Decided to start a new topic capturing current nuclear weapons news of interest. Other SP members please feel free to to add stories, links, reports, etc. that you find in your Interwebz searches
Further U.S. Nuclear Tests Highly Unlikely: Former NNSA Chief
Tuesday, Nov. 29, 2011 By Diane Barnes
Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON -- The United States is “almost certain” never to conduct another test detonation of a nuclear device, a former top U.S. nuclear weapons official said on Monday (see
GSN, Oct. 21). In the nearly 20 years since the nation’s last nuclear trial, technological alternatives to such detonations have advanced substantially while political obstacles to testing have grown close to insurmountable, said Linton Brooks, who headed the National Nuclear Security Administration from 2002 to 2007 under President George W. Bush.
The negotiation in the early 1990s of a global ban on atomic trial blasts marked “the beginning of the end of the U.S. nuclear testing era,” Arms Control Association head Daryl Kimball added in a panel discussion. The independent expert called for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the Senate previously rejected in 1999. Upon taking legal effect, the pact would prohibit explosive nuclear testing by any member state. “The United States current bears all the responsibilities of a CTBT signatory state, but because we haven’t ratified, we do not enjoy the considerable benefits of a legally binding global ban,” including the ability to demand on-site inspections of suspected violators, Kimball said.
The 182-signatory pact cannot become binding until it is ratified by 44 "Annex 2" states that participated in drafting the 1996 treaty while operating nuclear power or research facilities. Nine of those nations have yet to acquire legislative approval for the agreement: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States. The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program has achieved significant strides in obviating the need for test explosions to ensure the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and reliable, Brooks said. The effort, which includes surveillance of aging weapons and production of replacement components, is overseen by the semiautonomous Energy Department agency he once led. During his tenure, Congress repeatedly refused to provide funding for basic preparations that would be required to resume testing. “We aren’t going to test,” Brooks said. “Therefore, the question is not, ‘Should you support stockpile stewardship because you like the CTBT?’ The question is, ‘Should you support stockpile stewardship because you think it’s important that nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, reliable and effective?’”
Nuclear test blasts carried out during the Cold War were not intended to confirm that fielded U.S. systems operated as intended, said the former official, now a consultant to four Energy Department laboratories and a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “This was not like you pull every 18th device off an assembly line and test it to make sure it works,” he said. “It gathered data, it was a tool of scientific exploration. And the question, therefore, for the Stockpile Stewardship [Program] is, ‘Can we replace that tool [testing] with another?’” Advocates consider the treaty a means of discouraging explosive tests necessary for the development of new or more sophisticated nuclear weapons, but detractors contend that a U.S. pledge never to conduct such work could undermine confidence in the country’s nuclear deterrent (see
GSN, July 15).
The Obama administration has pledged to bring the treaty before the Senate for ratification, though the schedule for that initiative remains unclear. Kimball warned that insufficient time remains for the Senate to scrutinize, debate and vote on the test ban treaty prior to the November 2012 elections. To help lay the groundwork for legislative consideration of the pact in 2013, the Obama administration should “step up its CTBT outreach work and … pursue a fact-based, quiet discussion with Senate offices and staff about the issues that are at the center of the [treaty] discussion,” he said. Brooks said he had observed no serious discussion of a potential resumption in regular U.S. nuclear testing. “What’s on at the very most, even from enthusiasts for testing outside the government, is two or three tests. And nobody is prepared to divert the funds from stockpile stewardship into two or three tests,” he said.
“There is no plausible situation in which current stockpile stewardship and the deep scientific understanding … will not be enough to ensure the safety, security and reliability of our nuclear weapons for the indefinite future,” Brooks later added. The program “has been successful to date,” though its future effectiveness would depend on updates to nuclear weapons facilities and a continued infusion of skilled personnel, said Marvin Adams, a veteran nuclear weapons scientist who has served at the Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories. To date, the U.S. arsenal’s safety, security and reliability -- and the absence of need for new tests -- has been verified each year by the Defense and Energy secretaries, the directors of the three nuclear-weapon laboratories and the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, Adams said. Brooks noted that the NNSA administrator cannot influence the findings of the annual stockpile assessment.
Brooks said he was unaware of any proposal for a new nuclear weapon that would require testing, including a potential
deep earth penetrator. “It’s not just against our current policy, it’s solving a problem that we don’t appear to have,” he said. The former NNSA chief said he had not heard from technical experts “opposed to the CTBT” any potential “safety or security problem that’s so great that the only way you can fix it was to involve nuclear testing.” In addition, it is “extremely difficult” to conceive of a problem that would require testing to diagnose a problem or certify a solution, he said. Putting the treaty into effect might deter Iran from potentially conducting a nuclear-weapon test, panel experts suggested. The Middle Eastern nation maintains its uranium enrichment operations operations are strictly civilian in nature (see related
GSN story, today).
Brooks noted, though, that every past test of a uranium-based weapon has proven successful, and South Africa maintained a small nuclear arsenal for a period with no testing. “CTBT does not prevent people from developing nuclear weapons,” he said. If Iran opted against nuclear testing under a potential CTBT regime, it would have less confidence in any nuclear-capable missile it produced, Adams said. The nation might still move to produce such delivery systems, he added.
U.K. Commits $3.1B to New Nuke Facilities Tuesday, Nov. 29, 2011 The United Kingdom has committed $3.1 billion for work on new nuclear arms facilities before the government has made a final determination on whether to replace its submarine-based nuclear deterrent, the London
Guardian reported on Monday (see
GSN, Oct. 24). The Conservative Party, which leads the current British coalition government, has thrown its support behind a Labor-era initiative to build four new ballistic missile submarines to replace Vanguard-class vessels slated for retirement in the 2020s. Cost estimates for the plan have risen in the last year to as much as $40 billion, according to a previous report. The government has said it would delay a final decision to construct the submarines until after the 2015 election. A decision is also pending on replacing the nuclear-tipped missiles carried by the submarines. The funds would play a role in preventing problems involving the nation's current nuclear warheads, and would uphold the capacity to develop an additional weapon "should that be required," the British Defense Ministry said. The money includes $1.15 billion for a weapon construction and dismantlement site dubbed "Mensa"; a $989 million bomb-grade uranium site dubbed "Pegasus"; and a $361 million explosives facility dubbed "Circinus."
"This investment maintains the safety of the current Trident warhead stockpile by sustaining essential facilities and skills," according to a Defense Ministry spokeswoman. "It also helps maintain the capability to design a replacement warhead should that be required following decisions in the next parliament." "The fact that the [Defense Ministry] signed off on these costs before a decision has even been made on replacing the Trident warhead makes a complete mockery of the democratic process," countered Green Party lawmaker Caroline Lucas. The new facilities could remain operational for more than four decades, said Peter Burt of the Nuclear Information Service. "By spending billions of pounds now, the MoD is trying to force the hands of future governments into developing a new nuclear warhead, regardless of whether it will be necessary or affordable," he said (Rob Edwards,
London Guardian, Nov. 28).
---------------------------------------------
It would be very interesting if US politicians tied our weapons laboratories and scientists hands to the point that we "subcontract" our weapons work to the British. Some say it all started with Rutherford anyway so there is a fine tradition of British Boffinry. I say why not.
