sublight said:I've seen that before, it was at White Sands....
sublight said:One of the many missile projects my dad worked on.
pathology_doc said:Fascinating! I'd imagine that a fully operational land-based system, being entirely free of volume constraints, could accommodate a much greater number of missiles in fully assembled format (possibly even all of them) and more guidance-illuminator sets for a much higher rate of engagement.
Have to admit, though, I'm not sure I like the thought of a nuke-on-nuke engagement using an air-breathing missile as the interceptor vehicle. Was Talos's altitude capability really good enough to lift a powerful enough nuclear warhead high enough to avoid collateral damage? Over the sea it doesn't really matter so much; over sensitive targets, some of which may be civilian, though, it's another story. Possibly the relief from shipboard constraint would have allowed a much bigger rocket booster to be fitted to the ABM version for a better head start, but ultimately it's still an air breather...
In January 1956 West German key officials had been briefed on plans for bolstering American air defenses with NIKE units. In accordance with the Forces convention, the over-all construction program was submitted to the Federal Republic during the following month, and by 17 May 1956 real estate requirements of the NIKE program had been submitted.
By simultaneously confronting the German Federal and Land (State) governments with U.S. real estate requirements, it was hoped that Bonn would apply sufficient pressure to expedite action on the local level. The American Ambassador, however, withheld presentation of requirements to the Bonn Government at this time, pointing out that the Land governments should first be given sufficient time to act on the matter before he approached a high-level government agency. In the event of prolonged delay in acquiring the properties, the Ambassador promised to take action.
Almost immediately the program ran into determined local opposition, especially in the Rhine Palatinate. Resistance to the acquisition of NIKE sites stemmed largely from apprehension over losing agricultural land, from the belief that the presence of the NIKE installation would increase the danger of air attack, and from widespread opposition to rearmament. The problem was further complicated by U.S. Air Force insistence that TALOS missiles be used at four of the sites. When the U.S. Embassy requested the Federal Republic to assist in overcoming state opposition, Bonn drew attention to the constitutional restrictions that greatly limited the Federal Government's coercive power.
By April 1957 only 6 of the 24 NIKE sites had been definitely acquired. Of the 24 sites, 16 were to be located in the Palatinate, 2 in Hesse, 5 in Baden-Wuerttemberg, and 1 (tentative) in the Saarland. Baden-Wuerttemberg first approved all 5 sites, but local political pressures limited final approval to only 2. Hesse steadfastly refused to approve any sites, while by May 1957 the Palatinate had actually given final approval to the acquisition of only 5 and partial approval to 3 of the 16 sites. The German representatives declared that, since opposition to the NIKE program was increasing, they would be unable to make any further commitments in the foreseeable future .
In November 1956 the Department of Defense decided to withhold funds for NIKE construction pending evidence of coordinated Army-Air Force planning for the use of surface-to-air missiles. To prevent further delay in NIKE construction, US EUCOM suggested concurrent planning for both the NIKE and TALOS missiles. Since TALOS units were not programmed for Europe until FY 1960, and any delay in NIKE construction would leave U.S. forces in Europe exposed to unopposed nuclear air attacks, USAREUR wanted the construction funds to be released without further delay. The TALOS units, when made available, could be integrated into an air defense system in priority areas determined by a joint USAREUR-USAFE air defense planning committee.
The system would be at best semi-mobile, or more likely "transportable". And it would basically be an analogue of already-existing Nike-Hercules (which was already in service and running when Talos was still under testing).It's a pity a mobile Land Talos wasn't developed and deployed to Western Europe.
Entirely fixed base, AFAIK.The system would be at best semi-mobile, or more likely "transportable"
Well, I'm not sure; the components were designed for being ship-based, so they are at least theoretically transportable. As much as "Nike", I suppose; "Nike" were considered "mobile", because they could be moved from one prepared position to another in just a few weeks.Entirely fixed base, AFAIK.
Well, the fire control capabilities, I suppose. "Nike-Hercules" was strictly "one-one" weapon, i.e. just one target could be tracked and engaged with just one missile simultaneously (if the missile failed fo do the job, the second could be launched, but not two at once). Those limited capabilities could not be remedied without basically building a second "Nike" battery.I assume the USAF must have seen some advantage to Talos over Nike-Hercules, but I can't think what it was. Beyond being operated by men in blue suits, that is.