent an additional $16.8 billion, meaning total nuclear weapons spending amounted to about $29.4 billion -- roughly 0.8 percent of all federal expenditures. These numbers are far from a perfect representation of nuclear weapons costs however, budget experts say. For example, the strategic forces budget includes things like B-1 bomber aircraft, which can fly long distances but no longer carry nuclear weapons. It also includes B-52 bomber aircraft, some of which no longer carry nuclear weapons, and also four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines that have been converted to conventional missions only.
Also, of the $16.8 billion the Energy Department spent on nuclear defense activities, only $7.2 billion were directly tied to the nuclear stockpile, said Schwartz. "The other costs are important and related in various ways to the nuclear stockpile and nuclear security generally, but in all but a few cases they are costs we would continue to bear even if we gave up nuclear weapons tomorrow," he said. On the other hand, the 2012 strategic forces spending figure excludes several key items, such as costs associated with nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the United States and Europe, and relevant intelligence operations. "If just 10 percent of the total current intelligence budget were allocated to the nuclear mission -- a figure that may well be too low based on historical precedent -- the nuclear weapons budget would increase by $7.5 billion," said Schwartz. However, "it is dramatically true" that the percentage of federal spending that nuclear-weapons activities account for is less than it once was, said Russell Rumbaugh, director of budgeting for foreign affairs and defense at the Stimson Center. This is "largely because the size of the U.S. budget has increased so much," he added.
Whether the reduced percentage of budget dollars spent on nuclear arms over time suggests that the sector should be spared any cuts in the years to come -- as McCorkle suggests -- is another question, however. Benjamin Loehrke, senior policy analyst for the Ploughshares Fund, argues that they do not. "I'm skeptical of what can be learned from such comparisons," Loehrke told GSN. "Of course the percentage is in relative decline. At the height of the Cold War, the nuclear arsenal was irrationally big and extremely expensive." According to Loehrke, the comparison "tells you nothing about how many nuclear weapons we need today and how much the U.S. should spend on them." Such "strategic questions are more relevant than Cold War budget nostalgia," he says. Schwartz notes that, in 1962, the United States had 25,540 operational warheads -- as opposed to 4,680 in 2012. "The percentage figures say very little about trends, actual amounts of spending, or decisionmakers' views of the overall importance of the program, or lack thereof, across time," he argued. "As the federal budget expanded with the cost of the Vietnam War, the Great Society, etc., the relative percentage of everything else -- including nuclear weapons -- shrank," said Schwartz. "It's entirely possible for actual nuclear weapons spending to go up even as its share of the federal budget -- or the overall DOD budget -- goes down." According to Schwartz, current Energy Department weapons spending is nearly $2 million more than the average annual expenditures for the same activities during the Cold War, when adjusted for inflation.
He offered an analogy. "If I make $100,000 a year and spend $5,000 annually on a home security system, it doesn't follow that if I get a new job that pays me $200,000 a year that I need to double what I spend on home security for the same house in order to maintain the same percentage to keep my family and possessions as safe as they were before I began earning more," Schwartz said.
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I say go back to the 60's and have the same percentage of the defense budget 22% and that would equate to a nuke weapons budget of $115.5 billion.
Could easily afford sferrin's PK and Midgetman force and deployment structure along with a few hundred 'prompt global strike' missiles at Vandy B)
March 3, 2014
By Douglas P. Guarino
Global Security Newswire
A B-52 bomber being prepared for refueling in 2002. The aircraft type has been in service since the 1950s, when nuclear weapons spending accounted for a larger percentage of the federal budget. A B-52 bomber being prepared for refueling in 2002. The aircraft type has been in service since the 1950s, when nuclear weapons spending accounted for a larger percentage of the federal budget. (Greg M. Kobashigawa/USAF/Getty Images) Has the percentage of U.S. federal budget dollars devoted to nuclear weapons activities declined in recent decades? The answer, generally speaking, is yes, but what that means and whether it matters depends on who you talk to. Sherman McCorkle cited the issue in an interview last month with Global Security Newswire. He leads a new Strategic Deterrent Coalition that is looking to convince Americans that maintaining existing nuclear weapons is essential to national security. McCorkle was asked to respond to growing concerns that an increasingly tight budget environment would make it impossible to follow through on the government's current plans for modernizing the nuclear arsenal. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, for instance, released a report last month asserting the current plan would cost at least $1 trillion over the next 30 years and would be fiscally impossible to implement.
McCorkle, chairman and CEO of the Sandia Science & Technology Park Development Corporation, said he doesn't put too much stock in such studies. His company is located near the Energy Department's Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, which works on nuclear arsenal-related projects. "I think most people in America have learned over the last three or four decades that [for] anybody's point of view, there can be a study that would support that view," he said. "There are as many studies are there are points of view." McCorkle added that over time, nuclear arms have taken a shrinking portion of the federal budget pie. "If you track in cost and dollars going back to the 60s, 70s, 80s … the cost of the nuclear deterrent vis a vis the total defense budget or vis a vis the United States budget … is a smaller percentage now than it was then. … It's a decreasing amount of both our defense budget and our national budget." While exact figures on all nuclear weapons-related expenditures can be difficult to pin down, nuclear-weapons activities do generally account for a smaller percentage of the U.S. defense budget today than they did in past decades. For example, in 1962, the military's strategic forces budget was $10.6 billion, or about 22 percent of the Defense Department's total $48.4 billion budget that year, according to Defense budget documents. The now-defunct Atomic Energy Commission, meanwhile, spent roughly an additional $10 billion on nuclear warhead activities, according to Stephen Schwartz, editor of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies' Nonproliferation Review. This means that, in 1962, nuclear weapons spending amounted to more than $20 billion, or roughly 18 percent of a $106 billion federal budget that year. This was at the height of the Cold War, when the United States was building up its nuclear arsenal in competition with the Soviet Union, the world's other superpower. In 2012 -- more than two decades after the Cold War ended -- the strategic forces budget was $12.6 billion, less than 2 percent of the $652 billion in defense spending that year. The Energy Department spent an additional $16.8 billion, meaning total nuclear weapons spending amounted to about $29.4 billion -- roughly 0.8 percent of all federal expenditures. These numbers are far from a perfect representation of nuclear weapons costs however, budget experts say. For example, the strategic forces budget includes things like B-1 bomber aircraft, which can fly long distances but no longer carry nuclear weapons. It also includes B-52 bomber aircraft, some of which no longer carry nuclear weapons, and also four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines that have been converted to conventional missions only.
Also, of the $16.8 billion the Energy Department spent on nuclear defense activities, only $7.2 billion were directly tied to the nuclear stockpile, said Schwartz. "The other costs are important and related in various ways to the nuclear stockpile and nuclear security generally, but in all but a few cases they are costs we would continue to bear even if we gave up nuclear weapons tomorrow," he said. On the other hand, the 2012 strategic forces spending figure excludes several key items, such as costs associated with nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the United States and Europe, and relevant intelligence operations. "If just 10 percent of the total current intelligence budget were allocated to the nuclear mission -- a figure that may well be too low based on historical precedent -- the nuclear weapons budget would increase by $7.5 billion," said Schwartz. However, "it is dramatically true" that the percentage of federal spending that nuclear-weapons activities account for is less than it once was, said Russell Rumbaugh, director of budgeting for foreign affairs and defense at the Stimson Center. This is "largely because the size of the U.S. budget has increased so much," he added.
Whether the reduced percentage of budget dollars spent on nuclear arms over time suggests that the sector should be spared any cuts in the years to come -- as McCorkle suggests -- is another question, however. Benjamin Loehrke, senior policy analyst for the Ploughshares Fund, argues that they do not. "I'm skeptical of what can be learned from such comparisons," Loehrke told GSN. "Of course the percentage is in relative decline. At the height of the Cold War, the nuclear arsenal was irrationally big and extremely expensive." According to Loehrke, the comparison "tells you nothing about how many nuclear weapons we need today and how much the U.S. should spend on them." Such "strategic questions are more relevant than Cold War budget nostalgia," he says. Schwartz notes that, in 1962, the United States had 25,540 operational warheads -- as opposed to 4,680 in 2012. "The percentage figures say very little about trends, actual amounts of spending, or decisionmakers' views of the overall importance of the program, or lack thereof, across time," he argued. "As the federal budget expanded with the cost of the Vietnam War, the Great Society, etc., the relative percentage of everything else -- including nuclear weapons -- shrank," said Schwartz. "It's entirely possible for actual nuclear weapons spending to go up even as its share of the federal budget -- or the overall DOD budget -- goes down." According to Schwartz, current Energy Department weapons spending is nearly $2 million more than the average annual expenditures for the same activities during the Cold War, when adjusted for inflation.
He offered an analogy. "If I make $100,000 a year and spend $5,000 annually on a home security system, it doesn't follow that if I get a new job that pays me $200,000 a year that I need to double what I spend on home security for the same house in order to maintain the same percentage to keep my family and possessions as safe as they were before I began earning more," Schwartz said.
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I say go back to the 60's and have the same percentage of the defense budget 22% and that would equate to a nuke weapons budget of $115.5 billion.
Could easily afford sferrin's PK and Midgetman force and deployment structure along with a few hundred 'prompt global strike' missiles at Vandy B)
sferrin said:
It doesn't matter what rest of the budget is for. It isn't handouts vs defense. It is planes, tanks and soldiers vs ICBMs' and 300 Midgetmen & 100 Peacekeepers does not significantly increase the security of the USA over 450 MMIII with a fixed budget.
Who cares if Russia has more? That is not the issue. And they aren't the real threat, it is not an aerial delivery but a smuggled device
marauder2048
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I think the advent of reliable HTK ABM and the end of the ABM treaty collective makes a fixed (and suitably hardened) silo-based ICBM force quite survivable and affordable.
As sferrin and other have pointed out, destroying a silo pretty much requires a nuke whereas destroying a sub or other mobile launcher can be done anonymously and deniably with conventional weapons.
Since HTK ABM doesn't require a nuclear weapons release and can be built in (affordable) quantities to cover all of the silos at all of the fields, it provides the national command authority with greater flexibility and a less compressed time scale in which to react and respond. It also permits for a greater degree of silo hardening (at the cost of response time) since the ICBM force doesn't have to launch-under-attack in order to survive. I regard this combination as stabilizing.
I think a missile capable of launching south and/or performing plane changes with a single 475 kt MaRV (capable of evasion and accuracy adjustments) would suffice.
Certain consideration should probably be given to commonality with the Trident D5 successor.
As sferrin and other have pointed out, destroying a silo pretty much requires a nuke whereas destroying a sub or other mobile launcher can be done anonymously and deniably with conventional weapons.
Since HTK ABM doesn't require a nuclear weapons release and can be built in (affordable) quantities to cover all of the silos at all of the fields, it provides the national command authority with greater flexibility and a less compressed time scale in which to react and respond. It also permits for a greater degree of silo hardening (at the cost of response time) since the ICBM force doesn't have to launch-under-attack in order to survive. I regard this combination as stabilizing.
I think a missile capable of launching south and/or performing plane changes with a single 475 kt MaRV (capable of evasion and accuracy adjustments) would suffice.
Certain consideration should probably be given to commonality with the Trident D5 successor.
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Orionblamblam said:
Oh, you've recognise the flaw in your original claims have you? So you admit it is much more technically difficult than your hand waving said it was? How unsurprising.
Further than your narrow track satellite's field of view perhaps? Of course, if your satellite is in that low an Earth orbit, how long before it has to be replaced because of orbital decay? Ooops! Another technical problem which adds considerable expense to your plan...
So, we have 40 years before we have to worry? Wow, you seemed to implying it was already possible to track SSBNs. You mean it isn't? Doesn't that just reinforce the point that today, now and for the foreseeable future you can't track them? Doesn't that destroy your argument? :
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bobbymike said:
Perhaps you'd care to explain why the UK abandoned the silo based ballistic missile in the 1960s after they'd invented it?
Might it be, because they realised just how vulnerable a stationary, static missile in a hole in the ground was?
So, what has changed in the last 50 years? The attacking missiles are even more accurate now. The reconnaissance systems can find and pinpoint the silos for even better accuracy now. So, why would missiles sitting in holes in the ground be any less vulnerable now than they were then?
Silo based missiles haven't been attacked but then we haven't had a general nuclear exchange of strategic nuclear weapons which has made it necessary to attack them.
No one claimed it was impossible. The claim was "virtually impossible". There is a difference. :
That is not what was claimed by several people here. They implied it was easy. That it could be easily done.
MIGHT become "more vulnerable". Which means they are presently invulnerable, now doesn't it? And the ICBMs sitting in the bottom of their holes? How vulnerable are they? Now, today?
sferrin said:(And nevermind the fact that if ICBMs were on the way to our missile fields we'd launch.
We really can't launch *right* on warning, because ballistic missiles are kind of....irrecallable. Once you light the blue touch paper; that's it. There's no hollywood "abort code" that blows up the missile in flight with 5 seconds to go before the RVs hit the target.
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Pretty sure nobody suggested there was an "abort" code. :RyanCrierie said:sferrin said:(And nevermind the fact that if ICBMs were on the way to our missile fields we'd launch.
We really can't launch *right* on warning, because ballistic missiles are kind of....irrecallable. Once you light the blue touch paper; that's it. There's no hollywood "abort code" that blows up the missile in flight with 5 seconds to go before the RVs hit the target.
The point is, if you can actually SEE the strike coming in visually that's just a tad more proof than a glitch that says "oh, there's a missile coming in". A "glitch" isn't going to produce the visual data that an incoming strike would. I'd have thought that was obvious.
sferrin said:
Errr, how'd all the anti-nuke activist groups (back in the day) manage to get access to silos to pour paint on them then if they were so well guarded?
Even as recent as 2003; Catholic Nuns were causing $1,000 in damage to MM3 silo above ground fixtures and painting bloody crosses on the silo doors with their own blood (!).
With that stuff happening, it's not hard to believe that a Spetsnaz attack could destroy a good fraction of silo-based missiles.
The same report I found also raised the issue of Spetsnaz attackers hitting bomber bases with ATGMs to hit the fuelled bombers on alert and cause a conflagration, and also talked about the vulnerability of SSBN bases to an intense mortar attack.
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RyanCrierie said:
And you can destroy an alien spaceship half the mass of earth's moon with an old Apple computer too. :
Pardon my French but there's no ******* way there are going to be 450 teams of Russian special forces execute a simultaineous attack on our ICBMs. But I'll tell you what, it would be a HELL of a lot easier to lob 7 mortar rounds onto unprotected SSBNs tied up at the pier.
sferrin said:Pretty sure nobody suggested there was an "abort" code. :
Reason I mentioned that is that it's so damned prevalent in all "nuclear thriller" mass market fiction; giving a lot of people 'false confidence'. While I know the people 'read into' our nuclear plans know better; what about the minor level political functionaries who may become important?
Well, let's see, SBIRS would notice the launch plumes within about 30~ seconds of launch; and BMEWS and other systems would spot it as the missiles themselves (or the RVs) went 'over the pole' and became visibile.
That basically leaves you with 20 minutes to make a decision over whether to retaliate or not; and given the utter finality of retaliation -- you push the BIG RED BUTTON, that's it -- it's plausible to believe there'd be a significant delay in issuing the GO order by the political element.
Figure in a few minutes' delays inherent in executing the GO command -- the missile launch crews aren't going to snap to and launch immediately upon receipt of orders.
At this point, we're getting pretty close to Time of Impact; and even though Minuteman III is now pretty well hardened against TREE and direct radiation effects via radiation shielding on the missiles themselves; are we confident that they will be able to reliably launch and fly through a mushroom cloud from a nearby groundburst?
(EDIT: I really hate the forum software)
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I didn't mean launch as soon as you spot red flares at Russian ICBM launch sites. I mean launch before they hit. Depending on where they're coming from, and where they're going, spend 15-20 minutes to confirm in as many spectra as possible and then go. A depressed trajectory SLBM headed for Washington? Don't launch unless it hits. I'm referring specfically to enemy ICBMs headed for US missile fields, bomber bases, etc.
marauder2048
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RyanCrierie said:
My understanding is that Peacekeeper was substantially more resistant to post-groundburst/post-airburst environments, particularly x-rays than MMIII. Though perhaps once MMIII
was reduced to a single RV, they have the weight margins to go back and reinforce them. In any event, the age of MMIII and its uncertain survivability in a post-nuclear environment only increases the pressure to use-it-or-lose-it.
marauder2048
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sferrin said:
I'm curious to know how you see a layered ABM system influencing this timeline. With non-nuclear HTK types available, an early volley of interceptors could (with decent datalinks) let you probe the (suspected) target complexes with more sensors at closer distances.
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sferrin said:RyanCrierie said:
And you can destroy an alien spaceship half the mass of earth's moon with an old Apple computer too. :
And has been continually pointed out, all seven SSBNs would not all be tied up to the one quay simultaneously! Do you enjoy erecting strawman scenarios like this? 'cause that is the only way it's ever going to happen - inside your imagination. :
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Keep digging. I'd have thought you'd have reread the original conversation, realized how poor your reading comprehension was, and crawled back into your hole. Apparently I gave you too much credit. Keep shouting "straw man" though, since that's the only tool in your shed.Kadija_Man said:sferrin said:RyanCrierie said:
And you can destroy an alien spaceship half the mass of earth's moon with an old Apple computer too. :
And has been continually pointed out, all seven SSBNs would not all be tied up to the one quay simultaneously! Do you enjoy erecting strawman scenarios like this? 'cause that is the only way it's ever going to happen - inside your imagination. :
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Kadija_Man said:
*sigh* okay, write this down. There are 14 Ohio SSBNs in service. 7 are at sea at any given time and 7 ARE NOT. Comprende'? (Waits while he googles the most basic information there is about the subject he's been argueing incessantly about. :
) Hell with this. Tell ya what sweetie. How about we just ignore you from now on. Buh bye.
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