The whole story of how a TsAGI engineer got his own OKB to reverse engineer the F-86 Sabre was told in Samoleti Mira Jan/Feb 1997.
The article can be found online here:
http://www.dorogavnebo.ru/st/st.php?n=007&s=1 (3 pages)
Original article no longer available. I've attached a full translation.
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CHRONICLE OF BIRTH OF OKB-1
Pavel PLUNSKY
The history of Soviet aviation contains many interesting pages, one of which is an attempt to copy the American F-86 Sabre fighter, undertaken in the USSR in the period 1952-53. The veterans of the Sukhoi Design Bureau helped the author to restore the actual course of events on the basis of archival materials and personal memoirs: E.G. Adler, P.M. Drigo, A. Yu. Ongo, I.S. Ponomarev, as well as L.E. Krylov. I express my sincere gratitude to all of them.
To provide air defense for North Korea in November 1950, the 64th IAK was formed as part of the USSR Air Force, whose aircraft from the end of the same year were directly involved in repelling American air raids on DPRK facilities. From our side, MiG-15 and MiG-15bis participated in the battles. Their main adversary was the latest US Air Force F-86 Sabre fighter, modifications A, E and F.
The inevitable question arose about comparing the characteristics of these machines (it is interesting that the debate about the merits and demerits of the MiG-15 and F-86 has not subsided until now). The best way to find out the truth would be flight tests of a real plane. Attempts to capture the MiG-15 by the Americans were unsuccessful - our pilots were strictly ordered not to fly south of the conventional demarcation line that ran along the 38th parallel. The Americans solved this problem after the end of hostilities in Korea. On September 20, 1953, North Korean Air Force Lieutenant Kim Sum No flew on a MiG-15bis aircraft (serial number 2015337) to the territory of the Republic of Korea and surrendered. The vehicle was flown to the United States at Wright Peterson Air Force Base. During 1954, US Air Force pilot Tom Collins performed a comparative flight test program on this aircraft, which made it possible to reveal the actual level of performance of the main fighter of the USSR Air Force. American experts gave him a very high assessment.
The Soviet Union also showed interest in the possibility of studying new enemy technology "live". In April 1951, by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, a special group of GNIKI test pilots, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Dzyubenko, was even sent to Korea, who was assigned the task of "capturing" the F-86 and forcing them to land at their airfield. Then this plan was not implemented, but later, during an air battle on October 6, 1951, one of the destroyed Sabres made an emergency landing on the coast of North Korea. The pilot was picked up by the US Air Force's search and rescue service, and the plane, after a long epic of transportation at the end of 1951, was taken to Moscow for study.
Initially, the F-86 was at the State Research Institute of the Air Force, but soon it was transferred to TsAGI for a more detailed study and drawing up a detailed report. A preliminary inspection showed that the aircraft was not suitable for flight tests - the damage it received during landing and transportation was too great (the nose of the fuselage was badly crumpled on the aircraft, and the skin and power set were damaged in its lower part; in addition, there were numerous holes ). We decided to limit ourselves to the study of the aerodynamic characteristics of the exact (according to the available sample) Sabre model in the TsAGI wind tunnels, check the strength of the aircraft on static tests, carefully study its design features, and reproduce only some of the most interesting units and systems in natural form. There were no disagreements with the Air Force on this issue, and a joint letter with the text of the draft of the corresponding Resolution, signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, Air Force Commander Colonel-General of Aviation P.F. Zhigarev and the Minister of the Aviation Industry M.V. Khrunichev in mid-January 1952 was sent to the USSR Council of Ministers.
The government decree No. 478-152, issued on January 26 of the same year, confirmed the proposed plan and set a deadline for the completion of the work - the month of April. TsAGI was involved in the work - to study the aerodynamic layout, CIAM - the engine, VIAM - the materials used, NIAT - on the technology of aircraft and engine manufacturing, OKB-155 (A.I. Mikoyan) - to study the control system. A little earlier, at the end of December 1951, a separate government decree TsKB-589 of the Ministry of Armaments and NII-17 MAP instructed to copy the automatic sight A-C1 and the associated AN / APG-30 radio rangefinder installed on the Sabre. The corresponding domestic devices were coded "Snow" and "Grad".
By the beginning of May 1952, the study of the captured F-86 was completed. The summary report in the middle of the month was approved by the leadership of the MAP and the Air Force and on May 23 was sent to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Of particular interest is the assessment given by TsAGI specialists:
“The F-86A aircraft has basically satisfactory aerodynamic characteristics in all flight modes up to M = 0.93-0.94. Tests of its models ... show that starting from M = 0.8, the F-86A aircraft gets a sharp dive, and when M> 0.9 - a sharp decrease in the efficiency of the elevator. ... Satisfactory flight performance of an aircraft at high flight speeds (M> 0.8) is achieved using a stabilizer controlled in flight, and at high angles of attack - using slats distributed over the entire wing span.
The aircraft has large ailerons providing good lateral control both at low and high flight speeds ...
The aircraft is equipped with large brake flaps, which increase the aircraft drag by about three times without changing the longitudinal stability characteristics.
Boosters are used in the aileron and elevator control system, which provides acceptable handling characteristics without the use of specially developed aerodynamic compensation.
A feature of the F-86A aircraft layout is the use of the old scheme with a low wing position, which made it possible to achieve satisfactory lateral stability characteristics with a small relative vertical tail area. In addition, this scheme made it possible to separate the horizontal tail from the vertical and place it on the fuselage. However, with such an aerodynamic layout on the F-86A aircraft, it was not possible to eliminate the sharp pulling into a dive, and this required the use of a stabilizer controlled in flight.
... With the numbers M = 0.93-0.94, there is a loss of efficiency of the elevators and ailerons ... Therefore, the number M = 0.94 is the maximum permissible ... for normal operation ...
Comparison of the aerodynamic characteristics of the F-86A and MiG-15 bis models shows that their drag and lift coefficients in the range of angles of attack up to a = 14 ° practically coincide. The F-86A aircraft has a larger size, greater flight weight and an engine with less thrust compared to the MiG-15bis. As a result, according to the calculation data, it follows that the F-86A aircraft is somewhat inferior to the MiG-15bis in maximum speed at low altitudes and is significantly inferior in terms of vertical speeds and rate of climb at all altitudes. The steady-state dive speeds of the F-86A and MiG-15bis aircraft with open brake flaps are practically the same, however, in horizontal flight, the F-86A aircraft decelerates more intensively than the MiG-15bis aircraft.
The design destructive overload ... is approximately equal to 12 ..., which coincides with the design overloads established for this class of aircraft by our strength standards. ... "
The conclusion read: “As a result of the conducted ... research ... it was established that the layout and aerodynamic layout of the aircraft are not of particular interest, with the exception of the application:
a) ailerons with large relative chord and span;
b) brake flaps with a large relative area;
c) effective landing mechanization in the form of a slotted flap;
d) slat;
e) booster control of ailerons and elevator ”.
Similar conclusions were made by other specialists who took part in the study of aircraft systems. For example, it was noted the use of duplicated cable wiring in the control system of the RV, the stabilizer regulated in flight and the use of high pressure in the aircraft hydraulic system (up to 211 kg / cm2, while on the MiG-15bis - no more than 150 kg / cm2). Material scientists drew attention to the high content of cobalt in heat-resistant alloys (noting at the same time that the domestic industry has developed new heat-resistant alloys that do not contain cobalt in short supply in our country, which are superior to American alloys with cobalt), as well as the use of a special sealing material based on thiol, vulcanized without heating. CIAM specialists, who studied the J47-GE-13 engine, noted the use of a protective grill at the engine inlet, steel blades of high relative elongation in the compressor rotor, the simplicity and reliability of the combustion chamber and the compressor disc mounting system. The use of JP-3 fuel, which is a wide-fraction mixture, which has a high yield from oil in comparison with kerosene, made it possible to increase the starting height of the engine and improve its operation at low temperatures.
Several caveats should be made here. Judging by the data given in the text, it is not clear which modification - A or E - was the plane that came to us. Judging by the serial number, from which the first five digits 49-131X are known, it follows that it was F-86A-5, tk. "Sabres" of modification E in all reference books belonged to the order of 1950 and their numbers began with the number "50". But if you trust American sources, then some of the mentioned design features of the aircraft (such as, for example, the controlled stabilizer or the J47-GE-13 engine) were introduced only starting with modification E, while the F-86A appears everywhere in the text of the report. As for the "controlled stabilizer" - here, obviously, just terminological confusion: our designers meant the so-called "adjustable" stabilizer, which was not directly included in the longitudinal control channel and was used only for balancing and trimming. Such a stabilizer was installed on aircraft of the F-86A type together with elevators, in contrast to the F-86E, on which a stabilizer controlled from the handle was installed, which was deflected together with the elevators. And the engine, apparently, did not have to be selected in the field, and what was at hand at the moment was put on the plane. In terms of seats, full interchangeability of engines of all modifications was ensured. And most importantly: it is not entirely correct to make an unambiguous conclusion about the advantages or disadvantages of a particular machine only on the basis of calculations. It is very easy to make a mistake here - the calculation results and the actual flight data of the aircraft may differ. This is confirmed by the testimonies of Soviet and American pilots who took part in the battles, about the Sabre's better maneuverability in the horizontal plane due to the installation of slats, which ensured exit in a bend at large angles of attack and the absence of such strict restrictions as on the MiG-15. speed due to the installation of an adjustable stabilizer and boosters in the longitudinal channel). This allowed the Americans to effectively evade the attacks of our pilots, using a sharp entry in the "dive" from the coup. It was difficult to repeat this maneuver on the MiG-15bis due to the rapid increase in speed. the plane became poorly controllable already at M> 0.92. The Americans, however, managed to pull this border to large values of the number M.
The recommendations of the report, in fact, provided for the development by the domestic industry and the use of individual units, components and materials in the designs of new aircraft. They did not even have a hint of the possibility of copying and building the F-86A in the USSR. Such a statement of the question should be recognized as justified. It was inappropriate to copy the Sabre in 1952 with the aim of launching it into a series if there were domestic MiG-15bis / 17 machines in production (despite all their shortcomings). In this opinion, the leaders of the MAP and the Air Force were united. In addition, some innovations with the F-86A (radio range finder coupled with an optical sight, increased area brake flaps, a booster in the RV control system and others), on the recommendation of the military, taking into account the experience of the Korean war, have already either been worked out as prototypes. or were introduced into the series on the MiG-15bis and MiG-17 aircraft. It was assumed that this direction will be reflected in the government's decision.
It should be noted, however, that not all senior army leaders were of the opinion about the advantages of the MiG-15. So, the commander of the fighter aviation (IA) of the air defense, Lieutenant-General of Aviation E.Ya. Savitsky, who traveled to part of the 64th IAK, following the results of these trips, repeatedly expressed his concern to the country's top officials about the state and prospects for the development of aviation of the Air Defense Forces. At least twice - in February 1952 and in April 1953 - he applied to the Council of Ministers with letters in which, based on an analysis of the experience of the IA units that were part of the 64th IAK, he raised the question that the MiG type aircraft -15 cannot effectively fight the F-80 and F-84 fighters at low altitudes and are inferior to the F-86A and F-86E in maneuverability at low and medium altitudes. He proposed to create in the USSR a special fighter for medium and low altitudes, more effective than the existing MiG-15. Perhaps his opinion later played a role.
In the meantime, things took an unexpected turn. In May 1952, with a letter addressed to I.V. Stalin, a certain V.V. Kondratyev, an employee of TsAGI, who proposed "to build the F-86A" Seibr "aircraft in serial production, while maintaining its complete resemblance to the original", and in the future - "to critically master the methods of the American school by working on improving this aircraft with the aim of modifying it." He motivated this proposal with considerations of the best maneuverability of the Sabre in comparison with the MiG-15bis, and at the end of the letter he made a "modest" proposal - to use himself as the chief designer.
Here we need to make some digression for clarification. At the beginning of 1952, Kondratyev worked at TsAGI as the head of the brigade in the 3rd department (strength) and was the direct executor of the work on testing the F-86A design. It is no longer possible to find out how he got the idea of copying "Sabre". In those days, a person who declared himself in this way knew (could not help but know!) What his initiative would turn out to be in case of failure. But the fact remains - Kondratyev himself came up with such a proposal to the leadership and, as we will see it below, despite the desperate resistance of the department, he managed to get official support. There were rumors that the idea of copying "Sabre" in the highest echelons of power was carried out by N.А. Bulganin, and that Kondratyev was his distant relative. But this is only a version. I will only note that at that time Bulganin held the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and oversaw the work of the defense industries. Most of the documents on the construction of the Sabre, found in the MAP archives, relate specifically to the correspondence between the ministry leadership and Bulganin's secretariat.
Within the framework of the existing administrative-command system, Kondratyev's proposal could have the most unpredictable consequences and the MAP leadership was forced to take retaliatory measures. Bulganin received a letter from the minister, in which Khrunichev quite objectively expressed doubts about the need to copy the F-86 and launch it into series. But it was already too late: by this time, I.V. Stalin. It was possible to learn about how further events developed from the story of E.G. Adler (from the words of V.V.Kondratyev himself).
In June 1952 G.M. Malenkov, who oversaw the work of the MAP in the Central Committee, summoned a group of chief designers - A.N. Tupolev, A.I. Mikoyan, A.S. Yakovlev and "hero of the occasion" V.V. Kondratyev, accompanied by Deputy Minister S.N. Shishkin. The leader was ill and only Malenkov himself went to him. The rest of the guests were waiting in the waiting room. After a while Malenkov came out and turned to Shishkin: “Iosif Vissarionovich said that you underestimated the Sabre. It is not hard to imagine what the deputy minister might have experienced after such a statement. But no conclusions were drawn, and after a pause Malenkov, addressing the designers, said: “It has been decided to copy the plane. How many of you will take on this job? " Tupolev, obviously mindful of the recent epic with the B-29, refused immediately, Mikoyan also did not show much enthusiasm, and only Yakovlev immediately and unconditionally agreed with the proposal. The atmosphere in the reception was somewhat discharged. Malenkov went back to Stalin, and all those present were already congratulating their colleague on a new "successful" assignment. But Malenkov, who again left the office, reported Stalin's final resolution: "To copy the Sabre, organize a special OKB-1, the chief designer of which is to appoint Kondratyev."
Orders, as you know, are not discussed, but are accepted for execution. This time it was impossible to make a mistake: the instructions of Comrade. Stalin had to be executed to the point, but there was a possibility of interpreting the instructions themselves. Apparently, the MAP leadership did not change its attitude to the idea of copying the Sabre, as evidenced by the subsequent course of events. In the draft resolution prepared by the ministry, obviously not without intent, it was decided to place OKB-1 in Kuibyshev at plant No. 1. On the one hand, Stalin's order on the formation of a design bureau was carried out, since the organization of experimental design bureaus at serial factories at that time became a widespread practice, and on the other hand, a "time bomb" was brought under the work - the design bureau was deprived of its own production base, and its placement in isolation from the main branch organizations of the MAP greatly hampered communications, staffing with qualified personnel and reduced the efficiency of work.
Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2804-1057, entitled "On the F-86A Sabre aircraft", was issued on June 18, 1952. Its essence boiled down to the fact that an experimental design bureau was organized at the plant No. 1 in Kuibyshev for (directly according to Kondratyev ) copying, construction and further development of the F-86A aircraft, and V.V. was appointed the chief designer of this OKB-1. Kondratiev. The copied plane was asked to build in three copies: two for flight tests and one for static ones and equip it with a domestic VK-1 engine. The deadline was set very tight: exactly one year later, that is, in June 1953, the aircraft was to be transferred for flight tests.
As expected, the government decree was reinforced by departmental order No. 706 dated June 20 of the same year, which, in particular, provided for the temporary placement of OKB-1 in Moscow on the territory of the TsAGI branch in order to speed up work on the production of drawings. In this case, the branch was understood as BNI (Bureau of New Information), located on the "old" territory of TsAGI on Radio Street.
The recruitment of specialists took place according to a long-established scheme - people were sent according to the order issued "from above" from adjacent factories and design bureaus. The backbone of the new team was made up of BNI employees and former employees of Kondratyev at TsAGI, and E.G. Adler, who passed to Kondratyev from A.S. Yakovleva. By the beginning of September, OKB-1 in Moscow had reached its regular strength. The situation with the formation of the design bureau at the plant in Kuibyshev was worse - there were no necessary specialists on the spot, and no one wanted to move there from the capital. As a result, to replenish the OKB staff, plant No. 1 itself sent its draftsmen to Moscow, and the work on introducing the aircraft into production was transferred from the nonexistent OKB-1 branch to the plant.
In the process of work, from the very beginning, the question arose of replacing the engine, since the domestic VK-1 with a centrifugal compressor specified in the decree had large transverse dimensions and, when installed in the fuselage of the Sabre, designed for an engine with an axial compressor, "knocked out" almost the entire stock fuel. In addition, most of the organizations that participated in the study of "Sabre" subsequently "forgot" to return the investigated samples of devices and assemblies to it, as a result of which the designers of OKB-1 were left with essentially an "empty tin can".
On May 13, 1952, in an area controlled by the North Koreans, another Sabre made an emergency landing "on its belly", knocked out by anti-aircraft artillery fire. The pilot (he was the commander of the 51st Fighter Wing of the US Air Force, one of the aces of the Second World War - Walker Makhurin) was not lucky - he was captured. And the plane (this time F-86E) was delivered to the Air Force Research Institute by July 1952. Kondratyev, who learned about this on July 7, in a letter addressed to the minister, proposes to transfer the aircraft to OKB-1 in order to use its engine, units and instruments, and also undertakes to overfulfill the previously established plan, reduce the construction period to 8 months and build four aircraft instead of three. Of these, one, as expected, for statistical tests, and the other three are flight tests: one with a J47 engine, and two others with A.I. Mikulin AM-5 with afterburner. Replacing the engines was motivated in the letter "... from the point of view of providing the aircraft with the necessary flight properties, which had not been clarified earlier, before the preliminary study of this issue ...".
The leadership of the MAP "supported" Kondratyev, reaching Bulganin with a proposal to partially change the assignment: it was proposed to build only 2 flying machines: the first with the J47 installed on it, and the second, still with the VK-1. The proposal to install the AM-5 engine on airplanes was considered inexpedient. In agreement with Bulganin, a compromise decision was made to continue work on the F-86A "with the use of the most modern components and assemblies from the F-86E aircraft on this aircraft," which Kondratyev especially insisted on. But CIAM, which initially gave some residual resource to the J47-GE-13 engine, soon refused to guarantee anything. The situation has reached an impasse.
By mid-November, a mockup of the aircraft was made and the commission appointed by the order of the minister considered it at its meeting (unlike the usual procedure, when the mock commission was the prerogative of the customer in the person of the Air Force, this aircraft was originally created for research purposes and the composition of the commission was determined by the ministry) ... Obviously, it was here that the designers' concerns about the engine were finally expressed, and soon, on November 25, the Minister's order No. 1344 was issued, which proposed to consider the possibility of installing Mikulinsky AM-5 on the aircraft, along with the original J47. Specific instructions were also given to ensure the fulfillment of the assignment to all subcontractors. At the same time, it was proposed to install the J47 engine on the aircraft being restored, and on the copied (that is, newly built) machines - the domestic AM-5 engines "with afterburning." The equipment on all aircraft was supposed to be domestic (like the MiG-15), with the exception of weapons (the American Colt Browning machine guns available in the USSR were installed).
The situation seemed to be defused. The OKB got the opportunity to calmly finalize the technical documentation, and at the plant in Kuibyshev, the manufacture of airframe parts began. But new circumstances intervened: in December 1952, by a government decree, plant No. 1 was reoriented to serial production of the Il-28 instead of the MiG-15, and its director V.Ya. Litvinov went to the management with a request to remove from the factory the assignment for the construction of the F-86A. As a result, it was decided that part of the order (production of wings, center section and empennage) would be transferred to plant number 292 in Saratov, and the plant in Kuibyshev would only have to manufacture a fuselage with a pressurized cabin and general assembly.
Be in the place of V.V. Kondratyev, a person who is more prepared for such work, and most importantly, a more acceptable person for the leadership of the MAP, perhaps the “Soviet Sabre” would have been born. But the deadlines were getting closer, and things with the construction of a "live" machine in Kuibyshev were still not very good. Under the circumstances, the chief designer needed to somehow demonstrate his activity. I saw only one path - to receive an assignment for the construction of a new aircraft. By January 1953, in the design department of the OKB, headed by E. G. Adler, a proposal was prepared to create a now fundamentally new "high-speed fighter". The aircraft was a mid-wing of a normal scheme with a delta wing and a two-fin vertical tail, placed in the form of washers on the ends of the stabilizer. Two turbojet engines designed by A.I. Mikulin had a common nasal air intake and were located vertically in the tail of the fuselage, one above the other. The design data of this aircraft were (through a fraction, the values of the quantities are given according to the TsAGI examination):
Maximum speed - 1940/1650 km / h,
Practical ceiling - 18700/18000 m,
Maximum range - 2100/1500 km
The new project did not cause much opposition, TsAGI specialist V.V. Struminsky even wrote quite a favorable review. The MAP leadership, forced to respond to this proposal, in a letter addressed to Bulganin, gave an evasive answer, the essence of which boiled down to the fact that Kondratyev was not the first to propose the creation of such a promising machine: “... the declared flight technical data of the new proposed by Comrade Kondratyev fighter is not confirmed by the calculations of TsAGI and turned out to be lower in comparison with the data of the front-line fighters proposed by the chief designers of com. Mikoyan and Yakovlev ... ", and" as for the new aircraft layout (with a delta wing), as you were informed earlier, a similar proposal to create a new delta wing aircraft was made by the chief designer t. Antonov with higher flight data ... ".
In conversations with Kondratyev himself, officials referred to the fact that for the construction of such an aircraft, a strong production base was needed, which OKB-1 did not have. According to the existing order, strong production was created only for the fulfillment of a specific government assignment. It turned out to be a vicious circle. The time bomb finally went off. It only remained to wait for the erroneous steps from the inexperienced chief designer.
The calculation turned out to be correct. Kondratyev could not sit still, and new projects were soon baked like pancakes - with a frequency of one month: on February 16, he came up with a proposal to create a "supersonic fighter aircraft with a maximum speed of 2000-2200 km / h and a flight altitude of 21 km with two new engines with a thrust of 5000 kg each design of Comrade Mikulin "(AM-11F), and on March 17 - already with a new project" high-altitude fighter-interceptor with a maximum speed of 3000-4000 km / h and a flight altitude of 30 km, using ... engine operating on a new principle ”(engine“ MD ”designed by BG Shpitalny). And if regarding the first of them, the MAP's answer was still evasive, then by the time the second was released, the political situation in the country had seriously changed. After Stalin's death, as a result of personnel changes N.A. Bulganin moved to the chair of the Minister of Defense and lost the opportunity to directly influence the course of events, the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers was taken by G.M. Malenkov, and the Ministry of Aviation Industry for some time (from April to August 1953) ceased to exist altogether, since it was merged with the Ministry of Arms into one common Ministry of Defense Industry (MOP), whose minister D.F. Ustinov (formerly the Minister of Armaments). M.V. was appointed his deputy. Khrunichev.
These events could not but affect the fate of OKB-1 and its chief designer. In April 1953, Ustinov appointed a representative commission to consider a joint proposal by chief designers Kondratyev (OKB-1) and Shpitalny (OKB-15) to create a "High-altitude fighter-interceptor with a molecular engine MD-53". The conclusions of the commission were discouraging: “The declared ... characteristics of the engine and the aircraft are technically unfounded and unrealistic. ... The proposal can only be viewed as a technical adventure, and not as a serious engineering proposal. ... The proposal ... is essentially an attempt to mislead the Government. " Now it is already difficult to say what caused the sharp tone of the conclusions. Perhaps, in the face of the changed situation, the leaders of the industry decided to get even with Kondratyev for past grievances. The case turned out to be a good one - the project of the MD-53 engine, developed by the "non-professional" Shpitalny, was utopian, which was the main focus of the experts of the commission, including A.I. Mikulin, S.K. Tumansky and A.M. Cradle. They did not make such unambiguous conclusions about the aircraft. Moreover, it was said that to work out the issues of flight at such high speeds requires extensive and deep research work, that is, it was recognized that fundamental research lags behind the demands of practical science. However, this fact did not prevent the launch of the bureaucratic machine. All that remained was to wait for the results.
By the beginning of May 1953, the question of the very existence of OKB-1 was already discussed. Now almost no one even remembered why it was once created. Career V.V. Kondratyev as chief designer ended with the release of the minister's order No. 233 dated May 14, 1953. The document literally reads the following:
“Due to the fact that the chief designer of OKB-1, t. Kondratyev, is not able to ensure the creation of new prototypes of aircraft, does not have sufficient experience in this area and, according to the conclusion of the expert commission, has taken the path of technical adventurism, I order:
1. Comrade Kondratyev shall be relieved of his duties as the chief designer of OKB-1; *
2. to appoint the chief designer of OKB-1 T. Sukhoi P.O.
Thus ended the short history of copying the Sabre fighter jet in the Soviet Union. The new chief designer P.O. Sukhoi, apparently, by agreement with the leadership of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, was no longer involved in work in this area. He began the development of fundamentally new machines, later embodied in metal under the names S-1 and T-3. The corresponding government decree, which legalized the work of OKB-1 on this topic, was issued in August 1953, and at the end of the year the design bureau finally receives its production base - a branch of OKB-155 on the territory of the former plant No. 51 in one of the corners of the Khodynskoye Pole ... Hence the new name: OKB-51. It should be noted that the initial variants of the layout of the T-1 and T-3 aircraft were largely based on the proposals developed by E.G. Adler at OKB-1 under Kondratyev, and some technological innovations from the "Sabre" are very successfully introduced into their design.
V. V. Kondratyev
The appearance of the F-86 in the USSR in the early 50s was still not in vain for Soviet aviation, it made it possible to directly get acquainted with the equipment of the opposing side. Of the direct borrowings, one can note, for example, the ASP-4N (Snow) optical sight and the SRD-3 (Grad) radio rangefinder, which are copies of the A-1C sight and the AN / APG-30 radio rangefinder installed on the Seibra. In 1953, they were tested on a specially equipped MiG-17 / SG, and later the ASP-4N was even installed on MiG-17 aircraft. In addition to studying and copying some new devices and assemblies, new technological processes were introduced into production, such as, for example, machining on special milling machines to obtain wing sheathing sheets of variable cross-sectional thickness, widespread use of roller and spot welding of steel and light alloys, more widespread use of hot-stamped and cast units, explosive rivets, ramrod sealing of triplex lanterns and the like.
Another consequence of the study of the "Sabre" was the work carried out in the USSR to create and use new grades of fuel and hydraulic fluid. So, in particular, by Government Decree No. 1691-621 of April 7, 1952, the VNIINP of the Ministry of Oil Industry began work on the creation of kerosene with an expanded fractional composition - types T-2 and T-4. In cooperation with the Ministry of Aviation Industry and the Ministry of Defense, these works continued until the end of the 50s, and the requirement for the possibility of working on these types of kerosene was a sine qua non for all newly developed types of aircraft and engines. The end result of work on hydraulic fluid was the emergence of AMG-10 - the main type of slurry in the aviation of the USSR. But that's a completely different story.
In conclusion, it only remains to note that the work on the Sabre was formally closed by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2460-1017 of September 19, 1953, the expenses were written off, and the backlog at the factories in Kuibyshev and Saratov was destroyed.
After May 1953, V.V. Kondratyev repeatedly tried to challenge the label of a "technical adventurer" stuck on him, appealed to the MAP, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers with requests to review their case. In September 1953, the minister changed the wording of the order on dismissal to a neutral one: "in connection with a change in the assignment." Kondratyev was offered the position of deputy chief designer at plant number 918, where he worked for several years. And here, and later - in OKB-256 / Tsybin / he repeatedly went to the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers with proposals for the creation of new promising aircraft - a strategic bomber, a supersonic strategic reconnaissance aircraft and similar machines, but never received support in high spheres of leadership. because in April 1958 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union received an answer to a request to the MAP about the essence of these proposals: “... he (Kondratyev - author's note), due to his knowledge, practical work experience and organizational skills, will not be able to provide leadership to any independent an experimental design bureau or a scientific subdivision because Comrade Kondratyev was completely unprepared for leading work in the field of experimental aircraft construction. .. ".
